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ABSTRACT
PETITIONS, PROTESTS AND POLICY 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN COLONIES ON QUEBEC, 1760-1776
by
Mary Ann Fenton 
University of New Hampshire, December 1993
The beginning years of British rule in Quebec are examined from a new 
perspective: the influence of the American colonies on Quebec. Three major issues were 
selected as the basis of the study: the impact of the American immigrant merchants on 
the internal life of the province; the role of the American colonies on British policy as 
it affected Quebec; and the failed American invasion of Quebec in 1775-76. Several 
long-held beliefs with respect to the mercantile community, the American component of 
that community, and the support of the merchants for the American revolutionaries 
during the invasion are challenged. The conclusion that the American influence in these 
critical, formative years was a significant one in the development of the political, 
economic, and social development of Quebec adds a new dimension to Canadian history 
and to Canadian-American relations.
iv
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INTRODUCTION
For most of their national history, Canadians have been preoccupied with who they 
are as a people. They bristle when Americans assume that there are no differences 
between them. Part of their distress stems from the fact that Canada cannot escape being 
affected by what happens below the 45th parallel. These two issues, the differences in 
political culture between Canadians and Americans and how living next to the United 
States has affected them, have resulted in myriad studies by Canadian and American 
historians. But most of them begin their analyses with the influx of Loyalists during the 
Revolutionary War. Rarely do they trace the origins of the American influence from the 
beginning of the British rule in Quebec. Generally, historians either dismiss the 
possibility that there was an influence worthy of note or they treat the influence 
tangentially. Yet it was in this period, from the capitulation of Montreal in 1760 to the 
failed American invasion in 1776, that the tug of war was waged between those who 
would emulate the emerging republicanism of the American colonies and those who 
would resist such advances. For a brief period in 1775-76, there was a possibility that 
Quebec might have joined the American colonists in their fight for independence from 
the mother country. When that option was decisively rejected, Canada emerged as a 
society with a political culture distinct from that of its rebellious neighbors.
1
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2What is the basis for historians’ neglect of the influence of the American colonies 
in this seminal period in Canadian history? Perhaps it is because most Canadian and 
British historians are consumed with the effect that British rule had on the two founding 
peoples—the French and the English. This emphasis is understandable. Despite the 
merits o f cultural diversity, the more than two hundred year history of contentious 
relations between the French-speaking and English-speaking populations, which threatens 
Canadian unity today, had its beginnings in these early years of British rule. The 
treatment by these historians is usually from a nationalist perspective. The 
French-Canadian historian seeks an understanding of the inferior status of his people. 
The decapitation theory in which the French Canadians were victims of the conquest thus 
emerged. The English-Canadian historian defends the role of the British as conquerors 
for the tolerance and humanity shown the conquered people, especially as represented in 
the Quebec Act of 1774. Similarly, the British historian attempts to justify imperial 
policy which had to deal with an alien population that already had an established 
government. Its Quebec policy of conciliar government is applauded as a prototype of 
future British colonies.
Though American studies are scant in comparison to Canadian and British ones, 
the concerns addressed by American historians are also from a nationalist perspective: 
of how the Quebec Act affected the American colonies and whether it triggered the 
American Revolution; of the motives behind Britain’s western policy and how it thwarted 
colonial expansion; or why the American invasion of Quebec failed when prospects
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3seemed so promising. What is lacking from the historical literature is a focus on what 
the American influence was on Quebec, as Canada was then described, in this inchoate 
period of its history and what was significant about it.
The earliest reference to American involvement in British Canada occurred nine 
days after the capitulation of Montreal in September 1760 when General Amherst invited 
the traders in the bordering colonies to "come hither" with their wares and goods. These 
traders were among the first English-speaking civilians in Quebec, but they were only 
a small minority of a minority population. There were other merchants, who though not 
American-born had immigrated, mostly from England and Scotland, to New England or 
New York and then on to Quebec. The latter group, together with the American-born 
merchants, changed the equation of the American influence significantly. What is more 
important than the numbers is the influence this group exerted on the political, economic, 
and social development of Quebec. To try to understand this influence, it is first 
necessary to examine the English-speaking merchants as a group. Despite the merchants’ 
importance, in most histories of this period they have been depicted as unsavory, unruly, 
"licentious fanaticks." One of the considerations of this study will be to determine 
whether this characterization was a just one and how it originated. Since few merchant 
records were available, the primary source material came originally from official 
documents or from the personal papers of government officials, resulting in a one-sided 
view. The struggle of the merchants for political power threatened the government
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4officials, who were generally from an aristocracy that disdained all forms of 
republicanism and commerce.
In the special circumstances in Quebec, as military rule gave way to civilian rule, 
the clash between the merchants and the military and the military governors proved 
disruptive to the peace, order, and good government of the colony. One of the main 
obstacles to better relations between the merchants and the governors was the latters’ lack 
of sympathy for the merchants’ demands for political power. By the terms of the 
Proclamation of 1763, the English-speaking people in Quebec were promised the right 
of an assembly, as well as other British rights such as trial by jury and habeas 
corpus—the "birthright" due every Englishman. But the population of Quebec in 1763 
was estimated to be composed of only 200 English households against 65,000 
French-speaking people. [Estimates of the population vary, but for 1763, there is general 
agreement on these figures.] Beyond the numerical imbalance was the difference in 
language, law, customs, and religion.
How to resolve this thorny problem vexed British policymakers for the next eleven 
years. Initially, Quebec was treated the same as other colonies ceded to the British after 
the Seven Years’ War. But how could the policy of anglicization work in a country so 
predominantly French? The first two governors, charged with carrying out this policy, 
concluded that assimilation was not only impossible but unjust as well. Their energies 
were expended in trying to reverse the policy as called for in the Proclamation. But the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5merchants were equally determined to protect their interests. As they gained in economic 
importance, their demands for representative government became more strident. What 
the role of the immigrants from the American colonies, who had experienced a degree 
of self-rule unparalleled at that time, played in this struggle can only be determined when 
their identities can be established. This task will not be an easy one, for most of the 
literature does not differentiate between American or English merchants. They are all 
referred to as "English Canadians." The American influence was not limited to the 
actions of the merchants who had immigrated from the colonies. What was happening 
in the "old colonies" undoubtedly had an impact on the attitudes of the two protagonists 
in Quebec: the governmental officials and the civilian population. Yet this influence has 
been given scant attention. While the English-speaking merchants were pressuring the 
home government with petitions, protests, and personal representations, simultaneously, 
dissidents in the thirteen "old" colonies were also protesting British policy. Whether 
these parallel demands for greater autonomy influenced the policy decisions affecting 
Quebec or whether there was any spillover effect in Quebec of the colonists’ rebellion 
against British policy are questions to be addressed.
This attention to policy questions is the second focus of the American influence on 
Quebec and is an important consideration in the history of Canadian-American relations. 
To what extent were American interests considered by British policymakers in 
determining policy toward Quebec? Could the interests of Quebec compete with the 
powerful American lobby in London composed of American agents representing their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6colonies or private interests, as well as London merchants and members of Parliament 
with business and personal ties to the colonies? The triangular relationship of Canada, 
Great Britain, and the United States, which Canadians have perceived as detrimental to 
their interests, had its origins in the decision to retain Canada after the Seven Years’ 
War. The peace treaty, the Proclamation of 1763, Western policy of 1768, and the 
Quebec Act of 1774 were important policy decisions that affected both countries. The 
Quebec Act is of particular significance not only to Canadians but to Americans as well, 
for it is generally believed to have triggered the American Revolution.
Alarmed by the Quebec Act, which the Americans perceived as one of the 
Intolerable Acts designed to "enslave" them, the more radical element galvanized the 
separate states into a united force to pressure the home government into granting the 
colonies autonomy in all but imperial trade issues. These Sons of Liberty determined at 
the First Continental Congress to elicit the support of the Quebec merchants and 
habitants. But being the fourteenth state in an American union was too radical an idea 
for the majority of merchants who, though dismayed by the Quebec Act, did not want 
to sever ties with Britain. What sympathy the merchants and habitants had for the 
American cause was dissipated with the failed invasion of Quebec by the rag-tag 
American army. Along with the retreating army went many of the merchants who 
actively espoused the American cause. But the flow of merchants was not all outbound. 
Ever since 1774, merchants from New York and New England concerned about the 
nonimportation agreements of the colonies and about the possibility of breaking with the
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7mother country, relocated in Quebec. The year Seventeen Seventy-Six marked a pivotal 
point in the political cultures of both countries: the Americans went on to launch a 
unique experiment in democratic government; Quebec (Canada) remained a colony of 
Great Britain ultimately fashioning its government after the British parliamentary system. 
Never again would there be as favorable an opportunity to forge a continental union.
The study will be divided into two parts: from 1760 to 1774 in which the American 
colonies influence was indirect; and the two years, 1774 to 1776, when intervention by 
the Americans ranged from political persuasion to outright invasion. The first part, the 
indirect influence will deal primarily with the Montreal merchants, their feud with both 
Governors James Murray and Guy Carleton, and their efforts to pressure the home 
government to act in their interests. Four major policy decisions, mentioned above, will 
be examined that affected both the American colonies and Quebec. They include the 
Treaty of Paris of 1763 in which Canada was ceded to Great Britain by France; the 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 which followed closely on the heels of the treaty calling for 
anglicizing Quebec; Britain’s Western policy in 1768 in which the boundary between the 
Indian reserve and settlement was redefined and in which control of the fur trade was 
returned to the colonies; and the Quebec Act in 1774 that repealed the terms of the 
Proclamation, reinstituted Canadian law and customs, and returned the territory to its 
pre-conquest status. The latter act represented a defeat for the British merchants, whose 
dissatisfaction the American colonists hoped to exploit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The second phase of the study covers the period 1774 to 1776 and begins with the 
decision by the Continental Congress to enlist the support of the Canadians. When 
events overpowered the colonists, they decided to invade Quebec . . if it will not be 
disagreeable to the Canadians. . . ."1 The role of the habitant in supporting the 
Americans in the early phase of the war has been generally well documented. The part 
of the merchants has not. The effort here will be to determine how extensive the 
merchants’ support was and if it could have made a difference in the outcome.
The task outlined is an ambitious one and one that presents some difficulties. For 
example, the literature generally does not distinguish between "American" and other 
"English" Canadians. Only by culling all available records has it been possible to 
compile a list of merchants who were American-born or who had lived in the colonies 
before immigrating to Quebec. The greatest assist was the Dictionary o f  Canadian 
Biography. The English merchants listed in it are included in Appendix II, which 
contains a list of all merchants who could be identified to some degree. The files of the 
Quebec Gazette in the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa were another important 
source for identifying the more important merchants. Also in the Archives were 
applications for licenses to sell liquor, firearms, to engage in the fur trade, to post bond 
for those leaving the province. Data on the merchants was also found in the Provincial 
Archives and McCord Museum in Montreal; the Massachusetts Historical Society; the
Worthington C. Ford, etal., eds., Journals o f the Continental Congress, 1774-1789 
(Washington, 1904-37), II, 109-110.
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9Colonial Albany Social History Project in Albany, New York; the New Hampshire State 
Library, Concord; Baker Library at Dartmouth College; and the University of Maine 
Library in Orono. All these sources were of value in compiling the list of merchants 
living in Quebec in the period under consideration and in being able to identify which 
ones had immigrated from the American colonies.
Before proceeding further, the usage of certain terms in the paper needs 
clarification. Although Canadians and Americans share the same continent, the term 
"American" generally refers to the thirteen "old" colonies, now part of the United States. 
When referring to Canadians, unless otherwise specified, the term is usually applied to 
French Canadians and includes seigneurs, habitants, and merchants. Quebec now 
consists of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, but in the period under consideration, 
the terms Canada and Quebec are used interchangeably. Several style points in the use 
of quotations also need explanation. Since the "meaning" of quotations was the 
paramount concern, the exotic use of capitals in the original text has been altered to 
comply with today’s usage. In addition, to be consistent, "British" spellings, used also 
in Canada, have been modernized in the American manner. Otherwise, the quotations 
are generally true to the original text.
The historiography, as was mentioned earlier, is almost exclusively dealt with by 
British and Canadian historians. Until A. L. Burt’s study in 1933, The Old Province o f 
Quebec, most of the histories suffered from biases, national and even religious, and lack
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of important source material. In 1966, in Quebec, The Revolutionary Age, Hilda Neatby, 
Burt’s protdge, taking advantage of new historical materials available since Burt’s study, 
produced what is still considered one of the best overall analyses of the period. Several 
more recent works approach the subject from a British perspective. These studies 
include British historian Vincent T. Harlow’s two volume, The Founding o f  the Second 
British Empire, 1952; British political economist, Brian Donoughue’s British Politics and 
the American Revolution, the Path to War, 1773-1775, 1964; and the most recent study 
by Canadian historian Philip Lawson, The Imperial Challenge, 1990. All these historians 
revisit an old theme that the Quebec Act was enacted to punish the American colonists. 
This issue had been bandied about ever since the First Continental Congress proclaimed 
that the Act was one of the Intolerable Acts and intended to teach the rebellious colonists 
a lesson. All three studies refute this view and support the view that British 
policymakers were concerned primarily with the needs of Quebec.
In addition to the political literature, there has been a more recent interest in the 
economic and social history of the period. These new studies cast the merchants in a 
more favorable light, but they are from a nationalist perspective—English-Canadian and 
French-Canadian. One of the pioneer works that is still considered important is by 
English-Canadian historian, Donald Creighton. In Empire o f the St. Lawrence, 1956, 
Creighton contends that the first British Canadians were merchants before they were 
"Britons, Protestants or political theorists." He also suggests that the conflict between 
the English and Canadian merchants was not race- but class-driven. Creighton portrays
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the merchants as being more important to the development of Quebec than the British 
administrators. But he is criticized for his Anglo-centric views, since he generally 
neglects the Canadian merchants. French-Canadian historian Fernand Ouellet does not. 
His controversial Economic and Social History o f Quebec, written in 1966, deals with 
French-Canadian society. His hypothesis that the conquest cannot be blamed for the 
inferiority of French Canadians triggered an angry response from other French-Canadian 
historians, especially those of the "Montreal School." One of the most recent studies is 
by Jose Igartua of the University of Montreal. In A Change o f  Climate: The Conquest 
and the Marchands o f  Montreal, 1974, Igartua does not support the decapitation thesis, 
but he argues that the conquest required a readjustment that put the Canadian merchant 
at a disadvantage. All these studies are useful for they explore in greater depth the role 
of all the merchants. Increasingly, monographs are appearing on particular merchants, 
such as a work in progress by McGill historian, Brian Young, on the merchant, David 
McCord.
Why is this study important? The focus of the American influence on Quebec 
during the period under consideration has not been done before. By determining what 
that influence was, a new chapter is advanced in our knowledge of Canadian history; of 
Canadian-American relations, which includes the triangular relationship of Canada, Great 
Britain, and the United States; and of a neglected aspect of American colonial history. 
What can an American historian contribute who has lived and studied in both countries 
and whose concentration has been on Canadian-American treaty relations? One of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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first advantages is an awareness of the literature of both countries. This fact seemed 
obvious until it was discovered in the course of this undertaking that historians of both 
countries are generally not conversant with the literature of the other. As a result, 
linkages are not as apparent. For example, in the analyses of the Quebec Act, no 
attention is paid to the prejudices of the British policymakers who were simultaneously 
enacting both the Intolerable Acts and the Quebec Act. Could the views of these men 
be so compartmentalized that the decision in the one case was not influenced by the 
decision in the other? Another advantage of being an American historian might be that 
of a more detached view of this troubling period of history in which the conflicts between 
the English- and the French-speaking people, which plague Canada to this day, had their 
roots.
A more comprehensive understanding of Canadian-American relations emerges if 
the treaty history between the two countries is expanded to begin not with the influx of 
Loyalists or the Treaty of Paris in 1783, but with the earlier Treaty of Paris in 1763 and 
the arrival of American traders and merchants shortly after the conquest. The triangular 
relationship among Canada, Great Britain, and the United States has been a contentious 
one. Canadians have always believed that their interests were given short shrift by the 
British who wanted to remain on good terms with the Americans. This experience has 
resulted in Canadian distrust of the United States that lingers on even today. A careful 
review of the triangular relationship, which now can be traced to 1763, does not support 
such a view. As far as American colonial history is concerned, the interactions between
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the colonists in Quebec and their southern neighbors during this period has generally 
been ignored. Yet many of the same imbalances that are true in the relationship between 
the two countries today, existed then.
In a broader context, this period of history represented the social, economic, and 
political struggles that were taking place in England, the American colonies, and Quebec 
between the commercial class and the aristocracy, and between the forces intent upon 
more democratic representation and those who feared such tendencies as threatening to 
law and order. The ultimate decision of the Quebec merchants and habitants to reject 
the Revolution had implications that help explain the difference between Canadian and 
American political cultures, which are apparent today. With the influx of Loyalists, a 
conservative political culture fashioned after the British parliamentary system began to 
emerge. This helped shape Canadian society in a way that distinguished it from the 
American experience.
The following treatise attempts to advance a new dimension to the history of 
Canada and Canadian-American relations, and to a neglected period in American colonial 
history. Although Canadians cannot dismiss the fact that what happens below the 45th 
parallel will affect them, they can be satisfied that their quest for a separate identity from 
the United States can be traced to the very beginning of the English rule. For all these 
reasons, a study that focuses on the American influence in Quebec from 1760 to 1776 
appears justified and long overdue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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PROLOGUE
GENERAL AMHERST SETS THE STAGE
Only eleven days after the French capitulation of Montreal, General Jeffery 
Amherst, the British commander in chief of the North American troops, invited the 
traders and merchants in the bordering American colonies to set forth with all dispatch 
for Quebec. However controversial the merchants’ role became, there is little doubt that 
every encouragement was given to them to journey to Montreal and Quebec that fall. 
In his letter of September 19, 1760, to the governors of the bordering provinces of New 
Hampshire, New York, and Massachusetts, Amherst wrote to encourage:
the traders and adventurers of the province over which you preside to 
transport themselves hither and to Quebec with quantities of molasses, salt, 
wines, teas, sugars, and all kind of grocery, as likewise sheep and every 
thing also, that may occur to them to be useful; for all of which, they may 
depend upon finding good markets given encouragement, they can, in reason 
wish or desire.2
Amherst was clearly mindful of the risks the traders would be taking at that time 
of year should they comply with his request. As incentives, in addition to ready markets 
for their goods, he promised that the commanders at Forts George, Ticonderoga, and 
Crown Point would supply bateaux and "the hands to man them" as far as Chambly, 
where for the last fifteen miles to Montreal, the traders would be furnished land carriages
2Jeffery Amherst, 1st baron 1717-1797, Official Papers, 1740-1783 (London, World 
Microfilms Publication, 1979).
15
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at "easy" rates. In addition, any duties normally charged upon the goods to be brought 
in were waived. Only passports from the governors of the particular provinces were 
required.
Following these letters to the various governors, Amherst issued a placard in both 
French and English to be posted on church doors and in other prominent places in 
Montreal where the French congregated. He explained to the people of Montreal that 
because they had received such meager support from France for the past two years, 
Canada’s wealth, supplies, and necessaries were exhausted. But Amherst promised,
we have for the common good both of the troops and the habitant, given 
orders in our letters, to the different governors of the English colonies 
nearest to Canada, to repair hither with all sorts of provisions and supplies, 
and we flatter ourselves, that we shall see this project carried out without 
delay; and as soon as it is done, everyone will be notified so that he may 
have a share in it, at the current rates, and without duty.3
In just two weeks, Amherst had proved himself not only an extraordinary military 
strategist, but a perceptive and tireless administrator as well. The capitulation of 
Montreal a year after the British victory on the Plains of Abraham in Quebec City 
secured all of French America to the British. Seldom in the annals of military history 
had a fortified town surrendered as readily as did Montreal on September 8, 1760. 
Overwhelmed by what was described as one of the most astonishing military feats of all 
time, the French Commander Vaudreuil laid down his arms when he realized he was
3Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds., Documents Relating to the Constitutional 
History o f Canada, 2nd Rev. Ed. (Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1918), I, 40-41.
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surrounded. Although he would be tried by the French for this "shameful" surrender, 
Vaudreuil recognized that not to do so would have been too costly in human lives.
Amherst was the architect of this successful pincer movement. General James 
Murray traveled from Quebec down the St. Lawrence; Lieutenant Colonel Frederick 
Haldimand approached from the south; and Amherst from the southwest. They arrived 
at Montreal within a day of one another surrounding the French on three sides, making 
escape impossible. In a day when communication and travel were still primitive, this 
military feat, accomplished with little loss of life, was remarkable. Had any contingency 
hampered their approaches, the scheme would have failed. It did not.
Before departing for New York, where he would continue in command of the 
British forces in North America, Amherst established the administrative machinery 
necessary for governing the conquered people. Unknowingly, he set the stage for the 
bifurcated policies that would plague the French- and English-speaking people in Quebec 
even to the present day. Amherst recognized that until peace was declared, the primary 
object of the Army was to keep the 65,000 Canadians contented. The terms of 
capitulation were generous. They granted all Canadians the right to practice their 
religion, and the landed gentry the privilege to enjoy peaceable possession of their goods 
and other property. Canadians, in return, if they would not become loyal subjects of the 
king, were at least to remain neutral in any future conflict.
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Generals James Murray, Thomas Gage, and Colonel Ralph Burton were appointed 
governors, respectively, of the three existing districts of Quebec, Montreal, and Trois 
Rivibres. To assuage concerns of the "Canadians" (referred to as "habitants") about their 
new masters, captains of militia, comparable to justices of the peace in England, were 
appointed from the Canadian gentry in each parish and made responsible for resolving 
minor disputes. A right of appeal to a higher authority, the British officer in command 
of the district and then ultimately the governor himself, was established. In the 
settlement of civil differences, French law obtained; in criminal cases, British law. Since 
the British assumed their law superior to the French, they expected the Canadians would 
be grateful for this hybrid system of combining British rights with those practices already 
familiar to the people.
Amherst understood that such administrative actions were not enough to placate the 
fears of the habitants or to win their loyalty. Toleration for their customs, language, and 
laws was also reflected in his instructions to the soldiers. He insisted that the French 
language, which most of the officers spoke, should be used in all communications not 
only to show respect for the people but to ensure their understanding of what was 
happening and what was expected of them. "Benevolence" was the rule for the conduct 
of the English toward the French. But Amherst was aware that such tolerance by the 
American colonials toward the French might be expecting more than human nature would 
allow. For over a half century New Englanders had experienced firsthand atrocities 
committed by the Indians with the aid of the French on their people and communities.
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To avoid potential conflict, Amherst discharged the provincial troops first. The British 
regulars would remain to keep the peace. But if Amherst was concerned about the 
American colonists as peacekeepers, he was not concerned about them as civilian 
merchants and traders.
Until a peace treaty with France and the ceding of Quebec to Great Britain, which 
at the time was not assured, the army’s job was to maintain the good will of the 
Canadian people. Before he set out for New York, Amherst had attended to every aspect 
of what he perceived to be the duties of the conqueror toward a conquered people. He 
could not have realized then the consequences of his actions in inviting the American 
traders to Quebec. Since the clash during the first few decades of English rule was 
curiously not between the Canadians, the new subjects, and the English-speaking peoples, 
the old subjects, but between the English civilians, primarily merchants, and their 
compatriots, the English militia, it is important to know more about the merchants who 
moved to Quebec. The historians’ record is a confusing, sometimes contradictory one.
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CHAPTER ONE 
SWARM OF LOCUSTS?
In response to Amherst’s request, the initial influx of American "traders and 
adventurers" seems to have been sufficient to supply the beleaguered towns of Montreal, 
Quebec, and Trois Rivieres with the necessary provisions and supplies. Presumably, 
some camp followers, or "sutlers" as they were called, would have already been on the 
scene. Since there were no commissariat services in those days, sutlers followed the 
army wherever it went and were representatives, usually British, of large exporting and 
army contracting firms. From Amherst’s orders to the governors, it can be assumed that 
the sutlers’ supplies were not sufficient to provide for the civilian population as well as 
the occupying army. With winter approaching, the provisions that the merchants from 
the American colonies would bring were particularly important.
In most histories of this period, the merchants and traders who responded to 
Amherst are depicted as an unsavory element that came flocking from Britain and the 
American colonies to exploit the conquest. The oft-repeated description by Mason Wade 
states that a ". . . swarm of camp followers and commercial adventurers descended on 
the newly-conquered land like a cloud of locusts."1 More recently, two economic 
historians, French-Canadian Fernand Ouellet and English-Canadian Donald Creighton,
'Mason Wade, The French Canadians (rev. ed., Toronto, Macmillan of Canada, 
1968), I, 47.
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refute the view that the first merchants and traders "swarmed" or "flocked" to Quebec 
immediately after the conquest. Ouellet agrees with Creighton that "it was not. . . a 
mass phenomenon," but rather a fairly small number of individuals who came with or 
shortly after the army2. The number of American traders who secured passports that 
first winter cannot be determined since no records are available. If any traders came 
from Britain, it would not likely have been until the spring of 1761.
If these first merchants and traders could not be described as a "swarm," they also 
did not deserve to be labeled "locusts." Letters and newspapers written during the first 
winter of the occupation portray a cooperative, generous spirit on the part of all. In 
glowing terms, on December 3, 1760, Governor James Murray wrote to William Pitt, 
secretary of state for the southern department, of the important contribution that the 
merchants and traders made to the well-being of the army and habitants. He says,
I flatter myself you will pardon the liberty I take in troubling you with the 
enclosed. It regards a set of men who have been very serviceable to his 
Majesty’s troops and have run many risks and who have been induced to 
pour in their merchandize here to a large amount from a laudable of 
promoting trade at the invitation of Mr. Amherst, the commander in 
chief. . . . The troops being well lodged and provided with every necessary 
are at present healthy and likely to continue so.3
2Femand Ouellet, Economic and Social History o f Quebec, 1760-1850, trans. 
(Ottawa: Carleton University, 1980), 79.
3PAC, MG23, II, Vol. Ill, Murray Papers, Letters 1759-1789.
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A month later on January 1, 1761, in a letter to Amherst, Murray stated with pride 
that "the merchants and officers have made a collection of five hundred pounds Halifax 
currency. . . to help alleviate the distresses of the French habitant, who suffers famine 
as a result of the war and a bad harvest.1,4 He boasted that these acts of good produced 
a harmony between the French and English unprecedented at home.
Further evidence to support the positive role of the merchants in that first winter 
is found in many articles in colonial newspapers. For instance in the February 20, 1761, 
issue of The New Hampshire Gazette, a note from Quebec and Montreal states, "All 
Canadians well provided for and happy. Great harmony. English merchants and officers 
support poor during the winter. Provisions brought into Montreal and sold very cheap."
If the contribution of the merchants and traders was so profusely praised publicly 
and privately that first winter, what went wrong? In a letter written in 1766 when Murray 
had been recalled to London to answer charges brought against him by the merchants, 
his description of those merchants and traders who came following the army contradicts 
the sentiments he expressed in the above letter to Pitt at the end of 1760. In his letter 
five years later, Murray called the same merchants and traders,
people of little education or soldiers discharged after the reduction of troops.
All came to make their fortune, and I fear that many will not be over
Hbid.
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scrupulous in the way they come by it. I declare that they make up the most 
immoral collection of individuals I have ever known.5
Understandably, this proud man would be venting his anger at the men who injured 
him. Unfortunately, the latter view of the merchants is the one that has lived on. Most 
accounts of the merchants acknowledge that there is some foundation for these remarks, 
but that they are considered extreme. A. L. Burt and Hilda Neatby, both preeminent 
Canadian historians for their analyses of Quebec during the period under consideration, 
reflect the general sentiment. Neatby says that though the merchants were represented 
as "rude hecklers of the humane governor and would-be oppressors of the Canadian," it 
is only fair to view them as they viewed themselves, "building their own fortunes, but 
also enriching the community and the nation by seeing life steadily in terms of profit and 
loss."6
The immediate task is two-fold: to re-examine the role of the merchants from a 
different perspective of who they were individually and what they contributed to the 
development of Quebec; and then to determine what part the merchants who were 
American-born or with some American experience played within the context of the 
overall community. A brief overview of the situation in Quebec in 1760 is required 
before continuing the discussion about the character of the merchants and the role they
5 Ouellet, Economic, 80.
6Hilda Neatby, Quebec: The Revolutionary Age, 1760-1791 (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1966), 57.
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played in these early years of British rule. Elsewhere in the world, the Anglo-French 
war was not over. Uncertainty over whether the British would retain Canada at its 
conclusion made governing all the more difficult. The economy of the country was in 
a shambles not just as a result of the recent conflict, but also because of the corrupt 
practices of the governing elite under French rule. The legacy of the French was high 
inflation, scarcity of food and provisions, and a paper currency that had little if any 
value. Not inconsiderable, but rarely mentioned, were the numbers of French 
shopkeepers, especially bakers and butchers, who quickly learned from their masters the 
profits to be gained from artificially producing scarcities and price-gouging. Homes, 
churches, agriculture, industry and roads suffered the devastation of war and had to be 
rebuilt.7
The merchants and traders who arrived on this scene responded from economic, 
not humanitarian, interests. Their task was a difficult one. Transporting supplies over 
long distances was expensive, as well as risky. A hostile country, hostile Indians, and 
hostile climate all took their toll. The market for their goods had to be adequate for 
them to realize a profit. But the poverty of the people, the lack of currency, and endless 
regulations limiting the conduct of business resulted in the need to be competitive and 
concerned about their survival. Advertisements in the Quebec Gazette, which began 
circulation in April 1764 gave testimony to the extent of failed businesses. Many
7See Chapter 2, "The Crisis of the Conquest" in Ouellet’s, Economic and Social 
History, 46-70.
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merchants returned to England; others had to seek alternative means of livelihood. 
Neatby comments that the merchants saw life steadily in terms of profit and loss. How 
else could they see life under such circumstances?
The unstable business climate was not the only obstacle facing the merchants. 
Murray, in particular, but Gage and Burton also, embodied the prejudice of the British 
aristocracy toward the commercial class. The noble professions for the elite were the 
army or politics. The bias against those who made their living by commerce was 
long-standing. Nothing in the background, education, or experience of these men gave 
them an appreciation for the competitive nature of the middle class, especially in so 
remote and primitive a country as Quebec. On their part, the merchants were 
unsympathetic to the military. If the officers disdained those who made their living by 
commerce, the merchants viewed unfavorably those who made their living by fighting 
wars. Nor were the merchants acquiescent. They were feisty, competitive men not 
trained to obey orders docilely if they perceived themselves insulted or injured. Clearly, 
the sidewalks in Quebec, especially Montreal, were not wide enough to accommodate 
both groups of people, and after the first blush of cooperation among all peoples that first 
winter, dissension began to mount.
This situation presented problems for the merchants, but it also promised rewards 
for the enterprising. Although the most lucrative industry was the fur trade—it 
represented 78.5 per cent of Quebec’s total exports in 1760-other industries were there
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to be exploited.8 The exports of wheat, flour, lumber, potash, iron, and fish were not 
initially profitable, but many merchants invested in such undertakings which did become 
viable at the time of the American Revolution. Their entrepreneurial talents and their 
willingness to take risks provided Quebec with a more diversified economy. They also 
contributed to the infrastructure of the province by building roads, bridges, wharves, 
churches, schools, waterworks, and hospitals. They were founders of various fraternal 
societies in Quebec such as the Masons and the Beaver Club. After the great fire in 
Montreal in 1764, they were responsible for acting collectively to protect themselves 
against future catastrophes. Thus the Quebec Fire Society became one of the most 
popular volunteer organizations. The more successful merchants not only owned their 
own homes, but as members of the middle class, they recognized the profit and prestige 
of land ownership. Many of them enhanced their positions by buying up seigneuries in 
the faubourgs of Montreal, Quebec, and Trois Rivieres. Unfortunately, the historical 
record of these early years in Quebec has emphasized the merchants’ political role and 
given short shrift to the importance of their economic and civic activities. In order to 
evaluate the merchants in a fairer light, their political arguments should be examined in 
the context of who they were and what their contributions were in the development of 
Quebec.
The initial influx of immigrants was generally classified as Protestant and urban 
dwellers, divided equally between Montreal and Quebec. In a 1764 survey by Murray,
'Ibid., p. 83.
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two hundred Protestant households were listed in the towns of Quebec and Montreal;9 
in a more detailed study a year later dealing only with the district of Montreal, there 
were ninety-nine male Protestants in the town of Montreal and thirty-seven in the rest of 
the district. Of the ninety-nine about fifty were designated as new merchants. From the 
1765 list, the names, origins, and former callings of forty-five of the fifty new merchants 
were given. Over fifty per cent came from England and Scotland, twenty per cent from 
Ireland, thirteen per cent from the American colonies, and another thirteen per cent from 
various countries (Switzerland, Germany, France, Guernsey).10 No similar breakdown 
is available for Quebec, but assuming that an equal number of merchants settled in that 
port city, there would have been fifty merchants in each town and no more than one 
hundred in the entire province.
One of the problems in trying to assess the blanket condemnation of the merchants 
made by Murray and others is that distinctions were not made among the various groups 
of the English-speaking immigrants. Some of the innkeepers, barbers, tailors, bakers, 
hucksters were no doubt "people of little education." Some were "soldiers discharged 
after the reduction of troops." Some may have come to "make their fortune." Murray 
may have been partially right when he said "many would not be over scrupulous in the 
way they come by it," and he may have found them "the most immoral collection of 
individuals" he had ever known. One cannot judge what other collection of individuals,
9PAC, Q, 2, 332-36.
10PAC, C042, 5, 28-33.
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outside the Army, that he would have known. But his views cannot be supported by an 
examination of 200 merchants who immigrated to Quebec primarily between 1760 and 
1765.11 They were a diverse group, but if there was any common denominator it was 
that they were, generally, men from middle class families, competitive and 
entrepreneurial, who appreciated the opportunities open to them with the withdrawal of 
the French from Quebec and the introduction of British rule.
The most important merchants were those who engaged in the fur trade, which was 
the backbone of the Quebec economy. Adventurers and traders mostly from Scotland, 
England, Ireland, and the American colonies ventured to Montreal and west to Detroit, 
Niagara, Michilimackinac, the Illinois country, and eventually the northwest to engage 
in that lucrative trade, which included supplying the forts and Indians with provisions. 
Because of the great risks involved in the industry, most of the traders acted in concert 
with others. Many of the more prominent traders became partners at some point in the 
North West Company, the rival of that hallowed British institution, the Hudson Bay 
Company. The Frobisher brothers (England), Forrest Oaks (England), James McGill 
(Scotland), Richard Dobie (Scotland), Isaac Todd (Ireland), Peter Pond (America), Peter 
Pang man (America), and Simon McTavish (Scotland and America) are identified as 
having been partners in the North West Company at some point. A look at their 
backgrounds reveals a group of men whose energies, capital, and know-how were 
integral to the well-being and economic viability of the province.
uThe biographies of these merchants can be found in Appendix II.
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Of paramount importance were the Frobisher brothers, Benjamin and Joseph, who 
immigrated to Quebec from England in 1763 and Thomas in 1769. They arrived with 
some capital and immediately organized themselves into a family enterprise, but to share 
the risks they took on various partners. Their success was due to their early recognition 
of the importance of the western trade, initially in the Lake Superior region and later as 
far west as the Saskatchewan country. Also contributing to the success of their ventures 
was their willingness to assign to each other the role that best utilized their particular 
talents. Benjamin was the organizer and manager of the operation, which was 
headquartered in Montreal; Joseph, the eldest, acted as trader between Grand Portage, 
other posts, and Montreal; and Thomas spent most of his time traveling from Grand 
Portage to distant trading posts in the west. Thomas was seldom in Montreal. The 
company prospered until the downturn in the economy after the American Revolution. 
When Benjamin died in 1787, Joseph found himself in debt to the government. Only 
with the help of his wife’s dowry and his friends’ aid (Thomas Dunn, Robert Lester, 
Robert Morrogh, Thomas Scott, Isaac Todd, and James McGill) was he able to 
reschedule his debt and to survive. But Joseph knew that neither he nor his brother 
Thomas, who died a year after Benjamin, had Benjamin’s talent for administration, so 
he wisely sought the aid of Simon McTavish. Reorganized as McTavish, Frobisher, and 
Company, under McTavish’s shrewd leadership the company went from virtual 
bankruptcy to become the premier financial enterprise in Canada. Although Joseph 
complained to McTavish that his role was "limited to outdoor business, hiring of men
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and public duty," he was able to rebuild his fortune.12 He diversified his financial base 
by investing in the Batiscan Iron Work Company and the Company of Proprietors of 
Montreal Water Works. He tapped the forest resources of his seigneury at Champlain 
and accumulated vast land holdings. As one of the four original members to survive, he 
held a place of honor in the Beaver Club. He was active in religious affairs, was a 
major in the British militia, supported British parliamentary institutions, was a member 
of the Assembly from Montreal, a justice of the peace, and administrator of a pension 
fund for aged voyageurs. Joseph was described as "an immensely rich merchant, a most 
worthy, honest and beneficent man." He confirmed his brother’s testimony in 1766 that 
although there were some scoundrels in the trade "the greatest part. . . are men of 
property settled in Montreal and give bonds for their good behavior to a great 
amount."13
Another important merchant-trader who was a partner in the original North West 
Company was Forrest Oakes. He was also partner at various times with Charles Boyer, 
Peter Pang man, and his brother-in-law and chief supplier, Lawrence Ermatinger 
(Switzerland). Most of his time was spent in the interior country, either at 
Michilimackinac or Sault Ste. Marie, with his Indian wife. He was known for the 
meticulous records of indents and provision lists that he sent to Ermatinger. He arranged
12W.S. Wallace, Comp., Dictionary o f Canadian Biography (Rev., Ed., Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1945) V, 955.
13PAC, Shelburne Mss., MG 23A, 4, II, 162.
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for com shipments from Detroit, kept track of the wintering partners, and supervised the 
packaging and shipment of cargo inland and of furs to Montreal. Such organization was 
essential to the profits of any business, but especially to the fur trade. When Ermatinger 
died, he left property in England.
Another prominent merchant-trader was James McGill, who came from a 
prosperous trader family in Glasgow and was a graduate of the University there. His 
first trip to the pays d ’en haul in 1766 was as a deputy of William Grant. He was in 
partnership at various times with his brother, John; Charles Jean-Baptiste Charboillez, 
a veteran of the southwest trade; Isaac Todd; and Maurice-Regis Blondeau. His 
investment in the fur trade in 1782 was supposedly the largest in the colony, some 
£26,000. He was considered by his contemporaries as the richest man in Montreal, due 
to the fact that he was one of the largest shareholders in the North West Company. He 
married the widow Charlotte Trottier Desrivieres, nee Guillimin. The label 
"philanthropist" best describes his generosity and breadth of civic contributions, from 
overseeing the Lachine turnpike to bequeathing land and an endowment for a college in 
Montreal, today the prestigious McGill University.
Although Richard Dobie was apparently from "humble" origins, he had previous 
experience as a merchant in Scotland before coming to Montreal in 1761. His first 
successful entry into the fur business was in partnerships with Pierre Montbrun and 
Lawrence Ermatinger, later with Benjamin and Joseph Frobisher. For the most part,
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however, Dobie carried on his business as outfitter and financial backer alone. After 
1777 he became one of the principal fur traders and outfitters southwest of the Great 
Lakes and in the region around Lake Superior and Lake Nipigon (Ontario). Furs were 
not his only venture. He became an exporter of wheat, dabbled in efforts to produce 
ginseng in New York, backed a potash manufacturer, and sold wood produced from his 
own sawmill near Sorrel. He also served as a financial go-between for the government, 
paying accounts and advancing money for various governmental services. Due to the 
refusal of Britain to allow its colonies the right to issue paper money or set up a banking 
system, moneylenders often found themselves loaning money that the government would 
not reimburse. Despite such problems, Dobie accumulated an impressive fortune, was 
said to have a "luxurious" standard of living, and was an influential member of Montreal 
society. He was a member of the grand jury of the district of Montreal several times; 
he chaired the Presbyterian church’s committee to manage temporalities; and he was a 
member of the local Masonic lodge.
Isaac Todd, an Irishman, was considered a "father figure in the fur-trade 
community." He formed partnerships with McGill, the Frobishers, George McBeath, 
Nicholas Blondeau, and Peter Pond. He acted as an agent for Phyn, Ellice and Co. of 
Schenectady in 1774. Todd actively petitioned the British government to grant British 
rights and to reduce restrictions on the fur trade. He was a member of the grand jury 
in 1769 and was founder of the influential lobby, the Canada Club in London. The 
Canada Club played an important role in supporting the right of Catholics to participate
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in a general assembly for the province. Todd also headed the Quebec committee to 
gather support for repeal of the Quebec Act. He was a member of the prestigious Beaver 
Club.
Simon McTavish went from rags to riches and today enjoys a reputation as one of 
Canada’s important early figures. In 1763 he emigrated from Scotland to Albany, where 
he served an apprenticeship. In 1772 he joined with an important Albany merchant, 
William Edgar, who was engaged in the fur trade at Detroit and Niagara. In 1774 
McTavish and his partner, James Bannerman, concerned about the effects of the colonies’ 
nonexportation and nonimportation agreements on the fur trade, moved to Quebec. 
McTavish became the prime mover in steering the North West Company through trying 
days of increased competition and smaller profits. In 1821 his leadership and 
entrepreneurial skills thrust the North West Company into trade with China and the 
United States before it finally was absorbed by the Hudson Bay Company. Compared 
to McGill and Richardson, this industry magnate only modestly participated in the 
colony’s public life. His real contribution was in the wealth produced by the North West 
Company in terms of the economic development of Quebec.
In the same category of the Frobishers and McTavish, three of the first and 
best-known fur traders and adventurers were from the "old colonies." Even before the 
capitulation, Alexander Henry entered Montreal with Amherst. Soon, however, he was 
back in Albany, where his commercial connections were and where he procured a
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quantity of goods to trade at Montreal. Instead of Montreal, however, he headed for 
Michilimackinac, the farthest post in the interior at that time. It would be fourteen years 
before he reached Montreal. In the interim he became one of the leading fur traders, 
living among the Indians - involuntarily during Pontiac’s war where he witnessed the 
slaughter of the English - procuring furs, and selling them to Albany agents. In 1774, 
like many of his compatriots, he relocated to Montreal. There he participated in civic 
affairs; he was a justice of the peace, captain of the militia, signed petitions and 
memorials in support of an assembly, he was one of the nineteen founding members of 
the Beaver Club. But his real contribution was his knowledge of the west. His journal, 
"Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories," provides one of the best 
descriptions of Indian life of that day. He was one of the first traders to map the region, 
to make a detailed plan for an expedition to find an overland route to the Pacific, and to 
encourage trading with China. In contrast to Creighton’s description of the fur trader 
as being as untamed as the country he explored, Henry is described as a "middle-sized 
man, easy yet dignified and esteemed by all who knew him."14
Peter Pond, bom in Milford, Connecticut, was a controversial figure. He has been 
variously described: by some he was "bold and unscrupulous"; by others he enjoyed a 
reputation for "honesty and integrity." Pond’s father was one of the first traders to set 
forth for Detroit after the British conquest, leaving his young son, whose mother had 
died, to look after the family. The father’s fate, dying in debt to his Albany creditors,
"Ibid., VI, 316-19.
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did not deter the son from following in his footsteps. About 1765 he, too, left his own 
young family in Milford for the frontier, not to return except briefly for twenty years. 
By age thirty-one, according to Harold Innis, Pond was considered a master trader 
known for his knowledge of French and of the Indians, including their languages. Along 
with acquired skills of navigation and astronomy, his exploits in the northwest wilderness 
enabled him to provide maps of uncharted lands. Pond’s talent for organization and use 
of supplies enabled him to penetrate farther and trade more effectively than his 
contemporaries. Like Henry, Pond became a key figure in Quebec, being instrumental 
in the formation of the North West Company. But his reputation for violence—he had 
been involved directly or indirectly with two murders—forced his retirement from the 
trade. Pond drew maps of the country he discovered and presented them variously to 
Lord Dorchester, the Empress of Russia, and President Ezra Stiles of Yale College. In 
1790 Pond returned to live in the United States. He died, probably in Milford, 
Connecticut, like his father in poverty. His real contribution was in his pioneer 
discoveries of the Athabasca region which paved the way for others, such as Alexander 
Mackenzie, to explore the Mackenzie River systems.
Peter Pangman was more fortunate than Pond in translating his knowledge and 
expertise into material and social gain. Bom in Elizabeth, New Jersey, he traveled up 
the North Saskatchewan River farther than any white man had previously done. 
Pangman survived the period of fierce competition that threatened all participants in the 
fur trade. Eventually he joined the North West Company. When he retired, he did so
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an affluent man, enjoying more profit than loss. He purchased a seigneury from Jacob 
Jordan near Montreal, contributed to the building of the Scotch Presbyterian church in 
Montreal, married, and had a son who became a member o f the Legislative Council of 
Lower Canada.
The above merchants were among the more prominent ones engaged in the fur 
trade in the early days of British rule. But there were many other merchants who 
participated as suppliers. These were the merchant-traders who came with the army to 
provision it as well as the civilian population and were the "sutlers" to whom Murray 
disparagingly refers. Some of these merchant-traders might be headquartered in 
Montreal, where they would provide surety for other traders or provision the canoes. 
Among them were: John Askin (Ireland), Henry Bostwick (England), William Holmes 
(Ireland), Joseph Howard (England), and John Welles (England, New York). For 
biographies of these traders, see Appendix II. Other merchants came independent of the 
army and settled primarily in Montreal and Quebec. In addition to provisioning the army 
and the civilian population or investing in the fur trade, they seized other opportunities 
that the conquest afforded them. Brief descriptions of some of them will illustrate the 
range of their entrepreneurial activities and will afford a greater appreciation of the 
breadth of the commercial community.
Lawrence Ermatinger (Switzerland), already mentioned, was a sutler. He was a 
partner in the firm of Trye and Ermatinger, merchants of London. Although he was
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plagued with misfortune, fire destroying his home and offices twice, during his active 
years he was involved in trying to influence political and economic events in Canada. 
He helped finance partnerships, including one of Oakes and Charles Boyer; was a partner 
himself with Oakes; and owned a share in the North West Company. He was one of the 
first members of a Masonic organization in Montreal.
John McCord (Ulster Scot), literate, from a well-respected family of merchants, 
read about the conquest of Quebec by the British in an article in the Belfast Courier. 
With his second wife (Margaret Hanna, from a prominent Irish merchant family) and two 
sons, McCord left Newtry, Ireland, for Quebec. There he purchased a house, 
warehouse, and dock, and set himself up to supply the British regiments and the civilian 
population. His position in the merchant community was strengthened by family ties: 
his brother-in-law, James G. Hanna, was a successful clockmaker; his third wife, 
Henrietta Maria Gilbert, was from a prominent merchant family; two of his sons-in-law, 
Alexander Fraser and Malcolm Fraser, were substantial landowners and influential men 
in the province; another son-in-law was Josiah Bleakley, an important fur trader. 
McCord’s son, Thomas, married Sarah Solomon, daughter of the Montreal merchant 
Levy Solomon. McCord was a rebel sympathizer who suffered the disapproval of his 
countrymen. His house and dock were burned by the British during the American 
invasion, but he managed to continue to reside in Quebec. Too great a risk-taker, 
however, he suffered financial reverses. In order to avoid bankruptcy, he bequeathed 
his property to his son, John, Jr. In this way, he secured the income from his property,
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which was well-managed, and was the source of the family wealth. Today, the McCord 
Museum of Canadian History, affiliated with McGill University, records the exploits of 
the McCord family up to 1931.
James Murray wrote the Board of Trade that he could not countenance the 
appointment of William Grant, whom he called a "conceited boy," as a member of the 
council. Grant (Scotland), the son of the laird of Blairfindy, had a liberal education. 
He was fluent in French, and when he was only fifteen, he was sent to Quebec to 
represent his uncle’s firm, which had a contract as a navy supplier for Quebec. William 
soon began to diversify and to build a substantial fortune in trade and in land 
acquisitions. He seized every opportunity to take advantage of the sale of properties of 
French landowners who opted to return to France. But he became overextended 
financially, and to try to recoup his losses, he was persuaded to smuggle wine from 
Bordeaux, France, to Labrador on a ship owned by the merchant, John Gray. Grant was 
supposed to have sold the ship and with the proceeds purchase goods. The ship with its 
bootlegged cargo was wrecked off the Strait of Belles Isles. Still only nineteen, an 
undaunted Grant went on to amass a fortune in real estate in Montreal and Quebec. In 
1766 he married the widow of the seigneur Charles Jacques Le Moyhne de Longueuil. 
In the process he gained access to her extensive holdings since, according to French law, 
the wife retains her possessions, but the husband has sole discretion to manage it. Before 
turning twenty-five, Grant was estimated to be worth £80,000. He lived a long, 
productive life; frequently, he was at the center of controversy. An expert in French and
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English laws and experienced as a Court of Appeals judge, he devoted his political 
energies toward revising the province’s commercial code to make it more advantageous 
to business. He was prominent in establishing the Quebec Benevolent Society to support 
members in need; was a trustee of the Quebec Library; a charter subscriber to the 
Agriculture Society; founder and president of the Constitutional Club to promote 
knowledge of the British constitution; and was a leader, representing the English party, 
in Quebec’s first parliament.
One of the chief antagonists of the army in Quebec during the military regime was 
a young, carousing bachelor named George Allsopp (England). Allsopp was a junior 
partner in the mercantile London supply firm of Jenkins, Trye and Company. When he 
arrived in Quebec in 1761, he became one of the principal commercial and political 
figures in the province. Like Grant, he led a full but rarely tranquil life. Most 
biographers describe him as irascible for he seemed always to have been in the center 
of disputes, especially over the policies of Murray and the military. His objections were 
not without provocation. Along with several other merchants who were excluded from 
carrying on trade at government-controlled king’s posts, Allsopp protested the 
inconsistencies of Murray’s trade restrictions. Because of what Murray termed Allsopp’s 
fractious behavior, he refused to install him in government offices, purchased by Allsopp 
according to the customs of the day, which would have provided him with a secure 
income. Murray’s replacement, Guy Carleton, reversed both the decision to exclude 
Allsopp from the king’s post and from the offices he had purchased. Allsopp’s business
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interests ran the gamut of participation in the wheat, fur, timber trades, the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence fisheries, the manufacture of potash and spirits and the production of the 
Saint-Maurice Ironworks. His commercial concentration in later years was mainly in 
flour production, which in 1788 comprised twenty-two per cent of the colony’s annual 
production. Though he belonged to the Quebec Fire and Agriculture societies, his main 
interest outside his commercial concerns was in promoting British constitutional law for 
Quebec.
Hugh Finlay (Scotland) was more fortunate than Allsopp in the treatment accorded 
him by Murray. With family connections in the business communities of both Glasgow 
and London, he was independent of Murray for patronage positions. He arrived in 
Quebec in 1763 with assurance of being appointed postmaster of the colony. He was 
fluent in French, became affiliated with Stephen Moore, a merchant who had established 
himself in Quebec in August 1761. Their retail advertisements in the Quebec Gazette 
reflected in amusing alliteration—bindings, buckles, buttons and boots—the wide range of 
goods sold. In 1765 Finlay and Moore, deeply in debt, but unable to collect from those 
who owed them, had to turn their business over to creditors. Such bankruptcies were 
commonplace and part of the problem of the credit structure of business. Alternative 
sources of income were important to merchants. In Finlay’s case, his job as postmaster 
probably provided him some security. He instituted biweekly service between Quebec 
and Montreal via Trois Rivieres and a bimonthly post south to Albany to meet the mail 
packet between New York City and Falmouth, England. In 1773 he attempted to
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establish other routes—one down the Chaudibre and Kennebeck to Falmouth, Maine (a 
route made famous two years later for its impassability by Benedict Arnold on his march 
to capture Quebec City); another through the White Mountains down the St. Francis 
River in the Eastern Townships to Montreal. In 1774 Finlay succeeded Benjamin 
Franklin as one of the deputy postmasters general for North America. In 1775 Carleton 
appointed him to the Legislative Council and in 1776 to the "inner council of five." The 
latter body, though illegal, was the real legislative arm of the government. Finlay was 
vehemently opposed to the arbitrary powers exercised by Carleton such as corvees and 
billeting of soldiers. Not surprisingly, he was dropped from the inner council. From 
the Proclamation of 1763 on, Finlay had been a champion of British rights.
No list of merchants in Montreal would be complete without reference to Thomas 
Walker (England, Boston). Walker arrived in Montreal from Boston in 1763, 
immediately purchased one of the most substantial houses in the town and established 
himself as one of the leading merchants in the province. His reputation for abhorring 
the practice of billeting of soldiers became a major source of contention between him and 
the army. In 1764 his actions as a jurist against an officer who, he concluded, had 
abused the privilege of billeting led to an incident called "Walker’s Ear." This event, 
which will be discussed later, marked the turning point in the conflict between the 
merchants and Murray. From then on, the merchants’ efforts to have Murray recalled 
were relentless. Walker’s influence in Quebec is remembered more for his political 
activities than for his commercial ventures, although he was involved in the fur trade and
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was a major wheat purchaser and speculator. He played a major role in support of the 
American revolutionists during the invasion of Quebec in 1774-76, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. He is generally depicted as a cantankerous, difficult individual, 
a reputation which may be deserved; but this may be too one-sided a view. Very little 
is known about him when he lived in Boston, but before moving to Montreal, he was 
listed with other prominent figures of the day as a member of the Society for 
Encouraging Trade and Commerce within the Province of the Massachusetts Bay.15
Merchants who do not receive sufficient attention in this period are the Jews, many 
of them Sephardic Jews, who had immigrated to North America during the Seven Years’ 
War. Some were suppliers of the French; others stationed with the British troops in New 
York had gained reputable credentials so that after the conquest they were given contracts 
to supply the troops in Quebec and in the various forts vacated by the French. Aaron 
and Moses Hart, Eleazar Solomons and his cousin, Lucius Levy Solomons, and Samuel 
Jacobs were among the more prominent Jews who settled in Montreal, Trois Rivieres, 
and St. Denis. These merchants were well connected, having financial support in 
London, New York City, Philadelphia, and Albany. As a result they were able to 
operate on a larger scale than some other merchants who came with the army or shortly 
thereafter, but except for Joseph Bindon, Lazarus David, David Salesby Franks, son of 
Abraham Franks, Andrew Hays, and Simon Levy, there is no mention of them in any 
accounts of Quebec. One explanation that is advanced is that they did not find it
^Massachusetts Historical Society, T. Paine Mss.
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hospitable and returned to New York from where they came.16 They must have had 
some influence in Quebec, however, for these immigrant Jews were a close-knit group 
and, as in the following example, they kept business and family ties even after they 
returned to the colonies.
Aaron Hart (England, Albany) was a sutler who moved to Trois Rivieres, where 
he was purveyor of the troops under acting Governor Haldimand. Hart soon became 
involved in the fur trade, engaging the best known voyageurs in the region. He parlayed 
this success into substantial land acquisitions. Hart worked at establishing a family 
dynasty in Trois Rivieres and maintaining close ties to other members of his family. He 
traveled to London to marry a cousin, Dorothy Judah, whose brothers, Uriah and 
Samuel, were already in Canada. Aaron’s brother, Moses, joined him in Trois Rivieres; 
another brother, Henry, settled in Albany, and a third, Lemon, owned a rum distillery 
in London. Hart’s four sons were brought into his business enterprises and eight of his 
eleven children inherited substantial holdings in and around Trois Rivieres. Despite 
Aaron’s efforts to retain for his family their Jewish heritage, his survivors were 
eventually assimilated into the French-Canadian culture of Trois Rivieres.
Lucius Levy Solomons was part of a consortium with Ezekiel Solomons to supply 
the British army from Albany during the Seven Years’ War. After the conquest the
16B.G. Sach, History o f the Jews in Canada, trans. Ralph Novek (Montreal: Harvest 
House, 1965), 412-46.
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cousins became involved in the fur trade and moved their headquarters to Montreal. 
They were financially ruined during Pontiac’s uprising, and although the partnership 
broke up, they eventually recouped their losses and went on to become significant 
traders. In 1768 they were among the founders of the Shearith Israel congregation in 
Montreal, which helped solidify the Jewish community in Montreal that survives to this 
day. During the American occupation of Montreal in 1775, Levy cooperated with the 
invaders. When they left, the British turned him out of his house. Once again he 
survived and continued in business in Montreal until 1782.
Another Jew to arrive in Quebec with Wolfe’s army in 1759 as purveyor of the 
troops was Samuel Jacobs. In 1760 Jacobs loaded down a schooner with dried fish for 
Portugal, but it was commandeered for military transport. Stranded in Quebec, he 
opened up a retail store catering to the British officer corps. Like other merchants, he 
tried to diversify his business ventures to minimize risks. Thus before settling in 
St. Denis, his speculative ventures included forming a distillery company with two other 
merchants, Benjamin Price and John Hays; establishing a store at Crown Point to take 
advantage of the St. Lawrence-Richelieu waterway in an effort to ship goods more 
cheaply than traders in New York; and with partners, James Stewart and George 
Allsopp, he dabbled in potash production. All these schemes met with indifferent 
success, largely because Jacobs had too little capital and too little patience to devote to 
them. Finally, however, he realized that "a rolling stone does not gather moss," and he 
settled down to retail sales and grain trafficking in the Richelieu Valley. Jacobs was
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important to the region’s economy. While it might be assumed that as a major grain 
purchaser, he could take advantage of the habitant, a recent study shows that the habitant 
was a sharp bargainer and held out for as high a price as he could get. According to 
Allan Greer, the habitant was independent and quite able to take care of himself.17
There were other merchants who came soon after the conquest. Joseph Schindler 
(Switzerland), a silversmith who produced silver for the fur trade; James Hanna 
(Ireland), a clock and watchmaker, related to John McCord’s wife established himself 
first in McCord’s house in Quebec, but later became a prosperous merchant; Jacob 
Jordan (England), an agent for the London firm of Fludyer and Drummond, victuallers 
for the British troops in America; John Painter (England) probably came as the agent of 
a British firm. He left Quebec in 1776, but returned in 1783, prospered and became a 
major figure in Quebec’s commercial life. James Johnston and John Purss (both from 
Scotland) formed a lifelong partnership and engaged in diverse activities which included 
overseas trade.
Even those merchants who arrived without education or influence became in many 
cases productive members of Quebec society. One such example was Murray’s tailor, 
Ralph Gray (Scotland). Gray was a regimental tailor under Amherst, was wounded in 
the attack of Montmorency Falls, and on the Plains of Abraham in 1759. He secured his
17Allan Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1993), 149.
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discharge and established himself as a tailor in Quebec, setting up shop first on the Rue 
de la Pauvre and then purchasing with cash (£600) a stone house on Rue de la Fabrique. 
At first he carried commonplace items in his shop, but later such luxury items as Irish 
linens, silks, and elegant European velvets were advertised in the Quebec Gazette. With 
the success of his business, Gray was able to become a wealthy landowner and respected 
member of Quebec society.
Murray’s disdain for the "little educated" English element included the "soldiers 
discharged after the reduction of troops." In his list of 136 Protestants living in Montreal 
in 1765, thirty-six, or twenty-six per cent, were designated as soldiers, sergeants or 
corporals. These men were described as butchers, clerks, barbers, innholders, or clerks. 
One was listed as a goaler, another a schoolmaster, and another a merchant. Richard 
McCarthy (New England) probably was a commissary with the Connecticut militia. In 
1765 he was a freeholder and notary in Chambly; in 1768 he became a barrister and 
attorney-at-law. In 1770 he apparently decided to give up his practice since he is 
recorded as taking out a trading license to travel from Montreal to Michilimackinac. 
Whether he was a lone agent, or perhaps somehow involved with his uncle by marriage, 
who was believed to be the highly respected Canadian merchant, Francois Baby, is not 
known. For the next few years he traded between Michilimackinac and the Illinois 
country, and in 1775 he established himself in a place that he named St. Ursule’s on the 
east side of the Mississippi. During the Revolution he first provided valuable 
information to the British, but soon he joined up with the Virginian forces. He explained
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to his wife in Montreal that his change of allegiance was an attempt to establish a fortune 
for their children and a pension for herself in the event of his death. Whether this was 
true will never be known for he was murdered while in the service.
Two officers who remained after the reduction were Edward William Gray and 
Moses Hazen. Edward William Gray (England) came to Montreal on the British warship 
"Vanguard." He engaged in trade but was mostly an officeholder, serving as deputy 
registrar, provost marshal and deputy commissary for the district of Montreal. He was 
a notary public and lawyer. By marriage he was related to fur traders Forrest Oakes and 
Lawrence Ermatinger. Moses Hazen (New England), an officer also wounded at the 
battle of Sainte-Foy, impressed Murray with his boldness and courage in battle. Murray 
recommended him for a lieutenant’s commission in the 44th foot. Murray attributed to 
Hazen "so much. . . bravery and good conduct as would justly entitle him to every 
military reward he could ask or demand."18 In 1763 Hazen retired in Montreal on half 
pay, became a major speculator, and seized opportunities wherever he saw them. 
Unfortunately, he was always involved in dubious dealings, and whether as the plaintiff 
or defendant, he seems to have spent a great deal of his life in court. During the 
impending invasion of Montreal in 1775 by General Schuyler, Hazen was accused of 
being a traitor by each side. Reluctantly, he eventually decided to throw in his lot with 
the American rebels. After the war, he lived in New York and was tireless in his efforts 
to seek redress for those Canadians in his regiment who could not return to Quebec.
18Dictionary of Canadian Biography, V, 412.
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Hazen’s biographer, Allan S. Everett, laments the fact that Hazen, a "man of marked 
abilities and great drive," was prevented from realizing his ambitions due to the 
Revolution. Everett says that he was "a buccaneer in an age of buccaneers, [who] might 
have become one of the great colonizers of his generation."19
The foregoing description of merchants includes some who were American-born 
or who had an American experience. Most historians refer only tangentially to the 
influence of the American colonists in Quebec at this time. From Murray’s list of 
Protestants in Montreal in 1765, the American colonists represented only thirteen per 
cent of the population. However, that figure is limited and misleading. If the merchants 
who had lived in the colonies before immigrating to Quebec are included, the percentage 
becomes greater. As can be seen from Appendix II, out of a study of one hundred of 
the most prominent merchants, almost half came from the American colonies directly or 
had lived in the colonies at some point. In addition to mere numbers, another 
consideration has to be the extent of the influence these men exerted. In this context, 
three of the most important fur traders—Alexander Henry, Peter Pond and Peter 
Pangman—were from the American colonies. Moses Hazen and Richard McCarty 
contributed to the development of Quebec until the onset of the Revolution, when they 
eventually sided with the Americans. Simon McTavish, while not American-born, had 
apprenticed in Albany and had been affiliated with a leading Albany fur merchant,
19Allan S. Everett, Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American 
Revolution (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976), 179.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
William Edgar, before moving to Montreal. Alexander and Robert Ellice from 
Schenectady brought know-how, capital and connections to Quebec. Thomas Walker was 
another transplant from England by way of the colonies. Walker lived in Boston for 
eleven years and was imbued with ideas of republicanism. He played a prominent role 
in the political activities of the province. Thomas Aylwin (England) and Thomas Ainslie 
(Scotland) also lived in Boston before moving to Quebec. Important members of the 
American Jewish community arrived in Quebec from New York at the time of the 
conquest. Many of them returned but those who remained established themselves in 
Montreal, St. Denis, and Trois Rivieres and kept close ties with their families, friends, 
and business associates in New York, Albany, and Philadelphia.
A group of merchants of American origin who arrived in Quebec during this period 
and who have generally been ignored by historians except for their role in the American 
invasion of Quebec were Alexander, James, and John Livingston, all related to the 
prominent Albany family; James Price and William Haywood, whom Carleton described 
as "barbers," but who were listed as merchants and freeholders in Montreal in 1765. 
According to Creighton, Price loaned £20,000 to the Americans during the invasion in 
1775. Joseph Bindon, Joseph Torry, John Blake, Samuel Mather, and John Hacy are 
listed by Murray as merchants, bom in America and living in Montreal or its district in 
1765. Price, Haywood and Blake were among the Montreal merchants protesting a 
meeting of seigneurs in February 1766. Bindon, Blake, John Livingston, Price, 
Haywood, and Torry are listed as signing petitions for an assembly prior to the Quebec
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Act. They do not as a group appear to have been among the most prominent members 
of Quebec society, but they were active politically and did exert a critical influence 
during the 1775 invasion.
The purpose of the above investigation was two-fold: to determine the validity of 
the charge that the merchants were a disreputable "swarm of locusts" who descended on 
Quebec after the conquest; and to decide whether there was an American influence that 
was significant. The conclusion thus far is that there was an American influence of note 
and that the label of "licentious fanaticks" was undeserved. The foregoing descriptions 
of the merchants and those described in Appendix II illustrate how misleading the history 
of this period is if only the political and official accounts are relied on by historians. 
Many of the merchants either had some education, some connection with important 
supply houses in London, or some capital of their own with which to launch their careers 
in Quebec. They were responsible for developing the infrastructure of Quebec. In many 
developing economies, there are individuals who will channel their entrepreneurial talents 
to better their own situations and with their new-found wealth take flight. This does not 
seem to be the case with the Quebec merchants. Most of them reinvested in their own 
country. Often interrelated by business or marriage, they were the builders of 
community life.
This positive portrayal, however, does not ignore the fact that there were 
"unscrupulous" merchants who engaged in sharp practices. This fact is hardly surprising
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given the nature of new societies in general. Add to that the impact of the frontier on 
the mentality of an aggressive, ambitious, competitive element and it is understandable 
that this period of the early years of British rule was unstable. Nonetheless, what this 
retrospective suggests is that the merchants as a group were probably no better nor worse 
than the general society. Collectively, the merchants examined here could not have 
changed so dramatically to go from being "the worse collection of scoundrels ever 
known," according to Murray, to the responsible, civic-minded citizens that investigation 
into their lives would indicate.
An argument to support the good character of the merchants is that the supply 
houses of London would not have risked employing men whom they could not trust. 
With credit the only means of conducting business in the colonies, if the colonial agents 
were not trustworthy, the firms would not have survived. Self-interest was also the 
argument Benjamin Frobisher used in his letter to Shelburne, mentioned earlier. He 
argued that the greatest part of the traders were men of "property settled in Montreal" 
and since they had to give bond "to a great amount. . . their own interest and the 
difficulty of escaping the hands of justice would prompt them to behave in a becoming 
manner."20 There were scoundrels, as Frobisher admitted, but part of the problem was 
in distinguishing who and where the scoundrels were. Many of the more serious crimes 
occurred in the frontier, where conditions have always produced lawlessness. The 
unscrupulous were also not always the traders. Government officials were accused of
20PAC, Shelburne Mss., 162.
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exacting unreasonable fees from the habitants. Everyone seemed on the take. As will 
be seen in Chapters 2 and 5, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Sir William Johnson, 
and his deputy, George Groghan, were not exempt from conflicts of interest in Indian 
land deals. 21
Another possible criterion for determining the merchants’ behavior is to examine 
the Proclamations and ordinances issued between 1760 and 1764 during the military 
occupation.22 The records for Quebec have been lost, but those of Montreal and Trois 
Rivieres give sufficient knowledge of the tenor of the actions. In Montreal, the first 
action taken by General Gage was in February 1761, and it forbade the fraudulent 
practice of cutting dollars or crowns. In the same month traders and merchants going 
into the upper country were required to have passports and to list their merchandise, the 
number of canoes, and names of employees. On April 1, 1761, sending peltries to 
France was declared illegal. In order to combat the practice of individuals’ transferring 
money to other places where the value was higher, on July 20, 1762, an ordinance was 
passed increasing the value of French money from 6 livres toumois to 8 shillings, 
lOVi pence. On August 2, 1762, an ordinance was issued establishing one measure, the 
English yard, for sale of dry goods since representatives doing business in Montreal were
21See the Papers o f Sir William Johnson (Vols. III-XIII, Albany: The University of 
the State of New York, 1931-62) for a better understanding of frontier conditions. For 
background on Johnson’s and Groghan’s land deals, see Clement Currey, Road to 
Revolution.
22PAC, Annual Reports, 1918, Appendix B.
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making use of different measures to the detriment of everyone including merchants in the 
preparation of accounts with principals in England. The price of bread was fixed in an 
ordinance dated October 18, 1762. On January 13, 1763, selling com or flour outside 
Montreal was prohibited. In 1763 as a result of complaints by traders and merchants, 
those artisans, journeymen, and others who left their regular callings were prohibited 
from daily selling their wares below market value in the public squares in town.
When Burton replaced Gage as governor of Montreal, he fixed the price for bread 
and beef. On January 5, 1764, the storing, selling, bartering of gunpowder was declared 
illegal. A few months later, Burton declared all merchants and traders had leave to trade 
and traffic with the Indians openly and freely without passes. They were, however, 
forbidden to sell gunpowder, firearms, ammunitions, or spirituous liquors, and they were 
forbidden to pass beyond established posts on the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers.
Similar types of Proclamations and ordinances were passed by Governor Burton at 
Trois Rivieres. In September 1760, inhabitants were prohibited from selling game, 
sheep, and other items to travellers. They were also forbidden to receive or give, in 
payment for their goods or merchandise, the paper money known by the name of 
Ordinance money. On October 28, 1760, an ordinance read:
We are very much surprised to find in this town persons of a character so 
low and contemptible as to abuse the permission we have given to our 
merchants to sell brandy or other liquors to Canadians and habitants, 
prohibiting selling same to soldiers in fear of disorder. Despite this the 
sordid appetite for a paltry gain or the reprehensible desire to drink with our
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soldiers, has misled some wretched creatures, to buy booz for soldiers.
Unless stopped all sale to all people will be stopped.23
All coureurs des corns (hucksters) were forbidden to sell or be in town. Any 
found were warned they would have to leave within twenty-four hours. On March 19, 
1762, a Proclamation reminded those small traders who "are contemptible enough to 
employ all artifices to impose upon the Indians and deceive them in the dealing they have 
together" that the Indians were subjects of His Majesty.
The concerns dealing with the merchants and traders that were important enough 
to receive public attention are expressed in these official statements. Some were in 
response to the complaints of the merchants and were in their interests. Others clearly 
indicated the need to protect the consumers and Indians from shoddy practices. Many 
of the ordinances and Proclamations were commonplace at that time. A comparison with 
those of Albany, New York, which had been in British hands for almost a century, were 
quite similar. Because there was no uniformity of standards, such as there are today, it 
was difficult for the population, merchants and consumers, to appreciate what was a fair 
price for certain commodities.24 It is also important to note that the ordinances and 
Proclamations also censored the Canadians.
72 Ibid.
24See Chapter 3, "The Conduct o f Business," in Virginia Harrington, The New York 
Merchants on the Eve o f  Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935), 76- 
125.
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Thus far only the English mercantile community has been considered. What is 
generally ignored by most historians is that the many charges leveled against the English 
should also have been leveled against the Canadians. Canadian importers, itinerant 
hucksters, bakers, and butchers remained after the conquest. They were used to 
monopolistic practices and were not above taking advantage of the scarcity of food and 
supplies. But rarely are the Canadians considered in the same context as the English 
merchants and traders who were charged with being an "immoral" group. There is 
ample evidence to indicate that they should have been. Ouellet debunks the nationalists’ 
theory of the "trauma" of the conquest and argues that the real trauma was the 
exploitation of the habitant by his own people. Ouellet quotes an observer of this 
fraudulent behavior while France still occupied Canada.
It is a wonder that the Canadian isn’t annoyed from listening each day to the 
reproaches about the huge expenses made on his behalf in protecting his 
religious freedom and his possessions; but what disheartens and discourages 
him is the immense fortunes made under his very eyes by particular people, 
who have been sent from France, to govern them, but who greedily despoil 
them by turning to their own profit and to the prejudice of the colonies’ 
establishment the very investments that were destined them.25
These corrupt practices, Ouellet suggests, were so widespread among the 
population that even after the men of the Grand Societe returned to France, those who 
were left behind continued to take advantage of the situation.
25Ouellet, Economic, 48.
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Thus far, a review of the Proclamations and ordinances do not support singling out 
the English-speaking merchant community as an "unscrupulous" group of men. If they 
were, from Ouellet’s study mentioned above, they were not alone, for the Canadians 
were guilty of corrupt practices as well. Conditions were ripe for such practices, but 
despite such an acknowledgment, the foregoing identification of many of the most 
prominent merchants indicates that these men were frequently from good families, had 
influential connections, that discharged soldiers in some cases received Murray’s 
commendation, that those who might be termed "uneducated" went on to gain substantial 
wealth, and that the majority of merchants were responsible citizens of their 
communities. Two other segments of the English-speaking community that have not been 
mentioned are the professionals and government officials. They, too, have been 
chastised for taking advantage of the habitant, exacting unreasonable fees for services. 
The rest of the English-speaking population were the small innkeepers, shopkeepers, 
barbers, bakers, and other tradesmen. If Murray is referring to this segment of the 
population, he does not make that clear. But it is obvious that he is not, for his target 
is the articulate, politically active merchants who opposed him. Since Gates and later 
Carleton made the same disparagements against the merchants more than personal pique 
has to be considered.
Many historians have attributed the conflicts to be class-driven. There is little 
question that the disdain each had for the other underlay the ensuing political struggles 
between the merchants and the army and the merchants and the governors. Until 1763 
there were only slight indications of the strife that would later erupt. The merchants
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explained that they did not protest the denial of their civil rights because they understood 
they were living under military rule. When civilian rule went into effect on August 10, 
1764, they anticipated being granted the same rights as other Englishmen living in a 
British colony. They had no reason to think otherwise. An exchange between the 
merchants and General Gage on January 1, 1762, is illustrative of such an expectation. 
In a "humble address of the trading people of the city and government of Montreal" to 
Gage, the merchants expressed pleasure in the moderation and justice of his 
administration, the encouragement and protection he gave to trade and commerce, the 
easiness of access with which they could approach him, and the polite manner in which 
he received them. The merchants were voicing their appreciation for the appointment 
of an English council to hear and redress their complaints, which, they said, was 
evidence of the ."highest sense of, and strictest regard to, the liberties and privileges of 
a British subject." They assured Gage that "with strict regard to truth, [they found 
themselves] in the full and free enjoyment of those inestimable privileges, which, as 
subjects of one of the best governments in the world, we are entitled to."26
Gage responded. "I flatter myself that the new branch of commerce opened to His 
Majesty’s subjects, by the conquest of this country, will, through your integrity, care, 
and industry, be improved to the highest advantage." He promised that,
You will find a readiness in me to encourage your endeavors, and second 
your attempts; and will ever meet with that protection, for your persons and
26New Hampshire Gazette, March 19, 1762.
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properties, which every person, bom under the benign influence of a British 
government, has a right to expect and demand.27
Such harmony did not last long.
Perhaps the first rumblings heard from the merchants occurred in the fall of 1762, 
when they presented a memorial to Murray in Quebec complaining of the hardships 
placed on them and the nation by various articles in the Capitulation.
By these articles the French have liberty to export to France whatever 
peltries they may have without being confined to any particular time or 
quantity, to which purpose they are, moreover, to be found with British 
vessels at any time. By this means the French have got possession of the fur 
trade as fully as before the conquest of Canada, and run no other risk than 
that of the sea in fencing at home.28
The merchants went on to say that since the French were better acquainted with the 
country, they could engross all the fur trade and import manufactured goods from France 
by way of Guernsey and Jersey and "laugh at all the efforts of the British merchants to 
share it with them." If a stop were not put to such practices, the merchants warned, 
"adieu to the British trade in Canada; it will be in vain to import anything more than the 
trifle that may be wanting for the use of the troops.1,29
21Ibid.
2%lbid., September 25, 1762.
29Ibid.
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Increasingly, the merchants stepped up their protests against the regulators who 
they believed did not understand or have sympathy with the needs of the commercial 
community. At the same time, dissension was growing between the civilian population 
and the military. The merchants bristled when their wives, but not they, were invited 
to officers’ balls. Such slights only added to the outrage the merchants felt toward 
practices such as billeting of soldiers, corvees, and curfews. By the time the military 
occupation ended, the clashes between the merchants and the militia had reached crisis 
proportions.
Few historians have dealt with this clash from the perspective of the merchant 
class. A typical account of the military rule is expressed by A. L. Burt in The Province 
o f Old Quebec. Burt concludes:
On looking back over all the enactments of the military regime, one is struck 
by the fact that the governors did more than follow the forms of the old 
regime. They caught its best spirit. They speak not as conquerors to a 
subject race, but as fathers to their children; their words are less stem 
commands than paternal admonition.30
The military governors deserve much applause for their tolerance and concern for 
the conquered people. But what Burt misses is the subtle distinction that along with this 
tolerance went an air of superiority that was also demeaning. This distinction is not 
germane to the issue here; however, if the English merchants were also expected to 
submit to being treated like children, it is easy to understand how a clash between the
30Burt, The Province o f Old Quebec (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1933), 52.
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governors and the merchants would be inevitable. Creighton describes the merchants as 
spirited, ambitious, and competitive and, he adds, as a result of being linked to the 
savagery of North America,
A sense of the treachery and violence of men and nature in the new world 
was in their blood; and their lives were governed by the incalculable chances 
of success and calamitous failure and sudden death31
If Creighton is right, then how could such men be treated like children and denied 
what they believed they rightfully deserved?
The merchants’ case and their demands for British rights have generally been cast 
in a negative light as that of a small self-seeking English minority trying to impose its 
views on an overwhelming French-speaking majority. This indictment from their 
perspective and from the perspective of history appears to be less than just given the 
encouragement they received from General Amherst to venture to Quebec in the first 
place, the promise once there by General Gage that their rights as Englishmen would be 
protected, and that promise given constitutional guarantees in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763. The Proclamation which was intended to usher in a new period of British 
hegemony in North America instead triggered a bitter conflict that resulted in the recall 
of the first civilian governor and eventually to a reversal of policy in 1774. British 
motives in the policy decisions of the Proclamation and the influence of the American
31Donald Creighton, Empire o f the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 
1956), 27.
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colonies on those decisions are germane to an understanding of this embryonic stage in 
Canadian-American relations that began with the Treaty of Paris and the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE PROMISE OF THE PROCLAMATION
Few British policies have been so roundly condemned as the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763. For eleven years after it went into effect, its promise of British rights to the 
inhabitants of Quebec was a constant source of friction between the English-speaking 
merchants and the first two civilian governors. The Proclamation called for a general 
assembly, for a British system of justice, and for rights enjoyed by all Englishmen. With 
the same brush stroke, however, the Proclamation severely curtailed the fur trade by the 
reduction of the borders of the province, now named Quebec, to a thin strip on either 
side of the St. Lawrence. Land grants for settlers were prohibited and traders restricted 
between the Proclamation line (the Appalachian divide) and the Mississippi River. Had 
the political rights of the British merchants been granted, as was called for in the 
Proclamation, their frustration at being regulated economically might have found an 
outlet in the political power they would gain. But no attempt at calling an assembly was 
made. Murray found it inexpedient to do so on the grounds that a small minority of 
Englishmen would rule as an oligarchy over the overwhelming French-Canadian 
population which, because of its religion, was prohibited from holding office.
Once the Proclamation went into effect, the clash between the British merchants 
and the civil administrators and the military was inevitable. What had promised to be
62
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a far-reaching plan for global and continental integration of Britain’s vast new empire 
resulted in the disintegration of the empire. But was the cause of the disintegration the 
Proclamation itself or Murray’s (and later Carleton’s) refusal to implement it? Historians 
generally believe the policymakers who formulated the Proclamation were misguided. 
They argue that Murray was right and that a policy of anglicization did not take into 
account the peculiar conditions of the conquered people. What then was the rationale of 
the policymakers? Who were they? How much influence did the American interests in 
London wield in the formulation of such policy? Was that influence in competition with 
Canadian interests and did it undermine those interests as Canadian historians have 
variously claimed? The aliswer to these questions will provide a better understanding of 
the nature of the triangular relations among Canada, the United States, and Great Britain, 
for the roots of that relationship began in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris and the Royal 
Proclamation.
Before discussing the role of the various interests in both the Treaty and the 
Proclamation, the various forms of competition between the old colonies and the new 
need explication. In 1761, Murray complained that contracts for victuallers and money 
lenders for the army posts in Canada were awarded to American firms rather than to 
Quebec firms. Murray was right that many contracts were rewarded to syndicates in the 
colonies through connections in London. Such contracts were extremely profitable. 
Between 1768 and 1774 the victualling contract brought £90,000 sterling annually into
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North America and the money contract £94,000.* The two contracts usually went hand 
in hand. From 1760 to 1774 the New York agents, who enjoyed the lion’s share of the 
North American business, were John McEvers, partner of John Watts, and Watts’ 
father-in-law, Charles Apthorp of Boston. Already mentioned were the contracts 
awarded Phyn, Ellice, and Company. Other established firms carrying on a substantial 
business of supplying traders at Detroit were William Edgar, a New York merchant with 
whom McTavish was initially affiliated, and the Philadelphia firm of Baynton, Wharton, 
and Morgan.2 American involvement with an important and politically well-connected 
English merchant firm had many advantages—economic, political, and social. Canadian 
historians Creighton and Ouellet stress the fact that this influence was largely responsible 
for the disadvantageous terms of the Proclamation to Canadian fur interests.
The rivalry in the fur trade between the American colonies and Quebec centered, 
according to Creighton’s thesis, around the two river systems, the St. Lawrence and the 
Hudson. Until the fur trade moved farther west beginning in 1768-69, the major 
advantage of the Hudson seems to have been that transportation costs, especially those 
for tobacco and rum so vital to the fur trade, were less there than in the St. Lawrence, 
which was unnavigable from the onset of winter until the spring thaw. The New York
!Joseph R. Frese and Jacob Judd, eds., Business Enterprise in Early New York 
(Tarrytown, New York: Sleepy Hollow Press, 1979), 47-48.
2Jose Igartua, "A Change in Climate: The Conquest and the Marchands of Montreal," 
262-264, in Francis R. Douglas and Donald B. Smith, eds., Readings in Canadian 
History, Pre-Confederation (3rd ed., Toronto: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston of Canada, 
Ltd., 1990).
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to Michilimackinac route was considered the easier one. Large bateaux could be used, 
enabling the traders to carry greater provisions not only to sell to the Indians but to 
sustain them on longer trips into the wilderness. The main advantage the Montreal fur 
traders had was the experience of the French Canadians who manned the canoes and 
taught the English how to deal with the Indians.3
The rivalry in the triangular trade with London and the West Indies suffered not 
only in the fur industry, but in other industries as well. The riches of the St. Lawrence 
fisheries were severely curtailed by the Proclamation. The new boundaries of Quebec 
reduced that profitable export market in southern Europe and the West Indies, a void 
which the New England fishermen were only too glad to fill. The timber trade and the 
infant agricultural industry could not compete with New England’s highly-controlled 
markets, their geographic advantage, and their larger population, giving them market 
advantage.
Many of these advantages Canadian historians attribute to the fact that American 
interests were responsible for the delimitation of Quebec and for the restrictions imposed 
on the fur traders, both of which were detrimental to Quebec. To evaluate such charges, 
in this chapter the influence of the American colonies on Quebec shifts from Quebec to 
London and the ephemeral role of influence peddlers on the formulation of British policy
3Harold Innis, Peter Pond, Fur Trader and Adventurer (Toronto: Irwin and Gordon, 
Ltd., 1930).
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vis a vis Canada. These influence peddlers included American agents in London 
representing various interests, private and provincial, merchant-members of the House 
of Commons, and British merchants with American interests. In comparison, there were 
few spokesmen for Canadian interests at this time.
The decisions that affected Canada began with the debate over the retention of 
Canada at the treaty. That debate pitted the expansionists against the mercantilists and 
was of prime importance for it reflected the changing and conflicting attitudes about the 
role of the colonies and the mother country toward each other. The policy decisions with 
respect to retention of Canada at the treaty, the Proclamation, Western policy in 1768, 
and the Quebec Act of 1774 were influenced by that debate. Since the decision to retain 
Canada and the intent of the Proclamation are so important to an understanding of the 
history of this period, the arguments advanced in their formulation are treated here in 
some detail.
With the capitulation of Montreal in 1760, there were doubts whether Canada 
would be ceded to Great Britain. The pamphlet literature from 1760 to 1761, which was 
mostly anonymous, predated the end of hostilities and the beginning of peace negotiations 
and reflected a wide range of conflicting views. Generally, the expansionists, led by 
Pitt, wanted to retain all the conquered territory in order to quash France’s colonial 
designs. This included retaining Canada and the French sugar islands captured by Great 
Britain, especially Guadeloupe. Generally, the pacifists, led by the Duke of Bedford,
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argued that trade and not territory should be Britain’s concern. The Bedfordites were 
opposed to Britain’s being "overloaded" should Canada and Guadeloupe both be retained. 
However, no one view prevailed. Over sixty pamphlets, not to mention magazine 
articles and newspapers, argued the merits and demerits of the various options.
One of the notable exchanges of letters, both written anonymously, was in 1760: 
"A Letter Addressed to Two Great Men on the Prospect of Peace," referring to Pitt and 
Newcastle, and a response to it entitled "Some Account of Remarks on the Letter 
Addressed to Two Great Men." These two articles, presumably written by John Douglas 
and William Burke, respectively, represented contrary views about the retention of 
Canada and Guadeloupe at the forthcoming peace negotiations. The former pamphlet 
compared Guadeloupe and Canada. The reasons advanced for retaining Guadeloupe were 
enumerated. "It was an island of great fertility, well stocked, well cultivated, and would 
be an immediate producer of considerable riches to Great Britain. It could contribute to 
a lower price for sugar in home markets, supply neighboring countries with sugar, and 
increase British exports for the supply of necessaries for the planters and their slaves." 
On the other hand, the author reasoned, retention of Canada had great potential for 
establishing Great Britain as the leading mercantile nation in Europe. Canada’s potential 
wealth in furs, lumber, and fish would provide exports for markets in Europe and the 
Spanish and French settlements in South America. Britain’s manufactures could be sold 
to the Canadians and to the Indians, thereby providing employment for its people while 
at the same time enriching the nation. The fisheries would provide a nursery for seamen,
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strengthening Britain’s naval power. Above all, retention of Canada would give England 
secure possession of the whole Atlantic seaboard of North America. The author 
concluded: "Common sense gives preference to Canada. . . ."4
In response to the above letter, the author of "Some Account of Remarks on the 
Letter Addressed to Two Great Men" attacked the weakness of the argument in support 
of retaining Canada and advised instead retaining Guadeloupe. Those who believed 
retaining Canada would reduce the chance of another war with France, the author 
argued, neglected the fact that the French would still be in control of Louisiana, a vast 
territory bordering the American colonies; they would still navigate the Mississippi and 
be settled along it; and their long ties with the Indians would not easily be expunged. 
By removing France from the borders of the American colonies, those colonies would 
no longer be dependent on Great Britain for protection and would soon assert their 
independence from the mother country. In addition to these geo-political considerations, 
the economic advantage of Guadeloupe, according to the author, was that its products did 
not compete with those of England. Guadeloupe would immediately produce economic 
benefits. Jamaican trade alone accounted for as much as Virginia and Maryland and 
more than all the New England colonies combined.5
4January 3, 1761 article from London reprinted in the New Hampshire Gazette, April 
3, 1761.
5Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, 2 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio: The 
Arthur H. Clark Company, 1912) I, 58-60.
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As compelling as the latter argument seemed, the counter-argument articulated by 
Benjamin Franklin was considered one of the most popular treatises on the subject. In 
"The Interest of Great Britain Considered with Regard to her Colonies and the 
Acquisitions of Canada and Guadeloupe," Franklin supported the expansionists’ view, 
but from a pragmatic American perspective. Not surprisingly, Franklin favored retention 
of Canada. This astute statesman attacked the three basic fears of those who argued 
against retaining Canada: concern that without France on its borders, the American 
colonists would become more independent; that they would start their own manufacturing 
to supply the expanding population into the interior; and that the acquisition of such vast 
territory in America would depopulate Britain. Franklin had been one of the architects 
of the Albany Plan in 1754, a scheme for the colonists to join together in a federation 
for their mutual protection against the Indians. He knew firsthand how fractured and 
unwilling the American colonies were to join together in common cause even for their 
own protection. Franklin stressed in his article that with all their petty jealousies, there 
was little chance that the colonies would ever give up their own autonomies. Without 
the barrier of the French on the western frontier, he believed, the American colonies 
would grow and prosper and the mother country would be the economic beneficiary. 
With land to settle, the colonists would eschew manufacturing for farming, leaving 
Britain to supply an increasing population in need of her manufactured goods. 
Furthermore, he believed with the great river system, transporting goods to and from 
Britain would not be a problem. In contrast to Burke’s views about the economic role 
of colonies to the mother country, Franklin reflected the changing nature of the
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relationship, i.e. that supplying markets for Britain’s manufactures was at least as 
important as supplying her raw materials. Franklin also prophesied that in time Quebec 
would lose her distinct French culture and would become assimilated into the larger 
English-speaking culture of the continent.6
In less than sixteen years the formidable Franklin was proven wrong on two 
counts—the independence of the colonies and the assimilation of the French Canadians. 
But at the time, his argument was considered one of the most cogent and sophisticated 
on the subject. Even the author of "Remarks," who was against retaining Canada, 
declared that of all the writers who argued in support of Canada, Franklin was "clearly 
the ablest, the most ingenious, the most dexterous, and the most perfectly acquainted 
with the fort and faible of the argument, and we may therefore conclude that he has said 
every thing in the best manner that the cause would bear. "7
Such tributes should not be misleading. In 1761 a persuasive argument, more 
prophetic than Franklin’s, was made from a contrary viewpoint. The author of "The 
Reasons for keeping Guadeloupe at a Peace preferable to Canada Explained in Five 
letters from a Gentleman in Guadeloupe to his Friend in London" raised concerns not 
previously considered. The author queried, "How great a revenue or profit would accrue
6John Bigelow, comp, and ed., Benjamin Franklin, Works (12 vols.; New York: 
1904), III, 69.
7Ibid.
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from taking over an economy based on the fur trade?" He reminded his readers that New 
France had been a constant drain on France. Furthermore, he pointed out a glaring 
omission in the public debate: the inhabitants of New France were an alien race, one of 
a different culture and religion. Since their allegiance would always be suspect, he 
stressed the fact that the cost to Britain of governing would be even greater than for 
France since a permanent garrison would always be required. The author concurred with 
Burke that removing France from Canada would neither dissolve ties with the Indians nor 
remove France from the southern settlements on the Mississippi.
His remedy? It was based on trade, not territorial aggrandizement, and on three 
assumptions. First, the American colonies had exceeded the original function of the 
trading relationship with the mother country and would do so until Britain took remedial 
actions. Second, Canada should be left in French hands in order to be a check on the 
colonists. Third, by retaining the West Indian islands, especially Guadeloupe, the 
American colonies’ coastal trade would be linked with the West Indies in a dependent 
trading relationship with the mother country. According to Lawson, this "ingenious" 
plan would have guaranteed the loyalty of the colonies; it would have excluded the 
French from trade among the rich West Indies, which would then encourage the 
ascendancy of British economic might.8
8Philip Lawson, The Imperial Challenge: Quebec and Britain in the Age o f the 
American Revolution (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990), 13.
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Despite the fact that the American colonists themselves entertained no thought of 
independence during this period, it is important to note that in the British mind this was 
a distinct possibility. Examples of such fears were frequently heard. As early as 1759 
in a letter to Pitt, General Murray expressed the concern that without France on its 
borders, the mantle of British protection would no longer tie the American colonies to 
Great Britain.9 In 1761, the leader of the "pacifick" party, the Duke of Bedford, 
expressed his anxiety: "I don’t know whether the neighborhood of the French to our 
northern American colonies was not the greatest security of their dependence on their 
mother country, which I fear will be slighted by them when their apprehensions of the 
French are removed."10
The Cabinet discussions mirrored those of the public debate and illustrated how 
divisive the issue was. But despite the disparate composition of the Cabinet and the 
ambivalence of some of the ministers about which territories to be retained or returned, 
the members voted unanimously on June 24, 1761 to retain Canada. Many ministers 
continued to have doubts about this action, but the decision was not reversed. In fact, 
though peace negotiations broke off and though Pitt resigned from office four months 
later because the Cabinet would not support his call to declare war against Spain, the 
issue of ceding Canada to Britain was never again discussed either in Cabinet or at the
9Sir Lewis Bernstein Namier, England in the Age o f the American Revolution 
(London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1939), 323.
l0Ibid.
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treaty table. Lawson claims that the question of choice is a myth perpetuated by 
historians. He says that Britain never had a choice between Guadeloupe and Canada for 
the simple reason that France had no interest in having those "acres of snow" returned 
to her.11 France had long been concerned about the drain of Canada on its resources: 
its inclement climate, difficult access, and meager profits were so many millstones 
around her neck. Lawson claims that France used Canada only as a pawn in the peace 
negotiations. Whether there is merit to Lawson’s supposition or not, the fact is that the 
British ministry voted unanimously to retain.
Shortly after the June 24 vote, Bute, who replaced Pitt, was forced into a 
declaration of war against Spain since that nation joined forces with France to protect its 
own geo-political interests. Fortunately for Britain, its military successes in the West 
Indies and Havana brought the exhausted nations to the peace table where Britain’s 
negotiating position was enhanced. Despite this, the terms were generous since its chief 
negotiator, the Duke of Bedford, recognized that a humiliating defeat might only lead in 
the long run to another war with France. As might be expected, the treaty terms did not 
please the expansionists. But the Bute ministry believed the treaty gave Britain sound 
strategic and economic advantages. British interests were served and so were those of 
the American colonists. No longer would the colonists have to fear another war with the 
French in North America, and without the French to rile up the Indians, it was hoped
"See Lawson, Imperial, 15-18, and Zenab Esmat Rashed, Peace o f Paris (Liverpool: 
University Press, 1951) for a full discussion of the peace negotiations.
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that Indian uprisings would abate. To further that aim, the western border was secured 
by France’s granting all the lands east of the Mississippi River. Bordering the Atlantic, 
Britain would command all the territory of North America from Newfoundland on the 
north to Florida on the south. By expelling France from the continent east of the 
Mississippi, with the exception of two small islands off Newfoundland, and Spain from 
Florida, Britain’s commercial and naval power would make it preeminent in the world. 
The lucrative North Atlantic fisheries would be Britain’s to exploit; they would also 
provide a nursery of seamen for its navy in time or war. What was most important—the 
proposed treaty was considered an equitable one by the public.
Parliament obviously agreed with the ministry. The vote in support of the peace 
terms passed with a clear majority in both houses. Historians are not agreed on why 
Parliament voted as it did. Some nineteenth century Whig historians, opposed to 
George III and Bute, maligned the members of Parliament for being "bought off." More 
recently, some historians attribute the Canada vote to the powerful West Indian sugar 
interests which were credited for voting against retaining Guadeloupe in fear that the 
price of sugar would be reduced, impacting their own narrow interests. Sir Lewis 
Bernstein Namier, perhaps the most authoritative writer on parliament in this period, 
refutes this argument. Namier says that the sugar interests were not as numerous as has 
generally been depicted and that there was no solid voting block among them since some
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ambitious West Indian merchants saw that by retaining Guadeloupe they could extend 
their own empires.12
Namier contends that historians have tried to analyze the vote in terms of a division 
between Whigs and Tories. Even Alvord, who understood that there was "no such 
division of men and measures," Namier says, tried to be too "neat and symmetrical." 
This was because, Namier believed, Alvord ascribed "more permanence and coherence 
to eighteenth-century parliamentary groups than they possessed and he assumed that the 
question of Canada versus Guadeloupe was a major issue with them, on which the 
members of any one group had to think, or at least to speak and vote, alike."13 Namier 
says that factions abounded in the Parliament in 1762 with the Scotch, West Indian, and 
pro-American blocs most prominent. Pitt, Newcastle, Bute, and Bedford all had their 
followers. The combination of any of these factions or personalities might have 
influenced the vote. But even if the vote for the treaty could not be assigned to any 
particular party or faction, the American bloc in Parliament that Namier referred to was 
impressive. He devotes much attention to the makeup of those members of the House 
of Commons who had some connection with the American colonies from 1761 until 
1774. He lists twenty-two members who were elected in the 1761 general election and
12Namier, England, 322-323.
13Namier, England, 317.
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in succeeding by-elections.14 Of that number, four had served in America in the Seven 
Years’ War: Adam Drummond, Isaac Barre, William Harvey, and William Amherst. 
Four members served as provincial agents: Richard Jackson for Connecticut and assistant 
agent for Massachusetts; Charles Garth for South Carolina; Edmund Burke for New 
York; and John Thomlinson, Jr., as co-agent with his father for New Hampshire. One 
member, a native o f New Hampshire, John Huske, was Charles Townshend’s chief 
lieutenant.15 Two served as governors: Thomas Pownall of Massachusetts and Sir 
Charles Hardy of New York. John Sargent was active in the Stamp Act repeal and 
received recognition by the New York Assembly for his energies on their behalf.
Most of the American bloc members were merchants. Several MPs held lucrative 
victualling contracts. Sir William Baker brought in £110,000 annually during the Seven 
Years’ War, due probably to his friendship with Newcastle. Other partisans of 
Newcastle who also held contracts to supply the troops were James and George 
Colebrook and Arnold Nesbitt. Their American partner was Moses Franks, from a 
prominent Jewish family in Philadelphia, who also had relatives in Quebec.16 When 
Newcastle resigned, Colebrook and Nesbitt lost their contracts, but in 1763 Sir Samuel 
Fludyer and Adam Drummond resumed them, keeping Franks on as their American
14Unless otherwise cited, the descriptions of merchant-members of the House of 
Commons are taken from Namier, England in the Age o f  the American Revolution, 
Chapter IV, 265-327.
15Leland J. Bellot, William Knox, the Life and Thought o f an Eighteenth-Century 
Imperialist (Austin: the University of Texas Press, 1977), 44.
16See Chapter One, 39.
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partner. Drummond was also a friend of the New York merchant and counselor, John 
Watts. Watts and Franks were business associates. John Thomlinson, J r .’s father 
supplied gunpowder to New Hampshire during the War of the Austrian Succession from 
1740 to 1746. Both Thomlinsons engaged American partners, Barlow Trecothick and 
Charles Apthorp of Boston, the latter the father-in-law of John Watts. Trecothick would 
later become agent for New Hampshire as well as head of the Canada Committee, a 
lobby active in 1768, representing merchants with Canadian business interests.
Several merchant-members had regional interests in North America. Two members 
traded extensively with the southern provinces: Anthony Bacon, who lived in Maryland 
for a number of years and whose brother Thomas was compiler of the laws of Maryland; 
and Sir Ellis Cunliffe, a leading Liverpool merchant who traded with the southern 
colonies, especially with Maryland. Several members had interests in Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland. The two Fludyers, Drummond, and Anthony Bacon had enterprises in 
the coal mines of Cape Breton. As a merchant trading to Portugal, Brazil, and the 
Mediterranean, Joseph Gulston had interests in the Newfoundland fisheries. He also had 
commercial interests in New Hampshire. Chauncy Townsend, a coal and metal 
merchant, had extensive connections in New England, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia. 
He also had victualling contracts for both Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. Townsend 
boasted to Newcastle that he was conversant with the most considerable persons of New 
England which gave him a particular knowledge of that government. The foregoing list
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of merchants gives only a glimpse of the various liaisons between British merchants and 
their American interests.
In addition to the American bloc in Parliament, the Atlantic provinces were also 
represented in London by their appointed agents. These connections were not novel to 
the period under consideration. By the 1760s, representation in London by American 
agents or representatives of American interests had become an established and welcomed 
institution. The colonies had been sending envoys to represent their interests for a 
century and a half. When the colonies did not have representation, as was the case of 
North Carolina in 1768, Hillsborough, then secretary of state for the colonies, warned 
that they should appoint one since "the affairs of North Carolina must, in some degree, 
necessarily suffer delay and disappointment for want of a regular agent here duly 
authorized to act in every case in which the interest of the colony may be concerned."17
A third important political force in influencing policy toward the American colonies 
came from the British merchants with business interests to defend or promote. When the 
three groups—the merchant-members of the House of Commons, the American colonial 
agents, and the British merchants—joined together to pressure government action or 
inaction on a particular issue, their influence could be formidable. Since trade was 
considered the foundation of Britain’s preeminence in the world, mercantile concerns
I7William L. Sachse, The Colonial American in Britain (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1956), 94.
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were of paramount importance. But the British merchants’ and the American agents’ 
interests were not always compatible. The merchants’ self-interest in promoting policies 
that would not hinder the productive capacity and the buying power of their American 
customers had to be balanced with their interest in the strict enforcement of the 
navigation laws and mercantile restrictions. As middlemen, they reaped large profits by 
limiting most of the colonies’ foreign trade to Great Britain and by securing a monopoly 
in colonial markets for their manufactures. The task of the American agents was to 
hammer out regulations that both could live with. An interesting insight into this process 
is gleaned from a letter the New Hampshire agent, John Thomlinson, Jr., wrote his 
father in 1764. In it he said, "I have been a good deal engaged this week in attending 
upon the House and in meeting with the North American agents upon the present duty 
proposed (molasses and Madeira wine) to be raised in the provinces. . . . We agents 
have adjourned our further meeting till tomorrow when we shall after this day’s 
proceeding be better able to draw up our joint memorial to the Treasurer."18 In this 
instance, the joint action by the agents was referred to the ministry, but if the action 
concerned legislation, members of Parliament associated with the Americans were the 
ones responsible for seeing their interests protected in that governmental body.
As it is today, influence peddling defies monitoring. How does one know what 
transpires in the coffee houses or at dinner parties between political friends? The answer 
is that frequently it is only through happenstance—perhaps from a diary or personal
18Namier, England, 226.
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letters. For example, we learn that on December 31, 1765, Rockingham wrote to 
Newcastle that he had "company to dinner which consisted of Sir William Baker and 
Dowdeswell and Trecothick, Ltd. Dartmouth, etc. upon American topics."19 Did they 
discuss the Stamp Act? If they did, did it buttress Rockingham’s decision to repeal the 
Act?
"Access" to key policymakers is critical to the success of any special interest. In 
1762 and 1763 when the peace terms were being negotiated, most ministers welcomed 
input from colonial "experts." Three such "experts"—an American agent, an MP and 
friend, and a New York merchant who was a friend of an MP—illustrate the way the 
process worked. All three men were in support of retaining Canada at the treaty table. 
Foremost of the American agents residing in London, at least until 1772 when his 
influence began to wane, was Benjamin Franklin. At various times Franklin represented 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. His apartment on Craven Street 
was a meeting place for Americans traveling to London. He had cultivated a coterie of 
influential friends in diverse segments of British society. He was credited with authoring 
133 articles in various London newspapers as well as being responsible for publication 
of all newsworthy items concerning the colonies.20 It was well known that in addition
19Namier, England, 281.
20Sachse, Colonial, 102. Not all historians support the view that Franklin was 
influential with British authorities. John Sosin in Merchants and Agents says that 
Franklin’s influence was overrated and that Franklin himself was the source for claims 
of his influence. The record, however, as examined throughout this study, does not 
appear to support Sosin’s argument.
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to his persuasive pamphlet explicating the advantages of retaining Canada at the peace 
treaty, Franklin’s influence with Lord Bute was substantial. Bute frequently called on 
Franklin for advice. Evidence of his esteem for Franklin was reflected in his appointing 
Franklin’s son, William, governor of New Jersey, and honoring him with a baronetcy. 
Franklin was one of the first to register enthusiasm for the "glorious peace you have 
made, the most advantageous for the British nation, in my opinion, of any your annals 
have recorded."21
The role that Franklin had with Bute, Sir William Baker, MP, had with Newcastle. 
Newcastle sought Baker’s views on how the peace treaty would affect the colonies. 
Baker’s advice was usually liberal and pro-American. As a West Indian merchant, he 
was opposed to retaining Guadeloupe because it might bring down sugar prices.22 
During the Stamp Act crisis, the Rockingham ministry also called on him for advice. 
Baker was also Sir William Johnson’s financial agent in London. Through their 
correspondence, Baker was apprised of Johnson’s views on Indian and western affairs.
The influence of John Watts, a leading New York merchant, was less direct than 
Franklin’s or Baker’s, for his access was through Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Barre, 
member of Parliament and friend to America. Barre had served in America during the 
Seven Years’ War and maintained contact with his American friends, one of whom was
21Alvord, Mississippi, I, 73.
22Lawson, Imperial, 14.
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Watts. Watts’ views on what the aims of the peace treaty should be were expressed in 
a letter to Barre on February 28, 1762, and are especially interesting because of the 
threat Canada posed to Albany fur interests. Watts urged the desirability of retaining 
Canada. He made clear that he did not favor imposing restrictions on the fur trade, and 
he voiced confidence that the Americans would be the winners in any competition with 
Canada. His reasoning was:
The fur trade as I take it should have its natural course either through the 
St. Lawrence or Hudson River, as experience proves it most beneficial and 
safe. Each no doubt will possess some share from the efforts and struggles 
of its own inhabitants, and where the largest capital in commerce circulates 
and the best supplies of proper goods are found most probably the largest 
share will centre. I don’t see there any limitations necessary to the trade of 
Canada if we keep it, let it take its fair chance. The endless winters and 
tedious navigation are limitations enough.23
How significant were the opinions of Franklin, Baker, and Watts in the decision 
to retain Canada? We can only guess that their views added weight in support of the 
retention of Canada.
After the decision to retain Canada was made and the treaty ratified, newly- 
appointed ministers sat down to establish policies for Britain’s recently-acquired colonies. 
In the critical year when the Proclamation was being formulated, Bute resigned and in 
his place a triad of ministers ruled—Grenville, Egremont and Halifax. Lord Egremont, 
Grenville’s brother-in-law, succeeded Pitt as secretary of state for the Southern
23Harrington, The New York Merchant, 310.
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Department and Shelburne replaced Halifax as president of the Lords of Trade. Both 
Egremont and Shelburne relied heavily on the advice of those knowledgeable in colonial 
affairs. The reports of the governors of Quebec, Trois Rivieres, and Montreal, which 
Egremont had requested in December 1761, were submitted to the Board in early 1762. 
But except for their reports the key policymakers did not have anyone with firsthand 
experience in Quebec to advise them. Their reliance, therefore, was on anyone with 
knowledge of North America. Henry Ellis, just returned as governor of Georgia from 
1757 until 1762, served as chief adviser to Egremont. John Pownall, secretary to the 
Board of Trade, was Shelburne’s main assistant. William Knox, agent for Georgia, 
where he had served from 1757 to 1762 as provost marshall when Ellis was governor, 
advised both Egremont and Shelburne.24 In addition to these subministers, once again 
Franklin’s views were of considerable interest to the Board, especially since the Albany 
Plan of 1754 resolved the thorny issue of who would pay for Britain’s North American 
defense expenditures.
With the assistance of Ellis and Knox, early in 1763 Egremont developed a 
comprehensive plan for North America entitled "Hints Relative to the Division and 
Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired Countries in America." Egremont 
submitted this report to the Board of Trade on May 5, 1763, with the directive to prepare 
a report that would address two major considerations: how to maximize the commercial
24Leland J. Bellot, William Knox, 157-165; Sosin, Wlutehall and the Wilderness 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 54-57; Alvord, Mississippi, I, 157-165.
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advantages of the new territories and how those advantages could be secured to "His 
Majesty’s trading subjects." Egremont also asked that the Board consider what changes 
should be made in the forms of government already established in Quebec, what security 
provisions were necessary to protect North America against any European power, and 
how to preserve the internal peace against the Indians. In the latter case, fear of the 
Indians superseded the concerns of the fur merchants, who argued against regulation, and 
the land speculators, who objected to the prohibition against settlement beyond the 
Appalachian mountains. Egremont proposed that the Indians be assured the protection 
of their rights and a guarantee that their hunting grounds would not be invaded or 
occupied unless by fair purchase. Notices to that effect had already been sent to the 
governors of Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia, as well as the agents for Indian 
Affairs.25
The Board’s June 8 letter contained decisions to restrict Quebec to the confines of 
the St. Lawrence River and to administer it with a governor and council. The argument 
for delimiting Quebec was based on the belief that the American colonists would not 
choose to settle there. That being the case, the Board believed it improbable that English 
immigration would ever be sufficient to equalize the French and that Quebec should be 
segregated in the areas already occupied by it. In this way, the French could enjoy their 
own laws, be discouraged from settling in remote areas, and could more easily be held 
in subjection by British troops. A governor and council, the Board believed, would be
25Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 132-133.
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adequate for these purposes. Another reason for separating the vast territory that was 
Canada from the proposed truncated area to be called "Quebec" was that not to do so 
posed a threat to the American colonies. Left as it was, Canada would soon overawe the 
American colonies and even if it had a nominal civil government, in practice it would 
become a military government. In addition, since western settlements would now be 
prohibited to the American colonists, some alternative provision was considered essential. 
By re-annexing parts of the lands bordering the St. Lawrence that connected the Bay of 
Fundy to Nova Scotia, a large tract of land on the seacoast would be open for settlement. 
For the same reason the islands of Cape Breton and St. John’s (now Prince Edward 
Island) were also re-annexed to Nova Scotia. One of the advantages of this proposal was 
that such settlements would come under the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia rather than of 
Quebec, a choice the Board believed the Americans would prefer.26
Although the Board was not aware at this time of Pontiac’s rebellion, the decision 
to prohibit settlement had already been made by Egremont. His directive to the Board 
on this issue was primarily to determine the eastern boundary. Before making that 
decision, Shelburne believed it important to have input from those knowledgeable about 
the frontier. To a fault, Shelburne would not make a decision until he was satisfied that 
he had adequate information from those who knew firsthand what the situation was. To 
gain this information, much to Egremont’s distress, Shelbume requested that the 
commander-in-chief of the North American troops and the superintendents of Indian
26Ibid., 131-147.
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Affairs report to him directly. Egremont viewed this as a power-play on Shelburne’s 
part and would not give his consent.27 As a result, Shelbume delayed proposing a 
boundary line, but he believed that any boundary should not disturb settlements where 
the frontiersmen were already established west of the mountains and where the Indians 
were settled east of them. It was believed that gradually this boundary would disappear 
as the colonists expanded westward, but that would occur only through agreement 
between the Indians and the governors of the respective colonies. Since settlement was 
in the future, the Board saw no need to provide civil government. A military force in 
the different posts and forts would be necessary to protect the fur trade and the good 
treatment of the Indians. The superintendents of Indian affairs and the 
commander-in-chief of the army were given that responsibility.
Finally, on the issue of how the colonies could contribute toward their own civil 
and military expenses, Shelburne’s letter to Egremont stated, perhaps facetiously, that 
it deferred action since "it is entirely out of our power to form any opinion which we 
could presume to offer. . . as most of the materials necessary to form a just and accurate 
judgment upon it are not within reach of our office."28 Although Knox held strong 
opinions after his Georgia experience about how the colonies should finance such costs
27Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, Life o f William Earl o f Shelburne (3 vols.; 2nd rev. ed.; 
London: Macmillan & Co., Limited, 1912), 189-190.
nIbid., 192.
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and outlined them in a report to Shelbume, this vital issue was never addressed by the 
Board—a major flaw that critics of the Proclamation are quick to point out.29
On July 14, 1763, Egremont responded to the Lords’ of Trade proposal. The king, 
he said, agrees that there should not be settlement in the vast territory outside Quebec, 
but that all the Great Lakes and all the Ohio Valley to the Mississippi should be included 
in the new province; and that there should be civil government under the jurisdiction of 
the government of Canada. The king also sought the Board’s advice on how to promote 
peopling the new colonies either from those colonies that "may be overstocked with 
inhabitants, or from any foreign parts."30
The Lords replied to Egremont’s letter on August 5, 1763. They objected to 
annexing any of the land outside Quebec to any particular government, especially to that 
of Canada. They cited three reasons: First, the Indians might misconstrue such action 
as considering themselves under the government of Canada; second, it would give 
Canada superior advantage in the Indian trade, which should be open to all subjects; 
third, the only way the government of Canada could control such extensive property 
would be through fortifying the various posts and forts. This would give Canada 
inordinate military power, virtually inviting conflict between the governor of Canada and 
the commanding officers of the army. The Lords repeated that the boundary of Quebec
29Bellot, William Knox, 50.
30Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 150.
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should be, as previously recommended in their June 8 report, confined to the 
St. Lawrence and that the reserved territory should be placed under command of the 
commander-in-chief in North America.31
Later that August before the king could respond to the Board’s proposals, Egremont 
died. The shakeup in the Cabinet, due to the secretary’s death, was distasteful to 
Shelbume. He precipitously resigned, but prior to his resignation during the month of 
August, he was at work preparing the Board’s report. It was this report that Halifax, 
who now replaced Egremont, submitted to Hillsborough, Shelburne’s successor, on 
September 19, 1763. Halifax urged the Board to act quickly since there were fears of 
the deteriorating situation in Quebec and of further Indian uprisings. He suggested that 
they incorporate in the final Proclamation the policies already agreed upon: the reserved 
lands for the use of the Indians; free trade with the Indians under proper licenses and 
regulations; grants of lands for reduced officers and soldiers; and a commission 
establishing the commander-in-chief of the armies in North America the responsibility 
for governing the interior country. The latter condition was the result, Halifax informed 
the Board, of the king’s willingness to withdraw his previous suggestions that the lands 
reserved for the Indians be placed under the government of Canada.32
31Ibid., 151-152.
nlbid., 153-154.
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On October 4 the Board submitted the final Proclamation to Halifax. The most 
controversial issue in the report was the inclusion of an assembly for Quebec. In his 
covering letter, Hillsborough stated that in addition to a governor and council in order 
to encourage British settlers to the new colony, especially from the American colonies, 
"there should be an immediate and public declaration that the intended permanent 
constitution would consist of an assembly as in the other North American colonies."33 
The governor and council were granted temporary power to make ordinances and 
regulations, but no stipulation on how money bills should be initiated was included. 
Such an oversight led to questions of constitutionality when Murray tried to raise 
revenues.
Another provision that became controversial concerned the Proclamation line. 
Worried about further Indian uprisings, the Board eschewed Shelburne’s proposal which 
would have taken time to survey and opted instead for a straight line along the 
Appalachian divide. The Proclamation read that no "loving subject" could purchase land 
or settle in the territory without special license from a colonial governor. In addition, 
those who had settled there were admonished "forthwith to remove themselves." Since 
no enforcement mechanism was provided for violators, the settlers paid no heed to the 
law.
n Ibid., 156.
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Approved by the Privy Council on October 5, 1763, the Proclamation was not to 
go into effect until August 10, 1764, giving those who wished to leave the province time 
to settle their affairs. The terms seemed inclusive. A delimited Quebec was established 
to be administered by a governor and council, and when feasible, an elected assembly 
was to be called. In addition to an elected assembly, in order to encourage immigration, 
generous land grants were to be offered. English law would apply. The language and 
religion of the French-speaking inhabitants would be protected as stipulated in the terms 
of the capitulation and in the peace treaty. An Indian preserve was established between 
the Appalachian divide and the Mississippi River, beyond which no settlement could 
occur. Land purchase from the Indians might occur but only through colonial governors. 
The former French forts and posts were to be fortified. The western territory was to be 
governed by the commander-in-chief of the North American army and by the 
superintendents of Indian affairs. The fur trade would be open to all, but regulated so 
that abuse of the Indians might be prevented. The eastern lands that had previously been 
Quebec’s were ceded to Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, providing the colonists with the 
opportunity for new immigration north rather than west.
The Proclamation has had few defenders among historians. Donald Creighton 
termed it "the imperfect introduction of an imperfect imperial plan."34 W. S. Wallace 
called it "one of the most casual and inadequate instruments of government in the history
^Creighton, Empire, 35.
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of colonial rule."35 Philip Lawson’s most charitable comment was that Halifax "made 
a decision for the future that made no sense in Quebec, but. . . appeared reasonable in 
the British context."36 The criticism focuses primarily on the fact that the government 
of Quebec was to be fashioned after that of the thirteen old colonies and that the majority 
French-speaking, Catholic population was given short shrift. The difficulty in assessing 
the merits of the Proclamation as it was conceived is that it has become part of an 
ongoing debate between the two founding people—the French and the English. This was 
A. L. Burt’s warning in the 1930s. Then he cautioned that "though modem eyes may 
see the Proclamation as an egregious blunder, the eyes of that day saw differently."37 
As early as 1896, American historian Victor Coffin, and as recently as 1966, French 
Canadian historian Fernand Ouellet, remind us that the motives of the Proclamation have 
been distorted for various reasons. Ouellet comments that "it was too often forgotten at 
the time and since" that the Proclamation was not "conceived with the purpose of setting 
up the rule of a minority over a majority; nor with the view of bringing about, at any 
price, the subjugation of the French Canadians."38
What then was the intent of the Proclamation in 1763? The chaotic political 
situation during the time the Proclamation was being formulated probably accounts for
35W.S. Wallace, "The Beginnings of British Rule in Canada," Canadian Historical 
Review, 6, 1925, 208.
36Lawson, Imperial Challenge, 33-37.
37Burt, Old Province, 83.
380uellet, Economic, 95.
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the difference in interpretation about whether the policy was ill-conceived and hastily 
drafted, as has been charged. The contention here is that the issues involved were as 
carefully considered as those of any policy question and that while the political storms 
broke around the principal negotiators—they in fact created some of the turbulence—the 
policy was hammered out in a typical give and take fashion. That the final version 
contained changes from the previous report can be explained by the exigencies of the 
time—the critical need to provide Quebec with civilian government and to assure the 
Indians of Britain’s good intentions toward them. In defense of the policymakers, their 
primary concern was with British policy overall and not just with Quebec. Their intent 
was twofold: to have a consistent policy for all the colonies in North America that would 
complement its mercantile interests; and to repel Indian unrest in the western frontier of 
Canada and along the western borders of the thirteen old colonies. The negotiators 
argued over how Quebec would fit into such a scheme. Since the men most responsible 
for the decision were Whigs and pro-American, they envisioned an integrated North 
American territory stretching from Newfoundland to Florida in which Quebec would 
eventually become assimilated. In terms of prohibiting settlement beyond the 
Appalachian divide, they agreed that it was a necessity of the moment. All their 
intelligence from Amherst and Sir William Johnson reflected the need to restrict 
settlement; otherwise Indian hostilities would continue. There was disagreement later 
whether the intent was to prohibit settlement forever. The debate was a repeat of the 
previous Canada-versus-Guadeloupe argument. The expansionists, including Shelbume, 
believed western settlement was good for the colonies and the mother country; the
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mercantilists such as Knox wanted the American colonies contained between the 
Appalachian divide and the Atlantic.
This rationale for the Proclamation would find few defenders among historians who 
believe that the distinctive nature of Quebec should have been the primary consideration. 
Lawson’s study of imperial policy is the most recent work that deals with the 
Proclamation. While Lawson assigns most of the shortcomings of the Proclamation to 
Halifax, he also contends that disputes between Shelburne and Egremont prevented 
formulation of a well-thought-out plan. In fact, he argues that the rivalry between the 
two men prevented them from agreeing on anything. He acknowledges, however, that 
some of the problems were systemic. Jurisdiction between the two governmental bodies 
most responsible for American affairs, the Southern Department and the Board of Trade, 
was unclear. This situation exacerbated the stressful relations between the two men. 
Egremont believed that Shelburne was trying to usurp too much power. Shelburne 
believed Egremont was zealously preventing him from getting information necessary to 
do his job.
Lawson believes that the king’s attempts over the summer of 1763 to replace the 
Grenville ministry with one formed by Pitt, followed by the untimely death of Egremont 
and the precipitous resignation of Shelburne, prevented any progress from being made 
on the Proclamation. Believing that to be the case, Lawson understandably finds it 
inconceivable that when Hillsborough and Halifax succeeded to the vacated offices, they
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were able to produce a final document in six days. Lawson criticizes the Board for not 
considering the 1762 Quebec governors’ reports until October 28, 1763, after the 
Proclamation had been promulgated. But his major complaint is leveled against Halifax, 
especially for his inclusion of an assembly for Quebec. Lawson argues that Halifax was 
a "Whig of the old school" who in political and constitutional terms found it 
inconceivable to tell Parliament that English law would not prevail in Quebec over British 
subjects. Halifax, Lawson says, was willful and did not heed the counsel of others, 
particularly on the issue of an assembly. On the other hand, Lawson says that Halifax 
was motivated by political expediency, as one who always weighed views according to 
their popularity with the public and Parliament.39
Lawson’s arguments from this writer’s perspective fail on several counts. First, 
the conclusion that the chaotic political conditions and the rivalry between Shelburne and 
Egremont prevented the two men from making progress on a policy for Quebec ignores 
the history of the negotiations. Their disagreements had as much, if not more, to do 
with personal pique and protocol than substance. Substantively, a great deal had been 
accomplished. As stated previously, early in 1763 Egremont, with Ellis’ assistance, 
produced a basic document on policy issues which was enclosed in his directive to the 
Board on May 5. The exchange of views between Egremont and Shelburne during the 
summer established further agreements which were incorporated in the report that 
Shelburne worked on prior to his resignation. On September 18, Halifax submitted this
39Lawson, Imperial Challenge, 36.
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report to the incoming Board president, Hillsborough, and directed him to incorporate 
in a completed report those decisions that had already been made. In addition, Halifax 
informed the Board that the terms previously debated with respect to the reserved 
territories were resolved in the Board’s favor. The king had agreed to drop his plan for 
placing the territory under the jurisdiction of Quebec.
Second, Lawson is mistaken when he insinuates that the Board was derelict for not 
considering the Quebec governors’ reports until October 28, after the Board had 
submitted the Proclamation for approval. Lawson says, "It is instructive to note. . . that 
the Board of Trade itself did not formally take the 1762 reports from Burton, Gage, and 
Murray ‘into consideration’ until 28 October, 1763. "40 In their June 8 response to 
Egremont’s directive of May 5, the Board made specific reference to the governors’ 
reports: "It is obvious that the new government of Canada, thus bounded, will, according 
to the Reports of Generals Gage, Murray and Burton, contain within it. . . ."41 (Italics 
mine.) Even if the particular reference to the governors’ reports was not made, the 
contents of the Board’s letter clearly indicate that the information in it was culled from 
the governors’ comments.
Third, Lawson’s diatribe against Halifax seems excessive. The inclusion of an 
assembly for Quebec was, according to Lawson, based solely on Halifax’s stubbornness
40lbid.
41Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 142.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
and slavish devotion to "old Whig" republicanism. Curiously, Lawson never mentions 
the president of the Board, Lord Hillsborough, who had the responsibility to complete 
the final version and was an ardent advocate of an assembly for Quebec. It was 
Hillsborough, and not Halifax, who later was held responsible for that inclusion. As will 
be discussed later, his 1769 proposal to the Board called for an assembly that would 
include French Catholics. Neither Hillsborough nor Halifax, however, initiated the idea 
of an assembly for Quebec. In the beginning of the Board’s deliberations on Quebec, 
Egremont, his assistant, Ellis, William Knox, and Shelburne had all believed that when 
circumstances changed to "render it expedient, representative government should be 
granted His Majesty’s new Canadian subjects."42 In fact, Shelburne had gone even 
further. Detesting patronage and sinecures, he proposed to the council that there be an 
elected governor. This suggestion, presumably rejected by Grenville, was too radical for 
the times.43 As a member of the triumvirate, however, Halifax would have been a 
participant in these Cabinet discussions. The language of the Proclamation with respect 
to calling an assembly differs little from that initially discussed by Egremont, Shelburne, 
and their aides. In the latter case, an assembly was to be called "when expedient"; in 
the Proclamation, an assembly was to be called "so soon as the state and circumstances 
of the said colonies will admit."44 Halifax and Hillsborough obviously understood that
42Bellot, William Knox, 47.
43Alvord, Mississippi, 177.
^Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 165.
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Quebec was not yet ready, whereas Florida was. As a result, Florida’s governor was 
instructed to call an assembly immediately, fashioned after that of Nova Scotia.
Another perspective on Halifax, a more sympathetic one, is by Alvord and helps 
explain the rationale for his policy. Alvord, who describes Halifax as a man of 
considerable ability though precipitous in judgment, says that Halifax was popular with 
the merchants and that he was considered the principal authority on American subjects. 
American interests would, therefore, have been uppermost in his mind in the formulation 
of a policy for Quebec. In time Halifax believed that Quebec would become integrated 
into the rest of the English-speaking continent. He believed that economic integration 
with the American colonies would be the only way for Quebec to be viable. This would 
alleviate any concern on the part of the thirteen old colonies about an alien population 
on its borders. By prohibiting western settlement, by calling for an assembly and other 
British rights for Quebec, by advertising generous land grants in Quebec, Halifax 
believed there would be a large influx of immigrants from the south. Migration north 
rather than west would result in a concentrated population along the Atlantic seaboard 
which would harmoniously advance the mercantile interests of the mother country. 
Franklin, too, it might be recalled, believed that eventually Quebec would become 
assimilated into the larger English-speaking North American community.
As events proved, Halifax and Franklin miscalculated. But their views were 
justified at the time. The American colonies were becoming overpopulated and fertile
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land a scarce commodity. Many New Englanders had already settled in Nova Scotia; 
two decades later many more would seek political asylum and/or attractive land offers 
in Quebec. Is this, then, Lawson’s real criticism - that the policies espoused by Halifax 
and the other Whig policymakers were primarily concerned about the American colonists 
and not concerned about the distinct nature of Quebec?
If so, Lawson has company. Delimiting Quebec was considered the major blunder 
of the Proclamation, according to economic historian Donald Creighton, since "it 
repudiated Canada’s character and history as a distinct American economy and. . . 
recreated [it] in the interests of imperial standardization. A great inland commercial 
empire, its life rigidly simplified and organized to combine with geography for 
prosecution of a single staple trade, was to become a normal colony, limited in territory, 
devoted to agriculture, modestly typical and completely undistinguished."45 As far as 
Creighton was concerned, the Proclamation reduced Quebec to a stunted little colony, 
a fragment of what it had been. Creighton’s primary concern with the Proclamation was 
the effect it had on the merchants’ ability to carry on their trade. He says that their 
competitive, commercial, continental outlook required their access to the western 
hinterland. The boundaries of a truncated Quebec were satisfactory for the purpose of 
settling the country and for trying to appease the Indians, but it was a disaster for the fur 
trade.
45Creighton, Empire, 36.
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Creighton’s condemnation of how British policies jeopardized the distinctive aspects 
of Quebec as a fur trading colony fails to take into consideration the fact that no 
economy could long survive without a broader economic base. British policymakers 
anticipated a more diversified economy. What would happen when the supply of furs 
was exhausted, or beaver hats were no longer the fashion? Contrary to Creighton’s 
statement that the distinct nature of Quebec was not considered, the Board made it one 
of its first priorities. In its June 8 letter, the Board explained its position. Since 
Shelburne was not as sanguine as Franklin and Halifax that there would be an influx of 
immigrants to Quebec, the decision was made to divide the province. This division 
would do justice to both the British subjects and the French new subjects. The 65,000 
French Canadians who were already settled along the St. Lawrence would be ensured the 
rights guaranteed them by the treaty, and they would be discouraged from settling in 
remote places, where they would not be under the jurisdiction of any colony and unlikely 
to contribute to the trade and commerce of Great Britain.46
W. S. Wallace agrees with Creighton that by delimiting Quebec’s boundaries, the 
authors of the Proclamation failed to take into consideration the province’s reliance for 
its prosperity on the western fur trade. Wallace also asserts that those who drew up the 
Proclamation were "sadly ignorant of conditions in Canada" and that its language 
reflected a "smug Anglo-Saxon self-complacency."47 Wallace presents a laundry list
46Shortt and Doughty, Documents, I, 141.
47Wallace, Beginnings, 6 (1925), 208.
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of the Proclamation’s omissions and ineptitudes: its imprecise language called into 
question the constitutionality of the form of government; its policy of assimilation failed 
to consider the preponderance of the French-Canadian Catholic population; all religious 
issues were left up to the "king’s pleasure," leaving undefined that status of Roman 
Catholics—whether they could serve on juries, hold public office or commissions in the 
army.
These criticisms are all legitimate. But they have to be balanced with the 
motivations of the policymakers in 1763 that were discussed previously. The larger 
British interests were their concern. The men most responsible for the decisions were 
pro-American and Whigs, who believed in representative government. The 
disagreements between Shelburne and Egremont were more of protocol and personality 
than policy. Halifax and Hillsborough shared similar political views. The chief 
assistants of Egremont and Shelburne—Ellis and Pownall—are credited with authoring, and 
by inference, approving, a good part of the reports submitted by their offices. Assisting 
them all was William Knox, Ellis’ protege, who had served with him in Georgia from 
1757 to 1762.
In addition to shared political views, the key policymakers had special interests to 
protect. We know that Franklin whose counsel was sought by the Board and who was 
a personal friend of Shelburne had invested heavily in western land schemes and would 
not want the prohibition against expansion to be permanent. William Knox had
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substantial land holdings in Georgia and would presumably not want to jeopardize the 
value of them. Though there is not evidence for it, the merchant-members of the House 
of Commons, mentioned earlier—the Fludyer brothers, Adam Drummond, Anthony 
Bacon, Joseph Gulston, Chauncy Townsend - with interests in Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia, would probably have supported the decision to delimit Quebec. The Albany and 
Philadelphia fur interests, the London merchants with American partners or agents 
involved in the Indian trade—all would have resisted the king’s preference to have the 
western regions part of Quebec and administered by its governor.
In contrast to the supporters of American colonial interests, the spokesmen for 
Canadian interests appear inconsequential. Creighton points out this numerical imbalance 
in 1765. He says that the London merchants trading to the Atlantic colonies could 
muster as many as twelve hundred signatures for any petition dealing with their American 
interests. In comparison only fifty-six London merchants signed the memorial protesting 
the "Walker’s ear" incident and calling for an assembly in 1765 and only twenty-five 
firms signed the petition for Murray’s recall.48 This imbalance was probably greater 
in 1763, since many British merchants would not have invested in Quebec until there was 
certainty that it would be ceded to Great Britain.
Despite the controversy that subsequently evolved over the Proclamation, at the 
time it was formulated it appears to have had widespread support. As previously
48Creighton, Empire, 42.
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mentioned, Burt reminds us that "though modern eyes may see the Proclamation as an 
egregious blunder, the eyes of that day saw differently." The British merchants in 
Quebec were elated. Now they would be able to enjoy the rights they believed were 
theirs by birth. But even more important, now they might be able to gain the political 
power they lacked. This was of special concern to them because they believed their 
economic interests were being neglected by the military governor. Even Murray initially 
accepted the Proclamation with joy. He wrote in January 1764 that the Proclamation 
"gives everybody great content and satisfaction."49 He was confident that in time the 
policy of assimilation would work, that the Canadians could be weaned from their 
adherence to French laws and religion to British law and Protestantism. The only known 
segments of the Quebec population that would have been opposed to the policy were the 
seigneurs and the clergy, and they were even a smaller minority than the English 
merchants. We cannot know what the views of the habitants were, but much of their 
civil law had never been really threatened, so that the Proclamation would not have 
seriously concerned them.50
Rather than place all the blame for the failed policy on Whitehall’s doorstep, 
perhaps it would be instructive to consider other reasons for its failure. One of the 
obstacles to the success of the policy of assimilation was Murray himself. As mentioned
49Burt, Old Province, 83.
50Neatby, Quebec Act, Protest and Policy (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall of 
Canada, Ltd., 1972), 138.
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before, he was initially in favor of the policy. Only when confronted with the reality of 
having to implement such policies did he appreciate the enormity of the task. How could 
65,000 Canadians be assimilated into the culture of only 200 English households? He 
apparently did try to encourage immigration, writing personally to friends as well as 
advertising in some American newspapers. But he ignored instructions to make public 
intentions of calling an assembly as part of a plan to encourage immigration. Such an 
omission might have seriously jeopardized the colonists’ interest in settling Quebec. 
Murray also followed instructions to survey the land. But he was accused of showing 
partiality toward the seigneurs in these surveys, which resulted in enlarging the land of 
certain French landholders and reducing what was available for the English. When he 
equivocated on implementing the policy of anglicization, the merchants began their 
protests against him. Had Murray been more supportive of the merchants, they might 
not have resorted to radical measures. The Proclamation was, after all, the law of the 
land. The merchants believed its governor should implement it.
Another deterrent to the successful implementation of the Proclamation had nothing 
to do with the Proclamation, but with administrative policy and bureaucratic bungling. 
The two were intertwined. In the first instance, Murray’s dismissal from his appointment 
as military commander of Quebec provoked enmity between him and the new 
commander, Ralph Burton. When Murray discovered that he had been named civil 
governor of Quebec, but not military governor as well, he was outraged. In fact, he 
tried in every way possible to regain his command, and seriously talked of resigning.
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Despite his pleas that Quebec was a special case and needed its leader to have military 
power, Halifax insisted that separating the civil and military authority was in keeping 
with British policy in the colonies. Murray remained unconvinced. In the second 
instance, the offices of the war department and the secretary of states acted independently 
of one another. To maintain Gage and Burton, who had been military governors of 
Montreal and Trois Rivieres, in similar capacities, the posts of lieutenant governor were 
offered them. But these offers came after the war department had appointed Gage to 
replace Amherst as commander-in-chief of the North American army. Gage, in turn, 
appointed Burton to be in command of the northern armies which included Quebec and 
the rest of the territory that had been New France. As a result, both declined the civil 
appointments, and rather than make new appointments, the offices were abolished.
These changes left only the governor, stripped of his military authority, in Quebec 
City, and the military commander of the northern territory with no civil authority 
headquartered in Montreal. Many of the administration duties of the two men were not 
clear-cut in terms of civil or military jurisdiction. This problem would not have become 
as serious an issue if the relations between Burton and Murray had continued on the basis 
of the warm friendship they had enjoyed ever since the Battle of Quebec in 1759. 
Murray was convinced that Burton conspired with Gage to have his military command 
stripped from him. When Burton was promoted to a rank higher than his, the personal 
feud became obstructive of good administration. The abolition of the office of lieutenant 
governor need not have resulted in continual feuds over jurisdiction between the two men
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if Murray had not been overly sensitive to the fact that Burton outranked him militarily. 
Murray appointed two of his councillors to serve as unofficial lieutenants governor in 
Trois Rivieres and Montreal. A better use of them might have reduced the tensions 
existing in those towns, which certainly were too far distant to be ruled from Quebec 
City.
Another major obstacle to the success of the policy of assimilation was the slow 
recovery of the economy. Pontiac’s rebellion and the restrictions placed on traders by 
the Proclamation and Sir William Johnson impeded recovery of the fur trade. The 
foot-dragging of the French government to make good on converting the paper money 
held by the habitants at the close of the war resulted in a scarcity of hard specie. This 
shortage led to speculation and to restrictive policies detrimental to trade and business. 
In addition, the attempt to devise a uniform medium of exchange failed to take into 
consideration the trade flows between Quebec and New York. These were just some of 
the problems faced by those conducting business in Quebec, and many companies failed. 
Murray’s lack of understanding the value and needs of commercial activity resulted in 
regulations that the merchants said hampered them in conducting their businesses.
All policies, no matter how well conceived, depend for the execution and 
enforcement on the capabilities and willingness of the leadership. The Proclamation had 
its failings, but one of the greatest obstacles to the success of the policy stemmed from 
Murray’s rebuff of the merchants. The merchants had been encouraged to immigrate to
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Quebec. They had been promised that they would enjoy the rights of Englishmen. The 
Proclamation gave those promises legal standing. Had Murray been more of a civilian 
leader than a military leader, he might have tried to make some accommodation with the 
merchants, who were vital to the economic recovery of the province. At least, he should 
not have treated them so disparagingly. The Proclamation is generally considered to 
have been ill conceived and the cause of the turmoil in Quebec. The turmoil did not end 
with the reversal of that policy, the Quebec Act of 1774. In fact, for almost a century, 
policy shifts from assimilation to segregation would continue, making the question asked 
by Fernand Ouellet a penetrating one: "Can we believe that the Proclamation of 1763 
would have been so quickly abandoned if economic recovery had been rapid, if there had 
been a massive immigration into the province, and if there had been no American 
threat?"51
The year 1763 was a critical year in Quebec’s history. The Treaty of Paris, 
promulgated in May, ceded Canada to Great Britain and promised the French Canadians 
the protection of their language and religion "as far as the laws of Great Britain" 
permitted. One of the primary considerations in that decision was the fear of future wars 
with France against the colonists. The colonies were viewed as a vital link in England’s 
position as the leading imperialist nation in the world. Consistent with that belief were 
the policy decisions of the Royal Proclamation delimiting Quebec, calling for its 
integration into the North American community. There was also fear about Indian
51Ouellet, Economic, 95.
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uprisings, such as occurred in May and June with Pontiac’s rebellion. The Royal 
Proclamation provided for an Indian preserve to protect the Indians against further 
encroachment on their sacred lands. These decisions were made by neophyte 
policymakers who were generally pro-American. Influencing them were the American 
interests in London. What was considered good for the thirteen colonies was considered 
good for Quebec. In contrast, in 1763 there were few spokesmen for Canadian interests. 
Murray was named civilian governor and for a brief time he was supportive of the policy 
of assimilation. But soon his quarrels with the London bureaucrats, with the 
English-speaking merchants, and with Burton and Gage impeded any real chance of a 
successful policy. To understand the first years of civil government in Quebec, it is 
necessary to look more closely at the individual most responsible for its successes and 
failures—the governor and General James Murray.
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CHAPTER THREE
MURRAY VS. MERCHANTS
Most of the histories of the first years of British rule in Quebec derive from records 
of its military leaders. As a result, the bias of these leaders toward the merchant class 
has to be considered before any fair evaluation can be made of the role of the merchants. 
The officer class of the military was drawn from the British aristocracy and the 
aristocrats of that period disdained the commercial class. Murray was representative of 
his class, but more than that, he saw in the merchants a threat to his policies in 
maintaining the peace after the conquest and in gaining and keeping the loyalties of the 
Canadians toward the British. Whatever prejudices he may have had with regard to the 
American colonies were rarely expressed in writing by him, but it can be assumed that 
he shared the same concerns about their democratic tendencies as others of his class. 
What part the Americans in Quebec, who were for the most part merchant-traders, 
played in the early years of settlement is intertwined with the role of the merchants as 
a group. The English merchants, whether American or not, expected to be granted 
English political and legal rights with the institution of civil government. When Murray 
refused to grant the right of an assembly, as called for in the Proclamation of 1763, the 
merchants and Murray were on a collision course. How creditable a person Murray was 
is critical to any assessment of the role of the merchants in this period.
108
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Murray’s clash with the merchants has to be set in the larger context of the times. 
The supremacy of Great Britain among the nations of Europe was due in large measure 
to its importance as a trading nation. The commercial interests, especially in London and 
the West Country, exerted powerful influence in Parliament. As a result, the conjoining 
of the Montreal merchants with the London merchants represented an important 
counterforce to any policies which were viewed by the merchants as detrimental to their 
interests. Overlaying these economic concerns was the unstable political situation in 
which there were seven ministries from that of Pitt and Newcastle in 1760 and Lord 
North in 1770. Within the bureaucracy there was no clear channel of command for 
formulating and carrying out colonial policy. Jurisdictional confusion resulted with the 
Southern Department, Board of Trade, War Office, and Treasury all meddling in the 
affairs of Quebec. This statement seemingly contradicts the comments made in the 
previous chapter about the formulation of policy vis a vis the Proclamation and the 
bungling by the War Office and the Southern Department with respect to the office of 
lieutenant governor. Conceding such confusion, the development of a policy for Quebec 
did not suffer any more than most bureaucratic endeavors. What it did suffer from was 
the fact that other issues were more critical to Britain’s interests, and until 1770 it did 
not have as influential spokesmen as the Americans pressuring the government to give 
attention to Quebec’s problems.
The Proclamation may not have been adversely affected by the dissensions among 
the old Whigs and the new ministers appointed to replace them, but the new civil
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governor of Quebec believed he was a victim of these political dissensions. Merit alone 
did not win political or military appointments, nor recognition by government for 
services rendered. That was also true of the old Whig oligarchy that controlled politics 
under the two previous Georges and it would continue to be true under George III. 
Murray had always curried favor of those who would be influential in promoting his 
interests. While in Quebec, he enjoyed the favor of two of the four ministries in power: 
those of the Duke of Newcastle and the Earl of Bute from 1759 to 1763. When Bute 
resigned in April 1763 and George Grenville became head of the new ministry, Murray 
complained, unwarrantably as it turned out, that due to his brother’s falling out of 
political favor, he, by association, was also maligned. Certainly Murray was not 
politically naive about influence: he knew the rules of the game, and he was a willing 
player—as long as he had a winning hand. But with the mounting criticism of the 
merchants against him, he proved, even with friends in high places, to be his own worst 
enemy.
Although Murray was a controversial figure, most would agree that he was the 
quintessential "God, King, and country" patriot. He devoted his life to his king and was 
not found wanting in courage, integrity, and dutifulness. But accompanying these 
admirable qualities was an insufferable air of superiority, of intolerance, and even 
paranoia, for those who did not live up to his standards, differed with his views, or 
gained honors he believed due him. He was the aristocrat who knew what was best for 
the people, the general whose orders were not to be disobeyed under any circumstance,
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the public official who could not be compromised. The result was a career that, however 
exemplary, was also peppered with controversy.
Apart from all the dissensions, in the first few years Quebec was administered 
relatively well by Murray. His integrity and demand for honest government were 
reflected in his success in halting smuggling, in conscientiously setting administrative 
policy to promote the well-being of the habitants. One of Murray’s first reports on 
Quebec after the conquest in 1762, requested by Egremont, reflected his optimism that 
Quebec had an important role to play economically in Britain’s future. He saw potential 
for the fisheries, production of potash, the outfitting of masts for the British Navy, and 
not least important providing markets for British-manufactured goods. He ardently 
believed that the French Canadians would be among the most loyal of British subjects 
if British policy were equitable and just.
Despite this enthusiasm for Quebec, however, for over a year Murray had been 
requesting a transfer from Quebec to his old regiment in Ireland. The reason for this 
request probably reflected Murray’s sense of himself as first and foremost a military 
man. He was envious of his fellow governor in Trois Rivieres, Ralph Burton, who had 
been relieved of his governorship to assume command of forces in the West Indies. 
Murray believed Townshend was blocking his request to rejoin his old regiment in 
Ireland. His brother Gideon assured him in a letter on April 10, 1762, that his 
suspicions were ill-founded, that Townshend was a good friend. Gideon cautioned his
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brother against his suspicious tendencies and counseled him not to imitate "our three 
brothers."1
Murray’s desire to be relieved from his duties in Quebec was temporarily put on 
hold when Gideon informed him in a letter dated May 21, 1763, that he was the likely 
candidate for the new post of governor of Quebec. Murray was delighted with the 
prestige the new position would give him and spared no expense in equipping himself 
with befitting accoutrements. From his agent, George Ross in New York, he ordered 
a post chaise and horses, table silver in sets of six dozen. He asked the influential New 
York merchant, John Watts, to buy him two black slaves "born in northern colonies" and 
for each "a clean young wife, who can wash and do all the female offices about a farm." 
"I shall begrudge no price," he added and explained.
As it is now certain I am to remain in this country, where I propose doing 
all the good I can, by exciting the people to industry, and promoting the 
improvement of agriculture by setting a good example, I must most earnestly 
interest your assistance, without servants nothing can be done, had I the 
inclination to employ soldiers, which is not the case, they would disappoint 
me. And Canadians will work for nobody but themselves.2
To his wife, Delia, in England, he wrote on November 6, 1763, asking her to 
conquer her fears of the trans-Atlantic crossing and join him. Assuming that she would 
do so, he counseled,
•PAC, Murray Papers, MG 23, II, 1, Series 2.
2Ibid., Nov. 2, 1763.
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I need not tell you how necessary it will be to provide yourself with a large 
stock of magnificent clothes, the people of this country are very vain, love 
show and will expect to see their governor’s lady dressed as she ought to be.
I have wrote to Mr. Ross to give you what money you please so I expect I 
shall not be put to the blush by any deficiency on your part.3
These two letters reveal Murray’s desire to be a role model and to impress the 
Canadians. His admonition to his wife not to embarrass him apparently did not 
encourage her to brave the Atlantic.
One of Murray’s difficulties once the Proclamation became known was the fact that 
it did not go into effect until August 10, 1764. This hiatus of almost a year placed 
Murray in an untenable position. Gage left Montreal for New York to replace Amherst. 
Burton, who had returned from the West Indies and resumed his governorship of Trois 
Rivieres, replaced Gage as governor of Montreal. Haldimand was appointed to replace 
Burton at Trois Rivieres. Until the effective date of the Proclamation, both men had 
autonomy to run their respective districts, but Murray as governor-elect and as governor 
general in command of Quebec and all its territories tried to impose authority over 
Burton and Haldimand in anticipation of transforming the colony from a military to a 
civilian government. Burton and Haldimand, however, would not accede to such 
pretensions on Murray’s part. Burton ignored Murray, deferring instead to Gage in New 
York. An infuriated Murray complained to Gage that he was Burton’s ranking officer 
and that Burton was treating him with disrespect. Gage, whose own relations with
3Ibid., 23.
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Murray were contentious, wrote Burton to be patient, for he anticipated promoting 
Burton to the rank of brigadier general and to the position of command of the northern 
armies. When that happened, Burton would outrank Murray.
In part, the quarrel between Gage, Burton, and Murray, already alluded to in the 
last chapter, had to do with army protocol with regard to promotion. There were two 
ranks: army and regimental. Promotion in army rank normally depended upon seniority; 
in regimental rank, it depended upon a combination of seniority and ability to purchase.4 
Departure from this recognized plan of promotion, which Gage was proposing, was 
bound to create recrimination and disharmony. When a man of Murray’s sensitivity, 
vanity, and ambition became the victim of such irregular, though not uncommon, 
practices, the situation became explosive.
Compounding the problem was the fact that Murray’s jealousy of Burton was not 
without precedent. In 1759 though Murray was senior to Gage (by one day), Gage had 
been promoted twice to the position of brigadier general, thereby outranking Murray. 
Murray was convinced that the promotion was politically motivated since Gage’s brother 
was popular with the new government in London and Murray’s brother, a liberal Whig, 
was out of favor. The animosities between Gage and Murray were mutual and continued 
while both were governors of their respective districts. When each was appointed
4S. Morley Scott, "Civil and Military Authority in Canada, 1764-1766," Canadian 
Historical Review, LX (1928), 117-136.
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governor of Montreal and Quebec with autonomous power, in a letter to Amherst on 
March 27, 1761, Murray made clear that he would "hardly consult Mr. Gage, and as to 
authority I dare say, it is not meant, he should have any over the governor of Quebec, 
until we meet in the field, and then I know his brigadiership must take place, though I 
am his senior colleague] in America. "5
With such an attitude it is hardly surprising that upon Burton’s promotion to 
brigadier general, Murray’s previously warm friendship for Burton turned to bitter 
enmity. After the defeat of Quebec by the British on September 18, 1759, a year before 
the capitulation of Montreal, Murray was appointed to serve as governor of the town, 
Burton as lieutenant governor. During the spring of 1760 in a battle to retake Quebec 
at Ste. Foy, Burton commanded the right wing under Murray’s command in an almost 
disastrous battle. Militarily, Murray should not have risked such an engagement in the 
field where he was outnumbered three to one, but his desire, according to Burt, to 
emulate Wolfe overcame good judgment.6 He lost a third of his men. The right wing 
retreated in disorderly disgrace, ransacking the town in search of liquor. Murray did not 
blame Burton at the time. Later, he did, and claimed that his previous actions saved 
Burton from a court martial. When Burton, as commander in charge of the northern 
army, decided to make Montreal his headquarters, the two men tangled over authority 
just when strong government was essential in Montreal. The city was growing in
5Ibid., 121-22.
6See A.L. Burt, Quebec, 15-16.
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population and its economy was becoming diversified. Ever since the Proclamation of 
1763 was announced in October, the tensions between the army and civilians in Montreal 
had been escalating. But as the result of ineptness at Whitehall, Murray tried to govern 
affairs in Montreal from Quebec City, a distance of 180 miles. A combination of 
factors—the frictions caused by the personal feud between Burton and Murray, the 
disagreements over civilian and military jurisdictions, and the growing tensions between 
the civilian and military population of Montreal—created a volatile situation.
If the promotions of Burton and Gage were not enough of a blow to Murray’s 
vanity, when he learned that he had been stripped of his military command, he was 
anguished and angry. He complained to Halifax that the Canadians respected military 
authority and that he could not command their respect if he were denied that authority. 
Had he confined his arguments to questions of policy, perhaps he might have gained 
greater support in the ministry. His vociferous protestations at losing his military 
command were not restricted to the argument of why this was an unwise move. His 
vituperation expressed in letters addressed to James Oswald, Sir Harry Erskine, Halifax, 
his brother Admiral Murray, Lord Elibank (his father-in-law), and Lord Eglinton was 
aimed at Gage and Burton. To his good friend, James Oswald, vice treasurer for Ireland 
in Grenville’s administration, he complained that "Mr. Gage and Mr. Burton have long 
been plotting to ruin me. . . they mean no less than to turn me out of the Army. . . . 
It is all envy without the least provocation on my side."7 Murray pleaded, "If you find
7PAC, Murray Papers, MG23, III, 1759-1789, Letters to and from Murray.
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that His Majesty has come to a resolution to allow no civil governor to have any military 
command, for God sake get me as handsomely out of this civil embarrassment as soon 
as possible."8 On the same day, October 16, 1764, he wrote to Sir Harry Erskine: "If 
Abercrombie is in London, he can inform you that Mr. Gage and Burton have been long 
envious of me, and have been most industrious to hurt me, without the smallest 
provocation."9 On October 30, 1764, he continued his tirade against Gage and Burton 
to Halifax: "When I had the honor to be appointed governor of this province, these two 
gentlemen were much piqued; they have since taken every opportunity of showing their 
ill humor, which will probably continue till the cause is removed."10
Murray then described the explosive situation in Montreal. He said that the 
military and civilians were:
Inveterate enemies. . . . Every art is used to improve the least incident, 
which may augment popularity with the troops; discipline of course must be 
neglected, the Canadian deemed an alien and an irreconcilable enemy to 
England, the few British settled there held cheap, and everything in a 
ferment. The contagion may reach Quebec, but it cannot exist long, where 
the commander is not infected. In short, My Lord, I believe it will be 
happier for Mr. Burton and everybody here, was he ordered to another 
province. It must be disagreeable and very difficult for a man to serve in a 
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The spate of letters sent off decrying this personal injury and the charge that the 
actions came as a result of his compatriots’ jealousies alienated Halifax. The secretary 
told Murray that he should not have taken personally a policy, established under 
Shelburne, that was consistent with those in the American colonies. British troops in all 
the colonies were simply a detachment of the British army serving abroad; they were 
generally sent for a special purpose and there could be no thought of placing them under 
the command of governors with civil appointments, and often civilians themselves. 
Murray countered with the fact that Quebec was a special situation since the people were 
used to military authority. He stressed, in addition, that he was no "ordinary governor." 
He argued that he accepted a civil appointment with the belief that a military form of 
government was not only traditional but necessary:
It is by military force we are to govern this lately conquered province in 
which there does not exist above 50 Protestant subjects exclusive of the 
troops, and by my instructions of these 50 Protestants must be composed the 
magistracy; but what force, what weight can such a magistracy have unless 
the Supreme Magistrate has authority with the troops? It is evident that the 
Brigadier must, in fact, be the Governor. . . ,12
It is difficult to know whether there was justification for Murray’s position. Many 
Canadian historians such as Hilda Neatby and Donald Creighton support Murray, but that 
position depends in large measure on the judgment of whether the habitant was, in fact, 
used to military rule and, therefore, submissive. Since the habitants left no records and 
since they were not only war-weary but also suffering economic hardships in these first
12Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 211.
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years of the conquest, there is insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that they 
were submissive. In fact, as early as 1762 in an official report, Murray stated that the 
habitants "do not submit so tamely to the yoke, and under sanction of the capitulation 
they every day take an opportunity to dispute the tithes with their cures."13 As 
mentioned previously, in Murray’s letter requesting the purchase of slaves, the governor 
stated that employing Canadians is not an option since they "work only for themselves." 
On October 23, 1763, Murray submitted several petitions to the home government from 
French Canadians in which they expressed their concern about reinstating the hierarchy 
of the clergy, suggesting instead that the priesthood be preserved only as a devotional and 
educational body.14 Such references suggest that if the habitants were not independent, 
they were not submissive either, even under military rule.15
If the habitants were not submissive, as Murray and later Carleton generally 
reported them to be, such assessment was a serious misjudgment. In the Quebec Act of 
1774 payment of tithes was reinstated, which some historians argue was one of the causes 
in 1775 of the habitant refusing to bear arms against the American colonists. But in 
1764 Murray insisted that the habitant would respect only a military ruler, and just two 
years later the military command was restored to the civil command when Carleton was
nlbid., 79.
14Victor Coffin, "The Province o f Quebec and the Early American Revolution," 
Bulletin o f the University o f  Wisconsin, I, No. 3 (June 1896,), 284.
15The recent study by Allan Greer, cited before, on rural society in three Quebec 
parishes, supports the view that the habitant was not submissive.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
appointed to replace Murray. By that time, however, the jurisdictional difficulties 
encountered between Murray and Burton and growing doubts about the policy of 
anglicization, may have influenced Whitehall to return the military authority to the 
governor. Also by that time, the American colonists were colliding with British 
authorities over the issue of taxation. For that reason it may have seemed expedient to 
return the military authority to the governor of Quebec.
In 1764, despite his disappointment at losing his military command, Murray tackled 
the task of instituting civil government with energy and enthusiasm. Though at first 
optimistic about the policy of assimilation called for in the Proclamation and in his 
instructions, he soon found that implementation was another matter and he reverted to 
the view he expressed in 1762. One of the rare comments recorded by Murray in 
reference to the American colonies was his advice to Egremont that whatever the future 
government of Quebec, it should not be modeled after those in the American colonies for 
he said "the people here do not yet seem ripe for such a government."16 Murray firmly 
believed that was the case. He could not see how a small minority could legislate the 
interests of the overwhelming French-Canadian majority. To comply with his 
instructions for calling an assembly, Murray would be promoting a government run by 
an oligopoly of British Protestants, from no more than 200 householders, to rule over 
65,000 Canadian Roman Catholics. Religious freedom was granted by the Treaty of 
Paris but only "as far as the laws of Great Britain permit." This meant that if the laws
16Burt, Quebec, 83.
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were strictly applied, French Roman Catholics would not be eligible to vote for or sit in 
an assembly, to serve on the judiciary, or hold civil office. Given Murray’s sympathies 
for the Canadians and his disdain for the British merchants, it is not difficult to 
understand why he balked at implementing the policies called for in his instructions. 
Instead he compromised.
His first act as civil governor was to appoint members of the council. These men 
were carefully chosen by Murray and were partial to the Canadians. The council of 
twelve (four ex-officio and eight others) included only two British merchants—Benjamin 
Price and Thomas Dunn. While they could have been spokesmen for their commercial 
colleagues, they chose to remain neutral in the controversies with Murray. The first 
ordinance established a legal system which granted Canadians rights that compromised 
the terms of the Proclamation. The controversial ordinance for which Murray was held 
accountable was the work of Attorney General George Suckling and Chief Justice 
William Gregory, both considered unqualified for the job since neither was acquainted 
with the French language or with French law. Suckling had been appointed by the king 
on the strong recommendation of London merchants doing business with Canada, but no 
one was satisfied with the judicial system that was established. In an attempt to deal with 
the French and English populations, three courts were created: the Court of King’s 
Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and Courts of the Justices of the Peace. English 
law was practiced in the higher and lower courts and was confined to practitioners in 
King’s Bench and Protestants were made justices of the peace. However, the Court of
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Common Pleas was instituted to accommodate the Canadians and, as Murray put it, "to 
prevent their being made a prey to our upright lawyers."17 If cases had arisen before 
October 1, 1764, French law would apply; Canadians could sit on juries and either party 
might request a trial by jury; and advocates of civil law were permitted to practice. 
Murray appointed judges to the Court of Common Pleas who were sympathetic to 
Canadians. He also created a prerogative court to facilitate testamentary business; grants 
and rights of inheritance in force before the Treaty of Paris were recognized; and an 
alternative to the English law of primogeniture was provided by sanctioning the French 
custom of coparcenary, i.e., joint ownership, which, Murray maintained, contributed to 
the better cultivating and peopling of the country.
To the merchants who had been anxiously awaiting civilian government, the new 
civilian rule seemed no different than the despised military rule. Under military rule the 
government could commandeer men, carts, and canoes for transport of supplies. Under 
civilian rule, Murray decided that such impressment could not be exercised except on his 
authority. Murray frequently withheld that authority, some charged, arbitrarily. 
Curfews were still imposed; and those out after dark were required to carry lanterns. 
Another irritant, and one that provoked the crisis between Murray and the merchants, 
was billeting of soldiers. Under military rule, billets were found by the captains of 
militia and any householder could be required to receive soldiers. Under civilian rule, 
the merchants serving as justices of the peace assumed the role of finding housing for the
17Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, IV, 574.
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soldiers, although they themselves were exempt. In the November 29 ordinance 
establishing practices for billeting of soldiers, Murray also exempted seigneurs from such 
an invasion on their private lives. The noblesse were part of the aristocracy, and as 
such, Murray firmly believed, merited special treatment.
These first months of civilian rule convinced the merchants that Murray was not 
going to act in their interests. He could, they observed, bend the law according to his 
whims, but never in their direction. While Murray equivocated on calling an assembly, 
he strictly enforced regulations for fur traders. Licenses were required, as were 
recognizances before entering the territory, and all trade was restricted to just a few 
established, but no longer active, posts. These restrictions, the merchants and traders 
complained, put them at a competitive disadvantage with the French who were not under 
such regulations. They were already hurting economically due to the Indian uprisings 
the previous year.
According to Creighton, the merchants had two goals—to gain economic and 
political influence. Government regulations restricting their ability to compete with 
French and American traders thwarted their economic goals, and Murray’s refusal to 
inaugurate representative government thwarted their political goals. Men who were 
described as spirited and ambitious, who thrived on challenge and competition, were not 
about to submit silently to being so restrained. They exercised what little power they did 
have as members of the Grand Jury. In a presentment to the king on October 17, 1764,
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signed by both French and British members, the jurists argued that as the only 
representative body in the province, they should be consulted before any ordinance was 
passed. To further diminish the power of the governor, they insisted that the Grand Jury 
should audit the province’s public accounts at least twice a year. An addendum to this 
presentment, signed only by the British jurists, denounced the inclusion of army officers 
in the commission of the peace and protested against Catholics serving on juries.
An infuriated Murray attacked all the members of the Grand Jury for these actions. 
The Canadian members intimidated by Murray’s scathing attack issued their own 
presentment to the king, explaining that being unfamiliar with the English language, they 
had not understood the document they signed on October 17. The Canadians also 
expressed their resentment of the British members of the jury for the insulting addendum. 
But in the interim, the Grand Jurors were publicly thanked by fifty Quebecers for "their 
very spirited and laudable proceedings."18 The Grand Jury would later be chastised by 
the Privy Council in London for their "licentious" behavior. Most historians do not 
question the validity of the Privy Council’s decree, but perhaps a fresh look at the 
presentment and the response is in order. For example, the jurists objected to the legal 
system because they believed it would be costly, complicated, oppressive, and even 
unconstitutional. As it turned out, that was the very argument Carleton and the 
government made against the ordinance during the Quebec Act debates. Some of the 
other objections of the Grand Jurors were that of allowing peddlers to sell wares on
18Burt, Quebec, 112-113.
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public streets, to turning docks and wharves into private property contrary to the public 
good, to allowing commercial activities on the Sabbath, to proper regulations for 
maintaining safety and order. All these complaints were justified and subsequently dealt 
with by the governor and council, but the Privy Council accused them of overstepping 
their bounds and ignoring the proper channels for making such complaints. 
Understandably, the council could not condone such behavior, for law and order had to 
be maintained. But this very fact should not influence the historians’ assessment of the 
situation. This is especially true of the blanket condemnation of all the members of the 
Grand Jury. They have all been branded as "malcontents from not having been made 
magistrates," chosen by a devious opponent of Murray’s, Williams Conyngham. The 
foreman of the jury, James Johnston, was described as having been "thwarted by the 
governor in his attempt to obtain a share of public property." The inference is, of 
course, that he had a personal grudge against the governor. The source for these 
condemnatory remarks was George Suckling, the author of the ordinance being criticized 
and, as has already been mentioned, generally considered an incompetent attorney 
general. From what knowledge we have of these "malcontents," the description of them 
as such does not appear a just one. For example, Johnston was a man concerned about 
the religious life of his community; he had a life-long partnership with John Purss that 
was harmonious and responsible; in addition to his own children, he generously educated 
and employed his nephews; and respect for him by his community was evidenced by 
various civic appointments. Governor Carleton recommended him for a seat on the 
council and described him as "a man of a very excellent understanding and likewise very
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fit."19 He was active politically in support of English rights for the province. In 
addition to the Grand Jury presentment, he signed the merchants’ memorial a few months 
later calling for Johnson’s recall. Peter Faneuil, another grand juror, may have been 
related to the Peter Faneuil, who died in 1748 in Boston, and was a highly respected and 
important figure in that city’s early history. He also signed the petition for Murray’s 
recall.20 Alexander Dumas was a French Huguenot merchant living in Montreal who 
was part of an influential circle of merchant-iraders. He was active in the political 
affairs of the province. He signed a petition for an assembly in December 1773 and was 
an advocate for French civil law except in commercial dealings. Daniel Bayne, Thomas 
Aylwin, John Lymburner, Philip Payne, John Danser, and Gilbert McRandall were all 
merchant-traders involved in the economic and political life of the province.21 What all 
of them had in common was their objection to Murray’s administration, and whatever 
interpretation is put on the petitioners and the presentment, what is not debatable is the 
fact that both sides determined to influence the home government of the validity of their 
claims.
To assure that their message was accurately received by the British authorities, the 
merchants decided it was essential for them to present their grievances in person.
19Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, IV, 399-400.
20Efforts to establish the relationship between Peter Faneuil of Boston and the 
merchant in Montreal in the Massachusetts Historical Society records have failed. 
However, the likelihood is that there might be some connection, given the same name 
and origin of Massachusetts.
21See Appendix II for their biographies.
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Pooling their resources, they elected two of their brethren, Daniel Bayne and William 
McKenzie, to act on their behalf. Murray, too, had by this time decided that he needed 
a spokesman in London to voice his concerns about the Proclamation’s many 
shortcomings that hampered his ability to govern. His trusted friend and council 
member, Hector T. Cramahd, was dispatched to defend the ordinance establishing courts 
of justice and also to argue for reinstatement of a lieutenant governor for Montreal, since 
Murray claimed "every intrigue to our disadvantage will be laid and hatched there."22 
The following oft-quoted letter in which Murray’s partiality toward the "new subjects" 
is expressed reveals not only the crux of the problem of his administration but the flaw 
in his character that exacerbated tensions. With characteristic exaggeration and 
overdramatization, Murray says,
Little, very little, will content the new subjects but nothing will satisfy the 
"licentious fanaticks" trading here, but the expulsion of the Canadians who 
are perhaps the bravest and the best race upon the globe, a race, who could 
they be indulged with a few privileges which the laws of England deny to 
Roman Catholics at home, would soon get the better of every national 
antipathy to their conquerors and become the most faithful and most useful 
set of men in this American empire.23
The postscript to this letter was also characteristic of Murray for he was never 
hesitant to disparage those he did not like. In it, Murray brands three merchants who 
he erroneously believed were in London petitioning to become members of the council.
22Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 231-232.
23Ibid., 231.
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Actually, on the very day that Murray was writing his letter, Bayne and William 
McKenzie were embarking from Quebec for London. Murray described McKenzie as 
a "notorious smuggler and a turbulent man," and William Grant, "a conceited boy." The 
third, Alexander Mackenzie, he called "a weak man of little character." He informed the 
Lords that "it will be impossible to do business with any of them."24 While Bayne and 
William McKenzie were still on the North Atlantic, bound for London, the situation in 
Montreal had reached crisis proportions.
The conflict was over billeting of soldiers in private homes. Taking the lead in 
opposing this practice was the merchant Thomas Walker. According to Walker, the 
officers were bleeding citizens by having more than one billet at a time.25 Walker stated 
that in consequence of the ordinance,
The officers all want to change their quarters for better houses and demand 
feather beds and sheets, sometimes threaten to take the citizens beds from 
under them and turn them out of doors. They take their victuals from them 
and sit up all night carousing and burning their wood and upon the least 
reprimand threaten to burn them in their houses. The women are still more 
impertinent and abusive than the men. They will not quit the houses where 
they have formerly billeted and when they change insist upon being taken in 
with their husbands, in defiance of the ordinance and the justices whom they 
abuse with foul language.26
24 Ibid.
25PAC Report fo r  1888, XI, XII, Walker Memorial, Note 37.
26PAC, C042:4.
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According to the military, Walker encouraged citizens to withhold the privileges 
the soldiers formerly enjoyed and even relished turning soldiers out of their quarters into 
the streets on bitter evenings. One such incident occurred when an officer named Payne 
refused to vacate his newly acquired quarters, which the merchant and magistrate who 
lived below claimed to have rented themselves. The defiant Payne was arrested and 
jailed. Walker was one of the magistrates who signed the warrant. When complaints 
of this incident were reported to Murray, he summoned all the Grand Jury members to 
Quebec. But before that happened, it is believed that some of the men of the 28th 
Regiment decided to take revenge upon Walker themselves.
On the evening of December 6, 1764, they seized the opportunity to do so. Earlier 
that day in Quebec, Murray had issued a follow-up ordinance with respect to the 
responsibility of householders who were billeting officers: wood at specified rates was 
to be provided; officers were to have free use of the kitchen and necessary cooking 
utensils in common with the rest of the family; and rooms were to be decently furnished 
with either a fireplace or stove in each. Penalties for violating these instructions could 
range from a minimum of forty shillings to a maximum of five pounds. In Montreal, 
unaware of Murray’s attempt to shore up compliance of householders, Walker’s 
assailants, about twelve or thirteen disguised men, forced entry into his home. There 
they terrified Walker’s wife and servants and brutally attacked him, relenting only when 
they believed him dead. Miraculously, Walker physically survived the beating, though 
he had experienced, he said, over two hundred blows to his body. His swollen face was
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unrecognizable, except for one permanent mark—a severed left ear which was carried off 
as a trophy. Any attempt to trace the torturous trail of bringing Walker’s assailants to 
trial need not concern us here. What was significant was the fact that Murray, who 
believed he had tried to resolve the conflict as judiciously as he could, became the target 
of Walker and the merchants.
With only one exception, W. Stewart Wallace,27 historians have little charity to 
spare with regard to Walker and his wife. The Walkers may have been obnoxious28 but 
several points need mentioning that have been left out of most accounts of the incident. 
Walker had been promised by Murray that the trial of those accused of the attack would 
be held in Montreal, but Murray changed the venue, he said, because the defendants 
could not get a fair trial in Montreal. Comments by the merchant, Thomas Ainslie, 
support Murray’s concern. Ainslie described Montreal as "a melancholy scene [where] 
not a man in the street meets another but he thinks of having his throat cut." Ainslie 
says, "I don’t mean one set of people more than another for every man seems to be 
doubtful of his neighbour.1,29 But Walker and his wife also had fears. Theirs were that 
the 28th Regiment had been moved to Quebec due to the high state of tension between
27See W. Stewart Wallace, ed., The Maseres Letters 1766-1768 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Library, 1919) for his account of the Walker affair.
28Benjamin Franklin, who was their guest while on his mission to Canada with a 
companion, on his return said of them: "I think they both have excellent talents at 
making themselves enemies, and I believe, live where they will, they will never be long 
without them." William B. Willcox, ed., The Papers o f Benjamin Franklin, XXII (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 439.
29PAC, Council minutes, C042, 4, 188.
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the regiment and civilians. The Walkers were concerned that their safety could not be 
assured in that city. Walker also protested the expense that would be involved in 
transporting his wife, his servants, and himself that distance. The only note about the 
change of venue is in the March 6 council minutes. The minutes read, "Walker trial to 
be heard in Quebec because of the ‘very great expense to the governor.”' No mention 
is made about a fair trial. This information gives a slightly different cast to the 
accusation that Walker defeated the government’s best efforts to try those charged with 
his beating by his refusal to travel to Quebec for the initial trial.30
As has been mentioned previously, little is known about Walker before his arrival 
in Montreal in 1763 except that he was British-born, had emigrated first to Boston in 
1752, and was a member of a Boston merchants’ society. In Montreal, Walker bought 
a handsome home on Rue St. Paul near the cathedral and convinced the other merchants 
that he was qualified to be their spokesman. But even before the fateful evening in 
December, Walker was viewed as a troublemaker by the authorities. In a civil suit 
brought against him and his wife while Quebec was still under military government (no 
mention has even been made of what the charge was), his behavior was considered 
coarse and objectionable. Again, this information comes from official records. Yet 
Murray appointed Walker to the first grand jury. What, one might speculate, was his 
rationale for doing so? According to Hilda Neatby, Murray was warned of Walker’s 
disputatious nature when he appointed him a magistrate, but she says that Murray
30PAC, C042, 5.
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believed he could manage him. She presumably makes this assessment from a lengthy 
letter of Murray to John Fraser on September 11, 1764. In it Murray discussed how 
proud women and men can, if properly managed, produce good. He believed that it was 
the task of the "ruler" so that if results were not good, it was the ruler’s fault, not the 
individual’s. Pertaining to Walker, Murray said,
Walker and Knipe have been here with a very respectful address. I have had 
much conversation and if any confidence may be put in them we may hope 
to find the people at Montreal very tractable; to contribute to it I have made 
Walker and Knipe justices of the peace, the first is certainly a sensible man 
and with proper management may be kept within the bounds of moderation - 
made a useful member of society; the man is proud and wants not perhaps 
more than a moderate share of ambition; to give a right turn or bias to such 
passions is to show we can govern properly. The direction produces the 
effects and if every tool is not put to its proper use, the workman may be 
deemed ignorant or negligent.31
Perhaps such a boast was creditable in Murray’s military rule, but Murray’s exalted 
opinion of his ability to manage men in a civilian capacity, was his undoing. Walker 
could not be managed. When he thwarted all Murray’s efforts in his behalf, an 
exasperated Murray removed him as a commissioner of the peace. But Walker was not 
to be summarily dismissed. He decided to plead his case in London.
The year was 1765. Halifax was preoccupied with the rebellious response of the 
American colonists to the Stamp A.ct which went into effect in April. Also in April the 
public was outraged as news of the brutal attack upon Walker reached London. Shortly
3IPAC, MG23, GII, 1 (1) 2: Murray Papers, II, Letter Book, 1763-1765.
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after, another memorial from twenty-two merchants called for Murray’s removal for the 
good of the province. All but five of the fourteen jurors who signed the presentment in 
October 1764 signed this memorial. They were Samuel Duncan, Thomas Aylwin, 
Gilbert McRandall, John Lymbumer, and Alexander Dumas. The reasons for their 
failure to do so are not known. Perhaps Murray’s previous chastisement of them was 
sufficient to silence them. Or it is possible that they were out of the province at the 
time. In addition to the jurors, the other merchants who signed were: George Allsopp, 
Benjamin Comte, John A. Gastineau, Edward Harrison, James Jeffry, Eleazer Levy, 
William McKenzie, George Measam, John Ord, John Purss, James Shepherd, and John 
Watmough. John Purss and George Allsopp were partners of James Johnston. Both men 
became prominent merchants in Quebec, though until Murray was recalled, Allsopp was 
notorious for his opposition to the military and to Murray. Jeffry was Peter Faneuil’s 
partner in Quebec. The other signatories were merchants in various enterprises who 
contributed to the economic and political life of the province.
This memorial was given considerable weight in London since it was enjoined by 
one from prominent London merchants. The mayor and four aldermen, supported by 
four MPs, presented the Board of Trade with a "Memorial and Petition from the 
Merchants and Traders of the City of London trading to Canada, on behalf of themselves 
and others," signed by twenty-five firms involved in trade with Canada. Their message 
was that they had substantial proof from others in Quebec that the Quebec merchants’ 
accusations against Murray were true. They called upon the Board to put Quebec on the
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same footing as the other American colonies by granting the people British rights in 
order to "support the infant commerce to and from that part of the world."32
In the meantime, Fowler Thomas, a London barrister, was engaged by Bayne and 
McKenzie to serve as the Quebec merchants’ London agent. By the time Thomas Walker 
reached London, sympathy for him was widespread. For a time he was celebrated, at 
least long enough to gain the ear of the king, who reinstated him as a commissioner of 
the peace. Needless to say, Murray did not need this kind of blow to his ego, to his 
authority to govern, nor to his reputation, which was seriously being maligned by his 
foes in London. All these events commingled so that the merchants’ petition against 
Murray for not instituting an assembly as had been anticipated and a multitude of other 
charges portrayed Murray as a demagogue who had to be replaced.
Unfortunately for Murray, Cramahe was unsuccessful in gaining access to the 
relevant officials to plead the governor’s case in time to counter some of the charges 
against him. Eventually the government acted on the many issues raised by Cramahe. 
Generally, they were supportive of Murray’s actions. A ruling that Roman Catholics 
were not subject to the same incapacities, disabilities, and penalties that Catholics in 
Britain were subject to was issued on June 10, 1765, by Attorney General F. Norton and 
Solicitor General William De Grey. A few months later on September 2, 1765, another 
report, this time by the Board of Trade, examined the many complaints against Murray’s
32Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 235-236.
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administration, especially the September 17, 1764 ordinance establishing courts of 
justice. The Board recommended disallowance of this ordinance since it was deemed 
inadequate in several respects. Ironically, one of the primary concerns was that the 
ordinance discriminated against Canadians. The Board said:
The principal error by which the framers of this Ordinance seem to have 
been misled, is, that the native Canadians are under such personal incapacity, 
and their laws and customs so entirely done away, as that they cannot be 
admitted either as suitors or advocates to participate in common with the rest 
of His Majesty’s subjects of the advantages of that system of justice in 
respect to matters of property, for the administration which the Superior 
Court seems to have been instituted, for though they are admitted to serve 
indiscriminately as jurors in this Court, yet it is evident from the express 
mention of the peculiar privileges they are to enjoy in the inferior Court, that 
it is intended neither that their customs and usages in questions of property 
should be allowed of in the Superior Court, nor themselves be admitted to 
practice there as proctors, advocates or attorneys.33
The recommendation to remedy these "injustices" was to establish Canadians on 
the same footing as the old subjects, the English, with regard to serving as jurors, 
advocates, and proctors in all courts. Another recommendation to assure greater fairness 
for both Canadians and old subjects stipulated that juries for cases involving only British 
citizens would be all British; in cases involving only Canadians, all Canadians; and if a 
case were between a British and a Canadian, the jury would be evenly split.
The Board also condemned the Grand Jury of Montreal for its presentment of 
October 17, 1764. The members of the Jury were charged with "publicly arraigning in
33Ibid., 241.
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an irregular presentment, the justice and policy of acts of government passed under His 
Majesty’s authority, and submitted to his decision." The Board further chastised the 
Grand Jury for assuming powers belonging only to a legislature. Such acts, they 
concluded, were "indecent, unprecedented and unconstitutional."34 This report was 
issued on September 2, 1765, when Lord Dartmouth was president of the Board of 
Trade. As was previously discussed, the Board’s actions were directed against the 
improper procedure of the Grand Jury. What it did not address were the reasons for the 
jurors’ actions, i.e., anger at Murray’s refusal to call an assembly as was anticipated 
when the Proclamation went into effect.
The presentments of both the Quebec and London merchants, and the many private 
letters and hearings, all registering various complaints against Murray could not, 
however, be ignored by the new Rockingham ministry that took office on July 12, 1765. 
Clearly, Quebec was in a state of turmoil, and the general belief in London was that 
Murray had become part of the problem. On top of all the previous complaints, Murray 
was involved in still another row - this time with a Major Brown. Murray called for a 
military inquiry against him. This feud was related to the personal one with Burton and 
was fueled by the fact that civilian and military distinctions were not clearcut. The two 
men constantly quibbled over who had the authority to act. Burton had responsibility for 
defense of the whole province as well as for posts in the reserve territory around the 
Great Lakes. Burton accused Murray of refusing him cooperation, thereby hampering
MIbid., 246.
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his ability to perform essential military duties. Murray accused Burton of meddling in 
civil matters and of irritating merchants. It is difficult to judge the quarrel fairly, for as 
in the case of the merchants, the chief source of information is from Murray to superiors 
and friends.
One incident, however, is described in the 1765 legislative council minutes which 
throws some light on Murray’s quarrel with Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Christie, deputy 
quartermaster general responsible for provisioning the upper country. The issue was 
over impress warrants and who had the authority to grant them. Murray claimed he did. 
As reported by Christie to Burton, Murray issued warrants the previous August but 
recalled them in October. Christie says that requests made by him in person in 
December resulted in "offputs and delays." The governor promised to leave the warrants 
when he returned to Quebec, but he didn’t. Christie says, "I saw him on the road and 
he assured me he would assist the service," but he neglected to do so. Christie’s letter 
to Murray of February 19 was not answered until March 8. Communication between 
Burton and Murray apparently was no more successful. Burton’s letter to Murray on 
February 20, 1765, indicated that Murray had not furnished Fraser with warrants, as had 
been promised, despite the necessity to get them so that materials could be ready to send 
to Lachine as soon as the rivers were open and before the roads thawed. When the 
warrants were finally secured, it was too late for the early supply. The people in the 
upper country were distressed for this was their only source of supplies needed by seed
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time. In addition, as a result of the delay, they would have to pay summer, rather than 
winter, prices, which were much higher.35
Burt gives a different interpretation of the clash over impress warrants. He points 
out that Murray was trying to protect the habitants from the illegal, corrupt, and harsh 
manner in which Christie enlisted their labor. According to Burt, Murray gave authority 
to the Montreal justices of the peace, and he issued a warrant to Judge Fraser of the 
Court of Common Pleas. But Christie, with Burton’s support, would not accept civilian 
control over such an important army function. The conflict was finally settled by the 
home government in favor of civil authority, but it exacerbated the already hostile 
feelings between the civilians and the army, and between Burton and Murray.36 The 
variance in interpretation between what Burt conveys and the report in the legislative 
council minutes suggests not only the difficulty in trying to determine which party was 
at fault, but also of how impossible it was not to have resolved such jurisdictional 
problems, especially when the personalities involved were so hostile to one another.
The final clash between Burton and Murray that probably triggered the recall of 
both men is described in Murray’s letter to Halifax and a personal letter to his good 
friend Lord Adam Gordon. As has already been mentioned, Murray had persuaded 
Burton to send the 28th Regiment down to Quebec, believing this action might reduce
35PAC, C042, Legislative Council minutes, 1765.
36Burt, Quebec, 116-117.
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tension in Montreal over the Walker affair. But Brown, head of the regiment, was 
convinced that Murray was trying to harass the regiment. He was also convinced of his 
officers’ innocence. In Quebec, Brown determined that as senior officer he had the 
authority to take over the Quebec garrison. Murray believed that as commanding officer, 
he was the legitimate head, but he decided not to inflame the situation and retired to his 
home outside Quebec City. Only when he was twice refused entry to his own capital, 
did he challenge Brown’s right to command the garrison. Then he had his commission 
as military governor read out, and he pronounced his authority to parole the garrison 
until Gage ordered otherwise.
But the affront did not end there. While Brown was in Quebec, Burton arrived to 
inspect the troops. Murray hospitably offered him lodging. Burton not only declined, 
but callously ignored Murray’s goodwill gesture by excluding him from a huge 
entertainment hosted by him. Although Murray wrote to a friend, "I bore all this with 
the patience of a philosopher and the dignity of a veteran," he also behaved like a man 
insulted. On September 27, 1765, in a letter to the secretary of war, Murray called for 
an inquiry against Major Brown, "an inferior officer," who refused to acknowledge 
Murray’s military position. Murray accused Gage and Burton of approving Brown’s 
behavior. He requested the matter to be laid before a Board of General Officers.37
37PAC, Murray Papers, II.
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To the new administration in Whitehall, Murray’s request clearly indicated that 
disorder reigned in the province. The ministry decided, as had the Board of Trade 
previously, that it was not only impossible, but improper, for them to judge the many 
complaints lodged against Murray. On October 24, 1765, General H. S. Conway, who 
had succeeded the Earl of Halifax as secretary of state for the Southern Department, 
wrote to Murray to make preparations to return to England and give an account of the 
province. On April 1 of the following year, he was formally recalled. He departed from 
Canada on June 28, 1766, leaving Colonel P. Aemiius Irving, president of the council, 
as acting governor until the arrival of Colonel Guy Carleton.
In London, Murray was received with unexpected cordiality. His accusers, 
satisfied that Murray was recalled, were no longer interested in pressing charges against 
him. The merchants, as Creighton has averred, were less interested in constitutional 
issues than in their own economic well-being. Once Murray was removed, evidence to 
support their many charges against him was not forthcoming, and Fowler Thomas was 
forced to drop his indictment. On the other hand, Murray exhaustively answered every 
complaint against him. He called for a full investigation and a public vindication. He 
was not given a full investigation, but in April 1767, two and a half years after the first 
presentments against him, the Privy Council dismissed the petition and complaints as 
"groundless, scandalous, and derogatory."38
38Burt, Quebec, 126.
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Despite having been exonerated, Murray was never asked to return as governor to 
Quebec. His supporters believed that had he done so, he would have been able to 
reverse any negative views about his governorship. Many of the changes that he was 
instrumental in effecting would have made it easier to govern. In a long audience 
Murray had with the king, the king promised appointment of Canadian judges to the 
superior court and reinstatement of the military command to the civil governor. The 
need for a lieutenant governor to be headquartered in Montreal was also conceded. With 
these revisions, many of the jurisdictional squabbles between Murray and Burton might 
not have occurred. But the basic quarrel between Murray and the merchants would not 
have been any different. As long as Murray attempted to regulate their trade, neglected 
to call an assembly, and showed partiality to the Canadians, the antipathy between them 
would have been impossible to assuage. The same situation would have applied to the 
deep-seated animus between the officer class and the merchants no matter what Murray’s 
relations were with the military.
The circumstances under which Murray was asked to govern would have been 
trying to anyone. His instructions to anglicize Quebec placed him in an untenable 
position. He could not bring himself to carry out policies that would, in his view, 
alienate the Canadians, who were the overwhelming majority in Quebec. Conversely, 
he could not neglect to carry out the policies outlined in his instructions which were 
designed to shape Quebec in the image of the other American colonies. So, he 
compromised. As a result, his detractors accused him of only half-heartedly carrying out
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such policies. His efforts to promote emigration from the American colonies could not 
compete with the aggressive efforts of the American land promoters who were, despite 
its illegality, encouraging settlements beyond the Proclamation line. Nor could Quebec 
offer more attractive land than Quebec’s Acadian neighbor, Nova Scotia. In 1758-59, 
Nova Scotia’s Governor Lawrence was pressured by the Board of Trade to call an 
assembly for the purpose of actively promoting emigration from New England to Nova 
Scotia. Two Proclamations by the governor published in the Boston Gazette, the first 
on October 12, 1758, and the second several months later, were successful in 
encouraging a significant exodus from New England to Nova Scotia. From 1759 until 
1768, 8,000 migrants from New England had been lured by the attractive land grants 
offered them in Nova Scotia. In a colony of only 13,000 people, they became a 
dominant force.39 Whether a parallel emigration of settlers from New York, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, who would not have considered moving to Nova Scotia, might 
have been enticed to move to Quebec is worth contemplating. We know that many 
farmers from New York emigrated to Upper Canada after the Revolutionary War as a 
result of attractive land opportunities not available to them in New York. Had Murray 
called an assembly or advertised his intention to do so, similar enticements in the 1760s 
might have produced the influx envisioned by Halifax and Hillsborough in 1763.
39James E. Candow, "The New England Planters in Nova Scotia," in Canadian 
History, Pre-Confederation, R. Doublas Francis and Donald B. Smith, eds. (3rd ed., 
Toronto: Holt Rhinehart and Winston, Ltd., 1990), 215-217.
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Still Murray’s supporters argue that his strong belief that his primary task was to 
gain the loyalty of the Canadian people even at the expense of the few English settlers 
was the right policy. His supporters defend him as a decent, honorable, generous man. 
He was described earlier as being courageous, high principled, and dutiful. He was also 
described as insufferable, egotistical, intolerant, and, from this writer’s perspective, even 
paranoid. There is only one known biography of Murray and it is by a descendant. It 
is understandably biased in Murray’s favor, but it also admits that he was difficult, had 
an explosive temper, and was much too blunt.40 His personal letters to and from his 
relatives and friends reveal a personality that was suspicious and ego-centric. Before 
assigning attributes to Murray, such as his love for the Canadians, it might be fruitful 
to evaluate what kind of person he was from some of his personal correspondence.
Letters from his brother Gideon are the most revealing. On May 21, 1763, Gideon 
writes a long letter on a variety of matters which includes Gideon’s response to Murray’s 
accusations that he mishandled Murray’s affairs. Gideon says,
Now, as I love you, I must scold you for your odd conduct and expressions 
about your good fond wife—you injure her much by your suspicions; and are,
I fear, too hasty and rough with her in your late letters. If she saw your last 
letters to me and Jo Cranston of February 24th, I am persuaded they would 
either distract her or kill her.41
40R.H. Mahon, Life o f General the Honorable James Murray, A Builder o f Canada 
(London: J. Murray, 1921).
41PAC, Murray, MG23, II, 1, Series 2.
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Again on September 19, 1763, Gideon responds to his brother’s charges that he had 
neglected his affairs. Gideon says that "your wife and the Cranstons, and all our 
common friends will vouch for me that no one could take more pains and better care to 
serve you—I neither spared my purse nor person, left no stone unturned and followed the 
prudentest method and wisest advice." The next day, Gideon writes,
By Cranston’s letter, the last paragraph you say what shameful blunders you 
are guilty of in business, and yet you are always sure, to lay the blame on 
those concerned for you. I speak freely and feelingly, and you must be told 
it, and I hope you will mend. I hope at least it will cost you a blush, but 
have you not treated me, your very drudge, in the same absurd manner, in 
your latest letter? wherein you most cruelly accuse me with neglecting your 
affairs; not settling your accounts with old Cranston and allowing your 
money to lie idle in the banker’s hands:—and charging us out a large sum not 
then received? Now all this is owing to your own mistakes, and warm, quick 
Imagination.42
On March 20, 1764, Gideon wrote that Mansfield was responsible for his 
appointment as governor. For a third time he asked advice concerning his son’s military 
career. A year later on March 18, 1765, Gideon wrote that he has had no letters from 
Murray since August 1763. He said that his [Murray’s] wife was ill and that he feared 
she would not live long, "her health and heart, much broken."43
The insight into Murray’s behavior from Gideon’s letters might suggest that Murray 
had little time to attend to his family’s needs. On the other hand, his letters to friends
42 Ibid.
43Ibid.
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in England indicate that he spared little ink in seeking support and approval for himself. 
His ego-centric views and suspicious nature are reflected in these letters. His charges 
against Gage and Burton have previously been recorded in a letter to Halifax in 1763. 
In it he charged Gage and Burton with envy because he was appointed governor of 
Quebec. On October 3, 1765, he wrote to his good friend, Lord Adam Gordon, about 
falsehoods told in Great Britain against him. In the letter to Gordon, he wrote that it was 
Halifax who was behind Gage’s and Burton’s intrigues:
Until I am assured of the contrary by yourself, I shall always think that 
Burton and Gage were encouraged by Lord Halifax to foment and keep up 
the factions of the English traders here against me. The General’s (Burton) 
actions are too barefaced to leave a doubt that witness his approbation of 
Major Brown’s conduct in all the petty business you know, his parade here 
in reviewing the garrison, the entertainment he gave to the principal 
malcontent traders, and his refusing to accept of my house in town to lodge 
in preferring to it Major Brown’s quarters are manifest proof to me of my 
suspicions being well founded and you believe it possible. Yet I bore all this 
with the patience of a philosopher and the dignity of a veteran.44
In further consideration of Murray’s character, it is worth examining the charges 
brought against him of misusing public funds for his own gain. These accusations could 
never be substantiated and Murray was publicly exonerated. But there are some 
lingering doubts about some of his affairs. On January 26, 1764, while he was still 
governor elect, he wrote Sir James Cockburn that "the business of the seignorie shall 
certainly be accomplished, I have three or four in my eye. Give yourself no trouble 
about the money, ways and means shall be fallen upon to make that perfectly easy, and
“Ibid.. 249.
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agreeable."45 Of his own seignorie in a letter to his brother, George, June 9, 1763, he 
boasted that he had the most "beautiful farm in the world" which consisted of "800 better 
acres than any in East Lothian [Scotland] and cost me only £720. "46 While governor, 
he bought several other seigneuries in the province. Although he condemned speculating 
in paper money held by the Canadians, he, himself, wrote his agent that he had sent 
4,000 French livres to be invested for his personal account. How he obtained the French 
money is never explained. On numerous occasions, Murray offered those whose favor 
he wished to gain gifts of the best furs. While these actions by no means suggest 
corruption and are, admittedly, conjectural, it does suggest that when Murray took 
advantage of the situation, it was acceptable; when the merchants tried, they were 
unscrupulous rascals impoverishing the poor Canadians.
Murray should be credited for a spirit of tolerance and appreciation for the 
French-Canadian habitant that served Britain well in the early years of transition from 
French to British rule. He perceived his responsibility as governor of Quebec to 
extinguish prejudice against the Canadians and to cultivate connections which might be 
useful in case of another war. Gradually, he believed, at least initially, with a policy of 
tolerance, they could be assimilated. But he was unwilling to show equal tolerance for 
the merchant. Quite the reverse. In one statement he claims that it was a maxim of his 
"to shun addresses from the traders," and to consult the men of property in the colony,
45PAC, Murray Papers, MG23, II, 1 (1) 2.
46lbid.
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i.e ., the seigneurs. This favoritism of the seigneurs provoked dissension not only among 
English merchants, but among Canadians as well. In one instance, only seigneurs who 
represented the noblesse were invited to a meeting on March 6, 1766, in Montreal by the 
governor and council; Canadian and English seigneurs from the bourgeoisie were 
excluded. When the latter arrived at the court house, where the meeting was to take 
place, they were informed by Adam Mabane, a member of the council and judge of the 
Court of Common Pleas in Quebec, that they were not welcome and that the assembly 
was by a "particular order of the governor and council, that no person was to be 
admitted, but those contained in a certain list." Mabane was asked if he would read a 
paper to the seigneurs attending, but he refused saying that his orders from the governor 
and council were that "no paper whatever should be read, but what they had before 
them." The citizens were ordered out and a few were even thrust out. A protest was 
lodged by those turned away expressing the concern that the exclusion of so many old 
and new subjects would cause dissension between them and the noblesse "infusing in 
their minds a spirit of discontent contrary to his most Gracious Majesty’s kind Intention." 
This protest was signed by John Welles, R. Stenhouse, Matthew Lessey, Samuel Holmes, 
John Stenhouse, George Young, Joseph Howard, Lawrence Ermatinger, Matthew Wade, 
James Price, Thomas Barron, Jonas Desaulles, Richard Dobie, notarized by Edward 
William Gray, and witnessed by Benjamin Frobisher, John Thomason, William 
Haywood, and John Blake. James Price, William Haywood, and John Blake were all
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Americans who sided with the rebels in the invasion of Quebec and left the province with 
the defeated army.47
If the merchants accused Murray of causing defection between the English and 
French, Murray, in turn, charged that the English merchants were hostile to the 
Canadians. Creighton deals with this issue and makes an interesting observation. He 
says that the feud was not between races, "though it has been easily misunderstood as 
such." It was a feud between classes, between an old orthodoxy of privilege and status 
and a new orthodoxy of middle class liberalism. Creighton refers to the intermarriages 
between the French and English in Montreal, but he qualifies it by saying it was between 
those of the same class. The same situation prevailed when the prestigious Beaver Club 
opened its door—the French were not barred from admittance. This argument was 
advanced to prove that there was no stigma attached by the English merchants against the 
French merchants and that the two peoples lived together harmoniously.48 The lack of 
prejudice is also evident in the number of business partnerships between the Canadians 
and the English. There are many studies on the issue of whether the Canadians were 
discriminated against commercially by the British authorities.49 The fact that the British 
took over the fur trade from the Canadians requires another explanation, however, other
47Archives de Quebec, Montreal, Le Bulletin des Recherches Historiques, XXXVIII, 
2 (Levis, Fevrier 1932), 70-74.
48See Creighton, Empire, Chapter III.
49Igartua, A Change in Climate, 255-271; as well as Igartua’s unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Merchants and Negotiants o f Montreal, 1750-1775, A Study in Socio-Economic 
History, Michigan State University, 1974.
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than those that have been advanced which include charges of discrimination. When the 
fur trade became more competitive and monopolistic, the less competitive English 
merchants suffered the same fate as the Canadians. The difference between those who 
survived and those who didn’t was access to capital. If there were discrimination 
because American and British merchants had more ties with London, it was 
discrimination of a different sort.
Another aspect of the class struggle between the aristocracy and the merchant class 
was political in nature. In this instance the proximity of the American colonies 
contributed to the clash between Murray and the merchants who had emigrated from the 
American colonies to Quebec imbued with ideas of republicanism. For over a hundred 
years British policy of benign neglect suited the independent American colonists who had 
grown and prospered while developing their own political institutions. Attempts to rein 
in their independence by the ministries’ taxing policies, beginning with the Stamp Act, 
met with indignant protests. Enactment of the Stamp Act, which caused such convulsions 
in the colonies, is considered not to have overly dismayed the merchants in Montreal. 
The literature is sketchy on this issue, and although Murray denied that there was any 
protest worthy of note in Quebec, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that this may 
have been a whitewash by him in order to present his administration in a more favorable 
light. A digression to examine the impact of the Stamp Act in Quebec might help 
determine whether or not there was greater opposition to it than Murray contended and 
whether that opposition was influenced by the American colonists.
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An article in 1932 by British historian, W. B. Kerr, on the Stamp Act, is revealing 
for several reasons. Kerr refuted the claim by Victor Coffin in his 1896 study of the 
Quebec Act that the American-born or trained segment of the English in Quebec had 
vigorously protested the Act but they were only a small minority and could not influence 
the majority of merchants who acquiesced. Kerr claimed that there was no protest, even 
among the minority, and that the reason Coffin erred was that he did not have access to 
the Quebec Gazette. Kerr cited several articles in the Gazette to make his case. 
Ironically, it was the Gazette, the first newspaper in Quebec started in 1764 by two men 
from Philadelphia, Thomas Gilmore and William Brown, that protested the Act by 
discontinuing publication until the Act was repealed. Upon resumption, the editors 
explained to their readers:
It is with the most sensible pleasure we find ourselves emerged from an 
involuntary inactivity and once more at liberty to congratulate our former 
customers and the public in general on their being freed from the impositions 
of the grievous Stamp; an act more dreadful than the icy chains of our 
inhospitable winter. . . ,50
The letter that appeared in the Gazette on July 21, 1766, that triggered the 
controversy was one written by a committee of London merchants to their fellow 
merchants in which they castigated the rebellious actions of opponents of the Stamp Act. 
They admonished the Quebec merchants to be grateful for the "magnanimity of His 
Majesty’s government in overlooking lawlessness and repealing the Act." Affronted by 
the patronizing tone of the letter and its inaccuracy in assuming that the Quebec
50Quebec Gazette, March 29, 1766.
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merchants were guilty of spirited remonstrances, on July 28, speaking for thirty-eight 
other merchants, Joseph Cawthome responded. Cawthorne charged that the only reason 
there was not greater opposition was that those who were opposed were intimidated by 
the fact of living under a military government. This charge drew an angry response in 
the Gazette from an anonymous person, also claiming to speak for the merchants, though 
he was not one of them. He denounced Cawthome as "a stranger, one of the oddest 
compounds of ignorance and pedantism. . ." for mistakenly believing, first, that the 
people lived under a military regime, and second, that the people were wanting only in 
power, and not will, in not opposing the Stamp Act. From this exchange of letters, Kerr 
says, "We may now consider whether Cawthorne or the anonymous writer of this 
vigorous statement of conservative opinion better represents Quebec sentiment." He 
argues that if the merchants disapproved of the Act, they would not have been hesitant 
to express their views. For evidence, he cites both the 1764 presentment o f the Grand 
Jury in which they made extraordinary claims to function pro tempore as an assembly 
and the welcoming address of the inhabitants to Lieutenant Governor Guy Carleton in 
September 1766 in which they refer with pride to their obedience to the Stamp Act. In 
the latter case, according to Kerr, those who objected to this inclusion were unable to 
secure modification and thus he concludes that "they were a small minority. . . and no 
more was heard of the Stamp Act in Quebec." More importantly, he says, "In the Stamp
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Act affair these ‘contemptible sutlers and traders’ detached Quebec from the thirteen 
colonies and directed that province on a separate path.51
The article by Kerr is interesting for several reasons. With respect to the Stamp 
Act protests, it dismisses the fact that Cawthorne spoke for thirty-eight merchants and 
they were not all American-born or American-led; second, it dismisses the fact that 
although seventy merchants proudly claimed in their letter to Carleton that they submitted 
to the Stamp Act, a second letter of welcome was signed by forty-five merchants. These 
figures are not insignificant and suggest that there was an underlying discontent with 
British policy that would resurface in 1774. One other comment with respect to Kerr’s 
article is that it perpetuates the view without giving any evidence that the merchants were 
"contemptible" and that the merchant community was stratified between those who were 
British-born and American-born. This study will attempt to show that such an analysis 
was misleading, if not inaccurate.
What more do we know about the Stamp Act in Quebec? There are references to 
merchants meeting in coffee houses in Montreal to protest the Act. There are two 
statements by Murray, one on February 14, 1766, while the Act was still in effect, that 
"His Majesty’s subjects in this province have not followed the example of the 
neighboring colonies, but have cheerfully submitted to the authority of the British
S1W.B. Kerr, "The Stamp Act in Quebec," English Historical Review, 47 (1932), 
648-51.
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legislature."52 In a second statement made on August 20, 1766, after leaving the 
province, Murray says of the Canadians that "though stimulated to dispute it by some of 
the licentious traders from New York they cheerfully obeyed the Stamp Act, in hopes 
that their good behavior would recommend them to the favor and protection of their 
sovereign."53 In Murray’s personal correspondence, a letter from a friend in New 
York, a Colonel Maitland, dated January 13, 1766, refers to an incident in New York 
in which Murray was apparently hanged in effigy because of an address he made on the 
subject. According to Coffin, no statement was found of any revenue from the tax. 
Coffin attributes this to the fact that there probably was resistance passive, a term French 
Canadian historian Garneau applied to the Canadians.
If there wasn’t anything more than a resistance passive or resistance by only a 
small minority who could not persuade the majority, what was the reason for it? There 
are several explanations which have not thus far been considered. In 1765, Quebec was 
a small colony with a much smaller commercial population. There was only one post 
road between Montreal and Quebec, with scattered communities remote from one 
another. For this reason, according to Benjamin Franklin, who was called to testify on 
the Stamp Act before the House of Commons in February 1766, it would have been
52Coffin, "The Province of Quebec, 1760-76; Bulletin o f the University o f Wisconsin, 
I, 1897, 317.
53 Ibid.
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difficult to dispense the stamps by post, hence the resistance passive would not have been 
difficult.
There was another feature of the Stamp Act that might have reduced concern, at 
least among the French-speaking population or those using French in their business. A 
little known double duty clause in the Stamp Act was imposed on all instruments not 
written in English. The purpose of this clause was to advance assimilation of persons 
of foreign extraction into the English-speaking community and to prevent their 
interference in the conduct of law and business. Because it was believed precipitous to 
require them to do so, Canada and Grenada were exempted for five years from this duty.
Another significant difference between the American colonies and Quebec and 
hence the difference in their response to the Act was the fact that the tax was imposed 
to help defray the cost of the last war. In the same interview before the House of 
Commons, Franklin testified that the colonists were already paying heavily in taxes for 
the costs of the Seven Years’ War. Although Parliament had reimbursed America, 
Franklin stated it was only forty per cent of the actual cost.54 This situation could not 
be compared to that of Quebec, so that it was quite understandable why the colonists 
would be more outraged by the tax than the Canadians.
^Bigelow, Franklin, III, 404.
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Before finally leaving the subject, it might be well to explore another aspect that 
will be considered at greater length later. Creighton believed that the merchants were 
first and foremost concerned about their economic interests. Constitutional issues were 
secondary. If the merchants were acquiescent, it was because of the nature of their 
commerce. The duty on stamps was not viewed as significantly detrimental to them. 
This was true of some merchants in the American colonies who would not have joined 
in the protest, but for the organized threats and actions by the Sons of Liberty. Such 
threats were compelling enough for them to accede. There was no parallel situation in 
the sparsely settled province to that in the colonies of the organized Sons of Liberty. 
One might conclude that there probably was more resistance than has been recorded, but 
nothing on the scale of the rebellion in the American colonies. Nonetheless, it is worth 
noting that though the merchants did not overly react against the Stamp Act, they were 
quick learners in the art of such protest when one year later a tax on imports and exports 
was imposed. Creighton was right that they would act when their interests were affected. 
Since they believed Murray to be detrimental to their interests, they concentrated on 
seeking his removal.
How should one assess Murray’s tenure as governor of Quebec? Despite the many 
positive acts undertaken by him, Murray was incapable of dealing with the problems he 
faced. The transition of going from a military to a civilian government would have been 
a challenge to the ablest of administrators, but he was not one of them. His own 
personal failings exacerbated the tensions in the province, which particularly in Montreal
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had already erupted into violence between the mercantile community and the military. 
Murray’s own feuds with his fellow officers—Burton, Christie, and Brown—and with the 
English merchants became hopelessly entangled with the disputes between the army and 
the civilians. These quarrels were obstructive of his ability to govern, which was finally 
the reason that he was called home. Murray’s exoneration does not, in this view, exempt 
him from the fact that he precipitated the quarrel with the merchants by not showing 
them any of the consideration that he showed the Canadians. In their struggle to gain 
British rights as promised in the Proclamation, the merchants have been maligned and 
Murray has been applauded for championing the Canadians and protecting them against 
the rapacious merchants.
Murray was a tolerant and generous leader of a conquered people. For that he 
deserves credit. But the long-term result has been a bicultural and bilingual country, with 
a playing field that has not been a level one. Although the blame cannot be put on 
Murray, the second-class status of French Canadians in Canada until recent years had its 
roots in his efforts, and those of his predecessor, Carleton, to maintain the habitant in 
a subservient position to the seigneurs and clergy.
Murray readily admitted that the charge brought against him by the merchants that 
they were treated with a "rage and rudeness of language" was true. In contrast, he 
showed every consideration to the noblesse. For example, when he exempted the 
noblesse from having to billet soldiers, unless absolutely necessary, he explained that this
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was a right that people of family in all countries would expect. In fairness to Murray, 
he was expressing the views of his class, which in eighteenth-century England were 
acceptable. But he did not recognize that in postwar Quebec the kind of society that 
entrenched this class system could not be a productive one. The tragedy for the 
merchants and the habitant was that Murray’s successor, Guy Carleton, shared Murray’s 
views.
The merchants’ efforts to recall Murray may have won them the battle, but as will 
be seen, eight years later they lost the war. In the meantime, Murray resumed his 
military career which culminated in still another controversy when he was governor of 
Minorca. His Lieutenant Governor, William Draper, charged Murray with misconduct 
ranging from embezzlement to cruelty. Murray insisted on a "court martial" to 
determine his innocence. Once again he was exonerated. A career that was punctuated 
with so many dissensions requires close scrutiny. Murray’s motives were probably 
honorable overall, but his character flaws superimposed on the prejudices of his class, 
detract from the goodwill and effectiveness of his tenure as governor of Quebec. His 
views of the merchants of Quebec as "licentious fanaticks" have to be tempered with 
these shortcomings.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CARLETON VS. MERCHANTS
The Quebec merchants’ expectations for a good relationship with the acting 
governor were high when Lieutenant Governor Guy Carleton arrived in Quebec on 
September 22, 1766. The new governor had every intention of succeeding where his 
predecessor had failed. Before leaving London, Carleton was apprised of the merchants’ 
views from his good friend, Fowler Walker, the merchants’ agent in London. Without 
informing himself of Murray’s position, Carleton concluded that Murray was at fault in 
the conflict with the merchants and that he would join in common cause with the 
merchants for the good of the province. To his pleasure, Carleton received a reassuring 
welcome from a majority of the merchants. They pointedly reminded him that, unlike 
their cousins to the south, they had proudly accepted the Stamp Act and, what was more 
pertinent since the Act by that time had been repealed, they "loyally acknowledged the 
authority of Parliament to legislate for Canada." But as a reminder to the governor that 
not all the merchants were as submissive, another message signed by forty-six merchants, 
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Unfortunately, Carleton’s intention to avoid the divisiveness that had characterized 
Murray’s tenure as governor was short-lived. In fact, Carleton had not stepped foot on 
Quebec soil more than two weeks before his actions were called to account by some of 
the council members. The issue stemmed from a request by the merchant George 
Allsopp to reverse previous decisions by the council under both Murray and acting 
governor Paul Aemiius Irving. Believing that Allsopp was an important merchant who 
was discriminated against by Murray, Carleton saw this as his opportunity to win the 
allegiance of the anti-Murray faction. Also believing that the issue was of some 
immediacy, Carleton called together five members of the council: Chief Justice Hey, 
Council Secretary Cramahe, James Goldfrap, Thomas Mills, and Irving. These five 
council members reversed the actions taken by the previous councils and granted Allsopp 
the right under the terms of the 1765 ordinance of "free trade" to continue to carry on 
his business. The action itself did not provoke the controversy. Rather, it concerned the 
manner in which Carleton called the council meeting and then defended his actions. 
Such behavior revealed disquieting views about the new governor.
While Carleton has been generally considered a better governor than Murray, he 
nonetheless suffered some of the same shortcomings of his predecessor. This fact is not 
surprising for, like Murray, he came from the same aristocracy, was trained in the 
military, and shared all the same prejudices of his class. Their aristocratic-military 
background colored both men’s judgment about the role of the noblesse in Quebec society 
and resulted in their belief that security was the paramount responsibility of a governor.
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As military men they had little tolerance for dissent or any form of republicanism. Fears 
of "mobocracy" were more pronounced in Carleton’s case, however, for ever since the 
Stamp Act of 1765, the American colonists had become increasingly rebellious and 
threatening to British authority. The experience of living so close to them only 
heightened Carleton’s distaste for dissent. The result was an administration that verged 
on despotism, benign and well-intentioned to be sure, but one that stifled political growth 
in Quebec.
Some historians would object to this assessment of Carleton’s first tenure as 
governor (there were two). But historians have been as divided about Carleton and his 
role in Canadian history as they have been about Murray’s. Early biographers, Arthur 
Granville Bradley and William C. H. Wood, lauded Carleton as an heroic figure: the 
"father of British Canada" and "the great justifier of British rule beyond the seas." A. L. 
Burt, writing in the 1930s, says though Carleton was considered one of the greatest 
proconsuls in British history, he believed the governor’s "judgment and his character 
were not always as sound as had been assumed."2 Burt’s protege, Hilda Neatby, is 
more charitable overall. She describes Carleton as benevolent, humane, competent, a 
man of wide interest and large views." But she also describes him as ambitious, proud, 
sensitive. . . markedly resentful of any affront to his office or person," and that despite 
all his ability, his weakness was "that he saw in himself more of the insight of genius
2A. L. Burt, The Old Province, 87.
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than he really possessed."3 Creighton is one of Carleton’s harshest critics, labeling him 
"a political Tory and a social conservative, with a complacent belief in his own 
importance and an ingrained relish for authority."4 Some French Canadian historians, 
such as F. -X Gameau, believed Carleton the "father of the Quebec Act," which they 
termed their Magna Carta;5 more recently French Canadian nationalists charge Carleton 
with contributing to their second-class status in the predominantly English culture.6
Whether the judgment of Carleton is negative or positive, the role he played was 
of paramount significance, for the Quebec Act was a turning point in the future of 
Canada. If Carleton was not the "father" of the Quebec Act, he was of critical 
importance in the government’s decision to reverse its policy of assimilation. Historians 
have generally discredited the view that the Quebec Act was an act of revenge against 
the American colonists for their rebelliousness. But the fact remains that Carleton’s 
antipathy toward the republicanism of the Americans and his cries of alarm that Quebec 
must be fortified in the event of an attack by them, or by them in concert with the 
French, had to have had an influence on the decisions made in Whitehall and 
Westminster. Carleton’s positions in support of the seigneurs and clergy and for reviving
3Hilda Neatby, Quebec, 87.
4Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, 153.
5See the discussion on French-Canadian historiography in D.A. Muise, ed., A 
Reader’s Guide to Canadian History 1: Beginnings to Confederation, 47-55.
6For the various interpretations of the Quebec Act, see Neatby, The Quebec Act, 68- 
136.
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the whole body of French civil law to its pre-conquest status set a course for Canada 
that, despite the attractive aspects of cultural diversity, have plagued Canadian national 
life for more than two hundred years. An examination of the man and of the policies he 
espoused leads inevitably to the conclusion that his misjudgment of Quebec society was 
a costly one, not only for Quebec, but for the British empire as well.
Carleton’s contemporaries depicted him as cold, severe, sour, and morose. But he 
was also considered intrepid and incorruptible. Lord North expressed his confidence in 
Carleton, describing him: "so much of a soldier, and so little a politician. . . a resolute, 
honest man. . . a faithful and dutiful subject."7 He might have been describing Murray. 
The parallels between Murray and Carleton are numerous. Both sen/ed in Quebec in the 
Seven Years’ War. Neither had been civil administrators before being appointed to their 
positions in Quebec. Yet both were rewarded with the administration of an important 
province. The reason for such recognition stems from similar circumstances: each had 
friends in high echelons of government. In fact, George III was especially partial to 
Carleton. During Carleton’s first tenure as governor of Quebec, from 1766 to 1778, he 
enjoyed the trust and confidence of all the secretaries of state responsible for North 
American affairs: Henry Conway, the Duke of Richmond, Shelburne, Hillsborough, and 
Dartmouth.
7Dictionary of Canadian Biography, V, 152.
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With such support in Britain, Carleton was able to wield greater influence than 
Murray. He had other advantages as well. Carleton arrived in Quebec straight from 
London so that he was familiar with the views of the ministry and could be expected to 
work in unison with it. Murray, who had been in Quebec since 1759, had to glean 
whatever he could about the ministry’s views from a distance of 3,000 miles and a time 
lag of about three months. Carleton was also spared potential jurisdictional conflicts with 
the military for after his recall, Murray convinced the king and cabinet that the governor 
should have command of all the troops in the province. To assist him in administration, 
able men were chosen as attorney general and as chief justice, Francis Maseres and 
William Hey, respectively. As civil secretary, Cramahe, Murray’s right hand man, 
brought invaluable experience to the neophyte ruler. But all these advantages were 
secondary to the goodwill of the merchants. The merchants, having successfully 
removed Murray, were optimistic that the new governor would help promote the goals 
they long sought.
Initially, the merchants were encouraged by Carleton’s attention to their interests. 
He agreed to review and to recommend the removal of restrictions on the fur trade and 
the fisheries. He suspended introducing English bankruptcy laws because some of the 
merchants objected to them. He distanced himself from Murray’s closest advisers and 
rewarded merchants whom Murray discriminated against with appointments or grants. 
But in just a year, Carleton came to the same conclusion as Murray that the policy of 
anglicization could not work in a culture so predominantly French. This view was based
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on the same consideration as Murray’s—the security of the country. It was not surprising 
since both were military men. If the large French-Canadian population were to remain 
loyal to Britain in case of another conflict with France, the government would have to 
inspire them by protecting their interests. Carleton’s letter to Shelburne, November 25, 
1767, a little more than a year after his arrival in Quebec, reflected his negative views 
about the "old" subjects and the unlikelihood that they would ever be more than a very 
small minority in an overwhelmingly large French-Canadian population. He described 
the few Englishmen who were presently living in the Province as:
Having been left here by accident, and are either disbanded officers, soldiers, 
or followers of the Army, who, not knowing how to dispose of themselves 
elsewhere, settled where they were left at the reduction; or else they are 
adventurers in trade, or such as could not remain at home, who set out to 
mend their fortunes, at the opening of this new channel of commerce, but 
experience has taught almost all of them that this trade requires a strict 
frugality, they are strangers to, or to which they will not submit; so that 
some, from more advantageous views elsewhere, others from necessity, have 
already left this province, and I greatly fear many more, for the same 
reasons, will follow their example in a few years.
On the other hand he predicted:
While this severe climate, and the poverty of the country discourages all but 
the natives, its healthfulness is such, that these multiply daily, so that, 
barring catastrophe shocking to think of, this country must, to the end of 
time, be peopled by the Canadian race, who already have taken such firm 
root, and got to so great a height, that any new stock transplanted will be 
totally hid, and imperceptible amongst them, except in the towns of Quebec 
and Montreal.8
8Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 284.
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What is interesting about this letter is that it could have been written by Murray 
in 1762. It is surprising because by 1767 though many immigrants failed in their 
businesses and were leaving the country, most of the merchants and traders had become 
responsible citizens. In fact, the fur trade, which was still the dominant industry, 
increased in volume between 1765 and 1769.9 Also the purge of merchants that 
Carleton speaks of had already occurred in 1765-66 before he arrived in Quebec. This 
purge was not due to "lack of frugality," but rather in large measure to external forces 
such as Pontiac’s war, the decline of the English economy which resulted in cutting back 
on necessary capital for expansion, overproduction of agricultural goods, and an inability 
to compete with Albany in export markets. But the point is that the less viable merchants 
were the ones to leave; those remaining were generally astute, substantial businessmen. 
Though relations between Carleton and the merchants were never as contentious as those 
between the merchants and Murray, the views Carleton expressed in his letter to 
Shelburne reflect his disenchantment with them.
At the same time that Carleton became dissatisfied with the merchants, he grew 
increasingly partial to the seigneurs. This partiality was reflected in his determined effort 
to provide patronage for them in order to ensure their loyalty to the British. Perhaps due 
to class prejudice against the mercantile class, Carleton seems to have ignored the role 
of the Canadian bourgeoisie in the post-conquest era. The latter enjoyed more wealth, 
were better educated, and more cultured than the seigneurs, who were in desperate
9Ouellet, Economic, 74.
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financial straits, nonproductive, and held in low esteem by the habitants. The seigneur 
Charles-Antoine Godefrroy de Tonnancour of Trois Rivieres, is a typical example. He 
dissipated his paternal inheritance by selling off land, but the proceeds were never 
enough to maintain his luxurious way of life. Despite his indebtedness and idleness, 
Carleton appointed him to various commissions and in 1797 to be head of the grand 
juries for the Court of King’s Bench.10 According to Hilda Neatby, the governor was 
totally unaware that Canadian merchants were contemptuously amused by Carleton’s 
continued insistence on gaining patronage for the seigneurs.11 He was also unaware that 
their influence with the habitant was negligible. Numbers alone should have revealed 
this fact, for of 104 seigneurs mentioned by Carleton in his returns, only thirty-six lived 
among the habitants in the small towns and villages in the province.12
The misjudgment of Quebec society by Murray did not have as serious 
consequences for the future as in Carleton’s tenure as governor. Carleton was the chief 
source of information on the province, and because his views were held in high regard 
by the ministry in London, his recommendations were given serious consideration. He 
confirmed Murray’s views. Both stressed the importance of maintaining the loyalty of 
the Canadian population should any attempt be made by the French to recapture Quebec 
or should the American colonists decide to separate from Great Britain. Carleton waged
^Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, IV, 303-04.
"Neatby, Quebec, 104.
nlbid.
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an unrelenting campaign to convince the ministry in London to reverse the policies of the 
Proclamation and of the ordinance of September 22, 1764, which established the British 
system of law. While the government realized the need for a serious review of its 
policies toward Quebec, it was preoccupied with the threatening actions of the American 
colonists to its authority. Carleton responded to the danger of this threat to Quebec by 
attempting to quash any incipient rebellion on the part of the merchants. But until the 
home government had a chance to deal with Quebec, the policy of assimilation was still 
the official policy. Despite this, Carleton did whatever he could to ignore implementing 
it.
His brazen disregard of his instructions, insubordination that he would not tolerate 
in others, changed the course of events in that province. His goal for the future of 
Quebec was to return to the past. He was determined to advance policies that would 
protect the French religion and laws in order to win the confidence of the Canadians. 
He was equally determined to discourage all petitions protesting government actions or 
inactions. Where Murray’s antipathy toward the democratic tendencies of the mercantile 
class was never overtly expressed, Carleton made very clear that actions by the "mob" 
were not to be tolerated. The society he envisaged for Quebec was a hierarchical one 
with a governor and council, composed of a minority of seigneurs, in firm control at the 
top, and at the bottom the vast majority of habitants controlled by the seigneurs and 
clergy. This scheme was based on the mistaken premise that the habitant was submissive 
and that the pre-conquest society was feudal. From 1766 when he arrived in Quebec
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until 1770 when he left to advise the British authorities on revision of its Quebec policy, 
Carleton was devoted toward winning the loyalty of the Canadians. Any behavior that 
he perceived as threatening his goal and his authority had to be repressed. This was the 
underlying principle behind all his actions as he took over the administration of the 
colony.
Carleton’s rule from the start was autocratic. His first act in calling a council 
meeting, referred to earlier, was a harbinger of the kind of behavior that could be 
expected from the new governor. Untangling what really occurred is difficult since 
Carleton obfuscated the truth in his reports to Shelburne, and historians have disagreed 
in their interpretations of the incident. Burt has the most definitive account, Neatby the 
most balanced. While Neatby admits that Carleton’s actions were heavy-handed, even 
dishonest and unconstitutional, she condones his behavior as essential in order not to fall 
victim to the fractiousness which marred Murray’s governorship.13 Lawson gives an 
entirely different version of the incident and dismisses it as having been blown out of all 
proportion by Murray’s men who turned what was at worst a "piece of poor judgment 
into a constitutional issue."14 Lawson says that Murray’s old friends, who had a 
vendetta against the new acting governor, imagined a slight when they were omitted from 
the council meeting. Lawson claims that they were "unavailable or unable to attend." 
This version is difficult to understand unless Lawson read only the Shelbume-Carleton
131 bid., 93.
14Lawson, The Imperial Challenge, 89.
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correspondence, which is Carleton’s cover-up of the situation. The incident is important 
for it not only tells us how Carleton intended to govern, but it reveals his propensity to 
distort the truth which becomes important when judging his testimony before Parliament 
with respect to the Quebec Act. From a review of all sources, this is what seems to have 
happened.
Just two weeks after his arrival in Quebec, on October 9, 1766, Carleton privately 
called together five councillors, two considered Murray’s men, Irving and Cramahe. The 
purpose of the meeting was to reconsider a decision that had been previously made which 
required George Allsopp and Joseph Howard to cease their trading activities at the king’s 
post near Chicoutimi. The five-member council reversed that decision. When the other 
members of the council, all considered "Murray’s" men, learned of this meeting, they 
were alarmed, particularly since there were rumors that they were to be dropped from 
the council permanently. They appointed Irving to be their spokesman to voice their 
concerns to Carleton. Carleton was conciliatory. He assured Irving that the exclusion 
of the councillors had not been intentional, and to placate them, he invited them all to 
dinner the next evening. Just to be sure Carleton would not again bypass them, the four 
men presented Carleton with a somewhat disrespectful statement, protesting against "the 
method lately adopted of calling together only a part of the council."15 The councillors 
proceeded to admonish the governor on the conditions of their appointments to the 
council and informed him that in the likelihood that the council was to be restricted, as
I5Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 277-278.
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they understood it, the decision would be based on seniority. Carleton accepted this 
remonstrance: he was cordial to the councillors and promised a reply. That night at 
dinner, however, he obviously decided that he should assert his authority over the 
councillors. Deceitfully, he accused Irving of having lied to them. He said their 
exclusion from the council meeting was not an accident, but deliberate. He wanted them 
to know that he would call to council "as few or as many members as he thought 
convenient."16
When Carleton submitted the council minutes and the remonstrance to Shelburne, 
he included two covering letters. One supposedly was sent to the councillors. In it he 
repeated that it was not an accident that they were excluded from the council meeting, 
that he would not be dictated to, and that on all matters which did not require the consent 
of the council, he would call together such councillors ". . . as I think shall best be 
qualified to give me information" and others, though not councillors who are "men of 
good sense, truth, candor, and impartial justice."17 This covering letter was never sent 
to the Quebec council members since it was fabricated only for Shelburne’s eyes. But 
because the meeting in which the five councillors reversed the decision with respect to 
Allsopp and Howard was illegal, in a letter to Shelburne, Carleton misleadingly informed 
him that there had been two meetings. One, he said, was a regular one in which the 
decision was made; and the other was a meeting "for private information" which did not
16Burt, Old Province, 133.
17Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 277.
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require a council. In the same letter Carleton vilified each of the council members and 
suggested that this pro-Murray faction was intent on causing trouble. With resigned 
tolerance he said he would " . . .  give them time to cool and reflect, till matter occurs 
that may require a council."18 Thus, Carleton put the onus on the councillors for any 
disruptiveness in his administration and provided an excuse for not calling council 
meetings for a while. Such deviousness was not a good harbinger for those who might 
oppose the governor.
After this initial confrontation with "Murray’s men," in order to increase his 
authority, Carleton resolved to dismiss two of the most influential members of the 
council: Irving and Adam Mabane. His opportunity to do so arose over another 
government attempt to bring the culprits in the Thomas Walker case to trial.19 This 
time Walker accused six of Montreal’s most reputable citizens with the crime. They 
were arrested, and because Walker claimed his life would be in jeopardy if the men were 
granted bail, bail was refused. An outraged citizenry under the leadership of Irving and 
Mabane signed a petition to Carleton requesting that he grant bail or at least improve the 
manner of the prisoners’ confinement. While appearing to support their request, 
Carleton seized the opportunity to dismiss Mabane and Irving. The two councillors were 
informed of their dismissal in a note on November 28, but it was not announced until the 
December 1 council meeting, the first since the October 9 special session. In his letters
Klbid., 279.
19See Chapter 3 for an account of the incident.
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to Shelburne and the Board of Trade, Carleton explained that the petition was "the first 
open attempt to disturb the peace and interrupt the free course of justice since my arrival 
in the province." Because of the two councillors’ role in instigating the petition, 
Carleton informed the Board that he dismissed them "to make some example, thereby to 
deter all from such disorders; and particularly to convince the Canadians, such practices 
are not agreeable to our laws and customs. "20
For the second time in just over two months Carleton’s actions were contrary to 
administrative procedures and unconstitutional. Dismissal of a public official had to be 
at a meeting of the council with the reasons for the dismissal stated. Despite these 
illegalities, unhappily for his opposition, Carleton had the approbation of the authorities 
in Whitehall. For some time the Board had been receiving mixed messages from 
Quebec. Mabane complained of the new governor’s stuffiness and affectation of wisdom 
by a constant reserve and silence. Maseres, who would later become one of Carleton’s 
harshest critics, wrote to Rockingham on November 20, 1766, "I take the liberty of 
informing your lordship that your appointment of General Carleton to the command of 
this province has been of infinite advantage to it, in allaying the animosities that had 
hitherto subsisted here, and introducing a spirit of tranquillity and harmony amongst the 
inhabitants."21
^Dictionary o f  Canadian Biography, V, 142.
21Lawson, Imperial Challenge, 90.
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Secretary of state Shelburne was aware of the power play going on in the province 
and determined to allow Carleton to establish his authority without the government’s 
intercession. The secretary applauded Carleton’s actions. On June 20, 1767, he 
informed Carleton that he showed his letter to the king and that he had the pleasure of 
"confirming to you, his majesty’s gracious approbation of your conduct. The rectitude 
of those principles by which you have governed yourself and your firm though 
dispassionate manner of proceedings, if persevered in, cannot fail of giving due weight 
to your administration, of allaying any remains of faction which may not yet have 
subsided, and of putting an end to those impediments which too often arise from private 
views and personal jealousies."22
The dismissal of Irving and Mabane subdued the council, but not the merchants. 
As has been seen when their economic interests were affected, they could become 
assertive. The merchants closely followed the Stamp Act agitations in the colonies 
reported in the Quebec Gazette and presumably discussed them with the New York 
traders doing business in Montreal. But because the tax did not seriously affect them, 
there were no major protests. However, when a tax on exports and imports was imposed 
a year later, a protest reminiscent of the colonists’ cry of "no taxation without 
representation" was launched. The merchants refused to pay any duties, especially since 
they were enacted not with the sanction of Parliament but by a ministry strapped by the 
need of more revenue sources. Some merchants were arrested, some gave bail, and a
22Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 295.
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few remained in jail, at least for a few hours. These acts of protest occurred before 
Carleton’s arrival on September 29. The first trial came on November 8, a little more 
than a month after his arrival. Attorney General Maseres was the prosecuting lawyer in 
the case and Chief Justice Hey, the presiding judge. The jurors, most of them 
merchants, and obviously sympathetic to the accused, ignored the request to return a 
special verdict only on the fact of the promise to pay and not on the legality of the 
duties. Instead they declared the accused not guilty.
In the interim in London the merchants had brought a suit against Murray for 
illegally collecting duties during the military regime. During the course of the trial, it 
became known that Murray inadvertently charged a higher rate for rum than was allowed 
under the French regime. (He did this, he said, to encourage British imports.) This 
knowledge compromised the case, so the government offered to refund the difference to 
the merchants with interest. The plaintiffs gladly accepted and dropped the suit. 
Unfortunately, their action encouraged the treasury to issue fresh orders to collect the 
duties. Once again the merchants protested. Finally, the government realized that for 
the small amount of money involved, it was not worth jeopardizing the goodwill of the 
merchants. All further attempts to collect the duties were abandoned. As will be seen 
later, the merchants’ victory was a Pyrrhic one, for Carleton issued an ordinance in 1770 
just before leaving the province for England that disbanded jury trials in civil cases. His 
motive for doing so stemmed from these cases in which Carleton believed the jury’s 
verdict of not guilty obstructed the government’s right to raise revenues. Since the
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merchants involved in this protest were considered among the most respectable 
inhabitants of Quebec, most accounts of it state that "there was little doubt that the 
resistance was inspired by the spirit of rebellion in the other colonies."23
From the time Carleton assumed the responsibility for governing Quebec in the fall 
of 1766 until 1770, the merchants’ protests were limited. Several reasons might explain 
why. Burt suggested that the merchants’ hostility toward Murray was their rallying cry, 
and when he was recalled, their unity was dissipated.24 But the merchants were also 
encouraged by Carleton’s expressed sympathy toward them in the first year of his tenure 
as acting governor. They believed he would act in their interest, as in many instances 
he did. On one of the critical issues that concerned them, the regulation of the fur trade, 
Carleton supported their attempts to abolish the restrictions imposed on the traders by the 
Department of Indian Affairs. Other reasons might explain the merchants’ inaction. The 
first winter several merchants prepared a draft petition calling for an assembly which 
they presented to Carleton. He discouraged them from proceeding to gather signatures 
by stating that he had "many objections to great numbers signing a request of any kind," 
for such petitions "seldom conveyed the sincere desire of the subscribers" and "it had an 
appearance of an intention to take away the freedom of granting or refusing the 
request."25 He assured them that he did not object to assemblies in general and would
^Coffin, American, 314.
24Burt, Old Province, 136.
25Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 295.
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entertain any satisfactory plan they might propose. When they returned with their ideas, 
Carleton pressed them on the issue of Roman Catholics. Their response that Catholics 
could be electors but not representatives proved unacceptable to Carleton. Perhaps not 
willing to alienate the governor, who still seemed to be cooperating with them, the 
protesters backed down. Several further attempts at petitioning for an assembly under 
the leadership of John McCord failed to gain wide support. In a letter to Shelburne 
reporting these efforts, Carleton said of McCord, "He wants neither sense nor honesty, 
and formerly kept a small ale house in the poor suburbs of a little town in the north of 
Ireland, appearing zealous for the Presbyterian faith, and having made a little money, has 
gained some credit among people of his sort. "26 Carleton made very clear that McCord 
was not from the "better sort of Canadians." Perhaps Carleton’s Irish aristocratic 
background is the explanation for his disparagement of an "Ulster-Scot" from a merchant 
family. Carleton, no doubt, believed what he said even though it was a very distorted 
portrait of McCord. The fact that the McCord family was well-established and educated; 
that John came from the port city of Newtry near Belfast, where he was engaged in his 
wife’s family’s linen export company; and that from the time he arrived in Quebec, he 
was a substantial merchant is not given any consideration by Carleton.27
Most of the merchants believed that Carleton was supportive of them, and they still 
hoped that an assembly would be called. Their hopes were not without foundation. The
26Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 295.
^See more on McCord, Chapter I, page 34.
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records show that in May 1767 in instructions to Carleton, Shelburne advised calling an 
assembly. On March 6, 1768, Hillsborough, who had replaced Shelburne in the 
secretaryship, instructed Carleton to summon an assembly "as soon as the more pressing 
affairs of government will allow.” In July 1769 the Board of Trade decided it was 
"necessary in the present state of Quebec, that a complete legislature should be 
established." By this time any policy that would not restore to the Canadians their own 
laws was antithetical to Carleton. His response to the several requests from the home 
government for his assessment of the situation are instructive, for they reveal his bias 
against representative government and his prejudice for an authoritarian form of 
governing.
In June 1767 Shelburne informed Carleton that the administration of government 
of Quebec was under the most serious and deliberate consideration. This attention to 
Quebec affairs was forced on the Chatham administration by the opposition, led by Lord 
Richmond in the House of Lords, in May and June of 1767. Charging the Chathamites 
with inattention to Quebec’s problems, Richmond mounted a campaign to embarrass the 
government. Despite preoccupation with other concerns, notably actions of 
Massachusetts in pardoning the Stamp Act rioters and of New York in refusing to comply 
with the American Mutiny Act, the House of Lords passed a resolution on June 2 stating 
that "the Province of Quebec, for a considerable time past has wanted, and does now 
stand in need of further regulations and provisions, relating to its civil government and
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religious establishment."28 This action was the only instance until the Quebec bill 
where Parliament concerned itself with the Canadian issue.
Shelburne, however, had not been negligent in trying to find a remedy for the 
province’s problems. For the previous nine months, he had assigned one of his 
confidants, Lauchlin MacCleane, the task of recommending solutions. After a thorough 
review, MacCleane concluded that the only practical resolution was to revise the legal 
and religious administrative acts and to prescribe new test oaths for Catholics, enabling 
them to hold public office. Unfortunately, this watershed proposal to tolerate 
Catholicism would have meant political suicide for the Chatham ministry if it proposed 
such a solution at the time. Lawson says that Shelburne was anticipating what is known 
today as an "omnibus" bill on Quebec dealing with religion, justice, and representation. 
He wrote Carleton on June 20 requesting him to inform the ministry on "how far it is 
practicable and expedient to blend the English with the French laws"29 in order to 
establish a fair system for both the old and new subjects.
In another directive dealing with the same subject a few months later, the Privy 
Council ordered the Board to require the governor and council assisted by the chief 
justice and the attorney general, to report on the judicial system of the province. These 
officials were to be assisted by an outside representative chosen by Shelburne.
28Lawson, Imperial Challenge, 90.
29Shortt and Doughty, Documents, I, 281.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179
Accordingly, Maurice Morgann, a former private secretary of Shelburne’s, was 
dispatched to Quebec with Shelburne’s instructions to Carleton to give him every 
consideration.
On December 24, 1767, a little more than a year after assuming the acting 
governorship of Quebec, Carleton replied to Shelburne’s June 20 letter, stating 
emphatically that he believed Murray’s ordinance of September 17, 1764, had gone too 
far. Carleton was careful to preface his remarks with a reminder that Quebec was not 
a "migration of Britons, who brought with them the laws of England, but a populous and 
long established colony." Their system of laws, Carleton reported, established a 
"subordination, from the first to the lowest, which preserved the internal harmony, they 
enjoyed" and which "in one hour, we overturned."30 Imposition of English law, he
claimed, was "a sort of severity, if I remember right, never before practiced by any
conqueror." Carleton stated that confusion reigned and would grow as long as English 
law was enforced, for Canadians would not regulate their affairs by this law, and 
therefore most of their transactions were legally invalid. He accused the English jurists 
of making justice tardy and expensive, where formerly it had been speedy and cheap. 
"The courts. . . have introduced all the chicanery of Westminster Hall into this
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Carleton recommended declaring null and void the ordinance of 1764 and 
instituting in its place the old laws except where experience proved English law superior. 
An amalgam of the old and new law would produce a Canadian code. Carleton proposed 
other changes, but he recognized that such major overhaul was outside the purview of 
the provincial government. In order to prevent the problems getting worse, Carleton 
framed two ordinances to submit to the Board of Trade that dealt with property and 
expedition of court cases. The first proposed ordinance continued the French laws for 
tenure, inheritance, and alienation of lands; the second established monthly sessions of 
the superior court, ten to be held in Quebec and two in Montreal, each to continue until 
the cases were decided. The first ordinance Carleton submitted to Shelburne, but the 
second he did not since it was vociferously opposed by both the Canadians and English. 
The Canadians believed that the ordinance threatened their "own" court, the Court of 
Common Pleas, where they used their own language and their own laws. The English 
members of the grand jury opposed the ordinance for fear that speeding up the process 
would result in actions for debt that would be detrimental to business, especially since 
the province was experiencing a lack of commercial credit.
On January 20, 1768, Carleton further discussed his views. As for representative 
government, he had very strong opinions which he conveyed to the home government. 
He argued that the "better sort of Canadians," i.e. the seigneurs, "fear nothing more than 
popular assemblies which, they conceive, tend only to render the people refractory and
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insolent."32 He said that they were aware of the king’s displeasure with the misconduct 
of the assemblies in the American colonies and would be unhappy if "a like misfortune 
befell them." Carleton was leery of introducing the balanced form of British 
government—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—to the new world. He expressed 
the view that "the British form of government, transplanted into this continent, never will 
produce the same fruits as at home, chiefly because it is impossible for the dignity of the 
throne or peerage to be represented in the American forests."33 Carleton articulated the 
position later used by the Federalists in framing the American constitution. Carleton 
feared that in a situation "where all men appear nearly upon a level," democracy would 
soon supplant the monarchy and the aristocracy and promote strong republican ideas. 
This condition was to be avoided in Quebec. The autocratic Carleton’s solution for 
Quebec was to recognize the feudal system which, he erroneously thought, prevailed 
before the conquest. This, he believed, would secure "a proper subordination from this 
province to Great Britain" forever.
The views of Carleton and Shelburne differed over the issue of an assembly, but 
otherwise Shelburne was moving toward the inclusion of French civil law and the 
participation of Canadians in public office. These views represented a shift in the 
attitude of the government toward a moderate policy of anglicization. But that shift 
halted temporarily in 1768 with Shelburne’s resignation and the resumption to office of
32Ibid., 295-296.
33Ibid., 296.
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Hillsborough. Hillsborough immediately wrote Carleton reminding him of his role in the 
formulation of the Proclamation of 1763. He assured Carleton that "it never entered into 
our idea to overturn the laws and customs of Canada with regard to property."34 
Blame, according to Hillsborough, must be heaped on the "weak, ignorant, and interested 
men [who] were sent over to carry the Proclamation into execution, who expounded it 
in the most absurd manner; oppressive and cruel to the last degree to the subjects, and 
entirely contrary to the Royal Proclamation."35 It is very difficult to know about whom 
Hillsborough was speaking. Certainly Murray could not be charged with being 
oppressive and cruel in instituting the ordinance of September 17, 1764. Despite 
Hillsborough’s disavowal, the language of the Proclamation clearly required Murray to 
institute English law. Instead he compromised by establishing the Court of Common 
Pleas—a concession to the Canadians. Murray had been unjustly accused of not 
conceding more to the Canadians. Now Hillsborough had an opportunity to right the 
wrong of the Proclamation in regard to property law. But instead on August 12, 1768, 
in very detailed instructions to Carleton, now officially appointed governor of the 
province, Hillsborough repeated almost verbatim the instructions sent to Murray. He 
impressed on the governor the importance of calling an assembly as soon as possible. 
But he ignored, as he had previously, what the composition of that assembly would be. 
Whatever advances had been made in that direction by his predecessor would appear to 
have been dismissed by Hillsborough.
*Ibid., 297.
33 Ibid.
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The issue, however, would not go away. Pressures on the government by an 
organization called the Canada Committee, composed of London merchants, were stepped 
up. The government had ongoing consultations with this organization during negotiations 
with France over the Canada bills. Its members met regularly at the same London 
taverns and coffee houses, especially the New York and Will’s near Lincoln’s Inn. In 
a letter from the Canada Committee at the New York Coffee House on April 13, 1768, 
the merchants called for establishment of an assembly as the best means to revive the 
languishing trade of the colony. This was followed by another letter on September 20, 
1768, from the same address, but signed this time by "Sundry Merchants trading to and 
deeply interested in the Province of Quebec." Using the precedent of Grenada, the 
merchants proposed that a limited number of Roman Catholics could be admitted to both 
council and assembly.36 Here was a breakthrough on the problem of religious toleration 
made by an important segment of the public. If only Shelburne and not Hillsborough had 
still been secretary, perhaps the question of policy for Quebec would have been resolved 
sooner. Nonetheless, the proposal of the Canada Committee brought the issue of religion 
and what to do about it to the attention of the Privy Council.
On September 28, 1768, the council requested the Board of Trade to prepare a 
report for its own information on what to do about the legislature, ecclesiastical affairs, 
and revenue problems of Canada. Since the Board of Trade at this juncture had become 
little more than an adjunct of the office of the secretary of state for the American
36Lawson, Imperial Challenge, 106.
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department, the views expressed can probably be assumed to be those of Hillsborough. 
At last Hillsborough moved beyond his early position. The merchants’ actions in support 
of an assembly was the fillip he needed. He still maintained the position that 
administration of the province should include a governor, a council, and an assembly. 
But he recognized the need to include Canadians in that assembly. He recommended an 
elected assembly which would be composed of equal numbers of Canadian seigneurs 
from county districts and British merchants from the towns. The test oath would be 
waived in the former case, since they presumably would be Roman Catholics. The laws 
would follow the 1766 plan, never implemented, which would be an amalgam of French 
civil law with English criminal law.37 The Board also tackled the sensitive issue of 
ecclesiastical reforms for the province, even though Carleton cautioned against dealing 
with so "delicate and tender" a subject as religion until the legal reforms had been 
determined. Those Carleton considered "the ground work of the whole."38
The Board’s report was a comprehensive one stating that it took into consideration 
all the information available to it from reports and individuals knowledgeable in Quebec 
affairs. "Wants and defects" from the various governmental directives were enumerated. 
With great anticipation Hillsborough submitted this report to the Privy Council on 
July 10, 1769. But no action was taken on it at that time since the members were in 
recess. When the council still did not act on it by November, on the grounds that they
37Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 377-393.
uIbid.
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were awaiting the return of Maurice Morgann, Hillsborough realized that his report was 
not going to receive any serious consideration. He wrote Carleton, who had been 
waiting permission to return to London in order to explain his positions more clearly, 
and granted him that permission. In a secret and confidential dispatch, he also sent 
Carleton a copy of his report for comment. Ignoring any reference to the inclusion of 
an assembly composed of Canadians, Hillsborough wrote that he believed Carleton would 
respond favorably to the report. He instructed Carleton to be "careful not only that no 
part of it is communicated to any other person, but that in conversing upon the subject 
of any difficulties or doubts that may arise, you do avoid the appearance of their being 
other than the result of your own reflections; and I am particularly to desire that you will 
bring back the copy of the report with you, without suffering it to fall into any other 
hands whatever."39 Hillsborough’s concerns reflected the new policy of secrecy with 
reference to the future government of Quebec that had just been adopted. From this date 
to the Quebec Act in 1774, few reports dealing with Quebec are to be found in State 
papers. This fact might explain the charges of those who believed the government acted 
hastily and deviously in 1774.
The delays in governmental action on Quebec have been given many 
interpretations. The Board of Trade had urged the council to weigh all circumstances 
but not delay in taking immediate action for it was "high time some steps were taken 
towards a necessary reform, in a case of so great importance, as to affect not only the
39Ibid., 377, n. 1.
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security of this colony, but with it, that of all His Majesty’s other dominions in 
America."40 Apart from fearing a negative public response, the Privy Council was 
simply overwhelmed by the complexity of the issue. When the council finally had the 
reports it commissioned from the Board of Trade and from the provincial officials, it 
found that there was no unanimity of opinion about what to do. Hillsborough’s report 
represented a modified version of the policy of anglicization. Carleton’s report was not 
supported by his attorney general or chief justice since they disagreed over which law 
should be paramount. As a result three reports were submitted: Carleton wanted the law 
to be French; Hey, English; and Maseres, a code based on English law.
Carleton strongly believed that there was only one way to give satisfaction to the 
Canadians and that was to revive the whole body of French civil law that was in use 
before the conquest. Maseres and Hey disagreed that the whole body of law had to be 
revived. They believed instead that the civil laws needed revision only where it related 
to tenure, alienation, dower, inheritance of landed property, and the distribution of the 
effects of persons who die intestate. Maseres and Hey daily experienced the complexities 
of French law and believed that returning to it was not as simple as Carleton believed. 
French legal records and French legal opinion were inextricably part of the law, resulting 
in continuing the Canadians’ ties with France. Also the laws would be difficult for the 
English population. The mingling of both laws had been in use ever since the conquest 
and, they believed, it would be difficult to return to the former system.
A0Ibid., 391.
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Maseres disagreed with Carleton that the Canadians were not happy with English 
law. The two exceptions, which Maseres said could be remedied by Proclamation or 
ordinance, were the high cost and delay of legal procedures. Maseres argued that British 
law was understood by the Canadians to apply ever since the capitulation and that they 
did not have a problem adjusting to it. The Treaty of Paris promised them only that they 
would have the free exercise of their religion "as far as the laws of England will permit." 
If revisions had to be made at a later date, that would be the time to announce such 
changes. But for now, Maseres concluded, any drastic change would not be to anyone’s 
interest. In summary, he argued that French law was complex and would be difficult for 
English subjects to administer since they were not versed in such law; return to French 
laws would continue the Canadians in their desire to return to their former government; 
and it would discourage Englishmen from settling there. But all three men agreed that 
the main grievance of the Canadians was the uncertainty of the laws, the delay and 
expense of legal proceedings, and imprisonment for debt. They also agreed on habeas 
corpus, trial by jury for cases of tort, restoration of French law for property and 
inheritance, and continuance of English criminal law.
The reports were submitted to the Privy Council by Morgann in December 1769. 
But even with the reports before them, as well as Maseres, Morgann, and Carleton ready 
to answer any questions, the Privy Council still dragged its feet. Reluctance to deal with 
Quebec was politically understandable. Ever since a report by Maseres in 1766, which 
stated that only Parliament could revise the Proclamation of 1764, the ministry was
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reluctant to propose a bill for Parliament’s consideration. With its leader, Chatham, 
incapacitated and his chief minister Shelburne, resigned, the ministry knew it could not 
withstand public debate on so many sensitive issues, particularly those dealing with 
Catholicism and representative government for "another" American colony. It would not 
be until 1772 when Hillsborough was replaced by Lord Dartmouth that serious 
consideration of revising the existing laws produced the Quebec bill. In the interim Hey 
and Maseres remained supportive of the merchants and Carleton adamantly opposed to 
them.
Carleton’s last act before leaving the province in 1770 for London triggered anew 
the conflict between the merchants and the administration. He issued an ordinance that 
he believed would address the immediate problems of the inadequacies of the legal 
system. Prompted by complaints by Canadians of hardships suffered at the hands of 
justices of the peace, Carleton called for an inquiry by Maseres and Hey. The 
complaints appeared to have foundation. As a result, the September 1764 ordinance 
which granted civil jurisdiction to the magistrates was repealed. That authority was 
transferred to the judges of the Court of Common Pleas, leaving the magistrates 
responsible only for criminal and police jurisdiction. Seigneurs and militia captains could 
be appointed justices of the peace. To expedite matters, part of the French system was 
adopted. The court was divided into two separate ones, both to sit continuously in the 
towns of Montreal and Quebec. All civil cases were to be settled by Canadian justices 
of the peace and the Canadian Court of Common Pleas. The purpose of the ordinance
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was to cut costs, to give small debtors protection against being imprisoned or having to 
sell property at unreasonable prices for owing trifling sums, as well as to grant speedier 
justice.
The ordinance appeared to be a salutary move. But there was another perspective. 
Only a small number of justices of the peace were considered a problem, but all were 
being made to suffer the consequence. The merchants objected to the ordinance as a 
"dangerous infringement of the liberty of the subject" since it allowed traders to be called 
to account at any time by their creditors and it permitted delay in the sale of lands for 
small debts."41 The merchants renewed their old complaint that the administration was 
ignorant of business needs and legislated to the detriment of the commercial community. 
This charge had some legitimacy, for both Murray and Carleton were not conversant 
with their needs. But the business interests of the merchants had to be balanced with 
many other competing interests. Carleton was not unsuccessful in doing so. Perhaps 
what rankled most was his manner. This was seen earlier in Carleton’s treatment of the 
councillors.
When the merchants agitated against the ordinance, Carleton rebuked them for 
"their attempts to follow the conduct of a province which had incurred the displeasure 
of government at home and whose manner of demanding redress had proved the means 
of preventing it." He told the merchants’ delegation that he was ashamed of the way in
4IBurt, Old Province, 174.
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which "many of the king’s old subjects had behaved, sending about hand bills to invite 
the people to assemble in order to consult upon grievances, importuning, nay insulting, 
several of the Canadians because they would not join them."42 Carleton said he would 
welcome suggestions for improvement of the law if properly presented, but he warned 
"if in tumultuous meetings, or by dint of numbers only, laws were to be made or 
abrogated, the lowest dregs of the people, and the most ignorant among them, would, 
of course, become the law-givers of the country."43
With such over-dramatization on both sides, the conflict between governor and 
merchants was revisited. The governor abhorred anything that approached representative 
government. In 1770 the merchants broke their long silence in petitioning for an 
assembly. Interestingly, they pointed out that for want of an assembly, a great number 
of the new subjects "have hitherto proved rather a burthen than any benefit to themselves 
or advantage to the community; their extreme poverty and misery increasing with their 
numbers." In contrast, they boasted that they, the British subjects, "set examples and 
give every encouragement in their power to promote industry, are the principal importers 
of British manufactures, carry on three fourths of the trade of this country, annually 
return a considerable revenue into your majesty’s exchequer in Great Britain." But they 
warned, "the commercial interests have been declining and unless a general assembly is 
ordered to make and enforce laws to encourage agriculture, regulate the trade, discourage
42lbid.
43Neatby, Quebec, 99.
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such importations from the other colonies as impoverish the province, their own ruin as 
well as that of the province in general" will occur. They stated "that there is now a 
sufficient number of Your Majesty’s Protestant subjects residing in and possessed of real 
property in this Province, and who are otherwise qualified to be members of a general 
assembly."44 The petition was signed by thirty-one leading merchants from Montreal.
Unlike previous petitions, this one had little effect. After four soporific years in 
which the merchants’ political agitations were minimal, their influence seemed on the 
wane. In part, this may have been because the British government had other concerns 
that were paramount: India, France, and especially the American colonies. The Montreal 
merchants were pressing for representative government at a time when most MPs wished 
they never heard of allowing colonials any form of self-rule since Parliament’s 
supremacy was being challenged by the Americans. Merchants who might have joined 
together in common cause were alienated by nonimportation agreements in the colonies. 
There was another reason for the petition’s failure. Carleton had anticipated the 
merchants’ petitions and encouraged the new subjects, i.e., the seigneurs, to counter with 
a petition of their own. They submissively pleaded to be "judged and governed 
according to the laws, customs and regulations under which they were bom, which serve 
as the basis and foundation of their possessions, and are the rule of their families." They 
confessed "how painful and at the same time how humiliating it has been to them to be 
excluded from the offices which they might fill. . . for the service of your majesty, and
^Shortt and Doughty, Documents, 417-418.
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the comfort of your Canadian people."45 This petition defused whatever impact the 
merchants’ call for an assembly had on the government. There would be one more 
petition by the Quebec and Montreal merchants in 1773 and another counter-petition by 
the Canadians, but by then the tide had changed. The unlikelihood that British policy 
would totally ignore every report submitted to it calling for an assembly could not be 
fathomed in 1770. But that is what happened. What part Carleton played in that change 
was previewed in his first administration of Quebec.
How does one assess Carleton’s tenure as acting governor and then governor from 
1766 to 1770? What were his accomplishments and his mistakes? The first observation 
is the similarities between Carleton and Murray. Like Murray, Carleton had little 
tolerance for any kind of dissent, as has been seen in his dealings with the council. 
Those individuals who disagreed with him paid a price. For example, when Maseres 
differed with him about the solutions for Quebec, Carleton defamed his character. In a 
letter to Hillsborough, Carleton claimed that Maseres was prejudiced against Canadians 
because of their Catholicism. He charged him with being indiscreet and hoped that he 
might find a position "where the fervour of his zeal can be of no essential disadvantage 
to the king’s service."46 Even though Carleton was on better terms with the merchants 
and the society less divisive than it was under Murray, Carleton reached the same 
conclusion as his predecessor—that the policy of assimilation could not work. Instead
45Ibid., 421.
46Neatby, Quebec, 107.
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Carleton pressed for a policy that would protect Canadian language, laws, and religion. 
At the root of this decision was the concern that he had for the security of Quebec. The 
province needed to be militarily prepared against an invasion by France or by the 
colonists. The latter, he warned, was a distinct possibility. But in addition to military 
preparedness, he believed it was absolutely essential to gain the support of the vast 
majority of the population, the new subjects.
In his assessment of Canadians, however, Carleton was led astray by his own 
biases. His aristocratic-military background and his penchant for autocratic rule led him 
into believing the answer to Quebec’s problems was to gamer the favor of the seigneurs 
and the clergy, who he believed were the leaders of the habitants. Neatby says of 
Carleton’s avid support of the seigneurs: "Misled by an illusion of aristocracy and by the 
tastes of the professional soldier, Carleton did not observe that, in Quebec and Montreal, 
Canadian society could boast merchants and notaries abler and better informed than most 
of the seigneurs.1,47 Burt came to a similar conclusion: "What Carleton never grasped 
was the fundamental fact that frontier conditions had created in New France a freer and 
more democratic social structure than that of Old France, with which he was tolerably 
familiar."48 Burt expresses the opinion that Carleton’s delusions about Quebec society 
were a tragedy. He says, "Lured by the mirage of a well-ordered Old-World feudalism 
which he imagined had existed in Canada and, if restored, would be an ideal solution for
41 Ibid., 99.
48Burt, Old Province, 154.
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the Canadian problem, he strove to create what had never existed and could never exist 
on the shores of the St. Lawrence. This attempt was to give a painful twist to Canadian 
history."49 Coffin, in 1897, had come to a similar conclusion, but he was alone in 
suggesting that there was an American influence that helped shape Carleton’s views 
which in turn shaped the policy that produced the Quebec Act. How valid was Coffin’s 
position?
Carleton made no secret of his disdain for the colonists. In speaking of them, he 
always referred to them as "colonials." In his first year as acting governor, when he 
admonished those who signed a petition protesting the jailing of six respectable members 
of the Montreal community in the Walker case, and just before his departure for London, 
when he took to task the merchants who protested his ordinance concerning the justices 
of the peace and the courts, he exhorted the dissidents not to be "led by the English into 
the seditious practices of the other provinces." For four years Carleton tolerated the 
coverage of political and constitutional debates in the Quebec Gazette, Quebec’s only 
newspaper. But in 1770 he successfully pressured the Gazette from reporting on 
controversial issues, especially anything concerned with American affairs.
On every occasion the autocratic governor expressed his strongly held belief that 
an assembly could not work in Quebec. Republicanism would threaten the British system 
of mixed government: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The American colonies
49 Ibid.
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were more than a threat politically to Quebec, however. The economic rivalry between 
New England and Quebec during this period was to Quebec’s disadvantage. Until 1768 
and a new western policy, regulations in the fur trade were believed to favor the Albany 
traders. Militarily, as head of His Majesty’s forces in Quebec, Carleton was continually 
warning of the possibility of a potential military threat from the colonists and argued that 
the various posts in New York should be strengthened to cut off the northern colonies 
from the rest. By every measure possible, Carleton exhibited such disdain for Americans 
that in the words of Hilda Neatby, "Carleton was determined that Canadians should 
remain French, because he believed that the only possible alternative was the hateful and 
dangerous one of their becoming American."50
Political upheaval in England and America played into Carleton’s hands. He 
capitalized on the growing resentment of British policymakers and merchants toward the 
American colonists. The more liberal members of the government became a vocal, but 
small minority, and they were unrepresented in the government of Lord North. In this 
environment an undaunted Carleton pressed his case, repeating what he had been saying 
while resident in Quebec. His voice might not have been heard in the beginning of the 
decade by the architects of the Proclamation, but from 1768 to 1774, attitudes toward the 
American colonists were changing. The contrast in the influences brought to bear in the 
formulation of western policy in 1768 and in the debates on the Quebec Act in 1774 
reveals the extent of the British government’s distress with the American colonies. For
S0Neatby, Quebec, 108.
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the first time in the triangular relationship, Canada would reap the benefits of the rift 
between the colonists and Great Britain.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CHANGING POLITICAL ATTITUDES
By the time Carleton returned to London in 1770 to advance his views on policy 
for Quebec—that its future lay in returning to the past—a receptivity to so radical a change 
in policy had already been underway. A number of reasons other than the persuasiveness 
of Carleton help explain this departure from the previously held position that Quebec 
should be anglicized and delimited. Of paramount concern was the fear of another war 
either with France, in which the Americans might join with the American colonists 
themselves, or with the Indians. In such an event, the need to retain the loyalty of the 
French-Canadian population in Quebec would be critical. For this reason, Carleton’s 
arguments were given serious consideration by a new ministry that was increasingly 
anti-American.
Ever since the Stamp Act rebellion and cries of "sovereignty" by the American 
colonies, the number of American supporters in the ministry and Parliament had been 
diminishing. Even the London merchants were losing sympathy with the revolutionists 
whose nonimportation policies threatened their livelihoods. Also threatening was the 
illegal advancement of settlers into Indian territory. The latter situation had been a major 
concern of every administration ever since the Proclamation of 1763. But every 
administration until North’s equivocated on what policy to follow, although none until
197
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his advocated returning the western territories to Quebec. That decision, set forth in the 
Quebec Act of 1774, shocked the American colonists and is believed to have been one 
of the causes of the War for Independence. The view that the Quebec Act was one of 
the series of Intolerable Acts designed to punish the colonies for their rebelliousness has 
been adequately discredited by recent scholarship. But it is the contention here that 
though Parliament’s primary concern in the Quebec Act was to establish a viable 
government for Quebec, the confrontation with the American colonists over sovereignty 
played a decisive role in the terms of the Act. Two of those terms, the form of 
government and the return of the western territories to Quebec, support this thesis. By 
exploring the development of western policy and the role of the American agents in 
London over the issues of sovereignty from 1766 until 1774, it will be difficult not to 
conclude that there was linkage between the actions of Parliament and the North ministry 
with respect to the colonies and Quebec. Epitomizing the decline of American influence 
in the pre-Revolutionary years is the saga of the colonists’ premier spokesman, Benjamin 
Franklin, whose reputation tumbled from respected envoy to discredited revolutionary 
and unprincipled land speculator. Franklin’s dual role in various land speculations and 
in instigating rebellion in the colonies is seen here as contributing to the anti-republican 
frenzy in the ministry and Parliament in 1774 which produced the Intolerable Acts and 
the Quebec Act.
In a previous chapter on the Proclamation of 1763, the policy decisions with 
respect to the western territories were discussed. Three key issues were supposed to
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have been resolved by the Act: the western boundary, regulation of the fur trade, and a 
settlement policy. The shortcomings of the policy were reflected in the lack of 
establishing any means of enforcement. As a result, the boundary which had never been 
considered a permanent one, but one to meet the exigencies of the time, was ignored; the 
regulations too were ignored by disgruntled merchants, traders, and even London supply 
houses; and the settlement policy was up for grabs with land speculators all vying for 
British approval of their own particular schemes, while at the same time settlers were 
illegally pressing westward. By 1766, pressure for Britain to redefine its western policy 
was considered essential if another Indian uprising were to be avoided. The key figure 
in 1766 to determine how this could be accomplished was once again Lord Shelburne, 
who was largely responsible for the policy in the first place.1
Shelburne resumed the position of secretary of the southern department in charge 
of American affairs in July 1766 with the return of Pitt, now Lord Chatham, to head up 
the new ministry. The anti-American Grenville administration, followed by the 
pro-American Rockingham ministry, was now to be followed by an eclectic "broad 
bottom" ministry, with disparate groups represented. Thus the Minister of the 
Exchequer, Charles Townshend, and the Minister of the Southern Department, 
Shelburne, held opposing views on how to treat the colonists. Townshend proposed 
further taxes in order to defray the expenses involved in protecting the colonists in the 
western territories. Shelburne recognized the danger in such a policy, especially coming
'See Chapter 2 for Shelburne’s policy-making role in the Proclamation of 1763.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
200
after the violent Stamp Act protests. The repeal of that Act, due as much to the 
influence of the agents in London as to the boycott of British imports, had provided a 
respite from the divisive wrangling about Parliament vs. colonial rights.2 Shelburne 
intended to avoid any policies that would provoke a return to such hostile feelings. In 
his inimitable style, he set about garnering as much information as possible from all the 
key figures concerned with western affairs: Lord Barrington, secretary of war; General 
Gage, commander-in-chief of the North American army; General Amherst, former 
commander-in-chief of the North American army; Sir William Johnson, superintendent 
of Indian Affairs for the northern district; George Croghan, deputy Indian agent for the 
northern district; Benjamin Frobisher, prominent Canadian fur merchant; as well as his 
usual conferees on American matters, Benjamin Franklin and William Jackson, agents 
at the time for Pennsylvania. Shelburne considered Franklin, Jackson, and Amherst the 
most knowledgeable men on American affairs. Unfortunately, none of these men was 
conversant with the problems of the interior. What is more, Amherst had never been 
sympathetic to the Indians, and Jackson and Franklin were not disinterested advisers, for
2In Agents and Merchants and Whitehall and the Wilderness, Sosin makes the case 
that the colonists’ belief that the nonimportation policy brought about the repeal of the 
Stamp Act was a serious misconception. He contends that the government acquiesced 
because the colonial agents and the English merchants were able to diffuse what appeared 
to the home government as an arrogant overreaching of the role of a colony. When the 
colonist again used nonimportation to repeal the Townshend duties in 1768-69 and the 
Intolerable Acts in 1774-75, they succeeded in antagonizing or alienating both 
government officials and many of the English merchants. The latter realized in 1774 that 
nonimportation was not as great a threat since trade with South America was replacing 
that of the colonists.
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each had participation in various land schemes.3 The major issues that he sought their 
advice on were: how and where to determine a permanent boundary; whether to allow 
deregulation of the fur and Indian trade; whether the imperial government should 
continue its governance of the territory through its Indian superintendent; and overriding 
all these considerations was the critical one of how to pay the costs of any proposed plan.
The boundary issue had posed immediate problems when the Chatham ministry 
assumed office. It is important here to recall that the division proposed by Shelburne in 
1763 was to survey all the land and establish the boundary taking into account areas 
where settlement had already occurred. This proposal was eschewed by Hillsborough 
in 1763 for the simpler one of establishing the line along the Appalachian divide, first, 
because Shelburne’s proposal would take too long to implement, and second, because it 
might provoke misunderstandings among the Indians, leading to further violence. Those 
settlers already established west of the line were admonished to remove themselves 
immediately. Not surprisingly, they ignored the law, and with no one to enforce it, in 
fact, further settlement continued, much to the dismay of the government which was 
always fearful of a recurrence of Indian brutalities.
On the issue of imperial vs. colonial governance of the western lands, in 1763 the 
Lords of Trade under Shelburne resisted Egremont’s efforts to give to the governor of
3See Bernhard Knollenberg, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XLI (1954-55), for a discussion about a scheme purportedly 
to annihilate the Indians by infecting them with the smallpox germ.
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Quebec the responsibility of civil government for the territory. But they also resisted any 
effort to leave control in the hands of the colonists, since it was believed that their 
unevenhanded policies dealing with settlement and the Indians provoked Pontiac’s 
rebellion. Instead the imperial government was represented by two superintendents of 
Indian affairs, one for the northern district and one for the southern district. The only 
one we are concerned with here is the northern district. The commander-in-chief of 
North America was charged with the responsibility for maintaining order. But 
enforcement and the means of financing the costs of supporting troops along the border 
were problems that had not been resolved. Shelburne was aware that the Grenville 
administration’s attempts to finance the costs of maintaining control by taxing the 
colonists was counterproductive. But the Pitt administration was faced with a dire 
financial situation. The opposition had cut down the British land tax, reducing revenues, 
and demands for economy were being called for. Charles Townshend, chancellor of 
exchequer, wanted to impose duties on imports into the American colonies, which 
Shelburne opposed on the grounds that such duties would only aggravate hostilities in the 
colonies.
Of all the issues that had to be resolved, the most contentious one between 
Canadian and American traders was deregulation of the Indian trade. The regulations, 
which were established by Johnson to conform to the Proclamation, prohibited traders 
from carrying on their business except at designated posts. In addition, although the fur 
trade was open to all, licenses were required, the traders had to post bonds sometimes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
203
twice that of the supplies they were taking to trade, they had to list their inventories at 
the various posts and receive a pass from the commissary before trading at other posts. 
Most of the traders, whether from Quebec or the American colonies, did not seriously 
object to the regulations, but they disagreed about the regulation restricting trade to 
specified posts. Initially the traders from New York and Pennsylvania were partial to 
such restrictions. The Albany monopoly in the fur trade, which was inherited from the 
Dutch and continued until the 1720s, had allowed the fur trade to flourish with minimal 
risk to the merchants and traders by transacting all business in Albany. The Iroquois 
favored this arrangement since they were the middlemen. This system began to break 
down between 1720 and 1750. Robert Livingston was one of the early traders who 
pressured the government to allow traders to go among the Indians. Oswego replaced 
Albany as the new trading post among New Yorkers. But this was before the English 
inherited the French posts and before the fur trade moved farther west as a result of 
depletions and Indian wars.
While the traders in the old colonies were accustomed to the Indians bringing their 
furs to the posts, the Canadian traders, the coureurs de bois, had for a century been free 
to winter among the Indians. When Johnson restricted the trade to specified posts in 
1765, the Quebec merchants, English and French, violently opposed the restriction as 
being not only detrimental to the trade, but to the Indians as well. They orchestrated a 
steady stream of protests and memorials against the regulations. In 1765 Murray 
supported the merchants, writing of their concern to Gage. To lend their support, the
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London merchants trading to Canada wrote the Board of Trade on April 18, 1765. This 
message was followed by a similar one to the Board from the Quebec merchants on 
September 6, 1765. On March 30, 1766, their memorial to James Murray requesting 
permission to winter among the Indians was sent by John Welles, Johnson’s deputy in 
Montreal, to Johnson. This memorial was signed by a majority, almost two to one, of 
Canadians. The English included fur traders Richard Dobie, John Thompson, James 
Finlay, Joseph Torry, James Morrison, Samuel Holmes, Isaac Todd, Michael Wade, 
Robert and John Stenhouse, Jonas DeSaulles, Lawrence Ermatinger, John Porteous, John 
Livingston, John Jen(n)ison, Matthew Lessey, Benjamin Frobisher, and John Welles. 
Torry and Livingston were American. Benjamin Frobisher wrote separately to 
Shelburne, defending the reputation of Quebec merchants from the need for such 
regulations. He admitted that there were some bad men who might need regulation, but 
he stated that most of the traders were men of property settled in Montreal, and it was 
in their own interests to behave in "a becoming manner."4
The Quebec merchants next wrote Johnson on April 5, 1766, enclosing the same 
memorial they had sent Murray. Murray, who was not generally sympathetic to the 
traders, assured them that they could not only depend upon his readiness to redress their 
grievances but, he told them, "I shall have particular satisfaction in exerting myself to 
promote your interest. "5 Murray was apparently responding to the fact that the traders
4PAC, Shelburne, Mss, 50, 1754-1766, 162.
5The Papers o f Sir William Johnson, V, 149.
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addressed their petition directly to him and did not go over his head to London. This 
example of cooperativeness suggests that there could have been a better relationship 
between the two antagonists. But it was too late for Murray. In London the Board of 
Trade had already notified the governor that he was being recalled to answer the many 
charges brought against him by the merchants.
Murray’s replacement, Guy Carleton, was supportive of the merchants’ argument 
that the regulation restricting the trade to designated posts had to be rescinded. In March 
1767 Carleton wrote the Board of Trade that if the French and Spanish were not to usurp 
the peltry trade, the Canadians had to be allowed to roam at will, for restricting them to 
certain posts had proved detrimental not only to the merchants but to Great Britain as 
well. A quarrel between Johnson and Carleton resulted over this issue. In a letter to 
Carleton in January 1767, Johnson claimed that the "French" (meaning Canadians) had 
ignored the regulations and by roaming at will were the agents of the French in stirring 
up the Indians against the English.6 Carleton objected to Johnson’s charges, saying that 
ever since his arrival, he had observed the Canadians with "an attention, bordering upon 
suspicion," but had not discovered in them either actions or sentiments which did not 
belong to good subjects. Carleton accused "the other provinces, who are neither 
acquainted with these countries (the upper country), nor so advantageously situated for 
this trade" with being the "secret cause of their being so severely fettered." He argued 
that each province should take advantage of its own special situation and that there should
6Ibid., 481.
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not be rivalry between provinces. The rivalry, he preached, should be between British 
subjects and those of France and Spain, but, according to Gage, he practiced otherwise.7 
Gage appeared to have little tolerance for the Montreal merchants. He referred to them 
as "Walker’s people" and said that they "would leave nothing untried to gain their 
point."8 According to George Croghan, deputy superintendent of Indian affairs, Gage 
could not conceive Carleton’s design in giving preference of trade to his own 
government. He believed Carleton would find himself deceived by the French. Gage 
also thought Carleton meddled too much in the Indian department.9
Shelburne responded to all these conflicting reports in his excruciatingly cautious 
manner. A year after taking office he explained to Johnson that the issue of the 
regulations was "of so great importance as to require the utmost deliberation."10 
However, on June 12, 1767, Shelburne, persuaded by Carleton to make an exception to 
the rules until "a final arrangement can be taken in favor of the traders from Canada," 
ordered Johnson to allow the traders to range freely north of the Ottawa River and the 
Great Lakes.11 This decision resulted in jealousies among the traders who were not 
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Ellice in Schenectady, and William Edgar, an important trader from Schenectady, were 
among the most vociferous of the merchants in their complaints. They argued that if 
they were given the same privileges, they could undersell the French. A memorial to 
Johnson on November 22 from them and other New York traders at Detroit expressed 
these concerns, adding that traders were going out without permission. While Shelburne 
took seriously the threat to the fur interests, he was more concerned with the threat of 
another Indian uprising.
Shelburne expressed the belief that the principal source of abuses in the Indian 
trade was from fraudulent purchases and grants from the natives. By the fall of 1767, 
he had come to the conclusion that the resolution for these problems was to support three 
new colonies in the western territories. The attractions of interior colonies, in 
Shelburne’s view, were that they would reduce military expenditures, would add 
revenues in the form of traditional quitrents and other land taxes, would provide civil 
government for areas now without any, and they would resolve boundary conflicts among 
the old colonies. These were the arguments put forward by the many land speculators 
and their agents in London who had made Shelburne the target for their various schemes. 
Proposals by the Ohio Company, the Mississippi Company, the Illinois Company, for 
a settlement around Detroit, and another for a settlement at the confluence of the 
Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, similar to the Mississippi Company’s, were all submitted 
to Shelburne.
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The proposal most favored by him was that of the Illinois Company. George 
Croghan, deputy superintendent of Indian Affairs, was the mastermind behind the petition 
which was for a settlement at Fort Pitt. Croghan had enlisted the support of William 
Franklin, Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Wharton, Croghan’s brother-in-law, William Trent, 
William Johnson, and the influential Philadelphia firm of Baynton, Wharton, and 
Morgan. The latter firm thought Shelburne’s secretary, whom they considered a "fortune 
hunter," should be brought in on the deal. Lauchlin MacCleane was formerly from 
Philadelphia, where he was a druggist. He was also a friend of Franklin’s. The plan 
almost backfired when the offended MacCleane reported this attempt at a bribe to 
Shelburne.12 Nonetheless, he saw the merits of the petition and passed it on to 
Shelburne.
Franklin was enlisted to pressure the government to approve the Illinois Company’s 
petition. He dined privately with Shelburne and Conway at which time they discussed 
how to reduce American expenses. Franklin used the opportunity to stress the fact that 
the Illinois Company grant would not cost the government very much money and would 
be a source of revenue. He also recommended that Johnson, acquainted as no other 
person with Indian affairs, would be the ideal choice for governor of the new colony. 
What Shelburne and Conway did not know was that Franklin, his son, Governor Franklin 
of New Jersey, and Johnson were silent partners in the company. This subterfuge was
12While he held the office of secretary to Shelburne, MacCleane did not accept shares 
in any of these land ventures. Later he did, becoming a shareholder in the Grand Ohio 
Co.
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Croghan’s idea, for he believed the views of these men would carry greater weight if 
they appeared "disinterested." The strategy worked.
Shelburne called on the Board of Trade to discuss his proposals before a joint 
meeting of the London merchants under the leadership of Barlow Trecothick, agent for 
New Hampshire, and the colonial agents most directly concerned in the Indian 
trade—Franklin, Jackson, Edward Montague, and Fowler Walker, the latter still acting 
as agent for the Quebec merchants. The group unanimously endorsed Shelburne’s 
proposals. On October 5, 1767, Shelburne presented his recommendations to the Board 
of Trade. They were: to return management of the Indian trade to the colonies; to create 
three new colonies west of the boundary line, one at the mouth of the Ohio, the others 
at Detroit and Illinois; and to establish these new colonies as the western boundaries of 
the eastern colonies. The new colonies would bring in revenues by means of quitrents 
and land taxes. Shelburne reasoned that "such a new method of granting lands might be 
devised. . . as might give infinite satisfaction to America, contribute to the ascertaining 
of property, preventing future suits at law, and in great measure prevent the Indian 
disturbances, and besides all, incidentally produce a certain revenue, without its being 
the object."13 In making his proposals, Shelburne stated that the present method of 
managing Indian affairs was too costly, that implementing the 1764 proposals would 
further increase costs, and that the colonials, who were more familiar with the Indians,
13C.W. Alvord, "British Ministry and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix," Wisconsin 
Historical Society Proceedings (1908), LVI, 176.
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were better able to manage them than a ministry that was not familiar with the nature of 
the Indians.
In December 1767 the Board approved all Shelburne’s proposals and recommended 
them to the ministry, but before the Privy Council could act on the issue of the boundary 
and Shelburne’s recommendation for creating three new colonies, Pitt’s ministry fell and 
Grafton stepped in to form a new government. In forming a new ministry, Grafton 
united with the Bedfordites in spite of their known hostility to the American colonies. 
A reshuffling of the colonial office occurred resulting in Hillsborough’s assuming 
responsibility of a new office of American affairs. Shelburne, who had remained as 
secretary of the southern department, was forced out, and his successor, as in 1763, was 
Hillsborough. It was believed that the choice of Hillsborough was made because he was 
not opposed to violent measures toward the American colonies as were the 
Bedfordites.14 Still Grafton, who was partial to Shelburne, must have had doubts about 
Hillsborough’s commitment to carry out Shelburne’s policies for it was rumored that 
Benjamin Franklin would be appointed undersecretary to assist in establishing the new 
department. Franklin apparently did not take this rumor seriously. He was not 
especially keen about the new American secretary and expressed concern about his views 
toward America, but he did not think Hillsborough "in general an enemy to America."15
"Ibid., 179.
15A.H. Smyth, The Life and Writings o f Benjamin Franklin (New York: Macmillan 
Company, 1905), V, 90.
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What did worry Franklin was that he believed Hillsborough was opposed to western 
expansion.
Shelburne’s proposals for changes in western policy were still before the Board of 
Trade, as was the Illinois petition, when Hillsborough took over the secretaryship from 
Shelburne in late January 1768. Not until March 7, 1768, however, did the Board act 
on these matters. The Lords agreed to return control of the Indian trade to the colonies 
and except for a few designated posts, British troops were to be removed from the 
western territory to the old colonies. The underlying motive here was the growing fear 
in the ministry of the confrontation with the colonies over Parliament’s right to tax them. 
Presence of the army might intimidate the colonists against uprisings as had occurred 
during the Stamp Act crisis. Once again the colonies would be expected to regulate the 
Indian trade and to pay for their own protection by replacing British troops with 
provincial troops. Thus the costs to the British government for colonial protection were 
transferred to the colonies. However, the British government did not trust the colonies 
to deal with Indian affairs such as land purchases and treaty-making. These functions 
would still be the responsibility of the superintendents of Indian affairs. Shelburne’s 
well-thought-out plan was further dissembled by the Board’s rejection of the proposal to 
create three new colonies. The Board explained that "the proposition of forming inland 
colonies in America is. . . entirely new; it adopts principles in respect to American 
settlement different from what has hitherto been the policy of this Kingdom; and leads
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to a system which if pursued through all its consequences, is in the present state of this 
country of the greatest importance."16
Consistent with this opinion, the Board also rejected the Illinois Company’s petition 
for land west of the Appalachians, stating that "it has been the policy of this Kingdom 
to confine her settlements as much as possible to the sea coast."17 Franklin was 
dejected. He had invested time and money in the scheme and was now in serious 
financial straits. But others involved in the venture were not as easily thwarted. Without 
Franklin’s knowledge William Trent and John Hughes, an associate of Franklin’s from 
Pennsylvania, had anticipated the Board’s rejection and bought out the claims of many 
of the traders, transferring them to the company’s shareholders. This action was highly 
suspect, since the traders probably acted on the false rumors of threatened Indian 
uprisings which were circulated by the Illinois partners—Franklin, Johnson and 
Croghan-in an attempt to persuade Shelburne to approve the Illinois grant.18
This was the situation when, unexpectedly, Hillsborough reversed himself with 
respect to the boundary. In April, a month after his rejection of the Illinois Company’s 
petition, the secretary instructed Sir William Johnson to negotiate a treaty with the Six 
Nations to ratify the 1765 boundary but not to enlarge it. Johnson ignored the latter
16Alvord, "British Western Policy," 180.
17Cecil B. Currey, Road to Revolution. Ben Franklin in England, 1765-1775 (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1968), 234.
nIbid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
213
instructions, but he acted immediately on the former. He alerted his fellow speculators, 
William Trent, Samuel Wharton, and George Croghan, of the meeting. These men had 
regrouped and formed a new trading company called the Indiana Company, which was 
engaged in negotiating for land around Pittsburgh. In a secret meeting with Johnson and 
the chiefs of the six tribes prior to the treaty negotiations, the chiefs confirmed the grant 
made to Croghan nineteen years before. More important, they also stipulated that 
cession to the Crown of the larger tract of land negotiated in the Fort Stanwix Treaty was 
conditional on Britain’s acceptance of the Indiana Company grant. After these favorable 
actions prior to the Treaty of Stanwix in November 1768, Samuel Wharton wrote 
Franklin apprising him of their success and claimed that this action was an "act of 
justice" and the grant to the Indiana Company "a condition of sale." Wharton declared 
that if the Crown did not ratify the treaty, it would be interpreted by the Six Nations as 
having "doubts as to their rights of ‘fixing the terms and conditions of their sale and will 
necessarily induce them to conclude that they have been treated like children.’"19
Hillsborough was irate when he learned that Johnson had disobeyed his instructions 
not to enlarge the territory under consideration. He feared that Johnson’s acceptance of 
the land between the Ohio and the Tennessee rivers from the Iroquois might cause 
disputes with the Cherokees, who also claimed that the land was theirs. Hillsborough 
rebuked Johnson for his disobedience and for allowing private interests to become part 
of the king’s treaty. There is disagreement about Johnson’s personal involvement in
19Ibid., 240.
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these land deals. Alvord says we "may never know" whether Johnson had any ulterior 
financial motive in the negotiations of the treaty; that he, Johnson, "asserted again and 
again that his intention was to serve the best interests of the empire by securing as large 
a grant as possible, and he was always very angry at every charge of dishonesty which 
was made against him."20 Sosin says that "Dartmouth had no way of knowing that 
Johnson was something less than ingenuous in this matter. The superintendent was 
materially involved with the land speculators and had received some stock in the Ohio 
Company for his cooperation.21 Examination of the Johnson Papers supports the view 
that he was involved. However, Alvord is right that it is very difficult to believe from 
Johnson’s indignant responses to such charges that his behavior could be anything but 
uprighteous and ethical. Hillsborough instructed Johnson to persuade the Indians to take 
back their gift. Before this could happen, however, the Board of Trade presented its 
report to the council, which to Hillsborough’s chagrin approved the boundary as 
negotiated by Johnson. But the council did not consent to the Indiana Company’s 
petition. Hillsborough wrote Croghan that "His Majesty does not think fit at present to 
confirm the grants of land made to the Indiana Company" and that the land in question 
was to be returned to the Indians.22 To ward off such action, Wharton and William 
Trent were dispatched to London by the Indiana Company partners to promote their 
interests. At this juncture, the key members of the company, in addition to Wharton and
20Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 73.
21 Jack Sosin, Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial 
Policy 1760-1775 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), 142, 173.
22Currey, Road to Revolution, 241-42.
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Trent, included Franklin’s son William, George Croghan, John Baynton, George 
Morgan, and Robert Callendar. Once in London, Wharton and Franklin plotted a 
strategy to overcome Hillsborough’s objections. Their efforts included trying to cultivate 
important members of Parliament and pressuring Johnson to write Hillsborough that the 
Indians were outraged because the grants had not been ratified. The latter attempt 
proved fruitless. Johnson, who had already been reprimanded, would not do anything 
further to jeopardize his position as superintendent. But the stakes for Wharton and 
Franklin were high. Both had expended large amounts of money and time in their 
speculative ventures and both were in dire financial straits. Recognizing that the Indiana 
Company was viewed with a jaundiced eye, the two men decided to abort the company 
for a new one that would include many influential people.
Land speculation was rampant in England at this time, so that the two men had no 
difficulty enlisting many friends and acquaintances in their new venture. The most 
important ones were: Thomas Pownall, the ex-colonial governor of Massachusetts who 
was a member of Parliament; John Sargent, director of the Bank of England and also a 
member of Parliament; and Richard and Thomas Walpole. Thomas was the nephew of 
the former prime minister, and in deference to his enormous influence, the new company 
was named after him. He brought in many notables as members. The result was that:
The company now was represented by several levels of British society: lords 
and commoners, bankers, lawyers, men familiar with the colonies and with 
England, jurists, financiers, relatives of the famous and respected. The post 
office, the Privy Council, and the Treasury were represented. Intimates of 
the King and the Prime Minister were members. Rockinghamites,
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Grenvillites, Townshendites, and other factions covered the political
spectrum."23
The American faction included Franklin and his son William, James Galloway, 
Thomas and Charles Wharton, Johnson, and Croghan.
The Walpole Company’s next step was to petition for a two and a half million acre 
grant within the Fort Stanwix grant for which the Company would pay £10,460, the cost 
to the government for the treaty lands. Much to the surprise of the petitioners, 
Hillsborough recommended that instead of the acreage asked for, the group enlarge their 
petition to as much as twenty million acres. This action was not the consequence of a 
mind-change on Hillsborough’s part, rather it was a devious means to squelch the 
project. Even if the Treasury would approve such a large grant, the secretary believed 
the cost would be too great for the speculators and they would have to back down. But 
Hillsborough was unaware how far the company’s influence had gone. The petition for 
the twenty million acres was approved by the Treasury in eight days at the same cost of 
the original petition. In the interim the company had reorganized once again, increasing 
its membership, and changing its name to the Grand Ohio Company.
Victory seemed close at hand. But only fleetingly. The Treasury, concerned that 
its approval would be subject to criticism, reneged on the initial grant and said it only 
approved quitrents and the purchase price. The Privy Council would have to approve
23Ibid., 251.
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the grant. That was in April 1770. In June the council referred the approval to the 
Board of Trade, where Hillsborough tried his utmost to delay action. Knowing that there 
were other petitions for the same land before the Lords of Trade, Franklin and Wharton 
decided to negotiate with the Ohio Company of Virginia to buy them out or bring them 
on board. To make such an arrangement more agreeable, the company stockholders also 
passed a resolution respecting any proven prior rights in the area. Many opponents still 
remained; but gradually they either gave up or were won over. (George Washington was 
one of the latter and became a shareholder in the company.)
Not satisfied, Hillsborough asked the council to determine whether Virginia had a 
prior claim. Consequently, the always versatile Franklin took another tack. This time 
he decided to explore the legal issues of land ownership and prior rights. After 
examining such precedents as the Camden-Yorke decision, Franklin determined that the 
Indians had an "inherent and undoubted power to grant the lands" and that land 
ownership derived from native title was subject "only to the king’s right of sovereignty 
over the settlements and. . . inhabitants."24 Although Franklin won the support of some 
of the most able lawyers in England for this position, he found that approval of the grant 
still eluded him. Not until February 25, 1771, did the Board of Trade receive approval 
from Virginia that there would be no objection to the Grand Ohio’s claim as long as prior 
rights were preserved and protected.
24See Currey, Road, to Revolution, for a discussion of this decision, 259-262.
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Ever since 1766, the major American partners had been involved in one land 
scheme or another. The unending barriers thrown up by the ministry began to take their 
toll. The company’s reputation, and particularly Franklin’s, did not remain unscathed. 
Arthur Lee, a member of the Mississippi Company that also claimed a right to the Fort 
Stanwix grant, wrote of the Grand Ohio Company, "take my word for it, there are not 
a set of greater knaves under the sun. As their scheme originated in a most villainous 
fraud, it has been carried on in expense [and] corruption."25 Lee’s dislike of Franklin 
increased the longer he knew him. The interminable delays also took their toll among 
the partners. Wharton and Franklin were not on speaking terms. Wharton, Croghan, 
and Trent were on the verge of financial ruin. Franklin’s financial situation was always 
insecure. Now his political opponents were becoming more vocal in their threats to 
replace him as postmaster. This was the situation at the time that Hillsborough finally 
issued the Board’s report on the company’s grant. It was unfavorable.
Hillsborough’s argument was the same mercantilist one that framed the decision 
about whether Canada or Guadeloupe should be retained at the peace treaty in 1763; that 
the main purpose of colonizing was to improve the commerce, navigation, and 
manufactures of Great Britain. He stated that by extending the western boundaries, the 
peltry trade would suffer, the trade and commerce of the new regions would not be 
beneficial to Great Britain, and the colonies would become more insubordinate and 
independent. Hillsborough based his views on the advice of General Gage, who no
25Ibid., 257.
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longer supported western expansion since he believed it threatened peace with the 
Indians. On June 5, 1772, the Privy Council held a hearing on the unfavorable report. 
In an unprecedented act, a company spokesman was invited to attend to comment on the 
report. Samuel Wharton, tutored by Franklin who put aside his personal animosity 
toward his partner, was chosen to give the company’s defense. He reputedly gave a 
brilliant account, even if  not always factual, resulting in the ministry’s reversal of the 
Board’s report. The ministry believed that the land in question was not beyond the reach 
of the government, that the Grand Ohio Company had the first claim to it, and that the 
push of settlers into the area was already taking place. Left unsaid was that if the 
ministry had not approved the petition, it would have risked the ire of many leading 
political and mercantile leaders who were personally involved.
The council’s actions were a direct affront to Hillsborough. He had threatened to 
resign if the grant were approved. On August 1, 1772, he did so, causing considerable 
excitement in England. Here was a Philadelphia merchant who had impressively 
defended his petition against the criticisms of the colonial secretary and won. "No one 
from America, ever had so much interest, and was so attended to by the great lords as 
Mr. Wharton." reported the Reverend William Hanna in a letter to Johnson.26 How 
does one account for the council’s actions in support of western expansion at a time when 
there was a growing anti-American sentiment in the ministry and Parliament? Was it
26Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 139.
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pure self-interest on the part of so many who stood to gain financially from this 
enterprise?
Many reasons have been advanced about Hillsborough’s resignation over the Grand 
Ohio Company affair. One explanation was that it was a political attempt by the 
Bedfordites to replace North with Lord Gowen. By humiliating one of North’s chief 
ministers, Hillsborough, they hoped North would support him and bring on a cabinet 
crisis. But North did not take the bait. Instead he sacrificed Hillsborough, who had 
always been unpopular with the ministers. Perhaps Hillsborough was tired of all the 
machinations against him. He had acknowledged in a letter to Gage that the seriousness 
of disposing of the west was accompanied with such objections from all sides as "leave 
my judgment in a state of perplexity.1,27 He was slighted in 1769 when the ministry 
ignored his proposal with respect to government for Quebec. He was humiliated earlier 
that year when the cabinet did not back him on his reprimand of Johnson and his 
rejection of the boundary established by the Fort Stanwix Treaty. He must also have felt 
disappointment when his close friend, Lord North, did not support him. North had 
regarded Hillsborough "‘as his best and firmest friend’ in the ministry without whom he 
would have to yield to the Bedfordites."28 Franklin opined that Hillsborough had such 
a high opinion of himself he believed the ministry would disapprove the petition rather
27Ibid., 181.
28B.D. Bargar, Lord Dartmouth and the American Revolution (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1765), 69.
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than lose him.29 Conversely, there were those who believed that Hillsborough was so 
hostile to Franklin that he would rather resign than approve any project in which Franklin 
was a participant. Franklin himself seems to have boasted that he was involved in a plot 
to get rid of Hillsborough. A serious rift had already occurred between the two men that 
might lend some credence to Franklin’s claim.
The issue that brought about the open breach between Hillsborough and Franklin 
concerned the appointment of colonial agents. Hillsborough refused to recognize agents 
who had been appointed only by a lower house and not approved by the governor and 
council. Franklin and Edmund Burke, a member of the opposition in Parliament and 
agent for New York, vehemently argued that if the lower house’s appointment could be 
negated by the governor and council, the agent was no longer a representative of the 
people, but a government functionary. This argument had been going on for several 
years. Franklin accused Hillsborough of regarding the agents with "an evil eye, as 
obstructors of ministerial measures" and would be "pleased to get rid of them." Franklin 
further antagonized the anxious minister by stating that when the colonies "come to be 
considered in the light of distinct states. . . possibly their ministers may be treated with 
more respect, and considered more as public ministers.1,30
29A.H. Smyth, Writings o f Franklin, V, 433, Letter to Galloway.
30John Bigelow, comp., Benjamin Franklin, Works (12 vols., New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1887), IV, 388.
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The collision course on which both men had embarked finally occurred in early 
1771, when Franklin received his commission as agent for the Massachusetts General 
Court and decided it was necessary to pay his respects to Hillsborough in that capacity. 
Determined to be civil, Franklin no sooner finished presenting himself as the newly 
appointed agent when Hillsborough interrupted and said, "You are not agent. . . . You 
are not appointed. . . .  I have a letter from Governor Hutchinson; he would not give his 
assent to the bill."31 Franklin responded that there was no bill and challenged 
Hillsborough to produce the letter. He couldn’t, but before the meeting ended, both men 
had unleashed much of the pent-up resentment they had been harboring for each other 
for several years. Perhaps each expressed more than he wished. Unfortunately, for 
Franklin and for the American cause, this open breach tended to close many doors to 
Franklin and his influence as an agent and the premier spokesman for the colonies was 
diminished.
In the short term, however, Hillsborough’s resignation and the favorable action of 
the council on the Grand Ohio project reduced tensions. Lord Dartmouth was a good 
choice to replace Hillsborough. He had previous experience with the colonies as 
president of the Board of Trade, had voted to repeal the Stamp Act, and was 
knowledgeable about Indian affairs. In addition, he was a land speculator who shared 
Shelburne’s views with respect to western settlements, believing that such movements 
were inevitable. Hopes were high that the new American secretary would expedite the
31Currey, Road to Revolution, 273.
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final stages necessary to establish the new colony, now named "Vandalia" by him in 
honor of the Queen, who was a descendant of the Vandals. Dartmouth also had hopes 
of appointing his kinsman, Francis Legge, to the governorship of the proposed colony. 
Despite Dartmouth’s willingness to proceed with the final steps, the project was stalled 
for over a year. Interestingly, despite the fears that the lower houses of the colonies 
were exerting too much power, the proposed charter for Vandalia was no different than 
the other royal colonies. With the reform of government established, the end seemed in 
sight, but the Cassandra warning of Franklin that there’s many a slip between the cup 
and the lip proved prophetic.
The only remaining business was for the law officers to draw up the final papers. 
The Attorney General and Solicitor General, Edward Thurlow and Alexander 
Wedderbum, respectively, were politically ambitious men. For reasons that were not 
apparent in 1773, the two men seemed reluctant to proceed with the necessary legal 
forms. Some speculated that this was because, like Hillsborough and other members of 
the Board, they favored the Virginia claims. This opinion is supported by their statement 
to the Grand Ohio petitioners "that all settlers, and even those, who are now removing 
to settle, and all who should settle, until we obtained the royal grant, should not pay us 
for the lands they had settled on, but should be quieted in their respective 
possessions."32 Wharton was appalled by the remark for he believed it would only
32Alvord, Mississippi Valley, II, 162.
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encourage emigrants from Virginia who "do not stand in need of any such powerful 
encouragement, to seize the king’s vacant land upon the Ohio."33
Dartmouth was still intent on seeing that the Vandalia project was approved. He 
devised a strategy to circumvent the obstructionist behavior of Thurlow and Wedderbum, 
but the support for the new colony was weakening. The Bedfordites now opposed the 
project, giving credence to the argument that the council’s approval of Wharton’s petition 
was an attempt to displace North with Gowen. Gage, who had been summoned to 
London to give his views on colonial affairs, counselled Dartmouth not to approve the 
project. Originally, Gage had been in favor of an expansionist policy. In fact, in 1766 
he entertained the idea of purchasing land from the Indians on the Ohio River and had 
solicited Johnson’s advice on how to go about it. Johnson suggested various possibilities 
including participating in the Illinois Company, since he said he was empowered to add 
to the number of shareholders. Gage apparently declined this offer.34 As the person 
most responsible for keeping peace in the western territories, Gage had come to believe 
that expansion would have to stop to avoid another Indian war. He was also concerned 
about the possibilities of trying to keep the peace in the old colonies. Having to quell 
various "commotions," he no longer had patience with the Bostonians whom he called 
a "turbulent seditious people."35 His solution was to force the colonists into
33Ibid., 163.
34Johnson Papers, V, 187-88.
35Johnson, V, 211 n 35.
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submission. Troops were already deployed from Halifax and Ireland to Boston. Such 
sentiments were growing more popular with every affront to British sovereignty. This 
was the mood as a shipload of tea arrived in London which had been refused in 
Philadelphia. At the same time news of the Boston Tea Party also reached London. 
After several years of reduced tension between the American colonies and England, the 
country was seized with anti-American frenzy.
Unfortunately for Franklin, as agent for Massachusetts, he had requested a hearing 
before the Privy Council which was scheduled for January 29, 1774, two days after the 
news arrived of the tea being dumped in Boston harbor. The purpose of the hearing was 
to present to the council a petition by the General Court of Massachusetts for the removal 
of Governor Thomas Hutchinson and Lieutenant Governor Andrew Oliver. This action 
was taken after remarks made by Hutchinson and Oliver in private correspondence 
lamenting the seditious behavior of the colonies were made public. Franklin was the 
source of the published letter, despite his counsel to friends not to publish them.36 The 
comments aroused the already hostile feelings of the colonists against Hutchinson, his 
son-in-law Oliver, and also against the home government. The history of these 
prerevolutionary years in American history is not the focus of this study, but the growing 
hostility of the home government toward the colonies resulted in changing attitudes of 
its policymakers toward the American colonists and their representatives in London.
36For a contemporary account of the episode, see Israele Maudit, ed., Franklin before 
the Privy Council (London: J. Wilkie, 1774 reprinted Philadelphia: John M. Butler, 
1860); for a more recent account, see Currey, Road to Revolution, 318-32.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226
These attitudes would become important in the formulation of policies affecting both the 
American colonies and Quebec. Much of the growing hostility centered in London on 
the figure of Franklin, who became synonymous in the eyes of many with the 
insubordination of Massachusetts.
As we have seen, for the previous decade Franklin had been the voice of the 
American colonists in London. He was called on by key ministers of the day to express 
his opinions on policy toward the colonies. His reputation seemed unassailable. This 
was true of other colonial agents as well. They were recognized as a formidable lobby 
on the London scene. They were effective in pressuring for repeal of the Stamp Act in 
1766 and with the exception of tea, of the Townshend duties in 1770. To protect 
colonial interests, the agents met regularly to plan joint strategy. Most of them were 
appointed because of their influence with key members of the mercantile community and 
the government. But by 1770, their influence began to wane due, in part, to attrition. 
Massachusetts agent, Richard Jackson, who was intimate with most of the highest 
officeholders, became solicitor to the Board of Trade. Barlow Trecothick, agent for New 
Hampshire who had been spokesman for the London merchants trading to North America 
and head of the Canada Committee, suffered from palsy. Dennys DeBerdt and Robert 
Charles, New York agents, both died in 1770. Connecticut and Rhode Island failed to 
replace temporary agents William Samuel Johnson and Henry Marchant. Delaware and 
Maryland failed to agree on agents after the Stamp Act crisis. The House of Burgesses 
in Virginia failed to agree on one after 1770. The numbers were further reduced since
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
227
Franklin represented four colonies: Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and 
Georgia.
The agents’ influence waned for another important reason. The persistent 
confrontations with the colonies over the rights of Parliament aroused hostile feelings 
even on the part of those stalwarts who otherwise defended the colonists—such as Pitt and 
Shelburne. As the leading spokesman of the diminished agency in London, Franklin’s 
identification with the revolutionary movement in Massachusetts brought the entire 
institution into disrepute. As was discussed previously, Franklin rankled the ministry for 
the prominent role he took in support of the revolutionaries. His conflict with 
Hillsborough over the issue of agents’ appointments was one issue. Another was his 
view respecting America’s independence, expressed in a private letter, but inadvertently 
shown to Governor Hutchinson in Massachusetts, who circulated it to the ministry in 
London. Franklin’s views caused an uproar among those members already distressed 
over the issue of sovereignty. In his letter to Samuel Cooper in Massachusetts, Franklin 
stated, "Since the Restoration, Parliament. . . has usurped an authority of making laws 
for them [the colonies] which before it had not." He said he regretted such terms as "the 
supreme authority of Parliament, subordinancy of our assemblies to the Parliament and 
the like" for they confirmed the right of one part of the king’s dominions to be sovereign 
over their fellow subjects. "In truth," he stated, "they have no right, and their claim is 
founded in usurpation, the several states having equal rights and liberties, and being only
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connected as England and Scotland were before the union by having one common 
sovereign, the king."37
In 1771, Franklin expressed his concern with respect to Parliament’s insistence on 
keeping the tax on tea. He believed it was "bad policy" to heal differences by repealing 
part of the duties only, "as it is bad surgery to leave splinters in a wound which must 
prevent its healing, or in time occasion it to open afresh."38 Franklin’s revolutionary 
views hurt his reputation. Ever since 1772 and his falling out with Hillsborough, 
Franklin had stepped up his activities with the result that the Massachusetts petition was 
less a hearing to remove Hutchinson and Oliver than a hearing to censure him. This 
incident is well known, but is briefly repeated here to emphasize the extent of the 
disaffection of the British policymakers and the public toward the colonies and to 
establish a link between the government’s forthcoming actions on Quebec and the 
colonists.
It is interesting to note that the hearing drew the largest audience of dignitaries ever 
know for such an occasion, yet there were few, Shelburne being one, who came to 
support Franklin. Solicitor General Wedderbum represented Hutchinson and Oliver. His 
role in the hearings is important for it was he who, along with Thurlow, tried to stall the 
Vandalia project; who was advising the government on Quebec; and who would play a
37Bigelow, Franklin, Works, IV, 344-45.
38Bigelow, Franklin, Works, IV, 382.
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prominent role in the House of Common’s debate on the Quebec Act. During the council 
hearing, Wedderbum blamed Franklin for the violence in Massachusetts, not Hutchinson 
or Oliver. Sarcastically, he accused Franklin with "being so possessed with the idea of 
a Great American Republic, that he may easily slide into the language of the minister of 
a foreign independent state."39 Franklin’s defense was no match for the aroused 
solicitor general. The committee voted that the Massachusetts petition was "founded 
upon resolutions, formed upon false and erroneous allegations, and that the same is 
groundless, vexatious, and scandalous, and calculated only for the seditious purposes of 
keeping up a spirit of clamor and discontent in the said province."40 A severe motion 
of censure was levelled against Franklin, and the next day he was dismissed from his 
post office department.
Just at the critical stage of relations between the colonies and Great Britain, 
Franklin was silenced. The Earl of Dartmouth now confessed whatever respect he may 
have had for Franklin on other accounts he could "not applaud his conduct on the 
occasion of Mr. Hutchinson’s letter."41 Ever since the Stamp Act rebellion, Parliament 
had been wrestling with the problem of sovereignty. Almost to a man, the members 
believed that the colonies should be subordinate to the mother country. The tea party 
and the disclosure of Franklin’s view pushed Parliament over the brink. Even Colonel
39Currey, Road, 330.
40Maudit, Franklin - Before the Privy Council, 120.
4IBargar, Dartmouth, 92.
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Barre, who had always championed the American cause, told the House of Commons that 
he thought "Boston ought to be punished."42 The result was: The Boston Port bill, 
passed on March 31; the Administration of Justice Act, on May 20; and the Quartering 
Act on June 2. When the 1774 session concluded with enactment of the Quebec Act, the 
seeds for revolution had been planted.
At the outset of this chapter, it was suggested that there might be linkage between 
the confrontation with the American colonists over sovereignty and two of the terms of 
the Quebec Act: the form of government and the return of the western territories to 
Quebec. It is the contention here that these provisions were largely the result of the 
troublesome behavior of the colonists during the previous decade. Since most historians 
invariably treat the histories of Canada and the American colonies as self-contained units, 
these linkages are frequently overlooked. In this chapter, the dissensions between 
Franklin and Hillsborough have been discussed with respect to western policy, colonial 
agents, and sovereignty. As was discussed previously, Hillsborough was responsible for 
the final version of the Proclamation of 1763. He supported setting aside a reserve for 
the Indians, and the Appalachian divide was established as the boundary. After the Fort 
Stanwix Treaty in 1768, the new boundary negotiated with the Six Nations opened up 
lands west of the Appalachian divide. This additional land for settlement brought on 
many claims by land speculators. While the home government was involved in acting 
on these claims, the situation in the western territories was deteriorating. With
42Ibid., 107.
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deregulation of the fur trade and the removal of the army except at a few points, the vast 
area was left without any civil jurisdiction.
Each colony was supposed to regulate its own traders, but it could do little to 
enforce such regulations beyond its own borders. Without uniformity in the regulations, 
the traders could move at will to the colony with the least restrictions or cost. In 
addition, commissaries were supposed to be appointed by the colonies responsible for the 
particular posts within their bounds, but the colonies failed to provide for them. The 
result was a chaotic situation in which the Indians threatened the peace and fierce 
competition among the traders threatened to destroy the fur industry. The response of 
Quebec officials to complaints of the Montreal merchants was to recommend annexing 
the territory to an existing colony, in this case, Quebec. The merchants’ report, dated 
April 8, 1769, urged Governor Carleton to promote Quebec’s superior case to the home 
government. Three facts were stressed: that the territory was best linked geographically 
to Quebec, that they had the greatest number of traders, and that they sold more British 
manufactures than New York, which sold largely rum.
In the meantime, however, the colonies of New York and Pennsylvania were 
attempting their own solution. On June 11, 1769, Carleton was invited to join them in 
proposing concurrent legislation. He did not respond. In 1771 an invitation was again 
sent to Quebec by the governor of New York for commissioners to be sent to a joint 
meeting in December in order to regulate the trade with the Indians. Although acting
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Governor Cramahd initially agreed to send delegates from Quebec, he later changed his 
mind, since the Quebec council decided any such regulations would not be in its 
interests, given the nature of the competition between Quebec and the colonies. Cramahd 
had also received a letter from Hillsborough which informed him that the king 
disapproved of any Congress at that time, since he feared that any joint action taken by 
the colonists might result in their drive toward independence. Without Quebec’s 
inclusion, the Congress was aborted. Unjustly, all the blame for failure to control the 
fur trade was placed on the American colonists. This failure to assume responsibility for 
the regulation of the trade contributed to the decision by the ministry to return the 
western territories to Quebec. The influence of the Scotch fur merchants in Parliament, 
of the London merchants trading to Canada, of the Quebec merchants represented by 
Carleton, who was then in London—all commingled to support this action at a time when 
the influence of the American interests was on the wane.
Another problem for which Hillsborough might have felt responsible surfaced in 
the failed attempt of the colonies and Quebec to adopt uniform regulations for the fur 
trade. The American colonists wanted to impose a tax on rum. Without an assembly, 
according to the terms of the Proclamation of 1763, the Quebec government did not have 
the authority to raise revenues so that even if it wanted to, it could not act in concert 
with New York and Pennsylvania. Hillsborough had always advocated an assembly for 
Quebec—in his instructions to Governor Murray in 1764, to Carleton in 1768, and in his 
proposal to the Privy Council in 1769. Yet in 1771-72, he abandoned this position and
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supported Carleton’s for ruling Quebec by a governor and council. Were the same 
forces shaping his views on the American colonies also shaping his views on the 
government of Quebec? Did the colonists’ growing insistence on sovereignty, the 
unsavory attempts of the land speculators for get-rich schemes, and his showdown with 
Franklin have anything to do with his views on the form of government for Quebec?
Two other key figures with respect to the western territories and government for 
Quebec were Solicitor General Wedderbum and Attorney General Thurlow. Both had 
been charged with determining the constitutional issues involved in a government for 
Quebec. Their report reflected their partiality for Carleton’s proposals that the ancient 
laws and customs be returned to Quebec. In 1771, Thurlow rejected the view that it was 
necessary to assimilate a "conquered country in the article of laws and government to the 
metropolitan state or to the older provinces which other accidents attached to the empire 
for the sake of creating a harmony and uniformity." His prejudice against the English 
who immigrated to Canada is reflected in his statement that there was no "necessity of 
gratifying the unprincipled and impracticable expectations of those few amongst Your 
Majesty’s subjects who may accidentally resort thither, and expect to find all the different 
laws of all the different places from which they have come. "43
Wedderbum gave as the fundamental principle which governed him the view that 
"more attention is due to the native Canadian than the British emigrant, not only because
43Burt, Old Province, 182-83.
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that class is the most numerous but because it is not the interest of Britain that many of 
her natives should settle here."44 This view was consistent with the mercantilist ones 
against expansion. Any new colonies, such as the proposed one of Vandalia, would 
encourage emigration. This prejudice helps explain the delaying tactics of the solicitor 
general with respect to Vandalia. Coupled with his reluctance to support an expansionist 
policy was his disdain for Franklin. Stating that Franklin was "unworthy the favors of 
the Crown," Wedderbum made clear even before the council’s denunciation of Franklin 
that the delays in the Vandalia project were due to Franklin’s role in it.45 How much 
did Wedderbum’s dislike for Franklin and his distaste for colonial rebelliousness affect 
his decision to support reversing the policy of anglicization in Quebec and of returning 
the western territories to it?
It was the purpose of this chapter to describe the changing attitude of the British 
government toward the American colonies. The repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766 and 
Shelburne’s ascension to the office of southern secretary appeared to quell the distant 
rumblings of revolutionary fervor. Shelburne was favorably disposed toward the 
American colonists. As a free trader, he supported western expansion and meticulously 
set about garnering all the information he could from those he most respected—Franklin, 
Jackson, Johnson, Gage, and Amherst. A skillfully crafted policy was presented to the
^Sir Henry Cavendish, Government o f  Canada: Debates o f the House o f  Commons 
in the Year 1774 (London, 1839), 57-58.
45Currey, Road, 332.
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Board of Trade on October 5, 1767, but only part of the policy was approved before 
Shelburne was forced from office. His successor, Hillsborough, rejected the proposal 
for the creation of three new colonies, largely out of fear that the expansion of the 
colonies westward would lead not just to another Indian war but to colonial independence 
as well. As an Irish landowner, he was also afraid of emigration from Ireland to 
America. Increasingly, the mood in Great Britain was growing ugly toward the 
rebellious colonists who were once again protesting British policy, this time the 
imposition of the Townshend duties. With a forceful lobby supporting the Americans, 
Parliament acceded to their demands and repealed the tax, with the exception of the tax 
on tea. When this gesture of goodwill and accommodation did not placate the radicals, 
hostility toward the Americans hardened. By 1770 the ascension of the North ministry 
to the power of influence of the Americans was diminishing. Johnson and Gage were 
both warning of possible Indian uprisings in the western territories. The army had been 
removed from the various posts according to the policy established under Shelburne, but 
replacements of commissaries, smiths, and interpreters by the colonists were not 
forthcoming. Nor had the colonists established regulations for the trade.
In the meantime, the Quebec merchants and traders, English and Canadian, had 
been agitating for freedom to winter among the Indians and to return the western lands 
to Quebec. Carleton supported their petition. Such action would resolve a multitude of 
problems, including the bickering among the colonies and land speculators over the land. 
Carleton, who was now in London to promote his ideas on repealing the policy of
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anglicization for Quebec, touched a responsive chord when he spoke of his distaste for 
the "mobocracy" that he believed afflicted the American colonies. For all these reasons, 
as Carleton’s influence grew, Franklin’s steadily declined.
The duplicity of Franklin in instigating the colonists to join together in common 
cause against the mother country and his devious actions in trying to promote the 
approval of the Vandalia project were still fresh in the minds of the ministry as it began 
debate on the Quebec Act. Still, had Franklin’s reputation not been defamed in the 
brouhaha over the Hutchinson and Oliver letters, he might have been a mediating 
influence in the actions taken by the ministry in that fateful session of Parliament. As 
far as the Vandalia project was concerned, an exchange of letters between Sir William 
Johnson and Sir William Franklin at the end of May 1774 expressed the general situation 
with respect to Britain’s attitudes toward the American colonies. Franklin stated that: 
"The last letters from England mention that ‘the Ohio affair stands still, the present rage 
against American making it improper to be moved; yet the partners continue to think well 
of it, supposing the government cannot go back, after solemn steps taken and agreement 
made.’ For my part, as I see no prospect of that rage being lessened, for some years at 
least, I think the matter may, if it depends on that circumstance, be almost as well given 
up." On June 27 Johnson replied that he agreed. He said that "the spirit diffused on 
both sides of the Atlantic will require much time to allay, at the same time the disorders 
daily committed by the frontier inhabitants in that quarter, on the one hand inclines me
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to wish there was a government and on the other points out the weak and inadequate state 
in which a government amongst such people would probably remain for many years.M46
A steady drum roll warning of the irreconcilable rift between the colonies and the 
mother country could be heard if  Dartmouth were listening. He hoped for reconciliation, 
but he was getting advice from the wrong people—the officials in America who were 
telling them that the "right sort of people" were not in sympathy with the rebels. This 
misreading of the degree of outrage, even among the "better sort" against the series of 
repressive acts, misled Dartmouth into believing that the policy of submission would 
divide the colonists and bring about the desired results. British sovereignty would thus 
be acceded, independence would be thwarted. At the same time that the 1774 Parliament 
was pursuing the policy of punishing Massachusetts for its insolent behavior, it was also 
engaged in fashioning a government for Quebec that would ensure the loyalty of the 
Canadians in the event of invasion by the French or Spanish, or, as Carleton believed, 
by the Americans. Under such circumstances, could the one debate not be influenced 
by the other?
46Johnson Papers, VIII, 1158-1159, 1178.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE QUEBEC ACT: LAST OF THE INTOLERABLE ACTS?
The declaration and the resolves of the First Continental Congress on October 14, 
1774, included in the "grievous acts" passed in the 1774 session of Parliament, the 
Quebec Act. Nineteenth century Whig historians perpetuated the view that the Act was 
the last of the "Intolerable Acts" that triggered the American Revolution. Since then, the 
majority of British and Canadian historians have refuted the negative Whig interpretation 
and have generally lauded the Act as an exemplary model of British tolerance toward a 
conquered people and of conciliar government. The evidence is convincing that the 
paramount concern of the British policymakers was to fashion a government for Quebec 
that would meet Quebec’s particular needs and serve British self-interest. The most 
recent scholarship in 1990 by Philip Lawson painstakingly establishes the fact that the 
Act was not one of the Intolerable Acts designed to punish the colonists. That conclusion 
is not denied. To extrapolate from that conclusion, however, that the Act was not 
influenced by the crisis in the American colonies is simply not creditable.
The focus here is not to re-examine the vast historiography of the Act, which is 
primarily concerned with how British policy affected the bi-cultural national lives of 
Canadians, but to discover, if possible, the linkage between the Act and the American
238
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colonies. With few exceptions1 the interpretations of the Act suffered from lack of 
documentation and bias on the part of historians. Conversely, Lawson’s study on 
Imperial policy, which will be the primary work considered here, is extensively 
researched but fails because of too narrow an interpretation. Lawson acknowledges that 
his focus is on the "contemporary British context for the Quebec legislation of 1774" and 
that he "resisted the temptation to weave all the arguments of the period about Canada’s 
future into a parallel discussion on Ireland and America." He says that where the debate 
overlaps, its importance is acknowledged, but that his overriding intention is to portray 
the eighteenth-century debate about Quebec as it was then presented.2 The problem with 
this approach is that in his discussion of the Quebec Act, he, like those historians who 
claim there was no linkage between the two, dismisses relevant considerations. For 
example, Lawson examines all government records and papers at the time the Quebec 
Act was being drafted and concludes that the policymakers were concerned only with the 
needs of Quebec and the kind of government that would satisfy those needs. His proof 
is that there is no mention of the American colonies in any of the recorded discussions. 
Lawson appears to be on sound ground in drawing his conclusion from "facts," but by 
not considering a parallel discussion on America, he ignores the impact that events in the 
American colonies had on British policy toward Canada. What about the anti-American 
prejudices of the men who were responsible for the formulation and passage of the Act
‘The monographs of Victor Coffin, 1896; A.L. Burt, 1933; Hilda Neatby, 1766; 
Brian Donoughue, 1964; and Philip Lawson, 1990.
2Lawson, Imperial, ix-x.
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and the hostile political environment against the rebellious colonies in which the Act was 
passed? What different conclusions could be drawn from considering not only the Act, 
but the governor’s instructions subsequent to the Act; or the despotic practices of the 
conciliar government established by the Act; or the response of the Canadians to the Act; 
and finally of the response of the Americans to the Act? Lawson restricts his argument 
primarily to the Act itself and ignores these broader considerations. When they are taken 
into account, the question Lawson and other historians should have asked is not whether 
the Act was influenced by the quarrel over sovereignty with the American colonies, but 
rather how could it not have been affected by that quarrel?
One of Lawson’s most persuasive arguments that the Act was not one of the 
Intolerable Acts was that the bill had been in the works for many years prior to 1774. 
Brian Donoughue makes the same case which cannot be contested. The first attempt to 
address the problems of anglicization of Quebec, called for in the Proclamation of 1763, 
was in 1766. This proposal by Crown attorneys Yorke and DeGray, which was never 
implemented due to the fall of the Rockingham ministry, dealt with the judiciary. It 
combined French and English civil law and continued English criminal law. The 
proposal would have replaced the September 1764 ordinance by Murray, which with 
some exceptions, was to establish English law. Other proposals—Hillsborough’s in 1769; 
Carleton, Hey, and Maseres’ in 1770; and Crown lawyers Wedderbum, Thurlow, and 
Marriott in 1772 and 1773—were all, with the exception of Carleton’s, variations of the 
1766 proposal. Despite the best efforts of the various ministries from that time until
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
241
1774, no consensus emerged that would have made the task of resolving the issue easier. 
Although Dartmouth was determined to introduce a bill in the 1774 session of 
Parliament, he had not foreseen the impending crisis in the American colonies over the 
tea tax. While Parliament was preoccupied with the debates over the Intolerable Acts, 
the final version of the Quebec bill was being hammered out in committee. Was there 
any correlation between what was happening in committee and what was happening in 
Parliament?
Most historians agree with Lawson who disclaims any connection between the 
Quebec Act and the conflict with the American colonists.3 Hilda Neatby disagrees. She 
says, "By 1774, it is clear that the government, having procrastinated too long, was 
dominated by one idea. In view of the crisis in America some definite settlement must 
be made immediately for Quebec and the upper country."4 Donoughue concurs with 
Neatby. He says that it is "untrue to say there was no connection between the new 
Canadian policy and the government’s concern with events in the old colonies." 
Donoughue says that the incipient colonial rebellion probably precipitated the timing of 
the Quebec bill and that it "became expedient as well as just to satisfy the French 
Canadians that British rule was benevolent, lest they were tempted to join the malcontents 
to the south." With respect to extending the boundaries south to the Ohio River,
3See a summary of the discussion of secondary works in Neatby, Quebec Act, 68- 
136.
4Neatby, Quebec Act, 140.
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Donoughue says that the "ministers must have realized such action would frustrate 
American ambitions to settle in the interior.5 Carleton, a novice administrator but an 
experienced military man, had been alerting the various British ministries of the 
possibility of an American rebellion ever since his arrival in Quebec in 1766. Quebec 
was vulnerable, Carleton warned, unless the large Canadian population’s loyalty could 
be counted on in any pending conflict.
Less astute statesmen than North understood Carleton’s message. Time was 
running out. Quebec’s problems had to be addressed. Dartmouth informed acting 
Governor Cramahe that a bill would be presented in the 1774 session of Parliament. The 
dates of the bill’s four drafts in 1774—January, March, April, and May—would indicate 
that the ministry, after years of indecision, had determined they could no longer afford 
to wait. While the ministry was occupied with drafting the bill, Parliament was engaged 
in enacting the Intolerable Acts. The Boston Port bill was introduced in the Commons 
on March 14 and with the opposition favoring it, became law without a single vote cast 
against it. The Massachusetts Government bill, which repealed the assembly’s authority 
to pay officials’ salaries and to appoint members of the governor’s council, was 
introduced on April 15. This bill met with some resistance, but North managed to 
discredit his opponents’ objections with gross exaggeration of their views.6 The vote
5Bemard Donoughue, British Politics and the American Revolution: The Path to 
War, 1773-1775 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965).
6Peter D.H. Thomas, Lord North (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), 77.
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on May 2 was overwhelmingly—239 to 64—in the government’s favor. This was the 
same day that Dartmouth introduced the Quebec bill in the House of Lords. A few days 
later, the Massachusetts Justice bill won easy approval by a vote of 127 to 24. The 
discrepancy between the votes on May 2 and May 4 indicates that most of the members 
retired to their country estates after the passage of the second Intolerable Act. This helps 
explain the small attendance during the debate on the Quebec bill which did not begin in 
the Commons until May 26 and contributes to the charges of secrecy and ulterior motives 
brought against North.
In addition to introducing such an important piece of legislation in the shank end 
of the session, North was criticized for the manner in which he steered the bill through 
the House of Commons. The small minority opposed to the bill was angry over the 
Prime Minister’s refusal to make available the various reports prepared for the ministry. 
They insisted that they needed more information to make an intelligent decision. But 
North was determined not to give the opposition any opportunity to delay passage of the 
bill or to embarrass the government. North was well aware of the controversial nature 
of the bill, especially that of toleration for Roman Catholics. While the public was 
supportive of his actions toward the colonists, he knew he risked losing their approval 
if the bill were widely and publicly debated. And an election was coming up in the fall.
Lawson answers those who criticize the manner in which the bill was passed by 
explaining that the situation was not unique with the Quebec Act. Other important
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legislation was passed at the end of sessions with scant attendance. He had experience 
in manipulating the Commons to support his ministry and besides it was the way the 
parliamentary process worked. How could he be criticized for being successful? Lawson 
responds. On the motion by the opposition, referred to above, for more information, 
Lawson states: "North can be forgiven for being ‘bloody-minded’ on this motion and 
circumspect in response to charges of introducing secrecy to the process of seeing the bill 
through the House." Lawson admits that "the Quebec Act would have sunk without a 
trace if all the contradictory reports were laid before the House.1,7 Was North so sure 
that on as critical an issue as this, he should muzzle not only the opposition but the 
members of his own party who disagreed with his stance?
Among the members of his own ministry, there was opposition to the bill. One of 
the most interesting examples to illustrate North’s skill in maintaining a united front was 
the testimony of the Crown lawyer, Adjutant General Marriott, who was believed to 
oppose the bill. His testimony before the Commons was one of the most outrageous 
performances of chicanery perpetrated on a political body seriously trying to resolve a 
complex problem. A couple of his responses illustrate the complete restraint put upon 
dissenters by North. Asked what he thought was the best establishment of laws for 
Quebec, Marriott responded: "It is difficult to say, upon any subject in this world, what 
is best for any men or set of men on speculation: that which succeeds best in public and 
private life is best; and therefore I cannot tell what will be best for the Canadians."
7Lawson, Imperial, 137-38.
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Pressed again to state what sort of government he would give Quebec, he philosophized: 
"The giving laws to mankind is the perfection of all knowledge, human and divine. It 
is not the work of days, of months, of years, but of ages. For me to answer the 
question, what sort of government I would give to the province, I must be the vainest of 
men."8 If the opposition were trying to find a way to break down the ministry’s solid 
front, Marriott was not going to be the one to open the wedge.
In his attempt to speed the bill through the House, North refused to provide the 
opposition’s request for the various governmental reports on Quebec. The opposition 
argued that they had no information on which to make a sound judgment on so important 
a piece of legislation. Their request was certainly on the face of it reasonable. North, 
however, viewed the request as an attempt to delay and cause dissension within the 
government party since the opposition knew that there was no consensus among the 
ministers and law officers about policy for Quebec. Similarly, when the opposition 
expressed the desire to have General Murray, who was seen in the House, summoned to 
give testimony, North objected. Despite Murray’s credentials as a former governor of 
Quebec who could provide the Commons with the knowledge he gained through personal 
experience, North complained that "if every person is to be called who has happened to 
have resided in the province, we may go on for ever and ever. . . his [Murray’s]
8Sir Henry Cavendish, Government o f Canada: Debates o f the House o f Commons 
in the Year 1774 (London, 1839), 163-169.
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attendance is not to give necessary information, but to create unnecessary delay."9 The 
motion to call Murray was defeated, 36 yeas to 90 noes. Nevertheless, Murray 
communicated his views to Governor Johnstone, former governor of Pensacola, who read 
Murray’s statement. Essentially, Murray sided with Maseres who disputed Carleton’s 
claims. Murray stated that he highly approved Mr. Maseres’ evidence as to the matters 
of fact; that he gave the House the most accurate information. He added that he did not 
recollect one circumstance of difference between them except as to the number of 
inhabitants. However, the General said that he did not want it understood that he agreed 
with Maseres in all the conclusions to be drawn from those facts. Murray’s pique with 
Carleton may have prejudiced his opinions, but for a fuller understanding of the issues, 
it would have been instructive to know what differences Murray had with Maseres and 
with Carleton.
In addition to the Whig opposition in Parliament, the merchants in London, 
representing themselves as well as the English merchants in Quebec, signed a petition 
protesting the clause in the bill which stated that all matters of controversy relative to 
property and civil rights would be decided "by the laws of Canada, and by the judges 
presiding in the courts of judicature of that province, without the interposition of a 
jury."10 The petitioners asked that the bill not be passed into law with the 
above-mentioned clause remaining in it; and that they may be heard by their counsel
9 Ibid., 178.
10Ibid., 75.
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against the same. The petition was ordered to be referred to the committee on the bill 
and that the petitioners be heard, by themselves or counsel. Herbert Mackworth of 
Cardiff spoke for the "gentlemen whose property had been invested under the faith of the 
Proclamation and. . . under an assurance that that property was guarded by the laws of 
England."11 He asked why such an important bill should have been taken up at so late 
a date and why it originated in the House of Lords. He asked why there was so little 
evidence to support a policy to revoke the laws of England for laws of Canada, about 
which there was so little information. Mackworth summed up his argument be saying, 
"In short, Sir, I see nothing in this bill but the language of despotism."12 Nonetheless, 
after seven days and late nights of grueling debate, the bill passed the House by more 
than a two to one margin—56 yeas to 20 noes.
In the Lords, only Chatham, who had risen from his sick bed, pleaded against 
enactment of such an incendiary action sure to alienate the old colonies. He argued 
against rejecting those bulwarks of personal security—trial by jury and habeas 
corpus—that every Englishman was ready to die for. He called ridiculous and false the 
idea that the French Canadians could not benefit from law and liberty simply because 
they were used to arbitrary power. Most of all, the Old Commoner expressed his real 
fear: "that the bill might finally lose the hearts of all his Majesty’s American subjects."
"Ibid., 74.
"Ibid., 79.
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Apparently only five other lords shared his fears. The bill passed the upper house by 
almost a four to one margin, 26 yeas and 7 noes.
Only the king’s signature was required to make the bill law. A last attempt to stop 
that from happening was made by the mayor of London and a group of merchants. Their 
objections to the bill were valid ones. In all matters dealing with commercial law, the 
Quebec merchants were not protected, nor were the interests of partners of business firms 
domiciled in England, but trading to Quebec. The merchants had unsuccessfully pointed 
this out in their petitions to the ministry when they learned that the new bill would 
institute the law and custom of the Canadians. Calling upon the king at his home, they 
asked that he not sign the bill into law. Deviously, the king denied that the bill was even 
before him. He then rushed off to sign it and immediately prerogued Parliament. These 
actions—the refusal to provide the government reports on Quebec, the refusal to allow 
General Murray to appear, the muzzling of dissent within the government, the king’s 
deceitful denial that the bill was ready for his signature, and the immediate preroguing 
of Parliament, coupled with introducing the bill so late in the session at the same time 
that the last of the coercive acts against Massachusetts was being enacted—excited the 
suspicious mind then and now.
Was there any connection between North’s determination to reverse the policy of 
anglicization in Quebec and his equal, if not greater, determination to coerce the 
American colonies into submission? This question has not been given due consideration
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by those who assert that there was no linkage between the Intolerable Acts and the 
Quebec Act. One of Lawson’s claims that there was no connection rests on the fact that 
the period in which the Act was being formulated was one when relations between the 
colonists and England were relatively calm. It is true that there was a lull between the 
Boston Massacre in 1770 and the Boston Tea Party in 1774 in which no crisis 
comparable to the Stamp Act riots or the protest against the Townshend bills had 
occurred. But there was an underlying disenchantment with the American colonists, 
described in the previous chapter with respect to the pressures dealing with the western 
territories, evidenced in the decline in influence of the American lobby in London. 
Events such as the burning of the Gaspee in Providence Harbor, confrontations between 
the home government and Massachusetts over control of the civil list in 1772 and 1773, 
the break between Hillsborough and Franklin in 1772 over colonial agents, and the 
continuing concern about sovereignty fueled the fires that erupted when news of the 
Boston Tea Party reached London. Thus while the hostile feelings between the colonies 
and the mother country may have abated for a short time, they did not go away. On 
North American issues, Lords North and Dartmouth were increasingly showing partiality 
to Quebec and not to the American colonies.
This was the environment in which the 1774 Parliament debated the Quebec bill. 
Anti-American attitudes of the policymakers in Westminster and Whitehall had been 
shaped by years of confrontation with the colonists over sovereignty. Were those 
attitudes so compartmentalized that decisions made for Quebec were totally isolated from
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those made against the colonists? The role of prejudice in the men largely responsible for 
the formulation of the Quebec Act is a difficult but important issue in trying to 
understand the motives behind the Act. Lord North, Carleton, Hillsborough, Dartmouth, 
Wedderbum, and Gage were all instrumental in some aspect of formulating policy and 
defending it in the Commons. In previous chapters the attitudes of some of these men 
toward the American colonies have been discussed. It is worth broadening that 
discussion to attempt to understand possible biases of the men responsible for the Act.
ft
Along with Carleton, Lord North was probably the most influential figure 
responsible for the Quebec Act. He dominated the Common’s debate on the bill, rising 
to his feet seventy-two times—more than any other member. North was secure in his 
position in the Commons. Recognition in that assembly came during the Wilkes’ debates 
in 1763. North could be considered a hard-liner on the North Breton affair, calling for 
Wilkes’ expulsion from Parliament. His colleagues recalled that he spoke with "fire in 
his belly, displaying righteous indignation and spontaneous anger."13 North believed 
Wilkes’ behavior was an attack on the constitution and an affront to law and order. He 
won the approbation of the king for his stance. In the Commons’ debate on 
November 8, 1768, with respect to repeal of the Townshend duties, North stated, "He 
would not think of repealing the Townshend duties until he saw America prostrate at his
13Thomas, Lord North, 27.
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feet!"14 On the issue of Parliament’s right to tax the colonies, he firmly believed "no 
line can ever be drawn. You must possess the whole of your authority, or no part of it."
In 1770 North, thirty-eight years old, succeeded to the position of prime minister 
after Grafton resigned. He now wore three hats: prime minister, chancellor of the 
exchequer, and leader of the House of Commons. North was the only lord with a living 
father and, as a consequence, was eligible to serve in the Commons. This fact gave him 
a great deal of clout. The political scene had significantly changed from the influence 
of a more liberal pro-American ministry to a more conservative one in which North 
could solidify his power. As was seen in the previous chapter, the year 1770 saw the 
decline of the American lobby in London. Also in decline was the influence of the city 
of London, split over extremists who championed Wilkes and by the death of its mayor, 
William Beckford. The city represented the commercial interests of the merchants 
trading with the old American colonies and Canada. The proposed legal changes in the 
Quebec bill would have significantly affected their investments. Other events such as 
Grenville’s death and a split between Chatham and Rockingham left the opposition in 
disarray. In contrast, North his own mini-crisis over the Vandalia affair, with two of his 
ministers, Gower and Rockford [who had shared in the land company] intriguing against 
Hillsborough. But North survived it and solidified his position. As was discussed 
previously, Hillsborough was so strongly opposed to the Vandalia project, he resigned
14Ibid., 31.
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when the ministry approved it. On his resignation, North was successful in persuading 
his stepbrother, Lord Dartmouth, to take Hillsborough’s place.
With a ministry united behind him and personally loyal to him, North was able to 
meet the challenges of the American colonies on his terms. News of the Boston Tea 
Party galvanized public and government support against the colonists. Had the American 
agents, especially Benjamin Franklin, been influential in representing the American 
position on the legislation designed to coerce Massachusetts into recognition of 
Parliament’s authority, perhaps the outcome may have been less harsh. As it was, 
Franklin had just suffered an abusive reprimand by Solicitor General Wedderbum, 
mentioned earlier, and had lost favor with all but a few of his influential friends.
North’s steadfast belief that Parliament was supreme left him little tolerance for the 
continual confrontations of the colonists over sovereignty. He believed the home 
government should have firm control over them. This meant that council members 
should be appointed by the governor, not an assembly; that an assembly should not have 
the power of the purse strings by which it could threaten the governor and judiciary. 
These safeguards to imperial authority were incorporated in the Massachusetts 
Government Act. The ministry believed that these measures would bring Massachusetts 
to submission. North knew the public supported him on American policy. After the 
May 2 vote on the Massachusetts Government bill, most of the members of Parliament 
retired to their country estates while the ministry completed the final version of the
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Quebec bill. North seized the opportunity to push the Quebec bill through the sparsely 
attended session as quickly as possible while the advantage was his. His tactic was to 
limit the number of witnesses to be called before the Commons and to muzzle those of 
his own ministry who disagreed with his policy.
While North was undeniably the most influential person in steering the bill through 
Parliament, Carleton was the most influential in terms of the general policy. Considered 
the preeminent authority on Quebec, he was also the most influential witness before the 
Commons speaking in support of the bill. Although no one has claimed authorship of 
the Act, the basic policy unquestionably reflected Carleton’s views. As Quebec’s 
governor, he had been writing the various ministries ever since 1767 to express his 
opinion that anglicization could not work in the predominantly French-Canadian, Catholic 
population. His antipathy toward the republicanism of the American colonists was 
overtly expressed by him in his letters to the home government, to General Gage, and 
to petitioners who tried to assert their grievances by joint actions. He feared that the 
balanced form of British government of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy could not 
survive in the American "forest." This autocrat warned the merchants not to follow the 
conduct of a province which had incurred the displeasure of government at home. He 
warned against tumultuous meetings in which actions against laws were taken, for then 
"the lowest dregs of the people, and the most ignorant among them, would. . . become 
the law-givers of the country."15 Carleton proposed repealing the terms of the
15Neatby, Quebec, 99.
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Proclamation of 1763 and all the subsequent ordinances and Proclamations. In their 
place, he called on the government to revive the ancient customs and laws of the French 
before the conquest. In 1770 Carleton arrived in London to pressure for this policy1 
switch. He was consulted by Wedderbum and Thurlow, who were asked to prepare a 
bill for Parliament. In a "Memorandum of things necessary for establishing Laws and 
Government in the Province of Quebec," Carleton made specific recommendations that 
closely paralleled those incorporated in the actual bill introduced in the House of Lords 
on May 2 .16 If there were any link between the government’s actions in Quebec and 
the old colonies, especially Massachusetts, it was due to Carleton. His prejudice against 
the republicanism of the American colonies and his concern that they would rebel against 
the mother country are critical factors of the indirect but very real influence of the 
American colonies on the Quebec Act.
Another influential person in the formulation of the policy for Quebec was 
Hillsborough, whom North had described as "his best friend in the ministry." North 
called on him to give his views during the drafting of the bill even though he was no 
longer a member of the ministry. Hillsborough did not disapprove the government’s 
proposal to govern Quebec with a governor and legislative council. This seems curious 
given his insistence over the years for an assembly, which was discussed in the previous 
chapter. His position on western expansion was also covered in Chapter 5, and in this 
instance, his views were consistent with those that he held ever since 1763, when as
16PAC, Dartmouth Papers, VII, 2352.
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president of the Board of Trade he set aside land for an Indian reserve. The former 
American secretary consistently opposed all attempts to settle the lands west of the 
established boundaries. Several reasons have been advanced for his fervent opposition 
to western settlement: he was an ardent mercantilist, who believed the colonies would 
no longer serve the interests of Great Britain; he feared the depopulation of Ireland, 
where he was active in politics and where the vast Downshire family estates were 
located; and finally, he genuinely feared another Indian war if American settlers 
continued to encroach on Indian lands. When he became the American secretary in 
1768, he rejected Shelburne’s policy for creating interior colonies, he disapproved of the 
Indiana petition, he unsuccessfully tried to sabotage the Vandalia project, and he had no 
compunction against uprooting the French settlements that had already been established 
west of the boundary.
Hillsborough was frustrated with the American colonies for not promulgating new 
regulations for the Indian trade, but he did not accept Dartmouth’s solution for the 
territory, which was to return it to Quebec. Hillsborough objected not on the grounds 
that it would encourage Canadians to settle there, but because he was not in favor of any 
settlements in the territory. If the government were insistent on wanting to extend the 
boundaries of Quebec, he advocated that it should be done by the authority of the king 
rather than by an act of Parliament, for the latter action would, he believed, be a 
declaration that it was right and proper to settle. On May 1, 1774, Dartmouth responded 
to Hillsborough’s objections. He said that the Cabinet was unanimous in its decision to
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extend the province to the Ohio and Mississippi because it provided for establishment of 
civil government over numerous settlements of French subjects. Dartmouth assured 
Hillsborough that this did not imply "an intention of further settling the lands. . . and if 
it is not wished that British subjects should settle that country nothing can more 
effectually tend to discourage such attempts, which in the present state of that country, 
your lordship knows very well, it is impossible to prevent."17 If there are doubters of 
linkage between the Quebec Act and the American policy, this statement should be kept 
in mind.
Hillsborough’s influence is more difficult to assess than Carleton’s. He was not, 
as Franklin asserted, "an enemy of the colonists." Nonetheless, because of his lack of 
tact and poor judgment, he exacerbated the problems between the colonists and the home 
government. In 1768 when the Massachusetts assembly sent a circular letter to the other 
colonies to oppose the Townshend duties, he instructed Governor Bernard to insist upon 
the rescission of the resolution. When they refused, he ordered Bernard to dissolve the 
assembly and Gage to send a regiment to Boston. Despite a resolve "not to support or 
oppose men but measures," he was incapable of reconciling himself to those whose views 
were contrary to his. There is little question that he would support the government’s 
policy of coercion toward the colonists or that he would be opposed to extending the 
western boundary of Quebec, but his position in support of reversing the policy of 
anglicization in Quebec is not consistent with the policies he advocated prior to 1772.
I7Neatby, Quebec Act, 37-38.
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More baffling was his success in changing the property clause in the Quebec bill from 
that practiced in English law to the French usage of seigneurial tenure. Perhaps the 
former American secretary’s experience with the American colonists over issues of 
sovereignty, his humiliation over the Vandalia affair, and the open rift between Franklin 
and him with respect to the government’s policy on colonial agents lessened his 
enthusiasm for supporting English claims for Quebec.
If Hillsborough was not a friend of America, his successor was. Dartmouth was 
far less abrasive than Hillsborough and was determined to resolve the conflicts between 
the colonies and Great Britain amicably. Philosophically, he supported colonial 
expansion; in fact, he was a large landholder in East Florida. As late as 1773 he actively 
intervened to hasten the drafting of the Vandalia bill. But he must also have begun to 
have doubts about the ministry’s western policy of approving settlement grants for the 
territory. Gage and Johnson had been reporting concerns about the unruliness in the 
territories, especially in the Illinois country. The 1768 policy of removing the troops 
from the various forts had left a vacuum into which settlers were establishing 
communities without any civil authority. Hillsborough planned to remedy the problem 
by removing the entire population of some of the French-Canadian villages to one of the 
settled colonies. Following Hillsborough’s instructions, Gage issued a Proclamation to 
the inhabitants of Vincennes to resettle. But they refused. In a petition to the king they 
asserted that the right to their property was guaranteed them by the Treaty of 1763.
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Proof of their titles to the land were called for, but before this was accomplished, 
Hillsborough resigned and Dartmouth replaced him.
Dartmouth was a reluctant public servant. He had finally, under pressure from his 
stepbrother and fears of being discredited by his stepfather, accepted the position as 
American secretary. His conciliatory nature was applauded when he took over the office 
from the contentious Hillsborough and tensions with the American colonies were 
reduced. Dartmouth did not approve his predecessor’s Acadian approach to resolving 
the problems of the west. While he was moving forward with the Grand Ohio petition, 
renamed Vandalia, he was concerned about the need to take some action to provide civil 
administration to the entire region north of the Ohio River. According to Marjorie Reid, 
by 1773 the "general situation on the continent was beginning to overshadow the Illinois. 
Disaffection in the thirteen colonies was becoming serious, and the ministers no longer 
attempted to disguise their intention of using Canada as a bulwark of British 
authority."18 In December 1773 Dartmouth wrote Quebec’s acting governor, Lieutenant 
Governor Cramahe, that he favored re-annexing the territory north of the Ohio to 
Quebec. In the same correspondence, Dartmouth complimented Cramahe for the way 
he handled putting off the British merchants’ petition for an assembly. He assured 
Cramahe, who echoed Carleton’s position in support of the seigneurs, that he would 
favor revoking the Proclamation, instituting French laws, protecting and maintaining the
18Reid, "Quebec and Western Policy, 1763-1774," The Canadian Historical Review, 
VI, 1925, 15-32.
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Catholic church, as well as returning territories in the east, which primarily dealt with 
the seal fisheries, and in the west, with the fur trade. In short, he was determined to 
accept completely the terms of the seigneurs, while ignoring the petitions of the 
merchants in Quebec and London, and to do so during that session of Parliament.
Because of the crisis in Massachusetts, the actions against that colony took priority 
over Quebec. After the Boston Tea Party and misinformation from colonial officials that 
the "best sort of people" would support retaliatory measures against the perpetrators, 
Dartmouth unwisely set in motion, with the approval of North and the king, the 
Intolerable Acts. At the same time the American secretary felt the urgency to deal with 
Quebec. While the coercive acts were being debated, he asked Wedderbum to prepare 
a bill for Quebec. The four drafts mentioned before were begun in March and not 
completed until May 2. The second draft, approved by Dartmouth, included replacing 
English criminal law with French law. Wedderburn, Hillsborough, and Hey all objected 
so that the final bill submitted to the Lords by Dartmouth on May 2 retained British 
criminal law.
Parliament’s handiwork in that session worried Dartmouth. In terms of the Quebec 
Act, he feared that the rift between the commercial class and the government would 
widen. He attempted conciliatory measures. In his instructions to Governor Carleton, 
not only did he counsel Carleton to introduce wherever practical English civil law, but 
he seemed to be modifying substantially the intent of the Act to return the government
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to the Canadians. He hoped the merchants would recognize the government’s concern 
for their interests. The question his actions raise is how serious was the government’s 
intention to reverse the policy of anglicization? After the conclusive victory of the 
ministry in the fall elections was it able to take a calmer look at the terms granted in the 
Act and then attempt to modify them? Weren’t the terms in the instructions the very 
ones argued for by the opposition, but refused by the government during the Quebec Act 
debates? Doesn’t it appear that the Act was just a short-term expedient to meet the crisis 
situation in Quebec, in the territories, and in the American colonies? Despite his best 
efforts, the protests of both the American colonists and the Quebec merchants to the 
ministry’s policies devastated the placative Dartmouth. His only reason for not resigning 
was his loyalty to North.
One of the most mercurial figures to play a prominent role in the formulation and 
passage of the Quebec Act was Solicitor General Alexander Wedderbum. A promising, 
ambitious Scotsman, Wedderburn was educated at the University of Edinburgh, where 
he became familiar with such leading figures as David Hume, Adam Smith, and 
Dr. Robertson. A stellar beginning at the Scottish bar ended when he was called on to 
apologize for intemperate behavior. Rather than apologize he tempestuously tore off his 
gown, vowing never again to return to the bar in Scotland. In London as an intimate 
friend of the Earl of Bute, Wedderbum began his long career in British politics. He 
entered as a Tory; became a Whig, warmly embracing the cause of Wilkes; but in 1771,
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he broke with the Whigs and joined North’s government as solicitor general.19 
Wedderbum’s position with respect to the conflict between the colonists and Britain was 
well known prior to 1774. He opposed repeal of the Stamp Act and was a strong 
supporter of the Declaratory Act. His proposal to insert a clause in the latter bill to 
make it illegal to dispute Parliament’s right in book or pamphlets provoked charges by 
member of Parliament, Rose Fuller, that such a clause was worthy of Henry VIII or 
Charles II.20 Wedderbum also supported a motion asking the king to prerogue 
Parliament until he had positive assurances from the American governors "that the people 
are returned to a due sense of their duty and obedience to the laws."21 The Solicitor 
General’s scathing attack on Franklin at the January 28 Privy Council meeting reflected 
his attitude with respect to the protests of the American colonists as well as his invective 
against Franklin. Reports of the event in the British press said that Wedderburn "loaded 
him [Franklin] with all the licensed scurrility of the bar, and decked his harangue with 
the choicest flowers of Billingsgate."22 As mentioned previously, after months of delay 
in drafting the bill for the Vandalia project, Wedderbum finally refused to go forward 
with it, declaring in reference to Franklin’s involvement that he refused to reward those 
unworthy the favors of the crown. During the Quebec Act debates Wedderbum stated
19Dictionary of Canadian Biography, V, 132-134.
2(VThomas, British Politics and the Stamp Act Crisis: The First Phase o f the American 
Revolution 1763-1767 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 239.
21 Ibid., 21 A.
22Fred Junkin Hinkhouse, The Preliminaries o f the American Revolution as Seen in 
the English Press, 1763-1775 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), 158.
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that the English in the province had no right to expect British law and protection. He 
favored returning the western territory to Quebec and of reinstituting with some 
exceptions French law and customs enjoyed prior to the conquest. One of Wedderbum’s 
concerns was, like Hillsborough’s, the depopulation of England and Ireland. He did not 
favor emigration of British citizens into the western territories. He recognized that 
granting the western land to Quebec would repel most British Protestants from wanting 
to settle in a French-speaking, Catholic community.23
Lastly, the role of General Gage in influencing the ministry in its policies toward 
Quebec and the older colonies was a unique one since he had been governor of Montreal 
during the military occupation and commander-in-chief of North America until 1773. 
Every secretary of state sought his advice, and in 1773 Dartmouth called him home to 
present his views on western policy. Gage had initially been supportive of the land 
schemes in the western territories. As stated previously, he considered purchasing land 
on the Ohio, but the threat of Indian uprisings in the vast territory that had no civil 
government convinced him that an Indian reserve had to be maintained beyond which no 
settlement could occur. As for the threat from the American colonies, the 
correspondence between Carleton and Gage indicates that Gage agreed with Carleton that 
militarily Quebec could not be defended. Its citadel needed to be fortified, as well as 
forts in the territories. In event of war with the colonists, the north could be cut off 
from the south. It is reasonable to assume that Gage agreed with Carleton that in the
23Cavendish, Debates, 108-109.
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event of insurrection in the colonies, Quebec would become the battlefield. Gage’s 
appointment to the Massachusetts governorship, vacated by Hutchinson, was consistent 
with North’s get-tough policy and reflects the view that this was a strategic move. Gage 
had little tolerance for the kind of protests that had disrupted good relations between that 
colony and the mother country.
These men—North, Carleton, Hillsborough, Dartmouth, Wedderbum, and 
Gage—were the most influential men in the formulation of policy for Quebec. They were 
all competent, knowledgeable, intelligent, and experienced statesmen or military leaders. 
How then does one account for the misjudgment of such men with respect to the effects 
of the Quebec Act on the American colonies and on Quebec? Were they misled as a 
result of their own shortcomings and prejudices? The role of the colonies and Great 
Britain was changing, but with few exceptions—Shelburne, Pitt, and Burke—these men 
did not foresee the change. They were trapped in their traditional roles, reflecting class 
biases of eighteenth-century England. The British elite were representative of only a 
small number of families. Patronage and nepotism were not frowned upon, nor were 
expressions such as "the better sort of people" or "the rabble." Fear that the rabble 
threatened the relationship between the governed and those governing was of paramount 
concern to those responsible for the formulation of policy. Dartmouth accepted the 
assessment of officials in the American colonies who assured him that the "better sort of 
people" supported his get-tough policy toward Massachusetts. In Canada, the better sort, 
according to Carleton and Cramahe, were the seigneurs who had the support of the
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habitants. And so largely due to class bias, North and Dartmouth erred in their 
assessments of the situation in Quebec as well as in the American colonies.
Similar problems arise even today. In assessing the crisis in North American in 
1774, historians have the advantage of hindsight. Yet there are differences of opinion 
that seem inexplicable except for the fact that each of us filters the same information 
through different lenses. This is the rationale for attempting still another assessment of 
the Quebec Act. By examining some selective passages of the Act during the debates in 
the House of Commons and comparing the differences with Lawson’s interpretation, 
which is diametrically the opposite from this writer’s, some interesting insights might be 
gleaned. Here is a sample of that testimony.
Question: Are Canadian inhabitants desirous of having assemblies in the province? 
Carleton: Certainly not.
Question: Have they not thought with horror of an assembly in the country, if it should 
be composed of the old British inhabitants now resident there?
Carleton: No doubt it would give them great offence.
Question: Would they not greatly prefer a government by the governor and legislative 
council to such an assembly?
Carleton: No doubt they would.
Question: Was it necessary to have any land to be qualified to serve on a jury in the 
country?















I believe there is very little nicety in that matter; there is too great a scarcity 
of Protestants. I beg leave to add, in the list of jurors I mentioned, there 
were a great number of disbanded soldiers that kept tippling houses.
Is that the only idea of the assembly, that you even knew suggested to the 
Canadians, and to which they returned their answer?
I put the questions to several of Canadians. They told me assemblies had 
drawn upon the other colonies so much distress, had occasioned such riots 
and confusion, that they wished never to have one of any kind whatever.
Did not the Canadians likewise think, that assemblies which draw upon them 
expenses as well as distress?
By distress I meant the displeasure of this country. No. They never stated 
that.
Have you never heard, that they imagined they should be obliged to pay the 
expense of government as soon as they had assemblies, but that until they 
had them they were not to pay the expense?
No, that was not the idea of the Canadians; they dislike it as not being 
conformable to their ancient customs.
Was the dissatisfaction expressed by the Canadians at large, or by the corps 
of noblesse?
They were pretty unanimous in most points; as unanimous as so large a body 
could be expected to be.
What number of these noblesse is there in this country?
My memory will not suffer me to tell.
Nearly?
I suppose a hundred and fifty; I speak at random.
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Question: What is the occupation of them; do any of them trade? 
Carleton: I believe very few; they are not fond of trade.
Question: Do you know from the Canadians themselves, what sort of administration 
prevailed under the French government, whether pure or corrupt?
Carleton: Very pure in general; I never had complaints of the administration of justice 
under the French government.
Question: In general, have not the British subjects in Canada and the old subjects 
intercourse with one another?
Carleton: They have very little society.
Question: Do the Canadians in general communicate their sentiments to the British 
subjects at all, or to the officers, etc.?
Carleton: They are very decent people, and communicate their sentiments only to those 
whom the king has appointed to receive them.
The questions and answers continued along the same vein. Often Carleton’s 
responses were contradictory to those of other witnesses. This was particularly the case 
with Frances Maseres, Quebec’s attorney general from 1766 to 1769. Asked similar 
questions, here are Maseres’ responses.
Question: Do you think the people have a strong attachment to our laws and customs?
Maseres: I believe that the great body of the Canadians, with the exception, perhaps
of an hundredth part of the whole, would be very well satisfied with the 
establishment of those laws.
Question: What do you understand to be the sentiments of the Canadians with regard 
to the form of government they would wish to live under?
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Maseres: They have no predilection at present in favour of a legislative council, or in
favour of an assembly: I speak of the generality of the people. There are a 
few person who have thought more upon the subject than the rest: I believe 
they would incline to an assembly.
Question: What sort of an assembly do you suppose they would like: an assembly of
which they might have a part, or one which consists of his Majesty’s own 
subjects?
Maseres: I have heard some of them say they would rather have an assembly consisting
equally of Protestants and Catholics, or at least of such Catholics as would
take the oath of abjuration of the pope’s power, but not the declaration 
against transubstantiation,—than be governed by the legislative council. I am 
inclined to believe that they keep in view an assembly, notwithstanding the 
ill conduct of certain assemblies in North America.
In addition to the testimony by Attorney General Maseres, Chief Justice Hey was 
also called on for his views. He supported Maseres more than he did Carleton. On 
similar issues, he expressed these views:
Question: Have you found the Canadian inhabitants dissatisfied with the introduction of 
the English law, and exclusion of their own laws and customs? Do they 
generally approve of the trial by jury in criminal cases?
Hey: I think they do.
Question: Are not the laws of Canada respecting lands, dower, and gift by will, 
allowed by the court and juries at Canada, respecting the Canadian subjects 
only, to be just as they were when they were in the possession of the French?
Hey: I believe the Court of King’s Bench did admit the Canadian laws and customs
indiscriminately, in general. The ordinance directed them to do it.
Question: Then you believe the Canadians would be content to have the laws continued 
to them upon this subject.
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Hey: I believe they would. They have made objections to juries. The higher part
of the Canadians object to the institution itself, as humiliating and degrading. 
They have no idea of submitting their conduct to a set of men, their inferiors; 
and the lower order look upon it (as in truth it is) a burden to them.
Question: I apprehend the customs of Canada are as much considered by the juries of 
Canada, as the particular customs are here by the judge and jury?
Hey: I believe, in the Court of King’s Bench, they are. I have thought myself
obliged, in my capacity of chief justice, in every case of appeal, to determine 
by the same rule; because it seemed to me a gross absurdity, that I should sit 
to determine the merits of a case, governed by one kind of law, which they 
had determined under the provisions of another.
Question: Have the profits of the possessions of the Canadians been increased since the 
conquest?
Hey: They certainly grow more com, are more populous, and likewise cultivate
their land better. If this land had been now sold, no doubt it would have 
sold for more. The body of the people are not all dissatisfied with the 
conquest. To be sure the higher part are.
Question: Do you conceive that, at present, the Canadians are much attached to 
France,and would wish to be under that government again?
Hey: I do not apprehend that the body of them would. No doubt the noblesse and
the military have been great sufferers, from the loss of their employments 
and commissions; and it is natural enough to suppose that they would incline 
to their old employments, under their own government.
Hey was asked if he thought it impracticable, or difficult, to draw a line of 
admission of Canadian laws, as would give satisfaction both to the new and old subjects. 
Hey said that he believed it was possible and stated that this was the basis of his 
disagreement with Carleton, who supported the seigneurs’ demands for all French law. 
Hey specified which laws he thought should remain French and which English and how
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the administration of the laws could be established to remedy some of the complaints 
with respect to cost and the delay in resolving cases. These proposals, Hey believed, 
would have been acceptable to the Canadians at the time. Now he thought they wanted 
more. He would not say why he believed that to be true other than the fact that once the 
possibility was introduced of their retaining all their own laws and customs, they 
naturally aspired to it.
These excerpts from the testimony of Carleton, Maseres, and Hey reveal the 
differences in their opinions with respect to what the Canadians would accept and what 
they wouldn’t. The two legal experts, Hey and Maseres, both concluded after an 
investigation in 1770, that Carleton asked them to make, that the Canadians were not 
unhappy with English law, as far as it went. They both believed remedies in the areas 
where the Canadians were dissatisfied could be easily met by ordinance. As was 
discussed previously, two such ordinances were proposed before Carleton left Quebec 
in 1770 to address some of the complaints: one to establish more frequent court sessions 
(which was not adopted); the second, to transfer power to hear civil cases from the 
justices of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas.
In their testimony, Maseres and Hey made clear the distinction between the 
noblesse, whom Hey referred to as "the higher part," and the habitants, "the lower part." 
Carleton did not make such distinctions unless pressed. He said that the Canadians had 
not been happy with their current situation. When asked if the dissatisfaction expressed
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was by the Canadians at large or the noblesse, Carleton responded they were "pretty 
unanimous in most points, as unanimous as so large a body could be expected to be." 
He stated emphatically that the Canadian inhabitants would "certainly not" want an 
assembly; that such an assembly would give them "great offence"; that they would "no 
doubt” prefer a government by the governor and legislative council to an assembly; that 
when he put the question about assemblies "to several of Canadians" they stated that they 
never wanted one since they saw the distress, riots, and confusion they caused in the 
other colonies. Despite Carleton’s protestations that the Canadians would not want an 
assembly, an interesting document in the Baby collection—Francois Baby was an 
important Canadian merchant and fur trader—suggests that at least some Canadians 
considered joining the English merchants in their petition for an assembly in 1773. Eight 
Canadians first agreed and then withdrew to the regret of some of them. The draft 
document is without names signed only "Les vrais patriotes Canadians. ” It stated that 
Canadians were promised the benefit of English law by the Proclamation, including an 
assembly. They expressed alarm at their laws and customs being entrusted, as proposed, 
to the arbitrary authority of a governor and council."24
An important distinction should be made with respect to the opinions of the 
Canadians versus the seigneurs. Hey alluded to it in his testimony when he said that the 
Canadians would have been happy with the situation as it was, especially in 1770 when
24PAC, Baby Collection, Political Papers, XL, Letter to Quebec Gazette, July 21, 
1773, in Neatby, Quebec, 132.
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he and Maseres made their investigation. "Now"-in 1774-Hey admitted they wanted 
more. He said that "once the possibility was introduced of their retaining all their own 
laws and customs, they naturally aspired to it." Who introduced the possibilities? We 
know that the seigneurs were never happy with their loss of status and means of 
livelihood after the conquest and we know that Carleton identified with the noblesse. 
Was Carleton the instigator of this change? He was the architect of the Canadians’ 
petition to the king in 1770 calculated to counter the petition for an assembly by the 
merchants. When Carleton left to present his case in London, acting governor Cramahe 
carried on the same policies. He discouraged the merchants from petitioning for an 
assembly but encouraged the Canadians to petition for a return to their pre-conquest 
status. Was this a decision from the top down? Would it have made a difference to the 
ministry if it had been aware that Carleton was the instigator for the retention of 
Canadians laws and customs?
In other areas, Carleton’s testimony could be considered misleading, if not 
inaccurate. He claimed that there was little intercourse between the British and 
Canadians. In the biographies of the merchants in Appendix II, the degree to which the 
British and Canadian merchants intermarried, joined in business partnerships, and 
socialized is overwhelming evidence that the commercial class, whether British or 
Canadian, did not discriminate against one another. Creighton supports this view, saying 
that there were no race distinctions, but rather class distinctions. On the issue of "trial 
by jury," when Carleton was asked if it was necessary to be a landholder to qualify as
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a juror, he said that there were too few Protestants to adhere to that requirement and that 
on the list of jurors mentioned were a "great number of disbanded soldiers that kept 
tippling houses." To speak of "disbanded soldiers" in 1774, to refer to "tippling 
houses," and to ignore the fact that by 1774 the members of the mercantile class were 
the backbone of the province, as qualified as any body politic to serve on juries, makes 
this response by Carleton disingenuous. The statement was obviously designed to cast 
a negative eye on retaining "juries" in civil cases.
In contrast to this negative assessment of Carleton’s testimony, Lawson claims, "He 
performed brilliantly, defending his record and the general tenor of the Quebec 
legislation with enviable poise." Of the bill’s detractors, he says, "the interrogators on 
the opposition benches displayed a singular lack of ability. Their ignorance of the issues 
at stake in Quebec and of its society and institutions was manifest, but more evident was 
a phenomenal prejudice and bigotry about British institutions." Lawson adds, "Many 
opposition speakers greeted with incredulity Carleton’s assertions that the Canadians did 
not desire an elected assembly or trial by jury in civil cases."25 These remarks require 
further examination, for they are important to an understanding of why historians have 
generally disclaimed the opposition’s support for British institutions for Quebec.
The bigotry Lawson is concerned with here is the insistence by the opposition that 
British institutions, such as assemblies, habeas corpus, and trial by jury, were superior
25Lawson, The Imperial Challenge, 136.
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to French ones. These rights were assumed to be the privilege of every Englishman no 
matter where he lived. But Quebec posed a different problem, and so in 1773 an 
assembly was dismissed since it would result in a small minority of Englishmen 
legislating for the majority French-Canadian population. Instead a legislative council was 
considered more appropriate. But why? From what pool would the legislative council 
be drawn: the 108 to 130 seigneurs? Who would the seigneurs represent? Were the seven 
seigneurs appointed by Carleton a better representation than an assembly elected by 
qualified Canadians or better still inclusive of qualified Canadians as proposed in 1768 
and 1769 by Shelburne, the Canada Committee of London, and Hillsborough? How could 
the ministry be so aware of the tyranny that would result if a representative assembly was 
composed only of Englishmen and not foresee the tyranny that would result by the 
inordinate power given the governor who had authority to dismiss any member of the 
council he so pleased? Given Carleton’s previous behavior, this meant that unless 
councillors supported him, they could be—and were—dismissed.
The complaint that the opposition was not knowledgeable seems ironic given the 
refusal of North, condoned by Lawson, to provide government reports on Quebec for 
informational purposes. The charge that the opposition was surprised when they 
learned—from Carleton—that the Canadians were not in favor of an assembly has already 
been discussed. As far as trial by jury, the fact was that there was no unanimity of 
opinion on the issue. On religious toleration, Lawson is right that the opposition 
expressed it prejudices and bigotry. Edmund Burke, however, was an exception, for he
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called for religious tolerance not only in Quebec, but in England and Ireland as well. 
It is ironic that the ministers who were willing to approve tolerance for the Catholic 
religion three thousand miles from home were not ready to admit such tolerance in 
England and Ireland for another fifty years.
Most historians argue that the policies for the American colonies and Quebec were 
totally discrete. The contention here, also dealt with in Chapter 5, is that two terms of 
the Quebec Act were affected by the events in the colonies—the form of government and 
the extension of the western boundaries. By 1774 British policymakers had had their 
surfeit of representative government at home with the Wilkes affair and in America with 
letters of correspondence, nonimportation agreements, and other rebellious acts. In 
attempting to meet the challenge to its authority by the colonists, the home government 
determined that the root of the problem was in the structure of government. Colonial 
assemblies were too powerful; the king’s representatives, too weak. One way to remedy 
this defect was to take away the power of the assemblies. The Intolerable Acts were 
designed to curb that power and to coerce the colonies into submission. The ministry 
was united behind this effort as the only viable one left to it.
All the key figures involved in enacting the Intolerable Acts were also involved in 
determining what form of government to provide for Quebec. Despite years of wrestling 
with the problem, no agreement was reached until about 1773 that an assembly would 
not be appropriate. Carleton especially fostered that view. The autocratic ruler
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disdained republicanism as a threat to law and order. His preference was for a feudal 
arrangement where everyone knew his place from top to bottom. Since he was 
considered the key authority on Quebec, it is not surprising that even if conditions were 
more favorable, inclusion of an assembly for Quebec would have been resisted. A 
governor and legislative council, appointed by the king, were more controllable and 
suitable for an imperial government. To consider whether there was any link between 
the colonies and Quebec on this issue, two questions come to mind: whether the Montreal 
merchants’ petitions for an assembly were associated with the problems with assemblies 
in the colonies and whether Britain would have departed from its long tradition of 
governor, council, and assembly if the colonists were not challenging its authority in 
America and if the English merchants, imbued with the idea of republicanism, were not 
challenging Carleton’s authority in Quebec.
Another term of the Act which was influenced by events in the colonies was the 
re-annexation of the territory north of the Ohio River to Quebec. During the formulation 
of the Proclamation in 1763, the decision to establish the territory under the control of 
the governor of Quebec, which the king desired, was rejected. The reasons were that 
granting such power to the governor of Quebec would give him too great military power 
over the colonies, which would cause dissensions; and it would give the Canadians too 
great an advantage in the fur trade to which the colonies would also object. Apparently, 
these concerns were no longer considered valid. Why? One argument was that the 
colonies had not assumed responsibility for establishing uniform regulations for traders
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despite the efforts of Hillsborough to bring this about. This argument is only partially 
valid. As has already been discussed, when New York and Pennsylvania invited 
Carleton to attend a congress to resolve the issue, Carleton did not respond. Later, when 
Carleton’s successor, Cramahe was invited, he planned to attend until he learned that 
Hillsborough and the king opposed such congresses for fear that the colonists might seek 
the opportunity to unite against England. Without Quebec, the regulations would not 
have been effective. Another explanation, however, is that the king’s decision to annex 
the territory to Quebec was adamantly opposed by Shelburne and Halifax. Now Halifax 
was dead and Shelburne was out of government. The view that Quebec would have 
greater military power over the American colonies and that the Canadians would have 
a monopoly in the fur trade must have seemed an attractive one. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the Canadian fur trade was more profitable to the British than that of New 
York and it was also more important to Quebec’s economy than to New York’s. In 
addition to these concerns was the one expressed repeatedly during the debates and in 
correspondence: that is, the depopulation of England and Ireland. If the adjoining 
province were French Canadian and Catholic under French civil law, the colonists would 
be deterred from settling there. Dartmouth articulated what others were saying, 
providing sufficient evidence to indicate that one of the major reasons for the 
government’s actions in extending the borders to the west was to repel English 
settlement.
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All the foregoing discussion revolves around the formulation and enactment of the 
Quebec Act. But at the outset, it was suggested that any assessment of the Act would 
not be complete unless the governor’s instructions, the response of the American 
colonists and that of the inhabitants of Quebec were included. The latter two 
considerations will be discussed in the following chapter. Many historians, including 
Lawson, deal only with the Quebec Act, and as a result, laud the Act and its expression 
of tolerance for the Canadians. The instructions which followed cast a very different 
light on that "tolerance." Dartmouth had been concerned about the British merchants' 
protests to the Act. In his instructions to Carleton in December 1773, he asked Carleton 
to persuade the merchants of the justice and propriety of the form of government 
established and of the attention that was shown "to their interests not only in the adoption 
of the English laws as far as it was consistent with what was due to the just claims and 
moderate wishes of the Canadians, but in the opening to the British merchant, by an 
extension of the province, so many new channels of important commerce."26
On the question of religion, Dartmouth cautioned Carleton that he was to exercise 
very rigid control over the power of the Roman Catholic clergy and to remember that "it 
is a toleration of the free exercise of the religion of the Church of Rome only to which 
they are entitled, but not to the powers and privileges of it, as an established 
Church. . . .',27 At the same time, Dartmouth counseled Carleton that he was to give
26Shortt and Doughty, Documents, II, 585.
21 Ibid., 602.
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every aid to the Church of England, even suggesting that he give cautious encouragement 
to such Canadian priests as might wish to break away from the discipline of their church.
In deference to the English merchants, Dartmouth also instructed Carleton to 
inform the council that they should consider whether the laws of England "may not be, 
if not altogether, at least in part the rule for the decision in all cases of personal actions 
grounded upon debts, promises, contracts, and agreements, whether of a mercantile or 
other nature; and also of wrongs proper to be compensated in damages. ”28 How does 
one account for these concessions to the English merchants coming even before the 
effective date of the Quebec Act? Was the ministry’s actions with respect to the 
implementation of French law and religion only an expedient measure to win the 
Canadians’ loyalties in case of possible confrontation with the American colonists? We 
will never know the answer to these questions for the simple fact that Carleton, whose 
character was discussed in Chapter 4, hid the instructions from the councillors. The 
merchants were never informed of Dartmouth’s intent to protect their interests. As a 
result, the merchants continued their opposition, and in December, a record number of 
them--185—petitioned the government for repeal of the Act. Some of them looked south 
for redress of their grievances.
The question asked in the beginning of the chapter was not whether the Quebec Act 
was influenced by the quarrel over sovereignty with the American colonies, but rather
2ilbid., 599.
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how could it not have been affected by that quarrel? Several considerations have been 
explored in this chapter to establish the connections between the Quebec Act and events 
in the American colonies: the environment in which the Act was passed; the prejudices 
and biases of the men most responsible for formulation and passage of the Act; the 
specific issues that framed the terms of the Act; the subsequent retraction of the 
government’s avowal to institute French laws and customs as expressed in the governor’s 
instructions; and the repercussions that resulted from its passage. The immediate 
environment in which the Quebec bill was being drafted coincided with the government’s 
efforts to coerce the colonies into recognition of Parliament’s sovereignty. The 
recalcitrant colony of Massachusetts was the target of the Boston Port Act, the 
Regulatory Act, and the Imperial Administration of Justice Act, but the confrontation was 
not confined to Massachusetts. Ever since the Stamp Act of 1765, the colonies and Great 
Britain had been testing each other, with some movement of conciliation on the part of 
Britain over the years. But in 1773 the burning of the Gaspee, the formation of 
Committees of Correspondence, the publication of the Hutchinson letters, and the Boston 
Tea Party pushed the government and the public to the brink. The vituperative attack 
on Franklin early in 1774 revealed what little reservoir of goodwill there was for the 
colonists. The voices of moderation had been quelled and the ministry resolved that the 
issue was now an either-or situation: either the colonists accede to British sovereignty or 
sever ties.
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The men most responsible for the get-tough policy toward the colonists had dealt 
with the continual assaults on the government’s colonial policies, threatening the ministry 
and the ministers’ position in it. As with most political and military leaders in 
eighteenth-century England, they were products of the aristocracy and reflected the 
narrowness of their class in a changing time that called for innovative ideas and policies. 
North, Hillsborough, Dartmouth, Wedderbum, Carleton, and Gage had little sympathy 
or experience with the rising demands of the mercantile class. They based their 
judgments on a credo that formed the basis of the Canadian constitution almost a hundred 
years later: peace, order, and good government. Cabals, petitions, riots were reflective 
of a "mobocracy" that they feared. Their policies were designed to give support to the 
"better sort of people." They believed whole-heartedly that the imperial role required 
colonial subordination to the mother country. With the exception of Dartmouth, who was 
pacifist by nature, these leaders were willing to reduce the colonists by armed conflict 
if necessary.
Carleton and Gage had predicted the eventuality of such a conflict, and it was for 
that reason that they tried to alert the ministry to prepare an appropriate defense. For 
Carleton this meant not just a literal fortification in Quebec. He foresaw the need to win 
the loyalty of the Canadian people. The way, he mistakenly believed to do this, was to 
win the allegiance of the seigneurs and clergy. His advocacy on their behalf began in 
1767 with calls to reverse the policy of anglicization; by 1773 he encouraged the 
Canadians in the belief that it might be possible for them to retain all their laws,
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including criminal law. During the drafting of the bill, Wedderbum, Hillsborough, and 
Hey were responsible for a moderation of Carleton’s position. There is no question, 
however, that Carleton was the prime mover in influencing the government to reverse 
the 1763 policy. As a military man, his fears of an invasion "too shocking to think of' 
by the rebellious colonies alone or in concert with France or Spain directly connect the 
events in the lower colonies and Quebec policy.
These issues—Carleton’s influence in convincing the government to reverse its 
policy of anglicization; the decision of the home government to establish a conciliar form 
of government that was answerable to the home government; the re-annexation of the 
western territory to Quebec—are all considered to have been decisions made only with 
what was appropriate for Quebec. Would these decisions have been the same if the 
colonists were not challenging the home government? The answer to the question seems 
to be that the government would not have reversed itself so completely in just ten years 
if the colonies had not provoked them into such action. That the action was precipitous 
is suspected when considering the governor’s instructions. Those instructions 
countermanded the decisions made in the Act, and even though the Act legally carried 
more weight, the motives of the policymakers take on a different cast. Any analysis of 
the Act has to include the instructions and the response of the people affected. Whether 
the Act triggered the Revolution is not an issue here, but it did provoke calling a 
Continental Congress in which the Quebec Act was cited as one of the Intolerable Acts 
designed to enslave the old colonies.
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When the 1774 Parliament was prerogued on June 22, few of its members were 
aware that their actions would soon bring to a close the First British Empire. The 
attempt of Parliament to assert its rights over the American colonists by enactment of 
punitive measures against Massachusetts, coupled with establishing a government in 
Quebec antithetical to the republican principles considered rights of all Englishmen, only 
strengthened the resolve of the colonists to resist the tyranny being perpetrated on them. 
Looking northward, they assumed that their Canadian neighbors suffering the dire effects 
of the Quebec Act would be as affronted as they and would willingly join them in 
common cause against the mother country.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FROM PERSUASION TO INVASION
When Carleton returned triumphantly to Quebec in September 1774 with his new 
bridge and with authority to restore to the beleaguered province a more orderly, 
structured society, he was ecstatic. His mission to repeal the dreaded anglicization policy 
of the Proclamation and institute in its place the generous terms of the Quebec Act had 
been highly successful. His warm reception by the Quebec people, he believed was 
testimony to the fact that they were pleased with the reversal in policy. He wrote home 
that "all ranks of people amongst them view with each other in testifying their gratitude 
and respect, and the desire they have by every mark of duty and submission to prove 
themselves not undeserving of the treatment they have met with."1 Furthermore, he 
assured North, a Canadian regiment would "complete their happiness, which in time of 
need, might be augmented to two, three, or more battalions."2 Such statements led 
British historian Vincent T. Harlow to conclude that Carleton had "an unwarranted 
expectation of French-Canadian gratitude and support, an expectation with which he 
deceived himself and the ministry.”3 In any case, his optimism was short-lived for he
‘Shortt and Doughty, Documents, II, 583.
2Ibid., 584.
3Neatby, Quebec Act, 129.
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had not taken into consideration the effect that the Quebec Act would have had on the 
American colonists, or on the disgruntled merchants, and habitants in Quebec.
The new of the Act reached the American colonists just prior to the meeting of the 
First Continental Congress, called for the purpose of determining a collective response 
to the coercive acts, which now in their view included the Quebec Act. On September 9, 
1774, the Congress adopted the Suffolk Resolves, which declared that "the late act of 
Parliament for establishing the Roman Catholic religion and the French laws in that 
extensive country now called Canada, is dangerous in an extreme degree, to the 
Protestant religion, and to the civil rights and liberties of all America." From that point 
on, in quick succession, Congress passed addressed and resolutions claiming that the 
Quebec Act "abolished the equitable systems of English laws and erected a tyranny there 
to the great danger from so total a dissimilarity of religion, law, and government of the 
neighboring British colonies."4 In addition, the Nonimportation Association protested 
against the westward extension of Quebec, the discouragement of British immigration in 
that area, and the establishment there of an arbitrary government.
A different and disingenuous message was sent by Congress to the people of 
Quebec, one which Carleton later employed to warn the habitants that the Americans 
were not their friends. But in the aftermath of the Quebec Act, the distraught merchants
4Justin H. Smith, Our Struggle fo r  the Fourteenth Colony, 2 vols. (New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1903, 1907), 1,87.
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and habitants were receptive to the widely circulated message of the Continental 
Congress, which invited the Canadians to join them in their struggle against the 
arbitrariness of the British government. This message promised the Canadians the 
respect, toleration, and free exercise of their religion, while the Quebec Act, they 
charged, denied them their rights as British citizens: "Your judges and your legislative 
council, as it is called, are dependent on your governor. . . and he is dependent on the 
servant of the crown in Great Britain." Canadians were called on to reflect "which will 
be most for your interest and happiness, to have all the rest of North America your 
unalterable friends, or your inveterate enemies."5 Three hundred copies of this letter 
were printed and sent by the radical Boston merchant, Thomas Cushing, to his good 
friend, Thomas Walker, in Montreal. Both men probably knew one another when 
Walker lived in Boston just prior to his emigration to Montreal in 1763. Although the 
Quebec Gazette was forbidden to print the message, it was carried in every American 
newspaper and was easily available in Quebec. A French translation was distributed to 
the habitants and was well-received.
On October 21, 1774, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress voted "to take into 
consideration the propriety of appointing an agent or agents, to repair to the government 
of Canada, in order to consult with the inhabitants thereof, and settle a friendly 
correspondence and agreement with them."6 Anticipation that such an action would
5lbid., 90.
Hbid.
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produce positive results was not just wishful thinking. In September residents of Quebec, 
concerned about the closing of the port of Boston, sent one thousand bushels of wheat 
to Boston; Jonas Clark Minot, a merchant formerly a native of Massachusetts, 
transmitted them with the cordial letter to the Boston Committee of Donations. In 
Montreal, a considerable sum was collected for the same sufferers and forwarded in a 
bill of exchange. These expressions of sympathy were not left unacknowledged. The 
Boston Committee replied to the Quebec donors: "Whilst we stand compact like a band 
of brothers no proud invaders will be able to subdue us."7 All winter exchanges 
between the Massachusetts colonists and the French and English in Quebec continued.
In the meantime, the merchants from Montreal and Quebec were concerting with 
one another at coffee houses, taverns, and in "town meetings" to discuss letters received 
from the Congress. The joint committee resolved to write letters of thanks to all those 
who supported their interests during the Quebec Act debate, including the mayor of 
London, some merchants, and the former Attorney General Maseres. Petitions were also 
sent to the king, the Commons, and the Lords. Carleton reported these activities in a 
letter to Dartmouth on November 11 in which he named Walker, Todd, Price, and Blake 
as the instigators from Montreal and John Paterson, Zachary Macaulay, John Lees, Sr., 
John Aitkin, Randle Meredith, John Welles, and Peter Fargues as the leaders from 
Quebec. Carleton assured Dartmouth, however, that "several discreet" people did not
7Ibid., 99.
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participate in these meetings when they found out the nature of them."8 He told 
Dartmouth that he regretted the examples the merchants set for the Canadians and did 
not think government could guard too much, or too soon, against the consequences of 
an "infection, imported daily, warmly recommended, and spread abroad by the colonists 
here, and indeed by some from Europe, not less violent that the Americans."9
In November and December 1774 petitions to repeal or amend the Quebec Act 
were sent to Maseres to present to the appropriate authorities. The merchants’ main 
complaint was the denial of trial by juries in civil cases and of habeas corpus in criminal 
cases. The latter condition, they stated, subjected them to arbitrary fines and 
imprisonment at the will of the governor and council. Subsequently, these concerns 
proved not to be idle ones, for in fact Carleton imprisoned suspected "traitors" 
sometimes for several years without a trial. In a separate petition to the House of Lords, 
the merchants complained of the dire effect of French laws on trade. They warned that 
the credit of the country was already deeply wounded. In the petition to the Commons, 
they reminded the House of the extent of their commercial ventures which had been 
undertaken with the assurances that they were protected by British law as set forth in 
the Proclamation of 1763. The inference made by Carleton in his letter to Dartmouth 
that the "discreet" merchants did not participate in these petitions was fallacious for the 
petitions were signed by 185 merchants, among them the most reputable and important
8Short and Doughty, Documents, II, 587.
9lbid., 587-588.
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ones in the province. Many of them had signed previous petitions, but many more were 
signing for the first time, indicating a new level of discontent in the colony.10 The 
American colonists hoped to capitalize on this discontent.
Throughout the winter, correspondence between the Quebec merchants and the 
American colonists continued. Earlier John Brown, a Boston lawyer, had offered to 
journey to Montreal to enlist as much support as he could. Finally in February, the 
Massachusetts Congress accepted his offer. Brown was the right envoy to send. He was 
handsome, articulate, stoic—he made the arduous trek from Boston to Montreal over 
melting rivers and lakes—and was imbued with the revolutionary spirit. His task was to 
energize the merchants to commit themselves to the American cause and to send 
delegates to the Second Continental Congress to be held in May. Walker was Brown’s 
sponsor. But Brown did not succeed in his mission. Only James Price journeyed to 
Philadelphia as an independent agent. While the merchants were distraught, so drastic 
a step was fraught with too many uncertainties. In a letter to Congress, they asked if 
they could join them without agreeing to the policy of nonimportation. They were 
willing to help do what they could short of agreeing to actions that would ruin them 
commercially. They explained that if they agreed to nonimportation, the French would 
immediately monopolize the Indian trade and they would be ruined. Although they
10See Shortt and Doughty, Documents, II 590-591 for lists as well as Appendix I of 
this study.
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believed they had been shabbily treated by the home government and Carleton, they were 
still hopeful that the Quebec Act would be repealed or amended.
Their reluctance to actively join the colonists was not surprising for there were few 
parallels between Quebec and the American colonies. Quebec was still a sparsely settled 
province with almost total dependence on Great Britain for capital and markets. Quebec 
had less than two decades of British rule with no representative government; the 
American colonies had in some cases the experience of home rule for more than a 
century. The past decade in America had produced an organized network of political 
activities opposed to British policy. The Sons of Liberty had laid the groundwork for 
the ground swell of public opinion that they now tapped for their own political purposes. 
The fact that Quebec had only one newspaper in which public opinion was molded, 
compared to a flourishing chain of them throughout the colonies, epitomized the 
difference in political development between the thirteen lower colonies and Quebec. In 
Quebec collective action against government policy was limited to the commercial class 
that had little political power. Unlike their counterparts in the plantation colonies who 
were also dependent on Great Britain, the Quebec merchant risked being considered a 
traitor for joining in nonintercourse agreements. Conversely, the American merchants 
who were opposed to such agreements were boycotted and considered traitors if they did 
not join. Even the colony of Georgia was boycotted for not sending a delegate to the 
First Congress. Like Quebec, Georgia was sparsely settled and dependent upon 
Parliament for subsidies to cover administrative costs and to protect its western borders
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from Indians. The radicals in the province could not persuade the people to take a 
position against Great Britain until they were subjected to a boycott by the other colonies. 
The result was that Georgia had no choice but to join the other twelve colonies.
This phase of the protest in the colonies changed dramatically in April. Before the 
Second Continental Congress convened and just ten days after the Quebec Act went into 
effect on May 1, 1775, the hostilities of Concord and Lexington had already occurred, 
accelerating the movement favored by the more radical elements toward independence. 
Whether the American merchants liked it or not, they were caught in that swift-moving 
tide. Although Brown had been unsuccessful in enlisting the Montreal merchants to send 
delegates to Congress, he had a chance to note the preparedness of the forts en route. 
His report to Congress was that the forts could easily be taken and that the Canadians 
might not raise serious objections. Congress listened but did not sanction an attack. 
This detail did not disturb such impetuous men as Ethan Allen, Benedict Arnold, and the 
Green Mountain Boys, who without approval successfully captured Fort Ticonderoga and 
Crown Point. Their success repressed whatever caution they may have exercised and 
they next wantonly violated Canadian borders. Arnold went on to St. John and captured 
a British sloop and its cargo. On his return, he encountered Allen and advised him not 
to continue. But Allen was not someone you told what to do. Vainglory drove him on. 
He sent a letter to Montreal addressed to the "merchants that are friendly to the cause 
of liberty" and asked them to forward "provisions, ammunition and spirituous liquors" 
for the use of the army, for which they would be paid £500. En route to St. John, Allen
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was again forewarned, this time by a Montreal merchant and American supporter, 
Thomas Bindon. Bindon informed Allen that a British regiment was also on its way to 
St. John. Allen recognized the superior force he would be encountering and retreated 
to await another opportunity.
On June 25, 1775, after much deliberation, Congress finally sanctioned a full scale 
invasion of Canada. There was great optimism that their efforts would be victorious and 
that Montreal might be the target after securing St. John and Chambly. In part, this 
strategy was a defensive one for, as Carleton so frequently advised the British authorities, 
if the British occupied the Richelieu - Lake Champlain route to the Hudson, they could 
cut off New England from the rest of the colonies. Such danger would continue to exist 
unless the Americans could wrest Quebec away from the British. Encouraged by reports 
that there were many American sympathizers in Canada, Congress gave its endorsement 
to Major General Philip Schuyler, a New York patroon, that if the general found it 
"practicable and that it will not be disagreeable to the Canadians, he do immediately take 
possession of St. John, Montreal, and any other parts of the country."11 In a correlative 
move, Benedict Arnold was given approval to launch an invasion in the east, moving up 
the rivers Kennebunk, Carrabassett, Chaudiere to the St. Lawrence at Quebec City. 
There Schuyler’s army would meet him and Canada would be secured to the colonists.
"Worthington C. Ford, Journals o f the Continental Congress (Washington, 1904-37), 
II: 109-110.
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Or at least that is what they thought as Schuyler and Arnold embarked on their separate 
paths ultimately to rendezvous in Quebec.
News of these actions deterred whatever plans Carleton had for implementing the 
Quebec Act, which was supposed to go into effect on May 1. When Carleton heard that 
rebels had taken over Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point and were threatening St. John 
and Montreal, he left Cramahe in charge in Quebec and hastened to Montreal. He also 
declared martial law, with the intention of enlisting the habitants to defend the province 
against the Americans. Despite his boast during the Quebec bill debate that the 
Canadians, being granted their laws, customs, and religions would loyally support the 
government in any conflict, when the test came, he found he was mistaken. He had 
accepted the disaffection of the British "element," who continued to rebel against the 
repeal of the Proclamation, but he was rankled by the factiousness and discontent of the 
habitants. He wrote Dartmouth, "all subordination overset and the minds of the people 
poisoned by the same hypocrisy and lies practiced with so much success in the other 
provinces, and which their emissaries and friends here have spread abroad with so much 
art and diligence."12
This admission must have come as a jolt to the ministry, for until then Carleton had 
continued expressing his optimism that the habitants would rally to the support of the 
king. Privately, however, he had expressed a different and more honest opinion. As
12Shortt and Doughty, Documents, II, 665.
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early as February in a secret communication to Gage, he said he worried about the 
inhabitants. He claimed:
Ever since the civil authority has been introduced into the province, the 
government of it has hung so loose, and retained so little power, they have 
in a manner emancipated themselves, and it will require time, and discreet 
management likewise, to recall them to their ancient habits of obedience and 
discipline; considering all the new ideas they have been acquiring for these 
ten years past, can it be thought they will be pleased at being suddenly, and 
without preparation embodied into a militia and marched from their families, 
lands, and habitants to remote provinces and all the horrors of war.13
This, Carleton confessed, would "give an appearance of truth to the language of 
our sons of sedition, at this very moment busily employed instilling into their minds, that 
the Act was passed merely to serve the present purposes of government, and in the full 
intention of ruling over them with all the despotism of their ancient masters."14 How 
contradictory these views were to Carleton’s testimony just nine months previously 
during the Quebec Act debates that the habitant wanted only a return to his old way of 
life! Also, how damaging to the ministry that was depending on the habitant to help in 
the defense of Quebec!
The ministry had accepted Carleton’s assessment of Quebec society and acted on 
the assumption that with passage of the Quebec Act, the peasantry’s loyalty had been 
secured. After news had reached London of the battles of Concord and Lexington, North
“Ibid., 661.
“Ibid.
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declared that "if the refractory colonies cannot be reduced to obedience by the present 
force," though it would be necessary "to arm the Roman Catholics of Canada and to 
employ them in the service."15 That necessity came sooner than expected. On July 1, 
Dartmouth instructed Carleton that "the king relies on the loyalty and fidelity of his 
Canadian subjects for their assistance to suppress rebellion"16 and immediately upon 
receipt of his letter, he should raise 3,000 recruits. When news from Boston worsened, 
Dartmouth wrote Carleton again—increasing the total number to 6,000.17 The ministry 
had not yet received news that the rebels had taken Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point 
and were threatening St. John.
Carleton’s misreading of Quebec society could have proved disastrous for Great 
Britain. The extent of sympathy for the revolutionists is hard to gauge. Initially, while 
the American invasion was succeeding, the willingness to aid the invaders, or at least not 
to resist them, seemed to be significant. A report on August 4, 1775, from General 
Schuyler, the American commander charged with invading Canada through Lake 
Champlain, reveals the magnitude of Carleton’s misjudgment. Schuyler reported that 
Carleton apparently had only 450 men at his command and that "he had used his utmost 
influence with the Canadians to join and augment his army so that he might retake Crown 
Point and Ticonderoga, which they positively refused to do, and declared they never
15Ibid.
16Shortt and Doughty, Documents, II, 666, ft. 1.
11 Ibid.
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would fight against their brethren the colonists."18 All the parishes in the Richelieu 
Valley declared for the rebels. Carleton’s efforts to declare amnesty to all who engaged 
in assisting the Americans fell on deaf ears. The Canadians, Schuyler reported, had 
apparently considered the treatment they received from the soldiers in so cruel a light that 
they intimated a desire that the colonial troops should take possession of Canada.
Schuyler’s assessment of the Canadians’ disaffection was corroborated by Chief 
Justice Hey. Hey, who disagreed with Carleton’s assessment of the Canadians’ 
dissatisfaction with English law during the Quebec Act debates, was the first officeholder 
to acknowledge that the policies adopted in the Quebec Act were misguided or based on 
erroneous assumptions. In a letter to the Lord Chancellor on August 28, 1775, Hey 
reported, "Hardly a Canadian will take arms to oppose them [the Rebels] and I doubt all 
we have to trust to is about 500 men and two small forts at St. Johns." (In a letter to 
Dartmouth on June 7, 1775, Carleton estimated that all he could count on were 600 
men.) Hey summarized what had happened. "What will be your Lordships 
astonishment," he asks, "when I tell you that an act passed for the express purpose of 
gratifying the Canadians and which was supposed to comprehend all that they either 
wished or wanted is become the first object of their discontent and dislike." And whose 
fault was this? Hey says, "It may be truly said that General Carleton had taken on an 
ill measure of the influence of the seigneurs and clergy over the lower order of people
18Historical Manuscript Commission, Dartmouth Mss. (London, His Majesty’s 
St. Office, 1887), I, 383.
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whose principle of conduct founded in fear and the sharpness of authority over them now 
no longer exercised, is unrestrained, and breaks out in every shape of contempt or 
detestation of those whom they used to behold with terror and who gave them I believe 
too many occasions to express it." Hey says of the seigneurs that they "are too much 
elated with the advantages they supposed they should derive from the restoration of their 
old privileges and customs, and indulged themselves in a way of thinking and talking that 
gave very just offence, as well to their own people as to the English merchants."19
Similar reports about the habitants’ refusal to take up arms against the colonists 
came from Cramahe. In a letter to Dartmouth on September 21, 1775, he wrote, "No 
means have been left untried to bring the Canadian peasantry to a sense of their duty, 
and engage them to take up arms in defense of the province, but all to no purpose."20 
He said that the gentry, clergy, and "most" of the bourgeoisie showed their fidelity to 
the king, but "some" of the king’s old subjects had joined the rebels. He added that he 
wished that others who had the same inclinations would do the same. There is no doubt 
that the habitants and some of the English were assisting the rebels and that without their 
supplying the provincials with shelter, information, and provisions, the colonists’ early 
successes would not have been possible.
19Shortt and Doughty, Documents, II, 670-672.
20Ibid. , 667.
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Determining the extent of the habitants’ resistance to take up arms against the 
colonists in the first stage of the invasion has been fairly well-established. But trying to 
determine the extent of the merchants’ loyalty has not been well documented. Canadian 
military historian, George F.G. Stanley, says that the British merchants "provided no 
shining examples of loyalty to the Crown." Some, Stanley says, were willing to fight 
"should the need really arise and Montreal be invested."21 According to an observer 
who wrote a friend in London, in mid-July when Carleton attempted to get the British 
militia to assembly in order to appoint officers, no more than seventy responded. The 
blame for this poor showing was generally believed to result from the cabals, meetings, 
and correspondence between the English merchants and the American colonists that had 
been taking place at least since 1773. The fall of Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga, 
St. John, Chambly, Montreal, and Trois Rivieres in successive order gave the American 
colonists the advantage of momentum. It was during this initial stage of the invasion that 
the British days in Canada seemed numbered and consequently, support given the 
revolutionaries was at its height.
One of the most prominent merchants involved in trying to promote the American 
cause in the strategically important Richelieu Valley was James Livingston of Chambly. 
Livingston’s prominent New York relatives were ardent supporters of the revolutionists. 
His father and mother had lived in Montreal where their three sons were bom, but in 
1774, they decided to move to Albany. The sons remained in Quebec. James, a grain
21Stanley, Canada Invaded (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973) 30.
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merchant in Chambly, was responsible for convincing Schuyler that the Canadians at 
St. John would support the rebels. Previously, Moses Hazen, who had bene employed 
by Carleton to raise a regiment in the Richelieu district where he lived, took upon 
himself to warn Schuyler not to attack that fort, since, he said, the people would not 
support him. Hazen’s motive apparently was one of self-interest, for he feared his home, 
in the path of the invaders, would likely be destroyed should Schuyler attack. Hazen’s 
action resulted in his being suspected of playing the role of a double agent. At any rate, 
Schuyler acted on Livingston’s assessment and took St. John. Livingston was actively 
engaged in enlisting the support of the habitants to give flour and to join the militia. He 
employed all the lofty phrases of the revolutionists in his efforts—he assured the 
Canadians that the Americans were animated only by "spiritual good"; he called on them 
to demonstrate their "fraternal friendship" by forming a militia; and to join him at Pointe 
Olivier "with our arms to protect our flanks, which are menaced by people seeking our 
slavery. "22
After St. John was secured to the revolutionists, they turned toward Montreal. By 
this time Livingston was under command of General Montgomery, who had replaced 
Schuyler. The goal was to capture Montreal. According to Carleton, who was in 
Montreal when word was received that St. John had fallen, "fear seized the good subjects 
in the town at the rebels in open arms without and at those traitors within."23 He
22Ibid., 42.
23 Ibid.
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believed that as son as the provincials landed outside the gates, the subjects would 
capitulate on the most reasonable terms they could get. General Montgomery, who had 
married a Livingston and had been happily enjoying the life of a country gentleman in 
New York prior to his enlistment in the American army, could have taken Montreal by 
force, but he wanted to establish good relations with the people. He sent three agents 
to meet with the townspeople to discuss terms of capitulation. One of them was Price, 
the Montreal merchant who was now Montgomery’s adviser and banker. The Montreal 
committee was composed of John Porteous, Pierre Panet, John Blake, Pierre Meziere, 
James Finlay, St. George Dupre, James McGill, Louis Carignan, Richard Huntley, 
Francois Malhior, Edward W. Gray, and Pierre Guy. Only John Blake was American. 
Montgomery considered the terms of the townspeople as "haughty," especially since 
Montreal had no defense. Carleton had already abandoned the town to return to Quebec. 
Three of the terms of capitulation are significant for American historian Coffin based his 
view that the merchants were pro-British on them. The merchants asked: not to be 
required to billet soldiers in their homes, not to take up arms against the mother country; 
to be allowed to carry on trade as freely as before the invasion, and to be granted 
passports for that purpose.
Montgomery’s response to these terms was that "the Continental Army have a 
generous disdain for every act of oppression and violence; they come for the express 
purpose of giving liberty and security." He said he would "maintain in a peaceable 
enjoyment o f their property, o f every kind,t he individuals and religious communities of
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Montreal." Thus, religious freedom was promised; and the inhabitants were to be 
compelled neither to take up arms against Great Britain nor to contribute to the cost of 
the present war. No decision had been made at that juncture to reverse the order 
prohibiting the merchants from carrying on trade.24 Montgomery conveyed these 
sentiments as those of the Continental Congress.
By this time Carleton was via the St. Lawrence on his way back to Quebec. 
Livingston, anticipating such a move, had taken up a post at Chambly, the next fort 
outside Montreal. When Carleton appeared next to the fort, Livingston bluffed, for he 
had few men and little ammunition, that unless Carleton and his men surrendered, he 
would blast them out of the water. The men surrendered, but Carleton narrowly 
escaped. Montgomery turned Montreal over to the command of General Wooster, a 
critical mistake as it turned out, and followed the same route as Carleton. After 
Chambly, Trois Rivieres, half way between Montreal and Quebec City, was the next 
sizable town to capitulate without a battle. But the fortress of Quebec would not be as 
easy to conquer, as Arnold was already finding out. After his famous, or foolish, 
journey through the most inhospitable country that is now Maine and eastern Quebec, 
Arnold arrived at the first settlement of Sertigan. From all accounts, the people of 
Sertigan were totally supportive of the Americans, supplying all their wants even if at 
an exorbitant price. Arnold sent ahead to find out from this informer within the walls 
of the fortress, John Dyer Mercier, ex-coroner of Quebec, information on the number
24Smith, Struggle, 480.
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of troops in Montreal and Quebec and the sentiments of the Canadians. Arnold soon 
learned that Mercier had been discovered and arrested, and that the Americans’ arrival 
was anticipated by Cramahe. Another sympathizer was the superintendent of Caldwell’s 
Mill, John Halstead, a merchant from New Jersey. The mill was owned at the time by 
former governor of Quebec, James Murray. Halstead supplied Arnold not only with 
flour and wheat but the good news that except for one hundred "torys" the militia was 
ready to lay down their arms. The ardent loyalist and member of the Quebec council, 
Francois Baby, confirmed that fact that only half of the people could be counted on. 
Cramahe, too, was reportedly about to surrender. His mood was one of anger, 
especially with merchants—John McCord, Zachary Macaulay, and the Bondfields—for 
those “damn town meetings," which he complained had turned the province into its 
present state. He wrote General Howe that "there is too much reason to apprehend the 
affair will soon be over."25 The rebels were now at the gates.
Fortuitously for the British, Carleton was also at the gate. Colonel Allan Maclean, 
an officer of experience and determination, and his corps of Emigrants, nearly all of 
them veterans from previous wars, took over the defense of the city, the "malcontents" 
were given forty-eight hours to leave, and a new surge of optimism took over. 
Carleton’s strategy was to wait out the rebels. Even with Montgomery’s reinforcements, 
Quebec proved too resistant to a surprise attack and the failed attempt on December 31 
turned out to be a decisive and costly one. Montgomery had been one of 30 men killed,
25Stanley, Canada, 84-85.
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42 wounded, and 389 captured—a total of 461 casualties. In contrast, the British suffered 
the death of only one officer, four or five of the rank and file were wounded, two of 
whom subsequently died.26 Hazen and Edward Antill, an American merchant living in 
Quebec, had participated in the battle for Quebec. Afterwards, both men were 
dispatched to Philadelphia to notify Congress of Montgomery’s death and to urge relief 
for the northern army. Distressed by the rapidly deteriorating situation in Quebec, the 
Congress agreed to send more men, money, and three emissaries to Montreal to enlist 
support for their cause. In addition, Congress, impressed by Hazen and Antill, decided 
to raise a Second Canadian Regiment, putting Hazen in command and Antill, second in 
command. Hazen was reluctant to accept the command for fear he would lose his 
property in Canada as well as his half pay from Britain. He acquiesced when he was 
offered compensation for any loss of pay and he was assured the rebels would not lose.
When they returned to Canada, Hazen and Antill successfully recruited the 
"Congregantises," the name given the supporters of Congress. But by April 1, Hazen 
ran out of money and had to stop recruiting. He had already enlisted 250 men and had 
taken command of Montreal from Wooster. When Arnold called for reinforcements from 
Montreal, Hazen protested. He said that it would be impossible until his men had been 
paid. He reported that half of those who did go deserted on the way. A turning point 
on the Canadians’ attitude had occurred. In letters to Schuyler on April 1 and 6, Hazen 
cited many reasons for this change: the excess of the American soldiers and civilians;
26Ibid., 103-104.
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the faltering of Quebec; the worthless paper money used to buy supplies and to pay the 
recruits; the impressment of the habitants’ goods and services when they refused to sell 
unless paid. To the habitant, it was deja vu. With the spring thaw on the St. Lawrence, 
British ships with supplies, money, and reinforcements arrived in Quebec. From most 
accounts, the retreat from Quebec was disorderly and cemented the resistance of the 
habitants against continuing to side with the Americans.
In addition to hastening reinforcements in Quebec, Congress sent commissioners 
to try to maintain the affections of the people. But it was too late. Not even Benjamin 
Franklin (now seventy years old and unfit for such an arduous journey), Charles Carroll, 
or Samuel Chase, the latter two from Maryland, could persuade the Montrealers to 
support the cause. The experience was a humiliating and disagreeable experience for the 
men. Since they had no hard money, despite the fact that Carroll was one of the 
wealthiest men in the old colonies, they could not buy necessary services, like 
transportation from the border to Montreal. Only James Price came to their aid, loaning 
them £20,000.27 Many of the soldiers, American and Canadian, deserted. In June, of 
477 men under Hazen, only 175 remained. Those who really believed in the cause, 
habitant and merchant, continued their support of the revolution, moving south where the 
battles were taking place. James Livingston and his brothers, Alexander and Richard, 
continued to fight with the American troops throughout the war. James commanded the 
First Canadian Regiment. Antill was captured by the British at Staten Island in 1777,
27Creighton, Empire, 66.
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imprisoned until 1780. On November 14, 1780, Livingston wrote that Lieutenant 
Colonel Antill with family just arrived in a "flagg" from New York. A few days later, 
Antill applied for relief since he was unable to provide for his wife and children.28 In 
1785 he returned to St. John, Quebec. Of the English merchants who aided the 
Americans, he was the only one to return to Canada. In 1777 (after a fight with 
Benedict Arnold), Moses Hazen was court martialed, but exonerated. He was appointed 
quartermaster general of Lafayette’s force, which unsuccessfully tried to get endorsement 
to invade Canada again. In 1781, he was made a brigadier general. After the war he 
lived in New York and was, despite broken health, tireless in his efforts to gain 
government compensation for himself and Canadians who had served under him. Grants 
of 1,000 acres from New York State were given to the leaders of the First (Livingston’s) 
and Second (Hazen’s) Canadian Regiments. These men were Americans living in 
Canada at the start of the Revolution who had abandoned their businesses or professions 
to aid the revolutionists.29 Antill obtained 500 acres, James Livingston, William Torry, 
and Charlotte Hazen, 1,000 acres each. Thomas Walker left Montreal with Benjamin 
Franklin. He lived in Boston, where little is known about him. He apparently was in 
England in 1785, for there is record of his meeting Pierre du Calvet there. There is also 
a letter from him to General Henry Knox of July 21, 1785, that calls on Knox to "take
^Massachusetts Historical Society, Hancock Collection, 39.
29See Allan Everest, Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American 
Revolution (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1976) and Stanley, Canada, 
149-150, for accounts of the English merchants who aided the Americans in the aftermath 
of the war.
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the trouble to receive for me from the Board of Treasury, the remainder of the money 
granted me, by a resolution of the honorable Congress, dated the 15th April last"30 
Walker died in 1788 in Boston. In 1801, Mrs. Walker obtained 2,000 acres in Ohio 
because her husband "lost property in the amount of £2,500 sterling besides abandoning 
a lucrative business." James Price must have remained in the service for a letter from 
him to Joshua Huntington on March 5, 1779, from New Haven is in respect to 
provisions.31 Price was later compensated with the grant of 500 acres by the State of 
New York and 500 acres by the federal government in Ohio for his sacrifice during the 
war.32
Migration had not been all north to south, however. By 1774-75 several New York 
merchants concerned that the nonimportation policy would severely affect their 
livelihoods, decided to move to Montreal. One of the most influential merchant houses 
in this category was the firm of Phyn and Ellice of Schenectady, Montreal, and London. 
An account of the history of the firm provides invaluable insight into the many problems 
already discussed in this study and is worth recounting. The founder of the firm was an 
enterprising trader named John Duncan, whose initial venture at Niagara had to be 
aborted after the Proclamation of 1763, since his land grant was not sustained. He 
regrouped, however, and for the next several years other partners joined the firm: his
30Massachusetts Historical Society, T. Paine Collection, 1789-1790.
^Massachusetts Historical Society, Huntington Mss.
i2Ibid.
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son Richard, James Phyn, James Sterling, John Porteous, and Alexander Ellice. On 
Duncan’s retirement in 1767, the firm became Phyn and Ellice, and served as a 
middleman, directly exchanging goods for furs with the Indians in the interior. The need 
for increased capital and dependable commercial carters for the goods sent up the 
Mohawk River and around Niagara was critical to the success of the venture. In 1767 
due to delinquent debtors, creditors drew drafts on Hyman Levy, the company’s agent 
in New York. To cover these drafts, the firm pledged Levy packs of furs estimated at 
£3,000, but unfortunately, no market could be found for the furs. To try and meet their 
obligations, the partners sought loans from friends and relatives in Scotland. They 
bought sterling drafts on London, those of Peter Hasenclever. When Hasenclever went 
bankrupt, the firm was forced to place bills for collection in the hands of a New York 
lawyer, James Duane.
Fortunately, 1768 was a very good year. British policy to return control of the 
trade to the colonies, which were derelict in passing appropriate legislation, meant that 
the Indians could be exploited and that not as much capital was needed. Competition 
became fierce but Phyn and Ellice had long experience and keen business acumen. They 
supplied goods and liquor to posts, they had the contract of Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs William Johnson, and government officials at the post bought their supplies. 
Robert Ellice joined the firm and James Phyn married the daughter of Johnson’s good 
friend. Dr. John Constable. In 1769 competition with Montreal traders was increasing 
since the shorter route from Montreal to the northwest was more efficient. To compete,
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Phyn and Ellice built their own vessel to carry goods on the Great Lakes. To cut costs 
further, the firm decided to eliminate Levy and buy and sell directly with London. But 
they still faced another major problem: the colonies’ nonimportation agreement that went 
into effect in New York on August 27, 1768. This meant that they could no longer 
import supplies from England. The result was that the firm lost almost all its customers 
to Montreal merchants in the upper countries, and they realized they would continue to 
do so until the Townsnend Revenue Acts were repealed.
To circumvent the nonimportation laws, in 1770 the firm decided to import through 
Quebec. Phyn went there to superintend transporting the firm’s goods through Canada. 
But the competition from Montreal was still increasing. As a result, in 1771 the firm 
shifted part of its operation to London. There Phyn oversaw buying British 
manufactured products, shipping them to merchants in the colonies, and in return finding 
a market for various raw products consigned in payment. This plan took advantage of 
the partners’ know-how in trading methods and commercial accounting. In addition, it 
lessened the growing interprovincial rivalry with Quebec. Ability, enterprise, and capital 
were all that were needed. The partners had all but the latter. To raise capital, in 1773 
Alexander Ellice converted part of the firm’s assets into cash by not importing goods. 
In the upper country where there was no civil government, contracts were made with 
very carefully chosen representatives whom they could trust. When they again began 
importing, since they could not compete with Montreal in selling dry goods, they
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concentrated on selling tobacco, spirits, and rum. They also diversified, entering the 
grain trade and producing flour in a sawmill which they built on the Mohawk River.
British policy had posed problems for the firm ever since the founder’s, John 
Duncan’s, land grant had been rescinded by the Proclamation in 1763. The trade 
depression of 1760 was aggravated in 1764 by Grenville’s trade policies. The 
nonimportation policy protesting the Stamp Act in 1765 and the Townshend duties in 
1767 disrupted channels of trade. By 1770, with western policy in operation since 1768, 
the fir trade suffered from growing intercolonial rivalry and rivalry with Montreal. Now 
that the fur trade had moved farther west, the shorter route to the northwest gave 
Montreal the advantage. But nothing was more alarming and devastating to New York 
merchants than the colonists’ response to the Quebec Act of nonimportation and 
nonexportation and the Quebec Revenue Act, which levied duties on spirits and rum. 
Nonimportation was harmful, but nonexportation was fatal for perishable furs.
Phyn and Ellice bobbed with the tide and remained afloat. Phyn moved to London 
and the Montreal merchant, Isaac Todd, was engaged to represent the firm in Quebec. 
British policy, they understood, went where returns were best and Montreal was now 
more important than New York. Montreal offered another advantage due to the 
imperfections of the capital market which the firm astutely exploited. For example, 
because of the high rate of exchange in New York, a policy was devised of drawing 
sterling bills on Phyn in London to be sold at a higher rate in New York. Proceeds were
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sent to Quebec to be remitted at a lower rate in London to meet bills as they came due. 
All these efforts to subvert the law made the Ellices suspect. Alexander moved to 
Montreal in 1776, but James and Robert remained in Schenectady, where they were 
closely watched by the Schenectady Committee of Safety. The Committee accused them 
of not being "friends of American Freedom."33 Finally in 1778, Robert joined his 
brother in Montreal. James was allowed to take the oath of allegiance to the State of 
New York. The co-partnership was at an end, but Robert Ellice and Company of 
Montreal continued supplying the major fur traders until 1790, when the company was 
taken over by Forsythe, Richardson and Company. John Richardson, the Ellices’ 
nephew, who joined the firm in 1773, was the only survivor of the firm that had begun 
in 1760, when Richard Duncan had first started as a trader at Niagara.
The company’s history reflects the sophistication of the fur merchants and the 
problems they faced in trying to overcome enormous obstacles just to survive. The 
tenuous credit structure was as responsible for failure as Indians and the wilderness 
conditions. In 1768 James Phyn wrote William Johnson apologizing for asking him for 
payment of supplies already delivered to him. He said he would not do so except that 
"I have the greatest distress for cash to buy bread for the boatmen.34 In addition to 
credit problems, government regulations and policies were a continual threat to business
33Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence. Schenectady Committee, 
1775-1779 (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1925).
34Johnson Papers, VI, James Phyn to William Johnson, November 17, 1768, 462.
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survival. In 1774, Simon McTavish wrote to William Edgar, "What are we to do for 
rum as we will not be allowed to bring any up from Schenectady? But in case it [the 
Quebec Act] should not be repealed at all, we must inevitably break off our connection 
with this province and have our supply from Canada."35 The Quebec Act was not 
repealed and McTavish’s fear that the merchants would have to cut off their connections 
with New York became a reality. Other New York merchants affected were Robert and 
Alexander Henry, Daniel Campbell, Felix Graham, William and David Edgar, and 
McTavish’s partner, James Bannerman. The Henrys and McTavish and Bannerman 
moved to Montreal and became important merchants. Although there is no mention of 
the Edgars in Quebec, after the Revolution William Edgar’s wife, living in Albany, 
sought the governor’s permission to travel to Quebec to claim property.
While these merchants moved north for economic reasons, other disaffected 
colonists chose to leave the colonies for political purposes. Many of New York’s leading 
citizens chose to aid the British. This was especially true of the coterie that had 
developed around Sir William Johnson. Johnson died in the summer of 1774, but his son 
joined the 1st Battalion of The King’s Royal Regiment of New York, becoming its 
commandant. He lost nearly 200,000 acres of valuable land in New York as a result of 
Britain’s defeat. Other officers who served under him such as the McDonnells and 
Malcolm McMartin, held land in fee simple under Johnson. Many fathers and sons
35R.H. Fleming, "Phyn, Ellice and Company of Schenectady," Contributions to 
Canadian Economics, IV, 1932, 31 n. 4.
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served together as officers under Johnson: John Munro and his son, Hugh; Captain 
Alexander (Archibald) McDonnell and his son, Hugh; Captain Samuel Anderson and his 
sons, Joseph and Ebenezer; Ensign John Valentine and his son, James; Captain John 
McDonnell and his son Miles. Other officers were connected with Quebec through 
relatives, such as John Holland, son of the surveyor general of Quebec and William 
Claus, son of the deputy agent for Indian Affairs in Montreal.36 The first civilian 
loyalists arrived in Quebec between 1774 and 1776. They included William Coffin, a 
merchant who moved from Boston. His son served under Johnson. From 1776 on this 
influx of loyalists continued, but the year 1775-1776 was a watershed year.
Could Quebec have become the fourteenth colony? Since it didn’t, was this the 
rooting of a political culture that was distinct from that of the United States? The first 
question depends on knowing more about the support of the merchants. Much more 
research needs to be done in this area, for there are sufficient indications that at least 
during the brief period of a year from spring 1775 to the following spring, there was 
more support among the merchants than has generally been believed. Even Carleton 
admitted that after those who supported the Americans were asked to leave Quebec, there 
were many who remained who he believed were supportive of the revolutionists. 
Carleton rationalized that the merchants who supported the provincials were of American 
origins. But that does not explain references such as Carleton’s when he tried to raise
36Stanley, Canada, Appendix II, 156-157.
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troops that he received no help from "the damn’d rascals of merchants."37 The 
seigneurs, clergy, officeholders, and some members of the Canadian and British 
bourgeoisie were all that Carleton could count on in the early part of the invasion. The 
question to be determined is how many is "some" as it relates to the British merchants.
No estimates are available for the merchant population of Quebec in 1775-1776. 
Coffin, however, estimated the British male adult population at "hardly 600." Assuming 
a total English population at 2,000, this figure seems a valid one. Of the 600, he says, 
it would be a liberal allowance to grant the town of Quebec half that number. The 
official return for the defending force in Quebec on November 16, 1775, was recorded 
as being "200 British militia," and on May 1, 1776, "277 British militia." This, Coffin 
says, is decisive evidence that the British subjects were heartily loyal to English rule.
Coffin does not have figures for Montreal, but he makes a case based on the 
petition of the townspeople, mentioned previously, presented to Montgomery before the 
surrender of Montreal. The terms of the petition included not being required to billet 
soldiers in their homes nor to take up arms against the mother country. These terms 
suggest, according to Coffin and Creighton who makes the same argument, that the 
townspeople were not supportive of the Americans. Coffin also refers to a letter written 
by Carleton on October 25, 1775, "that on the attack on Montreal by the rebels a few 
of the inhabitants, ‘mostly colonists,’ had refused to take part in the defense." This
37Justin Smith, Struggle, 347.
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extrapolated Coffin, means that most of the English element had taken part.38 But on 
November 4, after the capitulation of St. John, Carleton wrote Dartmouth of the ill 
disposition of the Canadian population and "those traitors within, who by their art and 
insinuation are still more dangerous to the public safety.39 To whom is he referring? 
The forty jubilant Montrealers, all pro-American, who on November 3 presented 
Montgomery with an address of welcome?
Do any of Coffin’s statistics or arguments represent decisive evidence? If the 200 
registered in the militia in Quebec in November 1775 actually helped defend the town 
in December when the rebels were at the gates, then out of the presumed 300 male 
Protestants, his assessment seems valid. But how many who signed up in November 
actually fought in December? According to the Quebec merchant who aided Arnold on 
his arrival in Quebec, John Halstead, except for one hundred "torys," the militia was 
ready to lay down their arms. Canadian council member and ardent Loyalist Francois 
Baby added that the British could count on only half of the people in Quebec. In his 
account of the Quebec campaign, historian Stanley says that "Cramahe knew too, as 
Ainslie knew, that even though they [the male adult population of Quebec] had signed 
the declaration of their willingness to fight, some members of the English-speaking 
community were not really to be trusted.40 These comments raise questions about the
38Coffin, Quebec, 486, ft. 2
39Stanley, Canada, 64.
“Ibid., 83
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accuracy of Coffin’s assessment that two hundred male adults fought on the side of the 
British. Is the larger number, 266, seven months later supportive of Coffin’s assertion? 
Wouldn’t more men have been willing to sign up for the militia after the disastrous defeat 
of the invaders on December 31 and when the arrival of British reinforcements on the 
St. Lawrence was only a few days away? One would expect the population of Quebec 
to be more pro-British than Montreal for it would be composed of a greater number of 
professional people and recipients of government patronage. What about Montreal? As 
the entrepot for traders from the colonies and as a gateway to the west, the town was 
more dynamic, more readily influenced by the American colonist, and less conservative. 
It would be assumed that the male adult population, especially because of its commercial 
base, would be less nationalistic. Since Coffin was dealing only with the total adult male 
population and not the total merchant population, his figures help only to delimit the 
number. Any attempt to extrapolate from these figures or arguments what kind of 
support the merchants gave to the Americans cannot be considered anything more than 
conjecture.
By culling whatever information could be gleaned from primary and secondary 
sources identification of 200 merchants was made. These merchants are listed in 
Appendix II, which is divided into two sections. The first section includes 100 
merchants, who are used for the purposes of this study. These merchants were 
considered the more influential ones in Quebec. The second section of 100 merchants 
is not complete and more research needs to be done. These merchants are included to
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give some indication of the breadth of the merchant community. This list is still not 
inclusive. The justification for using only 100 merchants, or roughly one third the 
estimated merchant population, for the survey is that if data on a merchant were not 
available after using all the sources described in Appendix II, especially the Quebec 
Gazette and the Dictionary o f Canadian Biography, then that merchant could not be 
considered of particular influence in the province.
The loyalties of the 100 merchants during the invasion in 1775-76 can be divided 
into four groups: those who actively supported the rebels; those who were loyal to the 
British; those for whom there is no mention; and other. Of the 100 English-speaking 
merchants: thirty-one supported the Americans; sixteen the British; fifty were not
involved; and three came under the category, "other."
Of the 31 who supported the Americans, about half actively fought with the 
American forces. They were: Edward Antill (New Jersey); John and Acklan Bondfield 
(England); David Salisbury Franks (England and New York); Freeman (America); John 
Halstead (America); Udney Hay (Scotland); William Haywood (America); Moses Hazen 
(Haverhill, Massachusetts); Holton (America); James Livingston and his two brothers, 
Richard and Alexander (born in Montreal of American parents); Richard McCarty 
(Connecticut); James Price (America); and John Welles (England). Those who provided 
supplies, money, and services were: James Bell (probably England); John Blake
(America or Ireland); J.D. Mercier (America); Jonas Clark Minot (America); Lucius Ley
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Solomons (England); Ezekiel Solomons (England); John White Swift (America); and 
possibly Charles Hay and Joseph Howard. Many of these merchants were political 
agitators, especially Thomas Walker (England and Boston) and John McCord (Ulster). 
Several names appear on Carleton’s list of traitors, but little more is known about them: 
Blakely (America); James Jeffry (America); Hector McNeil (Scotland); and Joseph Torry 
and his two brothers (America).
Sixteen English-speaking merchants can be verified as supporting the British. They 
included: Thomas Ainslie (Scotland); George Allsopp (England); John Coffin (Boston); 
Robert Cruickshank (Scotland and Boston); Lawrence Ermatinger (Switzerland); Simon 
Fraser (probably Scotland); James Stanley Goddard (England); William Grant (Scotland); 
Edward William Gray (England); Samuel Jacobs (England and America); John Lees, Sr. 
(Scotland); Robert Lester (Ireland); William Lindsay (Scotland); James McGill 
(Scotland); Alexander Paterson (Scotland); and Thomas Scott (probably England). 
Stanley lists other merchants who were officers of the British militia at Quebec "as of 
April 1778." Since there is no record of their involvement in 1775-76, they were not 
included as supporters of the British during the invasion. They were: Hugh Finlay, 
James and Alexander Johnson, Charles Grant, Edward Harrison, and George Gregory.41
The third category (50) refers to those merchants for whom no record of support 
for either side was found. This group included the fur traders who can be established
41 Ibid.
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as being in the northwest in 1775-76. They were: Alexander Henry (America), Peter 
Pond (America), Peter Pangman (America), Joseph and Thomas Frobisher (England), 
Charles Paterson, James Finlay, William Holmes (Ireland), Jean Etienne Wadden, 
George McBeath, Forrest Oakes, and William Kay.42 Earlier the merchants who were 
in the militia in 1778 were listed. There were other merchants, who though listed as 
being in the militia or militia officers, had no record of participation in 1775-76 or 1778. 
These merchants included: James Tod (Scotland), John Purss (Scotland), John Painter 
(England), Ralph Gray (Scotland), and Richard Dobie (Scotland). The explanation for 
this may be that they joined the militia at a later date, especially when war again 
threatened the continent prior to the War of 1812. There were other prominent 
merchants for whom no reference is made during this period. They were: Benjamin 
Frobisher (Scotland); John Gregory (Scotland); Thomas Dunn (England); George 
Davison (England); and, Thomas Aylwin (England). Of the three in the "other" 
category, one, Aaron Hart, served both sides; John Livingston returned to New York 
before the invasion; and Benjamin Price died in 1768.
There are two important findings of the investigation of what role the merchants 
played during the invasion in 1775-76. One is that many more merchants gave aid to the 
Americans in the brief period in 1775, when they occupied western Quebec and were 
attempting to capture Quebec City in the east, than has generally been conceded.
42Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1930), 197-199.
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Although the majority were of American origin, they also included Englishmen and 
Scots. By a ratio of almost two to one (31 to 16), the merchants identified supported the 
Americans rather than the British. There were probably others, but one of the problems 
in ferreting out those who supported the Americans is that Carleton carried out policies 
of severe punishment to those who were found guilty. A witch hunt was actually 
undertaken for American sympathizers, which resulted in some cases of imprisonment 
on the grounds of "guilt by association." In the end Carleton listed only twenty-nine as 
traitors. This list, Creighton says, is probably incomplete and therefore invites serious 
question.
Carleton and Haldimand after him were paranoid about the loyalty of the populace. 
Although not English, the imprisonment of Pierre du Calvet (France) illustrates how 
difficult it was to know where loyalties transgressed to traitorous activities, du Calvet, 
an important member of the bourgeoisie from France, was a reformer whose ideas 
comprised the ordinance of February 1, 1770, in which Carleton stripped the justices of 
their power in civil suits. This did not please du Calvet, however, for Carleton’s blanket 
condemnation of all justices was unjust to those whose conduct had been prudent, 
namely, himself. He bristled at the practice of billeting soldiers, was vehemently 
opposed to the Quebec At, especially the denial of habeas corpus and trial by jury, and 
argued for a legislative assembly. Perhaps his querulous nature made him suspect, for 
in October 1775, he was accused of collaborating with the enemy, was found guilty, and 
spent the next five years trying to clear himself. The evidence, mostly from witnesses
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who said that he incited them to join the rebels, was considered inconsequential. 
Nonetheless, he was jailed, and on the point of being dismissed, he wrote a scathing note 
to Governor Haldimand, who had replaced Carleton. As a consequence, he languished 
in jail for another two and half years without a right to trial—a reminder that opponents’ 
fear of the Quebec Act’s denial of habeas corpus was not unjustified.
The second important finding of the survey is that most of the prominent fur 
merchants appeared to carry on "business as usual" during the years of the invasion. 
Even though his brothers were in the northwest at this time, we know that Benjamin 
Frobisher was in Montreal, for he led a delegation of merchants, referred to earlier, to 
petition the Continental Congress to lift the ban that had been imposed on trade. The 
merchants’ concern for their economic interests supports Creighton’s thesis that the first 
British Canadians were "merchants before they were Britons, Protestants, or political 
theorists."43 Creighton emphasized in referring to the conditions that the merchants 
presented to Montgomery for surrender of Montreal that these were hardly radical 
expressions of support for the rebels. But he does not go on to say that this meant that 
they were in. support of Britain. Creighton points out that except for Thomas Walker, 
none of the merchants who supported the Americans was an important fur trader. In 
other words, says Creighton, the men whose business activities were least attuned to the 
distinctive commercial system of the north were the ones who went over to the enemy. 
He claimed that the bulk of the merchants watched the Americans and their few
43Creighton, Empire, 28.
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sympathizers press southward without regret or perturbation. This statement is 
questionable if one examines who the merchants were and how many of them came from 
the colonies and still had business and personal relations there.
From this initial attempt to identify the extent of the merchants’ sympathies for the 
American cause, there is sufficient evidence to warrant a thorough re-examination of the 
merchants’ records. Only then can the assumptions about their role in the American 
invasion be confirmed. That there was more support from the spring of 1775 to the 
spring of 1776 than has generally been believed suggests the tantalizing possibility that 
the outcome could have been different, at least in the short term. Rather than conclude 
that the British were successful in routing the invaders, it seems more accurate to say that 
the Americans were unsuccessful in galvanizing the sympathies that were there due to 
their own mistakes and lack of commitment in the early days of the invasion. The 
merchants who supported the British or who remained neutral were the beneficiaries of 
the outcome. The American fur interests had already been on the decline. Those New 
York merchants concerned about the impending crisis between the American colonists 
and England had already moved their headquarters to Montreal. Many other merchants 
benefits from war contracts and were able to diversify their activities. Politically, those 
merchants who had been pressuring for reform of the political system and repeal of the 
Quebec Act continued to do so. With the influx of loyalists after the American 
Revolution, they were ultimately successful in being granted an assembly in the 
Constitution Act of 1791.
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One of the most important consequences of the failed invasion was that this event 
was a critical benchmark in the political culture of Canada as distinct from what became 
the United States. In response to the rebellion in the American colonies, the system of 
conciliar government was introduced in Canada, which fit the British concept of a 
mercantile nation. Canada was to be the kind of colony the Americans rejected: 
dependent and admissive of the sovereignty of the British Parliament. When Canada was 
granted self-determination, its constitution in 1867 was modeled after that of the mother 
country, not as in the American case, contrary to it. The political culture was more 
conservative, more hierarchical, less democratic than that of the United States. Those 
merchants who supported the American cause were passionate about a government that 
promised "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." In contrast, those merchants who 
remained in Canada were more comfortable with government that promised "peace, 
order, and good government."
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CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this study was to determine the extent and nature of the 
American influence in Quebec in its seminal period of English rule from 1760 to 1776. 
The conclusion reached is that the role of the colonists was an important one not only in 
the development of Quebec, which at the time was "Canada," but also in the history of 
Canadian-American relations. Three major influences were selected as the basis for the 
study. The first concerned the American immigrant merchants and the part they played 
in the colony’s internal life. Since no distinctions were made between the 
American-originated and other English-speaking merchants, the first task was to identify 
that population; and the second was to place the American component in the context of 
the community as a whole. The major issue addressed was the struggle of the English 
merchants to gain British rights. A second consideration was the role of the colonies, and 
of their spokesmen in London, on British policy as it affected Quebec. Four policy 
decisions were examined in order to determine the extent of the American influence: The 
Treaty of Paris in 1763, the Royal Proclamation in 1763, Western policy in 1768, and 
the Quebec Act in 1774. The most important policy decision concerned the Quebec Act. 
Despite the exhaustive research that has been done on the Act, another from an American 
perspective to determine whether there was linkage between the Act and what was 
occurring in the American colonies became unavoidable. The last major determinant of 
the American influence was how extensive merchant support for the American rebels was
323
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in the invasion of 1775-76. Heretofore, the English mercantile community had always 
been considered either neutral or pro-British. The focus on the invasion was to confirm 
or refute that conclusion. Concentration in these three areas—the role of the American 
merchants on the internal life of Quebec, consideration of the American colonies on 
British policy decision as they affected Quebec, and the role of the English-speaking 
merchants during the invasion—provide the basis for the conclusions reached. In some 
cases because of the broad scope of this survey, the conclusions are tentative and require 
further investigation. But the evidence thus far strongly suggests that in many instances 
a new interpretation of some orthodox views is in order.
One of the first revisions that seems not only overdue but "just" concerns the 
merchants in general. They do not deserve the pejorative appellation of "malcontents," 
which even to the present day is the term used to describe them. The explanation may 
be that most histories deal primarily with the merchants’ political acts and not with their 
economic and social contributions. Perhaps when the only source on the merchants came 
from the official records, this description, along with "licentious fanaticks" which has 
been echoed down the years, might have been understandable. Recent social and 
economic historians support the conclusions reached from this study: that the merchants 
were on the whole respectable, civic-minded citizens who were responsible for building 
the infrastructure of the colony and of developing its economic resources. If there were 
those who exploited their fellowman, they were no different from other groups in the 
society in which they lived.
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While the economic and social importance of the merchants might be conceded 
today, the merchants’ political role still does not have many adherents. The explanation 
may have to do with the interpretation of the political struggle of the English merchants 
for British rights. The merchants’ petitions for introduction of an assembly and for other 
British liberties continue to be seen as an attempt of a small oligarchy wanting to govern 
in its own interest, denying the vast French-Canadian population the right to its own 
language, laws, and religion. Exception is taken to this viewpoint for several reasons: 
first, the merchants were petitioning for rights that they formerly enjoyed, that were 
promised them when they moved to Quebec, that were essential to their economic 
prosperity, and that were provided them constitutionally in the Proclamation of 1763. 
Could they be expected to relinquish such rights, when they believed doing so would 
jeopardize their chances of having any input in the decisions that affected them? How 
could they combat the enormous control that the governors arbitrarily exercised over 
their daily lives? They were dependent on the authorities for their licenses to trade, to 
be granted liquor licenses, to leave the province, and to buy firearms. Under civilian rule 
they continued to have curfews and were obliged to obey other regulations that were 
infringements on their personal liberties. Their most serious complaint, however, was 
denial of an assembly. Only with an assembly could they curb the power of the 
governing elite, who, they believed, were prejudiced against them and who did not 
understand their economic needs.
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Second, the charges that the merchants discriminated against the French Canadians 
and wished to banish them, as Murray charged, and that the English had very little 
intercourse with them, as Carleton claimed, are not valid. The record is impressive that 
the merchant hired Canadians, intermarried, socialized with them, and took them on as 
business partners. If a case can be made, it is that the discrimination was, as Creighton 
concluded, class-driven and not race-driven. That was true of eighteenth-century English 
society in general. It was certainly true of the clash between the merchants and the army 
and the merchants and the governing elite.
Third, the charge that the merchants’ petitions for an assembly would result in a 
small oligarchy that would deprive the Canadians of their language, laws, and religion 
has to be examined in the context of the dissensions between them and the governing 
elite. Both sides took extreme positions. Murray and Carleton both showed disdain for 
the commercial class and partiality toward the Canadians, especially the noblesse. The 
bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, which included the army and the governing officials, had 
little experience with each other or inclination to understand one another. In postwar 
Quebec these misunderstandings were exacerbated by the fragile economy, the 
uncertainties over the future, and the particular foibles of Murray and Carleton, but 
especially Murray. The result was frequent disorders and clashes between the two 
groups. Had Murray, as any good leader should have, attempted conciliatory measures, 
the merchants’ demands might have been more tempered. We don’t know how they 
would have behaved in a less hostile environment, but their good relationship with the
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Canadian mercantile class and their proposal in 1765 to grant Canadians the right to vote 
for an assembly suggest that had the government played the role of honest broker, a 
better resolution to the problems of the Canadians and the English would have occurred. 
The merchants’ cooperative behavior in the first years of Carleton’s tenure as acting 
governor provides some basis for suggesting this possibility. Given the provocation on 
the part of the governing elite, the merchants do not deserve being cast in the role of 
malcontents.
The part played by the American merchants in these years was a decisive one. The 
estimate that they represented only thirteen per cent of the Protestant population living 
in Montreal and its environs in 1765 is a misleading one. From the survey of merchants 
who were in Quebec, listed in Appendix II, the actual percent is forty-four. This latter 
figure includes, however, immigrants who though not American-born had lived in the 
American colonies before moving to Quebec. The assumption made to include the latter 
group was that they were influenced, whether positively or negatively, by that 
experience. Apart from the per cent, this group wielded power disproportionate to its 
numbers. Some of the most important fur traders were from the American colonies: 
Alexander Henry, Peter Pangman, Peter Pond, and Simon McTavish. The merchants 
were generally from middle class families. They brought to Canada their energy, 
know-how, and, in some cases, much needed capital. They also brought with them their 
experience with, and in some cases their fervor for, democratic government. In this they 
were not alone for the English mercantile community all shared to varying degrees the
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beliefs that as British subjects they had a right to representative government, habeas 
corpus, and trial by jury. Some of the foremost political agitators for British rights came 
from the American colonies: Thomas Walker, James Price, James Livingston, Edward 
Antill, William Haywood, Peter Faneuil among others. The extent of the American 
involvement is reflected in Appendix I, which indicates the number of petitions and 
protests signed by the merchants calling for their rights.
The second consideration was the impact of American influence on British policy 
as it affected Quebec. The triangular relationship with Great Britain, particularly with 
respect to the treaty history, is generally perceived by Canadians as detrimental to their 
interests. An examination of that history does not support this view, nor can it be 
supported by studying the major policy issues in the period under consideration. While 
American interests were paramount over those of Canada in the Treaty of Paris, the 
Royal Proclamation in 1763, and Western policy in 1768, that was not the case in 
enactment of the Quebec Act in 1774. This change coincided with the decline of 
American influence in the ministry beginning in 1770. The Rockingham, Chatham, and 
Grafton ministries of the Sixties, generally favorable to the American colonists, were 
superseded by the North ministry, which was less favorable. In Westminster, similar 
disenchantment with the colonies was discernible. The challenge to its authority by the 
rebellious colonies had alienated even those who were American supporters. The effect 
of these changes began to surface about 1772 with respect to Britain’s western policy that 
affected both the colonies and Quebec. By utilizing both Canadian and American sources,
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a better understanding of the policy decisions emerges. The long wrangling over land 
claims in the Ohio country and the neglect of the colonies to establish uniform 
regulations for the fur trade or to replace imperial officers at the various forts resulted 
in continued illegal migration of settlers into the Indian reserve, which threatened Indian 
unrest, and fierce competition in the fur trade, which threatened the viability of the trade 
itself. When Carleton and Cramahe, as well as influential Scottish merchants, 
recommended returning the territory to Canada, the appeal was irresistible. The 
advantages to Great Britain of a more regulated fur trade in the northwest, in which 
Canada had geographic advantages, and the greater profit to Britain, since the fur traders 
in Canada sold more British manufactured goods than their counterparts in the colonies, 
resolved many problems.
These parallel threads—the dialogue with Canadian authorities over North American 
issues involving Quebec and the American colonies—became intertwined in the Quebec 
Act of 1774. The conclusion that there was linkage between the Act and events in the 
American colonies is at variance with the majority thinking and the latest treatment on 
the subject by Philip Lawson. Several arguments are advanced for linkage: First, two of 
the terms of the Act—the form of conciliar government and the return of the western 
territories to Quebec—were, in large measure, a response to the problems confronting the 
North ministry in the rebellious acts of the colonies over sovereignty and, as just 
mentioned, the need to resolve the threat of Indian uprisings in the territories and to 
protect the fur trade from further decline. Second, it seems implausible that key
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policymakers’ prejudices against the American colonists could be so compartmentalized 
that they would not affect their decisions with respect to Quebec. These men were not 
so shortsighted that they were unaware of the repercussions the Quebec Act would have 
on the American colonies. Third, even though Dartmouth had determined to enact 
legislation for Quebec in the 1774 Parliamentary session, the rush to have it drafted and 
presented at the shank end of the session was due to the confrontation with the American 
colonies and fears of an invasion of Quebec by them. Fourth, that Dartmouth’s 
instructions to Carleton so modified the intent of the Act as to seriously question the 
commitment of the government to reverse the policy of anglicization. The Act has to be 
considered one of expediency to gain the favor of the Canadians in the event of a 
showdown with the colonists.
Since the Quebec Act is viewed by some historians as having triggered the 
American Revolution and since the struggle of the merchants for an assembly was denied 
them in the Act, a review of the pros and cons of the Act became essential. The 
conclusion that the decision to reverse the policy of anglicization was based on mistaken 
premises might affront Canadian nationalists. The basis for this conclusion should not be 
construed to support a policy that would deny the French-Canadian population the right 
to their own history. But there can be no question in this author’s view that the views of 
the Canadians had been misrepresented by Carleton and that he was responsible for 
enactment of legislation that did not reflect the needs of the French-Canadian habitants 
but served only the narrow interests of the clergy and seigneurs. The argument is also
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made that the form of government, with the unbridled power given the governor to 
dismiss councilors and to deny habeas corpus in criminal cases was more despotic than 
it would have been had a system as proposed in 1769, which would have included 
Canadians, been tried. Since the Act was vehemently protested by the American colonists 
who viewed the Act as one of the Intolerable Acts, it became inextricably linked with 
Quebec in the effort of the colonists to enlist the support of the Canadians in their 
rebellion against Great Britain.
Interestingly, the invasion in 1774-75 by the American colonists is not given much 
attention in Canadian historiography. Little is known about the role of the merchants in 
that critical year when the Americans invaded Quebec. Donald Creighton’s analysis that 
the merchants were first merchants before they were Britons, Protestants, or political 
theorists is supported by the results of the survey of this study. The great majority of 
merchants do not appear to have joined the British in repelling the Americans. Many fur 
traders were in the northwest in this critical year, but many others were in Montreal. 
There are no indications that they participated in the invasion. Whenever there was any 
evidence of even passive support for the British, that support was acknowledged. The 
surprising result of the survey is that there were more merchants who supported the 
Americans than supported the British. Of those studied, fifteen supported the British, 
thirty-one the Americans, one both, two were not applicable. The great majority, fifty 
or fifty percent appear not to have been involved. More research needs to be done in
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this area. But the result of the 100 merchants studied here suggests that prior assumptions 
about the support of the merchants need revision.
Investigation of these three American influences revealed other instances in which 
there was a different opinion from the more orthodox views. The first such case involved 
the level of protest in Quebec against the Stamp Act. The general view is that there were 
only minimal protests. If this were true, several reasons were advanced of why this might 
be so. They were that: a little known clause in the Act exempted for five years those 
firms that conducted their businesses in French; the conditions of Quebec with its 
sparsely populated area and lack of roads made collection of the tax difficult; and the 
lack of revenue from the tax, which led Canadian historian Francois-Xavier Gameau to 
suggest that there was a "resistance passive. H u S  the protest been minimized? How 
does one account for the fact that the Quebec Gazette closed its doors until the Act was 
repealed? Does one ignore the fact that the welcoming address on Carleton’s arrival, 
signed by seventy people, was opposed by forty-five because it stated that the merchants 
proudly obeyed the Stamp Act and acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament to 
legislate for Canada? The only contemporary record that we have that the Canadians did 
not listen to the "licentious traders from New York, but cheerfully obeyed" the Act is 
from Murray. His credibility on such matters has been considered unreliable. If the 
Stamp Act did not galvanize the mercantile community into strident protests, however, 
the duties on imports the following year did. Their cries of "no taxation without
'Coffin, Province, 316.
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representation" suggest again that they acted when their interests were affected and that 
they were quick learners of the tactics used by their southern cousins.
Another area in which more research needs to be done concerns regulation of the 
fur trade. Creighton suggests that the New York traders were responsible for these 
regulations because they redounded to their benefit, giving them an advantage in the fur 
trade over the Canadians, which they otherwise would not have had. From the letters 
contained in Volume V of William Johnson’s papers, this claim is not justified. The New 
York traders wrote Johnson opposing these regulations, but Johnson and Gage, who were 
in solid agreement with one another, were determined to continue to control the fur trade 
for fear that if the regulations were lifted, the traders would exploit the Indians, leading 
to Indian uprisings. The significance of this issue is that more seems to be made of the 
rivalry between the New York and Canadian traders than might appear justified. Much 
more research needs to be done on this issue, especially as it relates to a better 
understanding of the Canadian-American relations.
Before concluding, an overview of this period seems appropriate. The tensions that 
existed between the British merchants and Murray and Carleton were not unique to 
Quebec. They were symptomatic of the changing times, and the situation in the American 
colonies was not dissimilar. The public official, whether sitting in Whitehall or in the 
governor’s chair in North American, was engaged in a holding action against the stream 
of history that was threatening to diminish his power. The role of Great Britain and its
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colonies was changing, but those policymakers who wished to retain the traditional role 
of the colonies to the mother country had not the vision to anticipate a different 
relationship. These men did not have the background to understand that the North 
American experience had gone beyond the point of tolerating a pullback from the 
independence that its developing society produced. The clash can be viewed as between 
the aristocracy and the rising middle class, which was also a clash between the two 
groups over who would have power. A few of Britain’s politicians understood this, but 
they were in the minority. The mercantile community had influence, but it was still too 
fractious to compete with the entrenched status of the aristocracy. The acts of North, 
Hillsborough, Dartmouth, Murray, and Carleton represented obstacles to the 
republicanism of the new breed of Englishmen in America. The struggles that ensued 
resulted in the end of the First British Empire and the beginning of a new epoch in which 
democratic forces would continue to uproot the entrenched power of an aristocracy that 
would eventually become anachronistic. The history of the struggle of the merchants for 
their rights in Quebec and the struggle of the American revolutionists for similar rights 
should be placed in this context.
At the outset of this undertaking, reference was made to the concerns that 
Canadians have about living next to the United States. Margaret Atwood says that 
watching their neighbors has become a national pastime. They worry that what happens
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to the south of them will ultimately affect them. They also fret that the Americans do not 
recognize the differences between them. The results of this study indicate that they are 
justified in being concerned that what happens to their neighbors has an impact on them. 
This study suggests that this was true from the very beginning of British rule. The 
triangular relations should have their origins not in the Treaty of Paris in 1783, but in 
the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Between then and the failed invasion of 1776, the American 
influence was important in shaping the political, economic, and social conditions in 
Quebec. But a decision was made in 1776 that the American struggle for independence 
from the mother country was not in their interests. Many loyalists prior to the end of 
the Revolutionary War agreed so that as American invaders retreated to the south the 
beginnings of a political culture distinct from that of the United States took shape. With 
the influx of the loyalists after the war, those differences were there to be strengthened 
and shaped into the kind of society that Canada is today. It was in the critical years of 
British rule, however, from 1760-1776, that the influence of the American colonies was 
a significant one - it should not be dismissed as it has been until now.
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A P P E N D IX  I
RECORD OF KEY PETITIONS SIGNED BY MERCHANTS, 1764-1775 
Key:
1 Presentments of the Grand Jury, October 16, 1764.
2 Petition of Quebec Traders to the King, April 1765, calling for Murray’s recall.
3 Petition to the King for an assembly, probably 1770.
4 Petition to the King for an assembly, Quebec on December 31, 1773, and Montreal, 
January 10, 1774.
5 Petitions for Repeal of the Quebec Act, November 12, 1774, to the King, the House 
of Lords and the House of Commons.
Bold face type represents known American originated merchants.
P e t i t io n s 1 r 1 4 «;
M p r i 'h a n ts
W ill iam  Aird Y
Tnhn Aitkin Y Y
fle n rg e  Allcnpp Y
F ran r ic  Andercnn Y Y
Tampc Andersnn Y
F d w n r d  A rat all Y
P e te r  Amnlrli Y Y
W illiam  Ashhy Y
F ran e is  Atkinsnn Y
T h n m as  Aylwin Y
N iehn las  Rayard Y Y
D aniel R ayne Y Y
T R eer Y
Tnhn Rell Y
Tean R em ard Y Y
Tame? R indnn
Jn sp p h  R in d n n Y Y
Taenh RittP7 Y
Tame? R lake Y Y
J n h n  R la k e Y Y
J n s ia h  R lp ak ley Y
J n h n  R n n d f ip ld Y
TTenry R nnne Y
Tnseph Rnrrel Y
D  R nnrh il lie r Y
T Pimuel Rnw les Y
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Petitions t 2 3 4 5
M erchan ts
Thomas Royd X
Nicholas Rrown X X
Philip Rruikman X X
John Rurke X
W illiam Callander X













Christy Cram er X











Richard Dohie X X X
Tames Doig X X
Thomas Duggan X









W illiam England X
T .awrence Erm atinger X X X
P ete r Faneni! X X
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Petitions 1 ?. 1 d s
M erchan ts




Tames Finlav X X
Michael Flanagan X
Peter Fnrhes X
D avid Salshy F ran k s X
Alexander F raser X X
Tames Fraser X X X
Malcolm Fraser X X
Simon Fraser X X X
Simon Fraser, Tr. X X
Thomas Fraser X
Benjamin Frobisher X X
George Fulton X X
Tames Galbraith X
Daniel Gallway X
Tnhn A Gastineau X
David Geddes X
Rengiah Gihh X
Tames Stanley Goddard X X
Hinrick Gonnerman X
Tames Gordon
Charles Grant X X X
Tames Grant X X
William Grant X
Fdward William Gray X
Palnh Grav X
Henry Grehassa X
Genrpe Grepnry X X
Tnhn Grepnrv X
John  Hacy
Jn h n  H alstead X
Tames Hanna X X
Tnhn Hare, Tr X
Fdward Harrison X X
A aron H a r t X X
Alexander Hay X X
C harles H ay X
TTdney H ay X
Andrew Hays X
W illiam  H ayw ood X X
M oses Ha7en
A lexander H enrv X X X
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Ahraham Holmes X X







Robert R Tanis X
Tames Teffry X X
G eorge Tenkins X X




Tohn Kay X X
W illiam Kay X
W illiam Keith X
George King X X X
Godfrey King X X
George Wright Knowles X
W illiam T aing X X
Gavin Ja im e X
Archibald T awford X
Alexander T awson X X
James Teach X
Meschach T eeng X
John J ees X X X
John T ees, Tr X X
Charles TeMarchant X
Charles TeMardent X
F.lea/er T evy X
Simon T evv X
John T.illv X X
W illiam T.indsay X
R ich ard  Livingston X




Jo h n  T.ynd X X
Zachary Macaulay X X X
John Maier X
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Petitions 1 2 3 4 -S
M p rrh n n ts
Spin Mann X
Alexander Martin X X
Tnhn M arteilhe X
Samiipl M a th e r
T M anrez
Tacnh M aurer X
R ich ard  M cC arty
William M cCarty X
Rnhert M cCay X
Pat M cClement X
Tnhn M cChier X
Tnhn M cCord X X X
Tnhn M cCnrd, Tr. X
Thomas McCnrd X X
R oger M cC orm ick X
Allan M cFarlain X
Peter M cFarland X X
Rohert M cFie X X
Andrew McGill X
Tames McGill X X




Roderick McT e.ori X X
Thomas M cM urray X X
Richard McNeall X X
Gilhert McRandall X
Simon M rTavish X
Fdward Manwaring X
James M ay X
George Measam X X X
.T. Melvin X X
John D . M errie r X
Randle Meredith X X
Peter M ills X
Alexander Milmine X
Jnnas C la rk e  M innt X X X
John M ittlehurger X
Solomon M ittelherger X X
Michl. Morin X
Daniel Mori son X
James Morrison X X
Samuel Morrison X X
William M urrav X X
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Petitions 1 2 3 4 5
M prrhan tc
Duncan M unro X
George M unro X
Richard M urray
John Neagle X X
T S Nicol X
Johan Nikal X
Tames: Noel X X




Alexander Paterson X X X
Allan Paterson X
Gharles Paterson X
John Paterson X X
Phil. Payne X X
Tames Perry X
Frederick Petry X X
Michael Phillips X
Andrew Porteons X X
John Porteons X X X
Tames Price X X
Jonathan Pullman X X
John Pnrss X
Ahraham O gier X
John Renand X X X
John Richardson X X
John Richardson, Tr X
TJugh Ritchie X X
Daniel Rohertson X X
Tames Rohinson X
John Ross X X
.Tacoh Rowe X





Samuel Sills X X
Rohert Simpson X
James Sinclair X X X
George Singleton X X
Francis Smith X X
.Tacoh Smith X
T.each Smith X X
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Petitions 1 2 3 4 5
M erchan ts
JEzekiel Solom ons X X
T.evy Solomons X X
J o h n  S ten house. X X
Thom as Story X X
M urdock Stuart X X
Tohn Sunderland X X
Jo h n  W hite  Swift X X
Jam es Symington X
H enry Taylor X
Noah Temons
J o h n  Thompson X X
Caleb Thom e X
Tsaac Todd X X
James Tod X
J o s e p h  T orry X
John Trotter X X
.faroh V an d er H eyden X X
Richard Vincent X
Je a n  F.tienne Wadden X X
John George W alk X
Richard W alker X X
Thom as W alk er X X
Thom as W alker, Tr. X X
Alexander W allace X
John Watmough X
William W eir X
Jo h n  W elles X X
_Adam Wentsel X
John W harton X
James D yer W hite X X
J^ohert Willcocks X
.Tenkin W illiams X
Tames W oods X
Rohert Woolsey X X
G. Youne X X
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APPENDIX II
MERCHANTS LIVING IN QUEBEC, 1760-1776
The following list of merchants who lived in Quebec from 1760 to 1776 has been 
compiled from entries of merchants in the Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
Volumes IV and V; records in the Public Archives of Canada of landholdings, exit 
bonds, applications for trading licenses, liquor licenses, and the selling of firearms; from 
an index of the Quebec Gazette, also located in the Archives; and from the petitions of 
the merchants described in Appendix I. Sources used to identify American connections 
were: the Massachusetts Historical Society index, the Colonial Albany Social History 
Project index, and the thirteen volume collection of Sir William Johnson’s Papers. These 
sources were in addition to the other primary and secondary sources listed in the 
Bibliography.
The intent in producing this index is to determine: the origins of the merchants 
prior to their arrival in Quebec, the scope of their business activities and their inter­
relationship with other Quebec merchants, their political activities, the role they played 
during the American invasion of 1775-76, and other contributions that were made to the 
development of Quebec. The biographies do not pretend to be complete. The sixteen 
years under consideration were years in which conditions in Quebec were particularly 
inhospitable to economic development. As a result, the enterprises of the mercantile 
community did not come into fruition until a later period. Nonetheless, the character of 
the men who were trying to establish themselves in this inchoate period of English rule 
in Quebec could be ascertained from their early efforts.
The results of this investigation form the basis upon which to judge the extent of 
the American influence in the commercial, political and social development of Quebec. 
Specifically, the attempt was made to discover what per cent of merchants had American 
origins—either American-born or had lived in the colonies—and what per cent supported 
the Americans in the invasion. This list is divided into two parts: those merchants whose 
identifications were complete enough for the purposes of this survey; and those 
merchants for whom only fragmentary information has been found. The latter is 
included in order to provide a better awareness of the extent of the merchant community.
In all, two hundred merchants were identified, of whom one hundred were used 
for this survey. Of those one hundred, sixteen are known to have supported the British, 
thirty-one the Americans, fifty no mention and another three, including one who served 
both sides, one who moved to New York, and one who died. In order to estimate the
344
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
345
number of merchants who were of American origin, whether American-born or not, a 
bolder print is used. The assumption in including those merchants who lived in the 
colonies, but were not American-born, is that experience shaped their attitudes, whether 
positively or negatively. Of the one hundred, forty-four were of American origin, or 
forty-four per cent.
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MERCHANTS INCLUDED IN THE SURVEY
1. AESSLIE, THOMAS
Scotland. Boston. Businessman, officeholder, militia officer. From 1749 
until 1760, he lived in Boston, where he entered the mercantile trade. 
Married Elizabeth Martin of Hampton, New Hampshire. Emigrated to 
Quebec in 1760-62 due to friendship with Governor Murray. He was 
appointed administrator of king’s posts on the lower St. Lawrence, where he 
enjoyed temporary monopoly on fur trade. He was also appointed Collector 
of Revenue for the province. As collector, he retained fees for the collection 
of provincial duties continued from the French regime until 1768, when local 
merchants refused to pay.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773.
Other: A lawsuit was brought against him by Joseph Howard on
February 13, 1786.
Invasion: British. He was a captain in the British militia during the siege of 
Quebec. His diary, "Canada Preserved" gives the fullest and most accurate 
account from the British perspective of the siege. He was pessimistic about 
the colony’s ability to resist the invaders. In November he wrote Sylvester 
Gardiner at Boston, "God forgive those who have so cruelly abandoned us." 
He denounced the demagoguery of British "Grunibletonians" and of 
American "banditti." The only exceptions to his general condemnation of 
ungrateful Canadians were the "nobles and clergy," both royalists, and the 
militia within the city, whose courage during Montgomery’s attack impressed 
him.
2. ALLSOPP, GEORGE
England. Businessman, officeholder, politician, and seigneur. He served in 
British quartermaster general’s department during the 1758 expedition against 
Louisbourg and as secretary to Lieutenant-Colonel Guy Carleton at Quebec. In 
1761 he arrived in Quebec as junior partner for the mercantile supply firm of 
Jenkins, Trye and Company.
Commercial Activities: With SAMUEL JACOBS and JOHN WELLES, Allsopp 
formed a company to exploit a potash works in Lower Town Quebec. With 
brother-in-law JOHN BONDFIELD, he purchased seigneuries of Auteuil and
346
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Jacques-Cartier thirty miles upstream from Quebec, including a gristmill. 
Bondfield relinquished his share, Allsopp began making flour and became 
indebted to Jacobs for grain purchases. By 1788 he was producing 22 per cent 
of the colony’s annual wheat production. Through many vicissitudes, such as fire 
destroying his mills twice, he managed to continue in the flour business.
Political Activities: An ardent promoter for British rights, he opposed the Quebec 
Act and protested elimination of jury trials and habeas corpus, the unauthorized 
Privy Council introduced by Carleton and continued by Haldimand, the absence 
of a clearly defined legal code to regulate commercial transactions and suits, and 
the inadequacies of the court system established under the Quebec Act. He was 
suspended from the legislative council for his "seditious spirit." He lobbied hard 
for an assembly, English commercial law, and the Constitution Act of 1791, 
which divided Quebec into Upper and Lower Canada.
Other: Although he was a member of the Quebec Fire and Agriculture societies, 
his business responsibilities demanded his full attention. He emerged as a major 
industrialist, but he also contributed to the political issues about which he cared 
deeply.
Invasion: British, though suspected of being an American sympathizer. He
served as commissary general for the Quebec garrison. In 1777 he was publicly 
assaulted as a "rebel" due more to his association with rebel supporters and his 
disputatious nature. He was stripped of his official posts as a result.
3. ANTILL, EDWARD
New Jersey. From a "good family." He practiced law in Canada from 1764 
until he left Quebec after Carleton ordered all sympathizers out of the town 
in November 1774. In the lower Canada land records, he is listed as owning 
several properties.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773.
Invasion; American. He joined Montgomery as chief engineer of the army 
and was with him when he died. With Moses Hazen, he left for the 
Continental army to report Montgomery’s death and plead for help. He was 
appointed second in command under Hazen to recruit Canadians for a 
Second Canadian regiment. After the failed invasion, he fought and was 
captured in New York. He was freed in an exchange in 1780 and lived in New 
York until 1785. With his family he returned to St. John in 1785.
347
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
348
4. ARNOLDI, PETER
Germany. St. John’s. Silversmith. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants in the Montreal district in 1765. He was listed as a farmer and 
former sergeant.
Commercial Activities: He was one of several silversmiths who engaged in the 
Indian silver trade. Others were JOHN OAKES, MICHAEL ARNOLDI 
(Brother), JOHANN PETER, MICHEL ROY, DOMINIQUE ROUSSEAU, and 
DELEZENNE. He petitioned for a liquor license in Montreal on March 27, 
1773, and was sponsored by ALEXANDER HAY.
Political Activities: He signed petitions to the king for an assembly, December 
1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act, December 1774.
Invasion. Not known.
5. ASKIN (ERSKINE), JOHN
Northern Ireland. Albany. Fur trader, merchant, officeholder and militia 
officer. After the conquest he entered the western fur trade.
Commercial Activities: In 1760, he was partners with ROBERT ROGERS. 
They went bankrupt due to Indian uprisings in 1763. Askin moved to 
Michilimackinac, where he ran a trading store, farmed, and was named 
commissary for the garrison. More importantly, he enjoyed a close 
relationship with Arendt Schuyler DePeyster, commandant at 
Michilimackinac in the 1770s. Commandants regulated the trade with 
Indians, allocated shipping space, and frequently tacitly approved illegal 
purchases of land from Indians. He had close ties to ISAAC TODD and 




England. Quebec. Merchant, justice of peace, member of Grand Jury, 1764. 
Aylwin was one of the first merchants established in Quebec after Wolfe’s 
victory, but in 1769 he left Quebec for Boston for six years. While there, he 
married Lucy Cushing. He returned to Quebec in 1774 due to the impending 
crisis.
Commercial Activities: Aylwin and Co. was a supplier to other merchants, sold 
wheat, and was a wholesaler of biscuits.
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Political Activities: He was an advocate of commercial rights. He signed the 
Grand Jury presentment in 1764, claiming that the Grand Jury rather than the 
governor’s council was the representative body in the province and should have 
a say in legislative and oversight matters. He signed the Cawthome letter in 1766 
regarding the repeal of the Stamp Act.
Other: He was involved in community affairs and in the fraternity of Masons. 
Despite having lived a comfortable life, he died in debt. Lawsuits were brought 




Albany. Montreal. Fur trader. Bannerman immigrated to Montreal in 1774.
Commercial Activities: He was a partner of SIMON McTAVISH and moved 
to Montreal with him in 1774 as a result of the nonimportation and 
nonexportation agreements in the colonies that were ruinous to their business.
Invasion: He was in the northwest carrying on the fur trade in 1775-76.
8. BAYNE, DANIEL
England. Quebec. Merchant. He arrived soon after the conquest with large 
quantities of British merchandise to sell. The venture failed.
Commercial Activities: He was partners with WILLIAM BRYMER. He bought 
a tract of land near the Strait of Belle Isle to carry on a seal fishery, which was 
protested by Governor Pailister of Newfoundland since the Proclamation of 1763 
granted that land to his province. The long quarrel ended with the Board of 
Trade ruling that the grant was legal and that the right of private property was not 
violated.
Political Activities: Bayne signed the presentment of the Grand Jury, October 16, 
1764, and the petition of Quebec traders to the king, April 1765. He represented 
Quebec merchants in London in 1764 to protest Murray’s refusal to consider 
British rights. Bayne and Brymer petitioned the Board of Trade to return 
Labrador to Quebec, which was granted in the Quebec Act.
Invasion: Not known.
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9. BELL, JAMES
Merchant, carpenter, landowner. He came to Canada during the Seven 
Years’ War; married into Gabriel Christie’s family. He arrived in Chambly 
with wife and son Alex in 1765. Traded wheat, meat, spirits, building 
materials, carriages, and horses. He never let language or religion stand in 
his way. He mastered French and occasionally allowed people to call him 
Jacques. His son and daughter were baptized in the Roman Catholic 
Church. He used French-speaking notaries and hired Canadians for his 
construction work.
Political Activities: He probably signed the petition for repeal of the Quebec 
Act, 1774, although the record indicates a "John" Bell signed it.
Other; A lawsuit was brought against him on April 8, 1782, by J. McDonald 
and Company.
Invasion: Mostly American. He offered help to the American forces on their 
arrival in the Richelieu Valley. His knowledge of the territory, skill as a 
carpenter, and resources as a merchant made him valuable to the colonials. 
He aided Major John Brown, Richard Montgomery, David Wooster, and 
Benedict Arnold. He oversaw the repair of Fort Chambly, built numerous 
bateaux and carriages. He helped raise troops and advanced £6,056.34 of 
personal funds for the American cause. Moses Hazen guaranteed £826 of this 
amount. After the war Bell sued Hazen for this amount and won his suit, 
which attached part of his property in Clinton County, New York. This 
included 1,000 acres in Refugee Tract and Hazen’s farm on Point au Roche, 
including the stock and farm equipment. After the American retreat, Bell 
provided the same services to the British. His biography in the Dictionary 
of Canadian Biography claims that Bell was forced to deal with the 
Americans. That seems highly unlikely given the extent of his assistance.
10. BINDON, JOSEPH
England. Montreal. Merchant. In Jews in Canada his name is spelled 
"Bindona." He applied for an exit bond, which was secured by EDWARD 
HARRISON, November 16, 1768. When the American commissioners 
granted the merchants leave to trade in the upper country, Bindon was one 
of the first to set out.
Political Activities; He signed the petition for an assembly in December 1773, 
and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion; American. Before Congress sanctioned capturing the forts of Fort 
Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. John, Bindon incurred the wrath of the
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British when he intercepted Ethan Allen at St. John to warn him that a 
British regiment was on its way. He was discovered, but managed to 
convince the officers that he was guilty only of indiscretion. He was on 
Carleton’s list of twenty-nine traitors. In the Quebec Gazette on July 31, 
1777, there is a notice of a sale by sheriff of property at his suit belonging to 
Pierre Henault, July 31, 1777. Otherwise, nothing is known of him.
11. BLAKE, JOHN
America or Ireland (Carleton lists Blake as coming from America in his list 
of traitors; Murray lists him as coming from Ireland in his lists of Protestants 
in Montreal in 1765). Merchant. Montreal. There are no records to 
indicate Blake’s business affiliations, but land records indicate that he had 
substantial holdings. In the Quebec Gazette from 1768 to 1771, he is listed as 
being involved in the sale of property belonging to Monsieur Louis 
deBerchers, Thomas Farrell, and Pierre Meziere. In 1772, along with other 
Montreal merchants, he consented to a resolution to fix light gold coin at a 
certain value. In 1775 he was a trustee, along with RICHARD DOBIE, and 
EDWARD HARRISON of the estate of GEORGE SINGLETON, insolvent.
Political Activities: Blake was an activist for British rights. He signed as a 
witness a notarized protest of several merchants against a closed meeting of 
seigneurs representing only the "noblesse" called by the governor and council, 
March 1766. He also signed petitions for an assembly in November and 
December 1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act, December 1774.
Other: Notice of a letter remaining in the post office appeared in the Quebec 
Gazette on August 5, 1790, and again on July 22, 1802. There is also a 
reference to John Blake being a passenger on board the brig Abigail from 
Halifax on May 25, 1797. On May 3, 1810, there was a notice of sale of the 
property of JOHN BLAKE and GEORGE WHEELER at suit of THOMAS 
DUNN. Whether these refer to the same John Blake is not clear.
Invasion: American. He was one of the representatives of the townspeople 
of Montreal who prepared articles of capitulation to present to Montgomery 
in November 1775.
12. BLEAKLEY, JOSIAH
Montreal. Fur trader. Militia. Bleakley married Margaret McCord, John 
McCord’s daughter. (There is a discrepancy between the account in the McCord 
family history and the biography of John McCord in DCB, V, and the Bleakley 
biography in the DCB, VI. The latter states that Margaret was Thomas 
McCord’s daughter.)
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Commercial Activities: In 1778 with JAMES FINLAY, Sr., he took out a license 
for two bateaux to take to Detroit. In 1783, with FINLAY and JOHN 
GREGORY, he took eight bateaux to Michilimackinac. He purchased a house 
there despite the fact that the territory was ceded to the Americans by the 1783 
Treaty of Paris. In 1806 he formed the Michilimackinac Co., but American 
custom officials seized their bateaux since they were forbidden to trade there. 
The War of 1812 interrupted this trade and Bleakley retired.
Political Activities: He signed the petition for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774. 
He was on a select committee in 1789-90 pressuring for an assembly.
Invasion: Not known. He was a lieutenant in the 1st battalion of Montreal’s 
militia in 1803.
13. BONDFIELD, ACLAM RICKABY
England. Quebec. Merchant. He married Dame Magdaleine Brouge.
Partners: JOSEPH CHARTIER. Little is known about his business
activities. He advertised in the Quebec Gazette property for sale at public 
vendue at General Wolfe’s Tavern October 11, 1764, and settlement of 
accounts, August 1765.
Political Activities: He signed a petition for repeal of the Quebec Act in 
1774.
Invasion: American. He supported rebels. He was on Carleton’s list of 
twenty-nine traitors. He left Quebec and was appointed assistant commissary 
of provisions by Congress. He may have returned to England after the war. 
Notice of sale of his property by order of the Court of Common Pleas at 
request of his wife, September 11, 1777.
14. BONDFIELD, JOHN
England. Quebec. Brother of Aclam. Merchant. Sold dry goods. Sold 
property in Chambly region to RALPH GRAY. He was one of the 
subscribers to agree to regulate light gold coin, which had been imported into 
the Province in great quantities, at a fixed rate so that it would not injure 
trade, June 12, 1772.
Political Activities: He signed petition for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: American. He was listed as one of twenty-nine traitors by
Carleton who left Canada in 1775. He set off for Philadelphia to procure
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contracts from the Continental Congress. He was appointed a commissary 
of provisions by Congress.
Notices in Quebec Gazette indicate that he died sometime before 1777. 
RICHARD HARRIS was named as trustee to his estate, September 18,1777. 
An auction of his widow’s household furniture appeared on July 30, 1778, 
and property for sale at Upper Town Quebec on December 23, 1779. On 
July 27, 1780, there was a deceased notice to persons having demands upon 
his estate.
15. BOSTWICK, HENRY
England. Montreal. Fur trader. He was the first Englishman to secure a fur 
trade pass from General Gage after the conquest. During Pontiac’s rebellion, he 
was captured and returned to Montreal for ransom.
Commercial Activities: He was a partner of FORREST OAKES and JOSEPH 





Commercial Activities: He was a partner of DANIEL BAYNE in the seal fishery 
in Labrador.
Political Activities: He represented the English merchants in London in 1764 in 
their protest against Murray’s refusal to institute an assembly and other British 
rights as called for in the Proclamation of 1763. He appealed with Bayne to the 
Board of Trade for land rights contested in Labrador by Governor Pallister of 
Newfoundland. Ultimately the Board supported their claim. Labrador was 
returned to Quebec in the Quebec Act of 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
17. CHINN, EDWARD
England. Montreal. Merchant. Officeholder. He was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants in Montreal in 1765. Possibly related to the Chinn family in Albany, 
New York.
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Commercial Activities: GEORGE ALLSOPP and CHINN established unlicensed 
trading posts in competition with those of the king’s post, which Murray ordered 
them to remove. When Carleton replaced Murray as governor, he rescinded that 
order. In 1771, Chinn entered the northwest fur trade, but he was a small trader. 
In 1775 he signed a license for one canoe, five men, and a cargo valued at £125.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in November and
December 1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act in December 1774.
Other: In 1765 Chinn took out an ad in the Quebec Gazette protesting




Boston, Massachusetts. Merchant. Quebec. Emigrated in 1775 on ship 
"Neptune" with his eleven children because of the impending war. He built 
his own distillery.
Invasion: British. As a volunteer in the militia, he was paid tribute by 
Maclean: "To your resolution and watchfulness. . . in keeping the guard at 
the Pres-de-ville under arms, waiting for the attack which you expected, the 
great coolness with which you allowed the rebels to approach; the spirit 
which your example kept up among the men, and the critical instant in which 
you directed Captain [Adam] Barnsfare’s fire against Montgomery and his 
troops, to those circumstances alone do I ascribe the repulsing the rebels 
from that important post, where, with their leader, they lost all heart."
19. CORRY, THOMAS 
Montreal. Fur trader.
Commercial Activities: Although little is known about him, Corry was a major 
figure in the fur trade, especially in the northwest, where he successfully wintered 
in 1772-73. He was involved in the cooperative movement beginning in the 
1770s to pool resources with other traders. He was supported by GEORGE 
McBEATH, ISAAC TODD, and JOHN ASKIN.
Other: He recommended STEPHEN MARIN, a trader at L’Assumption for a 
liquor license, March 4, 1774. Lawsuits were brought against him in 1784-85 
by F. Migneron and R. Robinet.




Scotland. Silversmith, merchant, officeholder, militia officer, banker. It is 
possible that he first went to Boston in 1768 to work with a relative who was also 
a silversmith. He arrived in Montreal in 1773.
Commercial Activities: Cruickshank was one of the major silversmiths in this 
period. He took on many apprentices and partners, in particular MICHAEL 
ARNOLDI, so that his works could not be distinguished from those of his 
associates. While he was a professional silversmith, he was also a businessman. 
His store carried clocks, jewelry, trinkets, hardware and contained many imports 
from England. Cruickshank also served as a banker, issuing promissory notes 
and lending money at interest.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly, December 1773, and 
for repeal of the Quebec Act, 1774. He favored restoration of habeas corpus and 
trial by jury in civil suits.
Other: Cruickshank was a prominent member of Montreal society, contributing 
to many civic projects. He was a member of the Agriculture Society, a founder 
of Christ Church, and served as a justice of the peace. Lawsuits were brought 
against him in July 1788, and February 1801, by J. Martin and C. Sorel, 
respectively. He left a considerable estate. His major contribution, however, 
was as a silversmith, introducing a new treatment and new aesthetics to the 
production and marketing of silver that was competitive with contemporary 
English and American work.
Invasion: Not known. However, he served in the militia from 1788-1797 and 
1800-1809.
21. DAVID, LAZARUS
England. Montreal. Merchant. He came to America with Amherst. Lazarus 
was part of the small, interconnected Jewish community. He was, along with 
Simon Levy (also referred to as Levy Simon), the first Jewish landowner in 
Montreal. He had established extensive trade and large land holdings in Montreal 
by the time of his death in 1776. The following year his family contributed 
property on Rue Notre Dame for construction of the first synagogue to be built 
in the colony. His widow raised five children, one of whom was David, bom in 
Montreal in 1764. David was a fur trader, businessman, and militia officer. His 
many civic and business activities helped revitalize and diversify Montreal’s 
economy during the economic downturn in the late 1780s.
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Political Activities: He petitioned for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
22. DAVISON, GEORGE
England. Immigrated to Trois Rivieres in 1773. Entrepreneur, officeholder, 
agriculturist, son of Alexander (see above).
Commercial Activities: With partners, ALEXANDER (brother), FRANCOIS 
BABY, DAVID MONRO, and MATTHEW BELL, they obtained a lease for 
Saint-Maurice Ironworks previously held by THOMAS DUNN and partners. 
They enjoyed a monopoly on the fur trade and fisheries on the north shore of 
lower St. Lawrence. He amassed a sizable fortune, largely through government 
patronage and by deals in which his brother, Alexander, took the initiative and 
the risk.
Political Activities: He opposed jury trial "in all small communities," since, he 
believed there must be a degree of connection or dependence through interest, 
alliance, or friendship, which argued against the impartiality of the jurists. He 
signed a petition for repeal of Quebec Act, December 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
23. DOBIE, RICHARD
Scotland. Montreal. Fur trader, businessman, militia officer. He is believed to 
have been a merchant in Scotland before emigrating to Quebec shortly after the 
conquest.
Commercial Activities: At various times he was in partnerships with
LAWRENCE ERMATINGER, BENJAMIN FROBISHER, ETIENNE-CHARLES 
CAMPION and WILLIAM GRANT, WILLIAM MAITLAND, ALEXANDER 
AULDJO, and ALEXANDER MILMINE. Dobie’s business activities were 
diversified: he was an outfitter and financial backer; gave surety for fur traders; 
exported wheat, potash, and wood from his own sawmill; and was an importer 
of British goods.
Political Activities: His political activities reflected his commercial interests. 
After the conquest, he called for the reorganization of trade. He supported 
efforts to introduce an assembly, opposed Murray’s favoritism of the "noblesse" 
and protested the closed meeting of seigneurs called by Murray and the council 
in March 1766. He objected to Carleton’s policies, but he believed that though 
"his head is weak and soft, I consider his heart and intentions are good."
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Other: He was a member of the Masonic Lodge, Presbyterian Church, and had 
a luxurious standard of living.
Invasion: Not known. However, he was active in the militia with the rank of 
captain from 1788 until 1797.
24. DUNN, THOMAS
England. Quebec. Businessman, seigneur, officeholder. Dunn was an 
enterprising member of the rising bourgeoisie who had arrived in Quebec soon 
after the capitulation to take advantage of opportunities afforded in newly- 
conquered territory.
Commercial Activities: In 1763, JOHN GRAY and DUNN, and soon thereafter 
WILLIAM GRANT, obtained a trading lease from Governor Murray to the king’s 
posts. This guaranteed them a monopoly of the fur trade and fisheries on the 
lower St. Lawrence. In addition, Dunn purchased a seigneury at Tadoussac, 
which extended his commercial empire to the entire lower north shore of the 
St. Lawrence, a residential property in Quebec. He was granted a lot in Lower 
Town, Quebec, to build a wharf for commercial purposes and with some 
associates rented the seigneury of Saint-Etienne. An opportunist, in 1777 Dunn 
took advantage of Grant’s marriage to the dowage of Longueuil to gain a trading 
lease for the posts of Mingan and Anticosti, which provided sufficient income 
from cod, salmon, porpoise oil, and the hides of seals for the two men to take on 
another partner, PETER STUART. The trio continued to buy almost all the 
seigneuries of Mingan and Anticosti. Dunn could now afford to suffer the loss 
of the king’s post, which occurred in 1786. He benefited from other commercial 
enterprises: he was one of the partners who held a lease in the Saint-Maurice 
Ironworks. When this venture seemed dubious, he and the other English partners 
sold out to CHRISTOPHER PELLISIER, who, as part of the agreement, made 
good on his promise to deliver 360 tons of pig-iron to Dunn. Dunn disposed of 
the pig-iron by selling it as ballast. Although he continued to be active in 
business, particularly in land acquisitions, from the 1790s Dunn’s career was 
centered primarily in the judicial, administrative, and political arenas.
Political Activities: He kept a neutral position politically, maintaining good 
relations with both the French- and English-speaking communities. As a result, 
he was awarded civic offices from justice of peace, member of the Quebec 
council, attorney for the king in succession matters, receiver general, judge of the 
Court of Common Pleas, and a seat on various other courts. Dunn was a 
member of the legislative and executive councils of lower Canada when the 
Constitution of 1791 went into effect. He continued to serve in that capacity until 
1808.
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Other: Until his death in 1818, Dunn had participated fully in the economic, 
political, and social life of Quebec. His biographers in the DCB, Pierre 
Tousignant and Jean-Pierre Wallot, dispute Creighton’s and Ouellet’s dismissal 
of Dunn as an "undistinguished" member of the bourgeoisie. They conclude that 
he was a happy and fulfilled man.
Invasion: Not known.
25. ELLICE, ALEXANDER
Scotland. Schenectady. Montreal. Merchant, shipowner, landowner, 
seigneur. Alexander was the son of a prosperous miller, attended Marischol 
College (University of Aberdeen), and studied at the Scottish bar. He 
emigrated to Montreal in 1774 as a result of the impending conflict with the 
American colonies.
Commercial Activities: Alexander and his four brothers arrived in
Schenectady in 1765. Alexander formed a partnership with local merchants 
JAMES PHYN and JOHN DUNCAN. They expanded their business from the 
fur trade to include grain and general merchandising. On Duncan’s 
retirement in 1768, Alexander’s brother ROBERT joined the firm which then 
was known as Phyn, Ellice and Company. The firm prospered and expanded 
with business ties in Detroit, Albany, New York, Montreal, London and 
Bristol, but in 1769 an embargo placed by American merchants on British 
imports prevented the company from delivering its goods to the interior. To 
circumvent the embargo in 1770, the firm imported goods through Quebec. 
In 1771-72, the partners evolved a scheme to beat their Montreal competitors 
by obtaining from the British government a virtual monopoly to supply 
Indian agents in the northwest. In 1774, as a result of the conflict between 
the American colonists and Great Britain and the nonimportation policy, the 
firm once again imported through Quebec and engaged ISAAC TODD, a 
Montreal-based merchant, as its agent. But the ruse was detected and the 
Ellice brothers were severely reprimanded by the Committee of 
Correspondence at Schenectady. The firm anticipated further troubles and 
prepared for such a contingency by converting their assets to cash and bills 
of exchange, and removing them to London, where James Phyn established 
an office. Alexander moved to Montreal, forming a new company, Alexander 
Ellice and Company, that furnished supplies to several of the major Montreal 
traders, JAMES McGILL, SIMON McTAVISH and GEORGE McBEATH. 
In late 1775, the remaining assets in New York were transferred to another 
brother, James, who remained in Schenectady and protected the firm’s 
assets. ROBERT remained in New York until 1778, when he joined his 
brother in Montreal. In 1779, the Montreal concern became Robert Ellice 
and Company, managed jointly by Robert Ellice and JOHN FORSYTHE.
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The firm continued under different partnerships eventually becoming the 
competitor, referred to as the XY Company, of the North West Company.
Invasion; Not known. Robert Ellice and Company, and Phyn and Ellice, the 
Schenectady branch, furnished military supplies and acted as messengers and 
paymasters for their respective sides. After the war, Phyn and Ellice moved 
into a triangular trade. In 1803 Alexander died, leaving an estate in excess 
of £450,000, including 350,000 acres of land in New York and Canada.
26. ERMATINGER, LAWRENCE
Switzerland. Montreal. Merchant. He arrived in Montreal soon after the 
conquest.
Commercial Activities: Ermatinger was a partner in the London firm of Trye and 
Ermatinger. He furnished goods to FORREST OAKES, his brother-in-law, and 
to other partners, including CHARLES BOYER, for their fur trade. He also 
acted as agent for the transport of goods and passengers to England. When his 
partner, Trye, died, Ermatinger returned to London to settle the affairs of the 
firm, but he wa forced to declare bankruptcy. However, with aid from his 
friends and creditors, he was able to return to Montreal in 1770. Fire destroyed 
his home and business twice, but adversity did not keep him from continuing in 
the fur trade. He and Oakes held a share in the North West Company. He also 
acted as agent for several London merchants, keeping them informed of Montreal 
market conditions, and serving as a middleman, but he amassed large debts and 
in 1783 was forced to sell all his property.
Political Activities: He sought to influence political and economic events in 
Canada, petitioning for an assembly in 1770, 1773, and for the repeal of the 
Quebec Act in 1774. He also protested the closed meeting held at the Court 
House in Montreal on March 3, 1766, called by Murray and the council, and 
restricted only to seigneurs representing the "noblesse."
Other: Ermatinger was an important merchant and member of the Montreal
community. He was a charter member of the Masonic organization in Montreal.
Invasion: British. During the occupation of Montreal, the American general, 
Wooster, ordered the arrest of Ermatinger and nine other prominent tories. The 
townspeople protested and he was freed, but Ermatinger left town to ensure his 
safety.
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27. FANEUIL, PETER
New England. Quebec. Merchants. Member of G rand Jury , 1764. 
Probably from the prominent Boston family, but is not an immediate relation 
of Peter Faneuil of Boston.
Commercial Activities; He was in business with JAMES JEFFRY, probably 
as a supplier. The only record of his business activities was when he applied 
for a permit, and gave bond, to put gunpowder on board a  schooner bound 
for Michilimackinac, where it was to be stored in the king’s magazine. He 
is listed as giving security of £2,000 for an exit bond for Jeffry. The 
partnership was dissolved in 1767.
Political Activities: Faneuil signed the presentment of the Grand Jury in 
1764 and the merchants’ petition for M urray’s recall in April 1765. In 1766 
he was one of the merchants that Cawthorne spoke for in a letter addressed 
to the London merchants who had admonished the merchants against any 
violent response to the Stamp Act. Cawthorne’s response expressed 
resentment of the "patronizing" tone of that letter. Indicating a more 
moderate view with respect to the Stamp Act, Faneuil signed the welcoming 
letter to Carleton of their good behavior and their recognition of Parliament’s 
sovereignty over them.
O ther: Not much else is known about him. He took an advertisement in the 
Quebec Gazette to assert that PHILLIP PAYNE, m erchant, was a man of 
honesty and integrity, August 18, 1766.
Invasion: Not known. He may have left the province before 1774.
28. FINLAY, HUGH
Scotland. Quebec. Merchant, justice of the peace, deputy postmaster, council 
member, seigneur, landowner. He was fluent in French. Finlay was from a 
prominent family in Glasgow and London. He arrived in Quebec in 1763.
Commercial Activities: With the advantage of some capital, he became a partner 
with STEPHEN MOORE, who had established himself in the retail business in 
1761. The company sold a wide range of goods, reflected in such advertisements 
as "bindings, buckles, buttons and boots" in the Quebec Gazette. The partnership 
did not last, however, for they went deeply in debt and by 1765 had to turn their 
business over to their creditors.
Political Activities: Finlay was a champion of British rights. He was opposed 
to billeting of soldiers in private homes. In 1775 he was appointed to the
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legislative council, but he opposed the arbitrary powers exercised by Carleton and 
was dismissed. He continued to fight for an assembly for Quebec.
Other: As postmaster general, he instituted biweekly posts between Quebec and 
Montreal via Trois Rivieres and south to Albany. He succeeded Benjamin 
Franklin in 1774 as deputy postmaster general of North America.
Invasion: No record, although he was listed in the British militia in 1778.
29. FINLAY, JAMES
Scotland. Montreal. Fur trader.
Commercial Activities: Finlay was an important fur trader. He was a guarantor 
of a number of French traders and despite enormous difficulties, he is believed 
to have wintered in the northwest as early as 1768-69, the first time traders were 
permitted to winter among the Indians.
Political Activities: He signed petitions calling for assemblies, 1773, 1774, and 
for repeal of the Quebec Act, 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
30. FRANKS, DAVID SALISBURY
England. Montreal. Son of Abraham Franks. He is credited for building 
the Vauxhall in Montreal, where many a gay evening was passed by the 
townspeople. Franks was active in Jewish affairs.
Political Activities: In Montreal in May 1775, he was arrested for "seditious 
utterances." The incident involved a protest over the Quebec Act which had 
just gone into effect. Some unknown person determined to express 
disapproval of the Act by throwing potatoes on the bust of George III in the 
Place d’Armes and inscribing "Behold the Pope of Canada and the English 
Sot." This provoked counter protests and a much heated debate. One 
speaker, Monsieur de Bellestre, called for hanging the perpetrator upon 
which Franks, standing next to him said, "In England men are not hanged 
for such small offences." A fight ensued and Franks was taken off by a party 
of soldiers with Fixed bayonets. Bail that was set at £10,000 was disallowed. 
Nonetheless, Franks remained in detention for a week.
Invasion; American. He joined the colonists when Montgomery occupied 
Montreal. In 1776 he was appointed paymaster of the garrison at Montreal. 
After the retreat of the Americans, he joined a Massachusetts regiment, but
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apparently was in Montreal in 1777, when Carleton made up his list of 
traitors. Franks returned to the United States, serving as adjutant and 
secretary to General Arnold. His experience in Canada, and knowledge of 
the French people and language qualified him for diplomatic posts in France 
in 1780 and 1784.
31. FRASER, SIMON
Scotland. Quebec. . Fur trader, explorer.
Commercial Activities: Fraser was an important fur trader who was involved 
with the western trade. In 1791 with Lesieur, Fraser entered into an agreement 
with the North West Company to trade at Riviere des Trembles and Portage de 
l’lle for five years with a guarantee of £200 profit. In 1799 over twenty new 
partners were added to the North West Company, including Fraser, but in 1804, 
when the XY Company and the North West Company joined forces, Fraser 
relinquished his share. In the same year, some of the old timers, including 
FRASER and THOMPSON, were exploring and establishing posts beyond the 
Rockies. Fraser River is named after him. From 1804 until the outbreak of the 
War of 1812, the company attained its last and greatest period of success.
Political Activities: Fraser signed petitions for a general assembly in 1770, 1773, 
and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: Not known. It is difficult to distinguish between Simon Fraser, a 
regular officer of the 24th regiment of foot and the merchant Simon Fraser. 
According to Stanley in Canada Invaded, it was the home of the merchant Fraser 
outside the city walls of Quebec at Pres de Ville, where Montgomery and many 
of his men lost their lives. Unaware that the house was fortified by the 
defenders, Montgomery charged right into their path with disastrous results. 
Lieutenant Colonel Fraser fought with Carleton and later, promoted to brigadier- 
general, commanded one of Burgoyne’s brigades in 1776. He was killed during 
the British counterinvasion of New York in 1777.
32. FREEMAN,_____________
American.
Invasion: He was on Carleton’s list of twenty-nine traitors. Commissary of 
Provisions, Trois Rivieres.
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33. FROBISHER, BENJAMIN
England. Merchant. Montreal. He arrived in 1763 with brother Joseph. Second 
brother, Thomas, came in 1769. The three brothers’ lives were linked in the fur 
trade.
Commercial Activities: He was a partner with brothers JOSEPH and THOMAS, 
JAMES McGILL, ISAAC TODD, JOHN WELLES, RICHARD DOBIE, 
CHARLES PATERSON, THOMAS CORRY, MAURICE-REGIS BLONDEAU, 
and SIMON McTAVISH.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for assembly, 1773, and repeal of the 
Quebec Act, 1774.
Other: He created wealth for Quebec: in 1785-86 alone, he hired 585 men and 
invested £46,000 in the fur trade. Due to his foresight in recognizing the 
importance of the northwest, and due to his financial and organizational talents, 
the North West Company, which started out as a family venture, he became the 
premier contributor to Quebec’s economy. He died with many debts, due in part 
to the downturn in the economy after the American Revolution. He was still an 
esteemed member of the Montreal community.
Invasion: Not known. On behalf of his fellow merchants and traders, when 
Montreal was occupied by the Americans, he petitioned the Continental Congress 
to allow the continuation of free trade.
34. FROBISHER, JOSEPH
England. Montreal. Merchant, militiaman, justice of the peace, member of 
Assembly from Montreal. Arrived with brother Benjamin, 1763.
Commercial Activities: See above entry. Joseph acted as a trader between Grand 
Portage, other posts and Montreal until the death of Benjamin and Thomas, in 
1787 and 1788, respectively, when he enlisted the support of SIMON 
McTAVISH. Reorganized as McTavish, Frobisher and Company, the firm 
became the premier financial institution in Canada.
Political Activities: Frobisher supported parliamentary institutions for Quebec. 
He was elected to the Assembly from Montreal East, was a justice of the peace, 
and an administrator of a pension fund for aged voyageurs.
Other: He invested in the infrastructure of Montreal: the Batiscan Iron Work 
Company and the Company of Proprietors of Montreal Water Works. He 
accumulated vast land holdings, and tapped forest resources from his seigneury
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England. Montreal. He arrived in Montreal in 1769 to join his brothers, 
Benjamin and Joseph. Thomas spent most of his time traveling from Grand 
Portage to distant trading posts in the west. He died in 1788.
Invasion: Not known.
36. GODDARD, JAMES STANLEY 
__________________ . Montreal. Merchant and trader.
Commercial Activities: Goddard was an agent responsible for distributing Indian 
presents for the London firm of FORTIER and ORILLET. He was one of the 
first traders in the west in the early sixties.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for Murray’s recall in April 1765 and for 
an assembly in 1773. He was also signatory to an agreement among merchants 
to regulate light gold coin, which had flooded the province in 1770, at a fixed 
rate.
Invasion: British. Although there is no mention of Goddard’s participation in the 
invasion, it was well known in Montreal, when it was under siege, that he 
supported the government.
37. GRANT, CHARLES
Probably Scotland. Quebec. Merchant.
Commercial Activities: He was involved in the fishing and sealing industry in 
the Lower St. Lawrence with his uncle, WILLIAM GRANT.
Political Activities: From 1770 on, he was an activist in petitioning for an 
assembly. In November 1773 he served on the committee of English inhabitants, 
meeting in Prenties Tavern, to plan a strategy including Canadian merchants and 
merchants from Montreal. He signed the petition for repeal of the Quebec Act 
on December 31, 1774.
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Invasion: Not known. He served as captain in the British militia at Quebec as of 
April 1778.
38. GRANT, WILLIAM
Scotland. Quebec. Merchant, seigneur, officeholder, politician. Grant was the 
one of the laird of Blairfindy, had a liberal education and was fluent in French. 
In 1759 at the age of 15, William was sent to Quebec as an agent for the London 
firm of his uncle, a navy supplier. His two brothers, Alexander and Robert, 
accompanied him.
Commercial Activities: In 1763, he entered into partnerships with two other 
agents of his uncle’s firm, PETER STUART and JOHN GRAY. They 
aggressively pursued various speculative opportunities, such as supplying 
merchandise and lending capital to French and Canadian merchants. In 
September 1761, he engaged in the fur trade with JAMES STANLEY 
GODDARD and FORREST OAKES in order to conduct trade at 
Michilimackinac. In 1765, he acquired exclusive trading rights there and at what 
is today Green Bay, Wisconsin. He became a co-lessee of THOMAS DUNN and 
JOHN GRAY to conduct the fur trade at the king’s posts on the lower 
St. Lawrence River. This led to further acquisitions in the same region, which 
enabled him to participate in the lucrative seal and salmon fisheries. Grant’s 
primary business activity was in the acquisition of landed property and by 1766 
he was considered one of the leading British merchants in Quebec. For the rest 
of his life, he continued to expand and diversify his holdings from the eastern 
boundary of Quebec in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where he engaged in the seal 
and salmon fisheries, to the Richelieu Valley in the west, where he entered the 
wheat and flour trade with SAMUEL JACOBS.
Political Activities: His petition for appointment to the governing council of 
Quebec was blocked by Murray who described him as a "conceited boy." He 
supported demands for repeal of the Quebec Act, for representative government 
and for the introduction of English commercial law. In 1773 he was elected by 
the Quebec merchants to a committee to spearhead constitutional reform. In 1777 
he was appointed to the legislative council and to replace deputy receiver general 
Thomas Dunn. He was dismissed from the council by Haldimand, but continued 
to press for introduction of habeas corpus, an elective assembly, and English 
commercial law. Expert in both French and English law, he stayed involved in 
the controversies that raged between those who wished to retain the Quebec Act 
as it was and those who called for reform.
Other: He was in the forefront of instituting new social institutions such as the 
Quebec Benevolent Society, the Quebec Library, the Agriculture Society, and the
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Constitutional Club. He was a member of the first parliament, generally voting 
with the English party.
Invasion: British. He joined the British militia to defend Quebec. He was 
violently anti-American and suffered a major property loss during the winter of 
1775-76, including buildings at Quebec and Saint-Roche, several fishing posts, 
and a vessel destined for Boston with relief supplies for the British.
39. GRAY, EDWARD WILLIAM
England. Montreal. Merchant, officeholder, notary public, lawyer, militia 
officer. Gray arrived in Montreal in 1760 aboard a British warship.
Commercial Activities: Engaged in general trade until 1764, when he began 
serving in various governmental posts. In 1767 he opened a vendu and 
commission business, importing goods from London merchants, advertising their 
arrival in the local press, and then auctioning them. He also sold on commission. 
Despite the many demands of his official positions, he continued in various 
commercial ventures. In 1792 he took on his nephew by marriage, FREDERICK 
WILLIAM ERMATINGER, as a partner in the firm of GRAY and 
ERMATINGER.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773. He sought 
bankruptcy laws to enable creditors to recover their money.
Other: He contributed to the Agricultural Society, Free Masons, the branch of 
the Quebec Library, and raised funds to aid England in the prosecution of war in 
Europe.
Invasion: British. He was one of ten prominent citizens in Montreal whom 
General Wooster attempted, unsuccessfully at first, to jail because of their British 
loyalties. Finally, they were arrested and imprisoned at Fort Chambly. After the 
invasion, Carleton appointed Gray to a three-man commission to investigate the 
district of Montreal to determine the extent of Canadian collaboration with the 
enemy.
40. GRAY, RALPH
Scotland. Quebec, tailor, merchant, politician, seigneur. He started as a 
regimental tailor under Amherst, wounded in 1759, discharged, and established 
himself as a tailor, selling luxury items in his shop. He became a wealthy 
landowner and respected member of Quebec society, retiring in 1778.
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Commercial Activities: His only partnership was in 1774 with DUNCAN
MUNRO, but it was dissolved one year later.
Political Activities: He signed Cawthome’s letter regarding the Stamp Act
repeal, July 1766. He did not become involved until 1808, when he sought 
election to the House of Assembly. R. Gray signed a petition for assembly 1773.
Invasion: Not known.
41. GREGORY, JOHN
England. Fur trader and merchant. Gregory was probably related to Mark and 
Thomas Gregory whose firm entered the fur trade shortly after the conquest. He 
did not come to Quebec until 1773.
Commercial Activities: By the end of the 1770s he was displacing his partner, 
JAMES FINLAY as the dominant partner. Efforts concentrated primarily on 
Detroit. When Finlay retired in 1783 or 1784, Gregory formed a new partnership 
with NORMAND MacLEOD and due to connections at Michilimackinac, they 
traded at that post. PETER PANGMAN and PETER POND persuaded them to 
join forces and move into the northwest trade. Pond joined the North West 
Company; but Pangman and his partner, JOHN ROSS, and one of his Montreal 
clerks, ALEXANDER MACKENZIE, became Gregory and MacLeod’s wintering 
partners. They could not, however, compete with the North West Company; and 
after John Ross had been killed, the partners, at McTavish’s suggestion, joined 
the larger company. Gregory bought MacLeod out and continued to assume 
greater responsibilities in the NWC. When McTavish died, he left £100 to his 
good friend Gregory. Gregory died in 1808.
Political Activities: He signed a petition for an assembly in 1773.
Other: As a member of a grand jury, he voiced concern about the inadequacy of 
Montreal’s jail and court house. He belonged to the Scotch Presbyterian Church, 
was a member of the Beaver Club, and was, according to the Montreal Herald, 
"one of our most respectable citizens."
Invasion: Not known.
42. HALSTEAD, JOHN
New Jersey. Quebec. Merchant.
Commercial Activities: In 1767, Halstead formed a partnership with JACOB 
JORDAN and COLIN DRUMMOND to purchase wheat and bake biscuits.
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After two years Jordan quit, but Halstead and Drummond continued in the 
grain trade. (Drummond was the brother of one of the principals in the 
London firm and its Quebec agent.) In 1768 he applied for an exit bond, 
guaranteed by Matias Halstead of Quebec, for £200. At the time of the 1775 
invasion of Quebec, Halstead was the superintendent of Caldwell’s Mill, 
outside Quebec.
Political Activities: Halstead signed several petitions for an assembly in 1773.
Invasion: American. Either before or when Carleton ordered rebel
sympathizers to leave Quebec, Halstead retreated to the Island of Orleans 
just below the town. He took the first opportunity to join Arnold, furnishing 
him wheat and flour from the mill. He reported to Arnold that all the militia 
except a hundred ‘Tories’ were ready to lay down their arms. Carleton listed 
Halstead as one of twenty-nine traitors and claimed that he became a 
commissary of provisions in the America army.
43. HANNA, JAMES
Dublin, Ireland. Clockmaker, silversmith, merchant. He emigrated in 1763 to 
Quebec. He was the brother of John McCord’s wife.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Other: The popularity of grandfather clocks among the middle class is
attributable to him. He was active in Quebec Fire Society, the Quebec 
Benevolent Society, and supported the establishment of the University of Quebec. 
He lived a comfortable life and left a modest estate.
Invasion: Not known.
44. HARRISON, EDWARD
Quebec. Merchant. He was interested in the potential of the Richelieu area of 
the St. Lawrence Valley. Not much is known about him. On April 6, 1769, he 
took out a bond on behalf of JAMES MORRISON for the Indian trade. He was 
a client of attorney Thomas Scott, and he sold JAMES TOD his fief at 
Grosse-Isle. He is recorded as giving bond to JOSEPH BENTON, November 16, 
1768. In 1773 he was listed as a trustee along with RICHARD DOBIE and 
JOHN BLAKE of the estate of GEORGE SINGLETON, insolvent.
Political Activities: He petitioned for Murray’s recall in April 1765 and an 
assembly in 1770.




Probably England via New York. Trois Riviere. Businessman. He is 
believed to have been a sutler who followed the troops. He is located in New 
York in 1760 and in Trois Rivieres in 1761, where he was purveyor to the 
troops.
Commercial Activities; Hart and ELEAZAR LEVY are recorded as having 
supplied SAMUEL JACOBS with merchandise in 1761 from Trois Riviferes. 
In 1763, a post office was opened in his home and in 1764, like so many 
merchants, he entered the fur trade. He engaged the best voyageurs in the 
region. His successes led to land acquisitions and the building of a family 
dynasty. His brother, MOSES, joined him in Trois Rivieres and when Aaron 
was out of the country, he managed his affairs. Ties were also established 
to Albany through his brother, Henry, and to London through another 
brother, Lemon. In London he married Dorothy Judah, connecting him to 
a large interrelated circle of Jews in New York and with her brothers, 
SAMUEL, JUDAH and URIAH JUDAH in Montreal. Hart was a sly 
moneylender. He granted loans liberally, not pressuring for repayment, but 
letting the debt escalate. He would then ask for security, suggesting a 
mortgage. On the death of the borrower, Hart would present his claim with 
interest to the unsuspecting heirs. In 1792, Hart began incorporating his 
children into his business. On his death, they inherited four Helds and seven 
seigneuries. The total in cens et rentes and the lods et ventes amounted at 
that time to £86,293.05, a considerable sum.
Political Activities: Hart joined the English merchants in petitioning for an 
assembly in 1770 and 1773.
Invasion; He served both sides. Though he denied that he voluntarily 
cooperated with the American invaders, he gave substantial support to them.
46. HAY, CHARLES
Scotland, Quebec. Cooper, merchant. He appears to have arrived in Quebec 
sometime about 1770.
Commercial Activities; According to the historian, A. L. Burt, Hay was a 
substantial merchant, with a nourishing trade in rum, wine, and wooden 
staves.
Political Activities; He petitioned for an assembly in 1773.
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Invasion: Probably American. Charles and his brother, Udney, left Quebec 
during the American siege in 1775. Charles returned but was suspected of 
continuing his sympathies for the Americans. In 1780, due to fear of a 
second invasion, Clareton’s successor, Governor Haldimand, intercepted 
letters implicating Hay, Pierre du Calvet, and Fleury Mespleth. General 
Allan Maclean supported the suspicions of the authorities and said that 
Charles was an out-and-out rebel who had close contact with the enemy. As 
a result, Hay was confined in prison without a trial. He was released in 1783 
after his wife’s petition to Shelburne.
47. HAY, UDNEY
Scotland. Quebec. Probably in partnership with his brother, Charles. See 
above.
Political Activities: He petitioned for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: American. Udney left Quebec before the siege in 1775, but unlike 
his brother, he did not return. Instead, he joined the American army as 
colonel and serve as quartermaster general at Albany, New York.
48. HAYWOOD, WILLIAM
American. Montreal. Merchant. Freeholder. He was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants in Montreal, 1765.
Commercial Activities: Haywood and JAMES PRICE formed a business 
partnership probably serving the Montreal community. The only reference 
to them in the Montreal Gazette was in reference to the sale of property of 
PIERRE MARTEL in 1774 and of FRANCIS NOBLE KNIFE, in 1769. 
There is record of a lawsuit brought against them on May 5, 1777, by R. 
Morland.
Political Activities: Haywood was politically active in petitioning for British 
rights. He signed a notarized protest against a closed meeting called by 
Murray, restricted to seigneurs who represented the "noblesse” and held at 
the court house in Montreal on March 3, 1766. Haywood also joined other 
merchants in self-regulating themselves to establish a fixed rate for light gold 
coin that had flooded the province in June 1777. He petitioned for repeal of 
the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: American. Haywood was described by Carleton as a great zealot, 
originally a "barber," in his list of twenty-nine traitors.
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49. HAZEN, MOSES
American, born in Haverhill, Massachusetts. Army officer, officeholder, 
landowner, seigneur, and merchant. In 1763, he retired on half pay. In 
1765 he was appointed member of the Grand Jury by Murray.
Commercial Activities: In 1764, with GABRIEL CHRISTIE, he purchased 
seigneuries in the upper Richelieu Valley. In 1765 he went into the timber 
business with JOHN HENNIKER and SAMUEL McKAY, supplying masts 
to the British navy. In 1775 he was in financial difficulties because of law 
suits by and against him.
Invasion: American. Carleton dispatched him to Boston to inform Gage of 
Benedict Arnold’s capture of St. John. He was suspected and jailed by both 
Americans and British for aiding enemy. He tried unsuccessfully out of 
concern for his property in the Richelieu Valley to discourage an American 
invasion. When it occurred, he was persuaded to join with the Americans. 
From then on, he and EDWARD ANTILL were key figures in recruiting a 
Canadian regiment. After the war, Hazen lived in New York City and 
tirelessly fought to have the men under him who could not return to Quebec 
compensated for their service. Eventually, he was successful.
50. HENRY, ALEXANDER
American, probably from New Brunswick, New Jersey. Fur trader, merchant, 
militia officer, justice of the peace, and author. Montreal. He arrived in 
Montreal with General Amherst in 1760.
Commercial Activities: Henry’s exploits as a fur trader in the early sixties are 
tales of adventure and misadventure. The second Englishman to secure a fur- 
trade pass from General Gage in 1761, Henry arrived in Michilimackinac while 
Indian hostilities toward the English were still life-threatening. Having survived 
the tomahawk and scalping-knife twice, Henry’s experience with the Indians and 
the French were to stand him in good stead. For the better part of twenty years, 
his fur trading activities took him from Michilimackinac to the northwest, 
operating out of Albany and Montreal but never settling in the latter town until 
about 1781. Henry’s first two trading partners were Canadians, ETIENNE- 
CHARLES CAMPION and JEAN-BAPTISTE CADOT. In 1774-75, Henry, 
Cadot and other pedlars encroached upon the territory of the Hudson Bay 
Company in the country around Lake Superior. Henry then proceeded to the 
Saskatchewan country, exploring and mapping the region. The quantity and 
quality of the furs he brought out from this trip excited the imagination of others 
and the fur rush to the northwest was on. In 1776, Henry left for England in an 
attempt to persuade the HBC to recruit Canadian canoeists to work for the 
company. He was unsuccessful. On his return in 1777, in partnership with
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JEAN-BAPTISTE BLONDEAU, then JOHN CHINN, he traded at Sault Ste. 
Marie. Once again, he returned to England where he produced a detailed plan 
for an expedition to find an overland route to the Pacific. After settling in 
Montreal, where he married and raised a family, Henry still returned to the fur 
trade on occasion, but he was involved in other ventures as well. His fertile 
mind anticipated the possibilities of trading furs to China; he proposed such a 
scheme to two of his New York friends, William Edgar and John Jacob Astor. 
He and Astor helped the North West Company to develop this trade.
Political Activities: He regularly signed memorials and petitions. In 1770 and 
1773 he signed petitions calling for an assembly.
Other: Civic responsibilities included serving as justice of the peace in Montreal 
and captain of the militia. He was one of the nineteen traders who founded the 
Beaver Club. His main contributions, however, revolved around his adventures 
in the west. His journal, "Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian 
Territories between the Years 1760 and 1776," has become an adventure classic 
and is one of the best descriptions of Indian life of that period. Despite financial 
reverses, due in part to the American Revolution and Indian wars, Henry 
maintained a secure place in Montreal’s society. He was described as a 
middle-sized man, easy yet dignified and "esteemed by all who knew him."
Invasion: Not known, although he was in Montreal in 1775 and sailed for
England in 1776, where he spent several years during the Revolution. After 
American independence in 1783, he seriously considered moving to Schenectady 
in order to continue to trade at Detroit and Michilimackinac, which were then 
American. His association with American John Jacob Astor, helped Americans 
to open the far west and enter the China trade.
51. HOLMES, WILLIAM
Ireland. Montreal. Fur trader. Holmes was listed as a "malster" in Murray’s 
list of Protestants in Montreal in 1765, but that is the only reference to his being 
a malster. He came to Montreal sometime after 1763, and by 1774, was actively 
involved in the fur trade.
Commercial Activities: CHARLES PATERSON, FRANCOIS JEROME dit
LATOUR and HOLMES wintered at Fort des Prairies in the Saskatchewan in 
1774-75. He joined ALEXANDER HENRY in 1776 on an expedition to visit the 
Assiniboins on the Saskatchewan. By 1778 he had formed his own company with 
ROBERT GRANT and was trading at Fort des Prairies and at Sturgeon River 
Fort, also on the Saskatchewan. Because of vigorous competition from the 
Hudson Bay Company and individual partnerships, profits were being squeezed. 
This resulted in informal pooling of resources and profits, which led in 1779 to
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the formation of the North West Company. Holmes and Grant became joint 
partners in the new company, but rivalry with the Hudson Bay was still intense 
and Holmes bowed to unscrupulous methods of competing. An unrelated killing 
of a trader named JOHN COLE by the Indians excited the French-Canadians 
engaged in his expedition, who believed the English were to blame. Holmes and 
the other English traders, only twenty seven of them to three hundred French 
Canadians, had to arm themselves against their own men. Despite the travails of 
harsh country, savage Indians, and fierce competition from the HBC, Holmes 
remained an active and ruthless trader in the pays d ’en haut until his retirement 




Invasion: American. Conductor of Artillery. He was on Carleton’s list of 
twenty-nine traitors.
53. HOWARD, JOSEPH
England. Montreal. Merchant, fur trader, officeholder. In 1760 Howard was 
one of the first British merchants in Montreal to enter the western fur trade. He 
married into a large Canadian fur trading family.
Commercial Activities: In 1761, Howard formed a partnership with JOHN or 
EDWARD CHINN (or both) and HENRY BOSTWICK to trade at 
Michilimackinac. Before the Indian uprising in 1763, he and other Montreal 
merchants petitioned Thomas Gage, acting commander in chief, to seek redress 
in the forthcoming peace treaty with France for the debts the Indians owed the 
traders. The traders continued to suffer losses from defaulting correspondents, 
resulting in the dissolution of the partnership in 1767. In 1768 Howard was 
insolvent, owing the British firm of BROOK WATSON, £4,506. By that time, 
Howard’s partnership with GEORGE ALLSOPP and EDWARD CHINN in the 
eastern fur trade, which was carried on at unlicensed posts in competition with 
the king’s posts, was also in trouble. Efforts to rescind an order to remove these 
posts was finally defeated in 1768. Howard’s ventures to continue in the western 
fur trade met with an equally dismal fate. Probably due to his political activities, 
his licenses to trade were rejected for three years, bringing him to the brink of 
bankruptcy. His pleas that should that happen, other worthy London merchants 
would suffer as well, resulted in his finally being granted a pass in 1781. He 
continued in the western fur trade until 1793, when he eventually did go 
bankrupt. He retired to a quiet life as a rural merchant in Berthier-en-Haut, 
outside Montreal.
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Political Activities: Howard ran afoul of the British military in 1764 when he and 
Thomas Walker refused to call on Ralph Burton as was customary on New Year’s 
Day. As a result, he was dismissed by Burton from his post as king’s auctioneer. 
Later he fell out with Walker, who charged him with being one of his assailants 
in the infamous Walker’s Ear case. Howard protested along with others of a 
closed meeting held at the Court House in Montreal on March 3, 1766. The 
meeting, called by the governor and council, was restricted only to the seigneurs 
of the "noblesse." Howard is mentioned as also protesting, along with Edward 
Chinn and London merchant, Anthony Merry, Murray’s trade restrictions at the 
government-controlled king’s post. The resulting controversy exposed the 
inconsistencies of official policy which vacillated between monopoly and free 
trade.
Invasion: Not known, but in 1779 Howard was accused of aiding the escape of 
THOMAS BENTLEY, a Kaskaskia merchant arrested for corresponding with the 
Americans. Howard was put on bond.
54. JACOBS, SAMUEL
Jacobs was a German Jew who had lived in Britain, the West Indies, and 
continental British America before arriving in Quebec as purveyor of troops. In 
1760 his schooner, laden with dried fish for Portugal, was commandeered for 
military transport.
Commercial Activities: In 1761 he formed a distillery company with BENJAMIN 
PRICE and JOHN HAYS and in the same year established a store at Crown Point 
to take advantage of the St. Lawrence-Richelieu waterway; with JAMES 
STEWARD and GEORGE ALLSOPP he went into potash production; finally, he 
settled in St. Denis and became a prosperous wheat merchant.
Invasion: Although he did not take sides during the invasion, he was hostile to 
the Americans for their seizing two of his vessels during the occupation in 1775. 
After the invasion he was appointed assistant commissary-general for victualling 
the troops stationed in the area.
55. JEFFRY, JAMES
American. Montreal. Merchant.
Commercial Activities: He and PETER FANEUIL were partners until 1767. 
It is assumed that they were suppliers for the posts. See PETER FANEUIL.
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Political Activities; He signed the petition for Murray’s recall in 1765. He 
was also one of the merchants that Cawthorne spoke for in his letter to the 
London merchants with respect to the Stamp Act.
Invasion: American. He was on Carleton’s list of 29 traitors, who
apparently left Quebec in 1775. Notice of an unclaimed letter for him at the 
post office was dated 1777.
56. JOHNSTON, JAMES
Scotch. Quebec. Merchant. He arrived soon after the conquest and rented a 
house on Rue des Pauvres with an option to buy if Canada was ceded to Great 
Britain after the war. In 1764, he was named foreman of the Grand Jury that 
signed the petition for Murray’s recall.
Commercial Activities: He formed a partnership with JOHN PURSS in 1762, 
traded furs and seals. In 1767 he was one of six English-speaking partners (two 
were French) who were awarded a contract by Carleton to the St. Maurice 
Ironworks. He sold shares to CHRISTOPHER PELESSIER. He has good 
relations with GEORGE ALLSOPP, JACOB JORDON, and ADAM 
LYMBURNER. In 1770 he ran a distillery with HENRY TAYLOR. Brother 
John Johnston represented the firm in London; another relative, DAVID 
GEDDES, served as agent in the West Indies. He was partner in a venture to 
buy a bridge spanning the St. Charles. He had many business ties in New York 
and the West Indies.
Political Activities: Despite scathing attacks on him by Murray, Carleton
recommended him twice for a seat on the council. In 1784, however, he attacked 
the judicial system in effect since the Quebec Act for being unfavorable to trade.
Invasion: Not known.
57. JORDAN, JACOB
England. Montreal. Merchant, seigneur, and member of House of Assembly. 
He arrived in Canada before 1761. In 1767 he married Ann Livingston, daughter 
of John Livingston of Montreal. He was a stamp collector and agent for the 
influential London firm of Fludyer and Drummond.
Commercial Activities: The firm held a large contract to victual troops in
American and in 1767 they acquired a contract to supply cash for army pay and 
expenses in the colonies. Jordan’s part in this enterprise gave him a supply of 
cash unusual for most merchants at this time. He built up a personal empire. 
With JOHN LIVINGSTON he acquired land in what is today New Brunswick and
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also on the Winooski River. In 1767 he entered the grain trade with 
DRUMMOND and JOHN HALSTEAD to purchase wheat and baked biscuits. 
He was a creditor of JEAN ORILLAT and by 1770 was the Montreal agent for 
the Saint-Maurice Ironworks. During the invasion in 1775 he had a contract to 
provide firewood for the Montreal garrison and one to supply horses and wagons 
for Burgoyne’s expedition. On July 5, 1776, he was appointed a deputy 
paymaster general and deputy commissary general. He and JOHN DRUMMOND 
were also agents for HARLEY and DRUMMOND, who succeeded Fludyer and 
Drummond to remit currency for army pay and expenses. In 1779, along with 
DRUMMOND and other merchants, he cornered the market in wheat, doubling 
its price to the consumer. The two partners used government money to purchase 
the wheat, for which they lost their roles as agents for Harley and Drummond. 
However, they were still retained by the government with large scale wheat 
purchases. Jordan continued to diversify. He entered the fur trade with veterans 
of the trade, but eventually all his ventures ran into trouble. The French 
Revolution ruined the fur trade and with it, Jordan as well.
Invasion: Although no mention is made of his involvement in the invasion, he 
obviously backed the British and was their agent in supplying the troops.
58. KAY, JOHN
Montreal. Fur trader. Kay was in partnership with his brother William. See 
below.
Political Activities: He signed the petition for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 




Commercial Activities: He was in partnership with his brother, John. In 1776, 
he secured a license, with John as guarantor, to take seven canoes, 41 men, 1,376 
gallons of beverages, 88 rifles, 2,400 pounds of gunpowder, 30 cwt ball and shot, 
valued at £2,600. In 1778, licenses for two canoes each were granted W. and J. 
Kay and D. RANKIN. Guarantors were GEORGE PHYN and JAMES McGILL. 
They appear to have been part of the "nine parties agreement" in 1779, the 
precursor of the North West Company. The last record of the Kays’ involvement 
in the fur trade was in 1780 when the license returns show they had two canoes. 
They were considered among the most prominent fur traders. The DCB lists
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them as having investments of £17,000, a considerable sum in those days. It 
states that their financial means was greater even than GEORGE McBEATH.
Political Activities: He signed the petition for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
60. LEES, JOHN, JR. (Until 1780 he added "Junior" to his signature.)
Scotland. Quebec. Militia officer, merchant, landowner, politician, judge, and 
officeholder. He arrived in Quebec with his parents shortly after the conquest. 
He was established in business in Lower Town with his father until 1777 when 
his father returned to Scotland.
Commercial Activities: In 1773 he entered into partnership with ALEXANDER 
DAVISON. The firm specialized in the import trade and in supplying British 
troops in North America. They acted as agent for AARON HART in England 
and as creditors for small merchants, occasioning more than one bankruptcy. 
They engaged in land speculation, and in 1786 along with Davison’s brother, 
GEORGE, obtained the lucrative leases of the king’s posts. Unable to get an 
extension on it, they sold it in 1793 to GEORGE DAVISON, DAVID MONRO, 
and MATHEW BELL. The partnership with Davison was dissolved in 1791.
Political Activities: Several times Lees went to England to complain about the 
laws governing the administration of justice. In January 1774 he signed a petition 
calling for an assembly for repeal of the Quebec Act.
Invasion: British. He enlisted in the militia under WILLIAM GRANT,
becoming a captain. His property was severely damaged during the siege of 
Quebec.
61. LESTER, ROBERT
Ireland. Quebec. Businessman, militia officer, politician, landowner. Lester did 
not arrive in Quebec until 1770.
Commercial Activities: The firm of Robert Lester and Company was an importer 
of cloth and spirits, and an exporter of wheat in the wholesale market. His only 
partner was his nephew, ROBERT MORROGH, who joined the firm in 1787. 
In addition to his business as a merchant, he also acted as a business attorney and 
an estate trustee. These positions gave him an opportunity to deal with some of 
the most influential merchants and firms in Quebec, especially THOMAS DUNN, 
ISAAC TODD, Todd and McGill, and Robert Ellice and Company. He made 
numerous small loans to ordinary people, but in the economic downturn after the
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Revolutionary War, he was forced to seize the property of those who could not 
repay the loan. He was in similar straits and had to be bailed out by a loan from 
THOMAS DUNN. In the recovery of the 1790s the firm diversified and 
expanded. Lester and Morrogh were among the leading exporters of wheat and 
flour in the province, owning their own fleet of ships. They also entered the 
timber and staves trade, rented land from the Ursulines, were partners in the 
Montreal Distillery Company until it was dissolved, expanded, and undertook 
major construction projects on their properties. In the 1800s, Lester continued 
to acquire land, some in the eastern townships, but his most important 
undertaking was provisioning the army, along with Todd. Until his death in 
1807, Lester was commercially active, but like so many other merchants, he was 
overextended and in 1807 it was bankrupt. Lester died heavily in debt.
Political Activities: Along with WILLIAM GRANT, he sought to revise a clause 
on qualifications for members of a proposed elective house of assembly in order 
to admit Roman Catholics. He signed petitions requesting an assembly in 1784, 
1788. In 1789-90 he served on a committee to protest delay of constitutional and 
judicial reform. He opposed the collection by government of lods et ventes on 
past property sales. He fought for the introduction of English law for the 
regulation of business. In 1791 he was elected to the Assembly from Lower 
Town.
Other: He was a trusted and active supporter of the Catholic Church, was a 
member of the Agriculture Society, petitioned for a non-sectarian university in 
Quebec, and served as treasurer of the Quebec library.
Invasion: British. He served as a captain of militia during the siege of Quebec.
62. LINDSAY, WILLIAM
Scotland. Merchant. As a youth he was sent to London to become clerk for 
merchant, ROBERT HUNTER. He was joint owner of the firm of LAWRIE, 
LINDSAY and THOMPSON. In 1773 he emigrated to Quebec.
Commercial Activities: In 1778 along with ADAM LYMBURNER, he was 
Quebec agent of London underwriters. In 1792 he was commissioned merchant 
and auctioneer in partnership with ALEXANDER HENRY in Montreal.
Invasion: British. Enlisted in the militia in 1775-76, rising to rank of lieutenant. 
He kept a journal.
63. LIVINGSTON, ALEXANDER
Canadian. Son of John, brother of James and Richard. See James below.
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Invasion: American. He was among the twenty-nine traitors listed by 
Carleton. He served as captain under his brother, JAMES, in the First 
Canadian Regiment. He retired in January 1781.
64. LIVINGSTON, JAMES
Probably born in Montreal of American parents. Merchant, settled at 
Chambly. Related to the New York Livingstons through his father, John, 
who was grand-nephew of magnate Robert Livingston, "first lord of the 
manor." His mother was Catryna, daughter of General Abraham Ten Boeck 
and Elizabeth van Rensselaer, both from well known New York families. He 
was also related to Richard Montgomery’s wife, Janet Livingston, daughter 
of Robert Livingston. James’ parents lived in Montreal, where he was born, 
but they returned to New York when the Revolution began.
Invasion: James and his brothers, RICHARD and ALEXANDER, actively 
supported the provincials in the 1775-76 invasion. James provided 
information to General Schuyler that the Canadians were ready and willing 
to join forces with the Americans should they invade St. John and Chambly. 
In October 1775 James was commissioned a colonel and sanctioned to recruit 
Canadians for the First Canadian regiment. He was involved in victories of 
Chambly, St. John, and Montreal, and was with Montgomery at Quebec. 
After the failed invasion of Quebec, he continued to fight with the First 
Canadian regiment. After the war he settled in Saratoga County, New York, 
where he served as representative in the state assembly. He died in New 
York in 1832.
65. LIVINGSTON, JOHN
New York. Merchant. On Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765. He was 
distantly related to the well known Livingston family in New York. Three 
sons born in Montreal, James, Richard, and Alexander-served with rebels 
in the Revolutionary War, and were listed by Carleton as traitors. John and 
his wife returned to New York at the beginning of the Revolutionary War.
Invasion: Not applicable.
66. LIVINGSTON, RICHARD
Canadian. Son of John and brother of Alexander and James. See James.
Invasion: American. He served as lieutenant colonel in the first Canadian 
regiment during the invasion of Quebec and later in the American colonies. 
He was captured at Fort Montgomery in October 1777.




Political Activities: He actively petitioned for an assembly. In November 
1773 he and THOMAS WALKER went to London to present a petition to 
Lord Dartmouth and to solicit the support of the business community. He 
was on the committee of English inhabitants, meeting in Prenties Tavern, to 
plan a strategy to include Canadian merchants and merchants from Montreal 
to join in their petition. In Quebec Macaulay tried to galvanize the merchant 
community to repeal the Quebec Act. Carleton accused him of the 
disaffection of the Canadians reputedly saying "it was your damn’d 
committees that had thrown the province into its present state, and prevented 
the Canadians from taking arms." Macaulay was one of the merchants who 




Scotland. New York. Army officer, Indian department official, fur trader. 
In 1760s he was stationed at Fort Niagara, then retired on half pay to New 
York City. Sir William Johnson, a fellow Mason, was his patron. In 1766 
he was appointed commissary for Indian Affairs at Fort Ontario (Oswego, 
New York), entertained Pontiac when he came to the post for a meeting with 
Johnson. In 1767 he was commissary at Fort Niagara until the British 
retrenchment in 1770, when he retired to a farm in the Mohawk Valley of 
New York. In 1773 he was again appointed commandant at Fort Ontario.
Commercial Activities: In 1774 MacLeod entered the fur trade in Detroit in 
partnership with GREGORY McGREGOR and WILLIAM FORSYTHE. He 
formed a new partnership in 1779 with JOHN McNAMARA, a 
Michilimackinac merchant. In the 1780s he formed the Montreal firm of 
GREGORY, MacLEOD and Company that opposed the North West 
Company until 1787, when it was finally absorbed by it.
Invasion: Not known. However, in 1778 he was captain in Detroit’s militia 
and took part in Henry Hamilton’s expedition against Vincennes (Indiana), 
whose inhabitants declared for the rebels.
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69. McBEATH, GEORGE
Scotland. Montreal. Fur trader. He was one of the first British traders to be 
issued a license in 1765 by Murray after the two-year ban, resulting from 
Pontiac’s War.
Commercial Activities: McBeath was one of the important fur traders from 1765 
to at least 1786. When the fur trade shifted farther west to the Saskatchewan and 
the Athabaska country, the traders began to form co-partnerships, leading 
eventually to such monopolistic ventures as the North West Company. In 1771- 
72, with the BLONDEAU brothers, ISAAC TODD and JOHN ASKIN, McBeath 
was part of an organization that supported THOMAS CORRY’S activities in the 
far west. In 1777, McBeath, with ALEXANDER ELLICE guarantor, was issued 
a license to take five canoes, 32 men, 790 gallons of beverages, 40 rifles, 1,200 
pounds of gunpowder, 12 cwt. of shot and ball, valued at £2,000 to Grand 
Portage. Innis states that he probably was issued a license in 1776 as well. In 
1778, several traders, including McBeath, were believed to have pooled their 
stock to send PETER POND to the Athabasca country. In 1778, McBeath and 
WRIGHT, were granted a license guaranteed by GEORGE PHYN and JAMES 
McGILL for six canoes. Because licenses were granted too late in the season, 
many of the traders again pooled their stock. McBeath and Company is listed as 
having two of sixteen shares in an arrangement referred to as "the nine parties 
agreement," a forerunner of the North West Company, which continued until 
1783. In the recession that occurred in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, 
trade was disrupted and became more competitive. The murder of John Ross in 
a skirmish with Pond’s men in the winter of 1786-87 precipitated a new joint 
venture and McBeath held one of twelve shares. Little else is known about 
McBeath.
Invasion: Not known. Innis says he probably had a license to trade in the 
northwest in 1776.
70. McCARTY, RICHARD
Connecticut. Military officer, lawyer, and fur trader. He was a freeholder 
and notary at Chambly in 1765 and commissioned a barrister and 
attorney-at-law in 1768. Two years later he was issued a trading license to 
go to Michilimackinac with goods worth £100.
Commercial Activities: He acted on his own, assuming bond for himself, 
though there is some suggestion that he may have been acting in conjunction 
with his uncle by marriage, Francois Baby.
Invasion: American. Initially, McCarty provided valuable information for 
the British at Michilimackinac, informing them about Indian and rebel
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
382
activities in the Illinois country. But then he apparently switched sides, 
joining the Illinois-Virginia forces. He captained a small group of mainly 
French-speaking volunteers in a rebel attack on Fort Sackville (Vincennes, 
Indiana). McCarty was appointed captain in the regular forces of Virginia, 
until he objected to Virginians’ treatment of civilians. He was arrested, but 
released. He was killed shortly thereafter on a mission to deliver a petition 
from the civilians of Kaskaskia to the Virginia legislature, complaining of 
their mistreatment by Virginia officials. He explained to his wife that his 
switch in allegiance was to establish a fortune for their children and a 
pension for herself in the event of his death.
71. McCORD, JOHN
Ulster-Scot. Import-export merchant. He was originally from a literate 
merchant Scottish famiSy • His second wife, Margaret Hanna, was also from 
a prominent merchant family in Newtry, Ireland, that ran a linen export 
firm. John read in the Belfast Courier that the French Canadians welcomed 
their English conquerors and decided to take advantage of the post-conquest 
opportunities. He arrived in Quebec in 1765 with his wife and two sons, 
John Jr. and Thomas.
Commercial Activities: He was engaged in supplying officers, soldiers, and 
civilians in Quebec with a variety of goods. He was in partnership with 
eldest son, JOHN Jr. He was engaged in trade with JAMES G. HANNA, a 
watchmaker from Dublin and relative by marriage. He and FELIX O’HARA 
received a grant of land from Carleton at Baie de Gaspee, which was held in 
the family until the twentieth century. In March 1771 in partnership with 
GEORGE KING and his son, THOMAS, he secured a liquor license in 
Montreal. By 1789 he had insufficient cash reserves and was £7,000 in debt, 
mostly to English suppliers. He held £6,400 in assets and £4,800 debts were 
due him, but they were not readily liquifiahle. To avoid bankruptcy and 
forced sale of his property, he took a course common to wealthy bankrupts 
and transferred his assets to a person acceptable to his creditors. In this 
case, it was his son JOHN Jr.
Political Activities: He petitioned Carleton to remove restrictions on the fur 
trade in the western territories and led the fight for an assembly. He was on 
the Quebec committee that petitioned the king in 1770 and 1773 for an 
assembly and in 1774 for repeal of the Quebec Act. He was known for his 
liberal political views.
Other: McCord was a prominent member of the Quebec bourgeoisie. He 
was upwardly mobile, a fact that distressed Carleton, who referred to him 
as a "malster."
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Invasion; He supported Americans. He was one of the merchants who left 
Quebec rather than fight the rebels in 1775. His property was burned as a 
result, but he returned to Quebec. A letter in the records of the Continental 
Congress suggests that his American sympathies continued until the 1780s. 
In 1784 he was considered by the Congress "useful to examine the claims 
made on Congress in Canada as a result of losses caused by the American 
Revolution, and thus presumably considered trustworthy by and sympathetic 
to the rebel cause." Fyson, Rich Man, Unpublished report, McCord History 
Museum and Pamela Pamela, et al., McGill Family History, Unpublished, 
McCord History Museum.
72. McCORD, JOHN, JR.
Northern Ireland. Quebec. Merchant. He arrived in Quebec with his father 
shortly after the conquest.
Commercial Activities: John followed in his father’s footsteps in the import- 
export business, supplying officers, soldiers, and inhabitants with a variety of 
goods. He was more cautious and successful than his father. When the family 
fortune was transferred to him by his father, he staved off bankruptcy by securing 
agreements with John Sr.’s creditors to pay off half the debts and to allow 
payment of the remainder in installments over four years. Five close family 
friends, including his brothers-in-law Malcolm and Alexander Fraser, gave 
security for payment of the first three-quarters of the debt. He then arranged to 
sell their house, store, and hanger to Malcolm. In turn, Malcolm agreed to allow 
John Jr. the use of the property for six years at £50 per year or to restrict the sale 
if John Jr. repaid £700 with £50 applied to interest. This arrangement secured 
the income base of the family wealth, which was used to discharge debts 
contracted by the father. By 1795 the estate was free of major encumbrances.
Political Activities: He signed the petition for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774 
and, like his father, was known for his liberal political ideas.
Other: John Jr. never married. On his death he left an estate of £13,000, as well 
as £6,000 in cash found in his home. He left £500 to Thomas, £1,250 to Mary 
McCord, Thomas’ daughter who cared for him, and the rest to his sister Margaret 
McCord, wife of Joseiah Bleakley.
Invasion: Not known.
73. McCORD, THOMAS
Northern Ireland. Quebec and Montreal. Businessman, militia officer, justice 
of the peace, agricultural improver, politician, officeholder. He arrived in
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Quebec with his father, John McCord, shortly after the conquest. A second 
marriage in 1789 was to Sarah Solomons, daughter of merchant Levy Solomons.
Commercial Activities: He was represented by his father in import-export trade 
in Montreal. In 1774 he formed a partnership with GEORGE KING in the 
Montreal Distillery Company, backed by JACOB JORDAN. In 1787 he had 
close ties to fur merchants, ISAAC TODD, JAMES McGILL, LEVY 
SOLOMONS, as well as FORSYTHE and RICHARDSON, the largest retail/ 
wholesale grocer in Montreal. His partnership with KING dissolved in 1793. He 
went into the wood trade with JOHN KAY. At this time he turned from his 
mercantile enterprises to investing and speculating in land. In 1792 he assumed 
a 99-year lease from the Hotel Dieux and acquired adjacent lands. He intended 
to develop the area and improve the farm. He went into the wood trade with 
JOHN KAY, introduced raspberry, gooseberry, and current roots from England 
and experimented with numerous vegetables, spice, and flower seeds. By this 
time he was a respected citizen of standing in the Montreal community, but he 
was overextended financially, declared bankruptcy, left his nephew to manage his 
properties, and left for Ireland for nine years. He fared no better in Ireland, 
again going bankrupt. On his return to Quebec, he was made a police magistrate, 
but was dismissed in 1823 for alleged abuses.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774. He was on a select committee pressuring for an 
assembly in 1788 to 1790 and was a member of the Assembly from Montreal 
West in 1809-1810.
Other: He was involved in the civic activities of his community. On his death, 
the editor of Montreal Gazette wrote of his private virtues and charity to the 
poor, and commenting on his public conduct, declared that "no honest or 
judicious man has ever ventured to accuse or even suggest him of malversation 
or neglect of duty." The income he received from his official posts, from his 
properties, and from the management of his brother’s property allowed him to 
build a fine home and live a luxurious life.
Invasion: Not known.
74. McGILL, JAMES
Scotland. Merchant, officeholder, politician, landowner, militia officer, and 
philanthropist. McGill was from a family that had risen from tradesmen to 
traders. He was educated at the University of Glasgow. McGill arrived in 
Montreal in 1766 en route to the upper country as deputy for WILLIAM 
GRANT.
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Commercial Activities: In 1767 he began trading on his own account. In 1769 
and 1770 he began a long association with ISAAC TODD and his brother JOHN. 
JOHN ASKIN of Michilimackinac was his forwarder. In 1775 he entered the 
northwest trade with TODD, BENJAMIN, and JOSEPH FROBISHER, and 
MAURICE-REGIS BLONDEAU. In 1779, McGill dropped out of the North 
West Company and he and Todd concentrated on the Ohio country. This area 
was threatened after the Treaty of Paris, but McGill protested British withdrawal 
from the area. He owned large tracts of land in Detroit due to debt owed him by 
Askin. In 1794 when Detroit was transferred to the United States, McGill was 
compensated by land across the river. This began his fruitful entry into land 
speculation as well as into new ventures. His business career paralleled the 
economic ups and downs of the province, but his wealth was significant.
Political Activities: He signed petitions in 1770 and 1774 calling for an assembly; 
however, he did not sign the memorial against the Quebec Act. From 1766 when 
he was made a justice of the peace, he remained involved with the administration 
of Montreal until 1833.
Other: He married into a well-established French-Canadian family and was 
involved with civic urban renewal and beautification. He was considered one of 
the richest men in Montreal. Today he is remembered most for the university 
that bears his name.
Invasion: British. He helped negotiate Montreal’s surrender in 1775. He was 
opposed to the rebellion and his home became a loyalist rendezvous.
75. McNEIL, HECTOR 
Scotland.
Invasion: American. He was one of twenty-nine traitors listed by Carleton, 
who noted that he "has long been settled and married twice in America."
76. McTAVISH, SIMON
Scotland. Albany. Montreal. Fur trader, dealer in furs, militia officer, 
landowner, officeholder, seigneur, and businessman. He arrived in America 
a poor boy and served an apprenticeship in Albany in 1763. In 1771 he 
sought a grant of land, 2,000 acres, in Albany County for his father.
Commercial Activities: In 1772 McTavish joined WILLIAM EDGAR, an 
important local merchant, in fur trade at Detroit, later Niagara. By 1774, 
because of a concern over the colonists’ nonimportation policies, he moved 
to Montreal with his partner, JAMES BANNERMAN. In 1776 with a new
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partner, GEORGE McBEATH, he outfitted five canoes with a crew of 
thirty-two and £2,000 of goods to go to Sault Ste. Marie. He left McBeath 
to carry on the trade while he went to London and Scotland. Now a rich 
relative, he paid the secondary schooling of nephews, DUNCAN and 
WILLIAM GILLIURAY, who later were connected with Phyn, Ellice and 
Company and Bannerman. He carried on a successful fur trade during the 
Revolution. By 1779 McTavish joined the FROBISHER BROTHERS’ 
coalition including CHARLES PATERSON, JAMES McGILL, ISAAC 
TODD, and ROBERT GRANT. After McGill pulled out of the North West 
Company, McTavish had four of sixteen shares. Other partners at various 
times included ROBERT GRANT, McBEATH, NICHOLAS MONTOUR, 
PETER POND, PATRICK SMALL, and WILLIAM HOLMES. In 1787, 
after Benjamin’s death, Joseph Frobisher solicited McTavish to form 
McTAVISH, FROBISHER and COMPANY. From then until the North 
West Company joined the Hudson Bay Company, McTavish was the initiator 
of successful ventures with John Jacob Astor and of trade with China.
Other: Unlike James McGill, McTavish had little time for civic or political 
affairs.
Invasion: He was in the northwest during the invasion.
77. MERCIER, J. D.
America. Quebec. Coroner. Mercier is on Carleton’s list of twenty-nine 
traitors.
Commercial Activities: Little is known about Mercier’s business activities. 
He seems to have been important enough to have participated with other 
merchants in self-regulating the price of light gold coin which flooded the 
province in 1766. A lawsuit was brought against him by J.H. Lacroix on 
November 20, 1789.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for a general assembly in 1773.
Invasion: American. He was a pro-American collaborator living within 
Quebec. Once outside Quebec, Arnold wrote him seeking vital information 
about the number of troops in Quebec and what the general might expect 
from the Canadians and merchants in the city. The Indian guide who was 
to deliver this letter instead turned it over to the British authorities. 
Arnold’s surprise attack was thus thwarted and Mercier was arrested and 
detained aboard a sloop of war in the harbor. His arrest was protested by 
some of the English merchants, who were themselves suspected of disloyalty 
to Britain.
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78. MINOT, JONAS CLARK
Boston. Quebec. Merchant.
Commercial Activities: Settlement of accounts of (GALVIN) GAY and
MINOT were advertised in the Quebec Gazette, June 27,1765. On May 21, 
1767, an ad appeared announcing the sale of merchandise of J. C. Minot and 
Guillaume; on May 26, 1768, an advertisement for a granary or storehouse 
at Cape Diamond appeared; and on December 22, 1768, the sale of raisins 
was announced.
Political Activities; Minot dispatched the present of wheat sent by Quebec 
merchants to Boston in the fall of 1774 as a gesture of sympathy to them for 
the closing of the port, the result of the Boston Port Bill, one of the 
Intolerable Acts. Creighton claims that he was not of sufficient political 
importance in Quebec to be included in either of the two committees that 
organized to call for an assembly. Creighton is mistaken. Minot signed two 
petitions for an assembly in 1773. He also was one of the merchants 
represented by Cawthorne in 1766, when Cawthorne wrote a letter in the 
Quebec Gazette decrying the patronizing tone of a letter from London 
merchants with respect to the Stamp Act.
Other: He was a freemason, advertised to apply to him for tickets for the 
Feast of St. John, December 22, 1766. He signed the sale of property 
belonging to PIERRE HOULDS, JR. By writ of execution, Minot’s suit was 
advertised in the Gazette, April 23, 1767. He signed with others an address 
to Lieutenant Colonel VALENTINE JONES, 52nd regiment, at his departure, 
October 13, 1774.
Invasion: American. He was on Carleton’s list of twenty-nine traitors. In 
the fall of 1774, residents of the city of Quebec who sympathized with Boston 
when Britain closed its port, sent one thousand bushels of wheat to that city. 
Minot was the merchant who transmitted the wheat with a cordial letter to 
the Boston Committee of Donations.
79. OAKES, FORREST
England. Montreal. Merchant and fur trader. He came to Canada during the 
military occupation.
Commercial Activities: He was a partner of MACKENZIE and OAKES in 1761. 
He ventured to Michilimackinac, but was sued for debt in Montreal by Joseph 
Lamoureux, dit Saint-Germain, a guide hired in 1761. He was represented by 
LAWRENCE ERMATINGER, his brother-in-law, who became a partner of his
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from 1763 to 1766. From 1771 to 1773 Oakes was associated with CHARLES 
BOYER, and in 1774 they went into partnership with PETER PANGMAN. 
When that partnership ended, Oakes became one of the first partners who formed 
the North West Company. He died in 1783.
Invasion: Not known. He was in the west country carrying on the fur trade 
during the Revolution.
80. PAINTER, JOHN
England. Merchant, officeholder, militia officer. Arrived in Quebec in 1765.
Commercial Activities: Painter sold merchandise both wholesale and retail,
probably as an agent for a British firm. In 1776, he left the province for seven 
years. On his return he resumed his business and prospered.
Political Activities: There is no record of his involvement before 1783, when he 
supported trial by jury in commercial suits. He was appointed to a grand jury in 
1785, and after the Constitution Act of 1791, he supported ADAM 
LYMBURNER for a seat in the assembly.
Other: He was active in civic affairs. He served as a member of Trinity House 
of Quebec to improve navigation on the St. Lawrence. He set up a relief fund 
for pilots who were victims of accidents, had the first lighthouse built in 1809 and 
buoys installed. In 1809 he was one of seven delegates to set up an association, 
the precursor of the Committee of Trade, that would represent the interests of 
Quebec businessmen in dealing with political authorities. He was a member of 
the Fire Society, justice of peace in 1796, and lieutenant in the Quebec militia.
Invasion: Not known. He left the province during the American Revolution, 
1776-1783.
81. PANGMAN, PETER
Elizabeth, New Jersey. Fur trader. Little is known about his early life.
Commercial Activities: In 1767, Pangman was trading in Michilimackinac. 
In 1771, he formed a partnership with JOSEPH FULTON, FORREST 
OAKES, and CHARLES BOYER. Pangman tried unsuccessfully to ship furs 
through Hudson Bay, a route that was considerably cheaper than shipping 
through Michilimackinac and Montreal. By 1777 Pangman had moved 
farther west to the North Saskatchewan River at the mouth of the Sturgeon 
River, where Peter Pond had spent the winter. When Pangman’s earlier 
partnership ended in 1778, in order to reduce competition in the trade that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
389
was devastating everyone, Pangman joined a traders’ alliance, which included 
WILLIAM HOLMES, BOOTY GRAVES, ROBERT GRANT, and 
CHARLES McCORMICK. The Crees, maltreated by JOHN COLE, 
murdered Cole and one of Pangman’s men and evicted the traders from their 
camp. In 1779, Pangman and JOHN ROSS became partners and in 1780, 
they held one of sixteen shares in the new North West Company. When the 
North West Company reorganized in 1783-84, Pangman and Ross were not 
included. To compete with the NWC, Pangman, Ross and ALEXANDER 
MACKENZIE joined GREGORY, MacLEOD and Co. When Ross was killed 
by one of Pond’s men in 1786, the result of the fierce competition between 
the two companies, the two firms merged. Each of the partners, Pangman, 
Gregory, MacLeod, and Mackenzie held a share in the new company, 
increasing to two shares three years later. In 1790, Pangman traveled up the 
North Saskatchewan farther west than any white trader had been to that 
time. Pangman left the west in 1793 for the last time.
Other; Pangman retired in 1793, married, and purchased a seigneury near 
Montreal from JACOB JORDAN. He supported the building of the Scotch 
Presbyterian Church in Montreal.
Invasion; Not known. He was probably in the Saskatchewan country at the 
time.
82. PATERSON, ALEXANDER
Scotland. Montreal. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants living 
in Montreal, 1765.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and was accused 
of being a leader of the "cabal" for the repeal of the Quebec Act.
Invasion: British. Paterson was the only merchant to lose his life in defending 
the Market Gate at Montreal from an attack by Ethan Allen.
83. PATERSON, CHARLES 
Montreal. Fur trader.
Commercial Activities: In 1774 with James McGill, Paterson secured a license 
for five canoes, thirty-four men, and a cargo valued at £2,000 to go to the 
northwest. In September 1775 he met PETER POND, JOSEPH and THOMAS 
FROBISHER, ALEXANDER HENRY at Lake Winnipeg and wintered at Fort 
des Prairies along with HENRY, JAMES FINLAY, WILLIAM HOLMES, and 
CADOTTE.
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Political Activities: He signed the petition to the king for an assembly in January 
1774.
Invasion: Not involved. He was in the northwest.
84. POND, PETER
Milford, Connecticut. Army officer, fur trader, explorer, map maker, and 
writer. He fought in the Seven Years’ War, in 1750 received an officer’s 
commission, and joined Amherst’s forces for the taking of Montreal. After 
the conquest, Pond left for the West Indies, but when he returned he found 
that his father had left for Detroit to engage in the fur trade and his mother 
had died. He stayed in Milford to care for the family. Pond was not 
deterred from following in his father’s footsteps though he died in debt.
Commercial Activity: Pond, traded in the west for six years, from 1765 to 
1771. In 1771 he formed a partnership with FELIX GRAHAM, a New York 
merchant trading to Michilimackinac. Buying supplies from ISAAC TODD 
and JAMES McGILL, he ventured west beyond Lake Michigan to Green 
Bay, Wisconsin. He continued his trading to Prairie du Chien. He did so 
well, he decided to buy his partner out. He then formed another partnership 
with THOMAS WILLIAMS, that lasted until 1777. As the fur trade moved 
farther west, Grand Portage, then Fort Williams, replaced Michilimackinac 
as the trading center. GEORGE McBEATH became his next partner, taking 
over the trade between Montreal and Grand Portage, while Pond continued 
moving on. He wintered in the Saskatchewan area in 1776-77 and 1777-78. 
The Frobisher brothers and McTavish and Company, with whom McBeath 
was associated, had pooled their spare goods and put Pond in charge, 
instructing him to go into the Athabaska country. He wintered there in 
1778-79. This joint venture was perhaps the forerunner of the North West 
Company. The success of this venture in terms of the furs obtained brought 
others into the trade. In 1780-81 Pond wintered at Michilimackinac, where 
he entered into a new partnership with McBEATIl and BOOTY GRAVES. 
The next winter he spent with JEAN-ETIENNE WADDEN at Lac la Ronge 
(Saskatchewan) competing side by side. Each represented their respective 
houses; Pond the larger Frobisher organization, and Wadden, smaller houses 
such as FORREST OAKES and JOHN ROSS. The rivalry ended in 
Wadden’s death, and though Pond was charged, no record exists of any court 
case. In 1784 Pond was in Montreal; he had become a member of the Beaver 
Club. First he refused joining the North West Company, but later changed 
his mind. In 1786-87 Pond returned to the Athabaska country, where Ross 
had gone to compete with him. In a scuffle Ross was shot by one of Pond’s 
men. This resulted in the merger of the competing houses and the end of 
Pond’s fur trading career. Though he was not in the area where the murder
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had been committed, because of the earlier death of Wadden, Pond was 
forced to retire.
Other: Pond produced maps of the regions he explored and recorded 
invaluable information on which Alexander Mackenzie capitalized. As the 
first white man to explore the Athabaska country, Pond led the way to the 
discovery that linked the Mackenzie watershed with the rivers flowing into 
Hudson Bay. This turned out to be a more lasting contribution than his 
exploits in the fur trade, although his achievements in it led to what was 
described as the North West Company’s "new Eldorado." In 1790 Pond left 
Canada for the United States, hoping to gain recognition for his discoveries 




Scotland. Montreal. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants living 
in Montreal, 1765.
Commercial Activities: Along with his brother, WILLIAM, and THOMAS
PORTEOUS, he was a grain merchant and exporter.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly in 1770, 1773 and for 
repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
86. PRICE, BENJAMIN
England. Quebec. Merchant, justice of the peace, member of Quebec council, 
master of the court of Chancery. In 1761 he sent out from Plymouth, England, 
a ship laden primarily with his own goods, to Quebec. He followed a year later 
with more goods.
Commercial Activities: From what records there are, he seems to have operated 
independently. He engaged a "confidential clerk" to represent his business 
interests in Montreal.
Other: He was a reliable and prominent citizen. Murray appointed him to the 
council, as a justice of the peace, and a master of the court of Chancery. After 
the disastrous 1765 fire in Montreal, Adam Mabane and he were appointed 
commissioners to help the needy and make a report to Murray. The report called
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for more help and for stronger civil administration to cope with incompetence and 
some corruption on the part of junior officers. Price solicited funds for the 
victims of the fire in England as well. King George is said to have contributed. 
He must have been a landowner in the area around Lake Champlain, for Daniel 
Robertson and he seized 200 trees cut by Samuel McKay, claiming that they were 
cut on their land. Little more is known about Price. He must have died in 1768.
Invasion: Not applicable.
87. PRICE, JAMES
American. Montreal. Merchant, freeholder, on Murray’s list of Protestants,
1765.
Commercial Activities: Little is known about Price’s business. He was listed 
as having been a merchant before immigrating to Montreal. He had 
substantial landholdings and seems to have enjoyed some affluence. He and 
WILLIAM HAYWOOD, both Americans, were partners. On his list of 
twenty-nine traitors, Carleton listed Haywood and him as "Great Zealots, 
originally Barbers." A lawsuit was brought against them on May 5, 1777, by 
R. Morland.
Political Activities: He signed petitions for an assembly, 1773, and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1775. In 1766 he signed a notarized protest against a 
meeting called by the governor and council of only seigneurs who were 
members of the "noblesse." Price and others were barred from the meeting, 
which they declared caused dissension in the community between them and 
the "noblesse." He signed the ietter of welcome to Carleton on September 29,
1766. Price was a rebel sympathizer who actively tried to gain support of the 
merchant community in Montreal. He went as an unofficial delegate to the 
Second Continental Congress.
Invasion: American. During the invasion, Price served as Montgomery’s 
adviser and banker. When Montgomery arrived in Montreal, he dispatched 
Price to deal with the terms of a capitulation agreement. In 1776 he loaned 
the Americans £20,000. Price fled Montreal when the Americans retreated 
from Quebec. Price sought compensation in New York for losses suffered as 
a result of his aid to the American cause and in 1801 was granted 1,000 
acres, 500 in New York and another 500 in Ohio.
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88. PURSS, JOHN
Scotland. Montreal. Businessman, militia officer, officeholder. He arrived in 
Montreal at the time of the conquest.
Commercial Activities: In 1762 Purss went into partnership with James Johnston, 
buying and selling furs, seal oil, and products of the Saint Maurice Ironworks. 
In 1765 JEAN-BAPTISTE BOUCHETTE joined the firm to exploit a fishery and 
trading post probably in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In addition, they now held a 
share in the Ironworks. When Carleton decided the government could no longer 
afford to maintain the King’s Wharf, which was indispensable to the merchants, 
in 1770 Purss and Johnston secured a 30-year lease for five shillings annually. 
The firm also ventured into the distillery business with Johnston’s brother-in-law, 
HENRY TAYLOR during the 1780s. Taylor had discovered a method making 
beer from spruce, a product they widely exported. The partners also held shares 
in the Dorchester Bridge, and until Johnston’s death in 1800, they held rental 
properties which provided them with additional revenues. After Johnston’s death, 
Purss proceeded to divest himself of his properties in Quebec, but he acquired 
200 acres in Granby Township and another 200 acres in Milton Township.
Political Activities: Purss was active in political affairs. As Johnston’s partner, 
it was not surprising that he signed the petition for Murray’s recall in 1765 and 
the welcoming address to Governor Carleton in 1766. In 1772 he subscribed to 
an agreement with other merchants to voluntarily regulate the price of light gold 
coin. Not until 1784, however, did he petition for repeal of the Quebec Act. In 
1791 he supported demands for the elimination of the seigneurial right of lodes 
et ventes.
Other: He took an active part in Quebec’s public life, supporting the
establishment of the Quebec Fire Society, which offered its members fire 
insurance, and organized popular subscriptions to help victims.
Invasion: Not known.
89. ROSS, JOHN
_________________ Quebec. Fur trader.
Commercial Activities: Ross was a key figure in the exploitation of the
northwest. The first mention of him is in 1780, when Ross and Co. was listed 
as holding one share in a joint agreement with other companies and persons. 
This was the beginning of cooperative arrangements necessitated by the large 
capital needed for trade in the hostile northwest country. In 1780, license returns 
list Ross and PETER PANGMAN as having four canoes in the Athabasca 
country. In 1785 Ross and Pangman convinced JOHN GREGORY and
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NORMAND MacLEOD to join forces with them to form an opposition company 
to the North West Company. Rivalry was so intense between the two companies 
that Ross was killed, probably by one of Pond’s men. His death brought about 
a merger of the two companies, making the North West Company the most 
important company in Quebec.
Political Activities: Ross signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: Not known.
90. SCHINDLER, JOSEPH
Switzerland. Quebec and Montreal. He was an engineer of mathematical 
instruments, silversmith, merchant. Schindler arrived in Quebec in 1763. He 
occurred debts which the seigneur of Beauport, Antoine Juchereau Duchesnay, 
discharged. He married Genevieve Maranda at Quebec.
Commercial Activities: In November 1766, he switched from being a
mathematician to a silversmith, not an unrelated field since the training and 
instruments needed for making mathematical instruments are similar to those 
required by silversmiths. He took on several Canadian apprentices. He made 
trade silver, jewelry and trinkets for the Indian trade, although he also produced 
some church silver. In March 1775 he became agent for a merchant-voyageur 
named Monforton of Montreal and took four apprentices to Michilimackinac. In 
1776 he was charged with producing substandard silver hollowware, but a jury 
acquitted him. In 1777 he continued to carry on business with fur traders at 
Detroit. Although he remained active as a silversmith until his death in 1792, he 
also engaged in other trade. In 1784 he and CHRISTY CRAMER acknowledged 




Probably England. Quebec. Merchant, officeholder, militia officer, and 
landowner. He arrived in Quebec about August 1762. A disagreement with a 
Scottish sergeant led to the soldier’s armed assault on Scott. The incident 
probably reflected the strained relations between the military and the small 
community of merchants in Quebec. It also could have reflected the antagonism 
between Scots and English. Scott complained to Governor Murray, himself a 
Scot, only to be castigated for his "damned English arrogance."
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Commercial Activities: Little is known about his business activities.
Other: Scott served as attorney, controller of customs, and in 1800 he superseded 
Ainslie as collector of customs. He sided with Governor Carleton over the 
dispute with Ainslie over the collector’s jurisdiction and fee schedules. He 
enjoyed good standing in the community, was named curator of Carleton’s 
nephew’s estate, was a justice of the peace, commissioner of a committee to 
report on Jesuit estates, and a founding subscriber of the Quebec branch of the 
Agriculture Society. He lived on the Rue des Pauvres which, contrary to its 
name, had become the street of the wealthy. He was granted large tracts of land 
on Riviere Saint Charles from JOHN DRUMMOND, which included the elegant 
"villa" called Sans Soucie.
Invasion: England. Despite his feud with Ainslie, Scott served as a lieutenant 
in Ainslie’s company during the siege of Quebec in 1775-76.
92. SOLOMONS, EZEKIEL
England. New York. Montreal. Merchant and fur trader. Ezekiel and his 
cousin LUCIUS LEVY were in New York as early as 1755. During the Seven 
Years’ War, cousins CHAPMAN ABRAHAM, BENJAMEN LYON, and 
GERSHOM LEVY supplied the British army. The partners had financial 
support in England and were connected with an active fur trader in the 
Hudson Valley, Hyman Levy. Such strong backing gave them an advantage 
over other traders at the time. In 1760 Ezekiel and Levy moved from Albany 
to Montreal.
Commercial Activities: In 1761 Ezekiel was one of the first traders at
Michilimackinac, arriving there even before the British troops. While he was 
in Michilimackinac, Levy was at Fort Niagara. During Pontiac’s rebellion 
in 1763, four of the partners were captured and much of their supplies taken, 
but they were able to escape. Although they were able to make arrangements 
with some of their creditors to satisfy their debts, others would not. Since 
English bankruptcy laws did not apply in Quebec, they were prevented from 
going into bankruptcy, thereby losing £18,000. The brothers dissolved their 
partnership, but both continued in their fur trade and prospered.
Political Activities: He signed the welcome address to Carleton in September
1766.
Other; Ezekiel was a subscriber to the relief fund for sufferers in a fire on 
Sault au Matellot St. Quebec, November 28, 1793. He was a member of the 
Quebec Fire Society June 25, 1795, and founder of the first Jewish place of 
worship in Montreal.
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93. SOLOMONS, LUCIUS LEVY
England. New York. Montreal. Merchant and fur trader. See above, 
EZEKIEL SOLOMONS.
Commercial Activities: In addition to his activities as a fur trader (also see 
above), after the American Revolution, Levy traded other commodities such 
as barley, starch, hair powder, and snuff.
Political Activities: He signed a petition in 1773 requesting a legislative 
assembly for Quebec.
Other: He and his cousin, Ezekiel, were founders of the first Jewish place 
of worship in Montreal.
Invasion: American. He cooperated with Americans during occupation of 
Montreal, providing supplies to troops and establishing three hospitals. He 
remained after Americans were driven out, but was in great disfavor. The 
British turned him out of his house and threatened those who helped him. 
In 1784 he unsuccessfully petitioned Congress to reimburse him for his losses.
Solomons died in 1792. Property belonging to his vacant estate was 
advertised to be sold at public auction. There were prior claims on property 
purchased from him by SAMUEL BIRNIE and a notice of creditors of a 
dividend to be paid out from his estate.
94. SWIFT, JOHN WHITE
America. Quebec. Presumably a merchant, but no records have been found 
about his personal or commercial life.
Political Activities: Swift petitioned for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: American. Carleton named Swift as one of the twenty-nine
traitors in Quebec during the invasion.
95. TOD, JAMES
Probably Scotland. Quebec. Merchant, politician, militia officer and seigneur. 
He is recorded as being in Quebec as early as 1767, but he did not settle there 
until 1774, left for England in 1776, and returned in 1777.
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Commercial Activities: His early import business in Quebec was small and not 
too successful. In 1781 he began to diversify and with SIMON FRASER Sr., 
exported furs. In 1785 he became involved in the St. Lawrence fisheries along 
with WILLIAM GRANT, PETER STUART, and MATHEW and ADAM 
LYMBURNER. He continued to import and to sell assorted commodities 
including West Indian and European spirits, sugar, coffee, tobacco, Irish butter, 
soap, and vinegar. Tod suffered losses as a result of bankruptcies common at the 
time, but he was not in debt himself until 1788. From 1783 until 1789 he spent 
winters in London representing his own interests as well as serving as a trustee 
for other merchants with creditors and suppliers.
Political Activities: He did not become involved in political debates, but in 
London he tried to present the merchants’ concerns about trade regulations and 
joined with a mercantile lobby to secure the appointment of Guy Carleton to 
return as governor. In 1792 he was elected to the Assembly. He voted with the 
British minority, with the exception that he supported translation into French of 
matters introduced in English.
Other: He subscribed to the Agriculture Society and was a director of the Quebec 
Fire Society. He served in the Quebec Battalion of British Militia rising to the 
rank of captain in 1804.
Invasion: Not known.
96. TODD, ISAAC
Ireland. Montreal. Businessman, officeholder, militia officer, and landowner. 
Arrived in Canada shortly after the conquest.
Commercial Activities: Todd was considered a father figure in the fur trade 
community. He was established in business in Montreal in 1765. In 1767 he 
entered the fur trade, but suffered severe loss when his hired traders were killed 
by Indians. In 1769 he was associated with JAMES McGILL and the 
FROBISHER brothers, and suffered losses again when canoes were plundered by 
Indians at Rainy Lake (Ontario). A partnership with RICHARD McNEALL 
ended in 1772, when he and GEORGE McBEATH acted as suppliers for 
THOMAS CORRY and JOHN ASKIN at Michilimackinac. In 1773, Todd was 
in Michilimackinac with JAMES McGILL and PETER POND. He provided 
valuable information to Phyn and Ellice, for whom he served as agent in 1774.
Political Activities: Todd signed the petition to repeal the Quebec Act in 1774 
and was opposed to the Quebec Revenue Act of the same year. However, he 
dropped out of the Montreal Committee that was being pressured to join with the 
American rebels in April 1775.
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Other: Todd was active in Montreal’s public life. He served on its grand jury, 
was a member of the Scotch Presbyterial Church and of the Beaver Club.
Invasion: Not known. He was in the North West Company during the invasion.
97. TORRY, JOSEPH
New England. Montreal. Merchant. Torry was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants living in Montreal in 1765. He was described as a merchant prior 
to immigrating to Montreal.
Commercial Activities: There are no records to indicate what his business 
was; but he is listed in the land court records as owning property.
Political Activities; Torry signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion; American. Torry and his two brothers, JOHN and WILLIAM, 
were on Carleton’s list of twenty-nine traitors.
98. WADDEN, JEAN ETIENNE
Holland. Montreal. Fur trader.
Commercial Activities: Etienne was granted a license in 1773 to take two
canoes, sixteen men, and a cargo valued at £750. In 1774 he signed a license for 
Joseph LeClair to take two canoes and thirteen men to go to Grand Portage and 
to winter in the north. In 1775 he secured a license for two canoes and fifteen 
men; in 1777, for three canoes. Wadden was believed to be one of the traders 
in 1778 to pool their stock to send PETER POND to the Athabasca country. In 
1778 his license to take out three canoes was guaranteed by R. DOBIE and J. 
McKINDLAY. Wadden and Co. with one share, participated in the "nine party 
agreement" in 1779, renewed in 1780 and discontinued in 1782. The agreement 
was an effort to counter the rivalry that was killing the trade and to spread the 
risks. Wadden wintered in the Churchill River area in 1779-80. In 1782 he was 
killed. News of his death was believed to be the cause of the dissolution of the 
amalgamation. In addition to his activities as a fur trader, Wadden is listed as 
applying for a license to sell spirits in Montreal in 1771 and 1772. JOHN 
DALGLISH and JAMES WOOD gave him a character reference.
Political Activities: Wadden signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for 
repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
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Invasion: Not known. Like other fur traders, Wadden was in the northwest 
during the invasion.
99. WALKER, THOMAS
England. Boston. Montreal. Merchant, landowner, and local official.
Commercial Activities: Walker’s political life overshadowed his commercial 
enterprises. Prior to arriving in Montreal, he must have been a prominent 
member of the mercantile community in Boston for he is listed as a member 
of the Society for Encouraging Trade and Commerce within the Province of 
the Massachusetts Bay. In Montreal, he engaged in the fur trade. He owned 
land in L’Assumption, adjacent to Montreal, and produced wheat.
Political Activities: Walker was an aggressive proponent for British rights. 
He was opposed to billeting of soldiers in private homes, corvees and other 
army regulations over the civilian population. Appointed by Murray, he 
served on the first Grand Jury in Montreal in 1764 and signed the 
presentment calling for larger powers of the Grand Jury in the absence of an 
assembly. An incident called "Walker’s Ear," described in Chapter 3, 
galvanized the merchant community into recalling for Murray’s recall. Their 
campaign succeeded; Walker was reinstated as a justice and Murray was 
recalled. In 1773 Walker and ZACHARY MACAULAY travelled to London 
to gain support for the merchants’ petition for an assembly. In 1774 Walker 
was one of the leaders opposing the Quebec Act.
Invasion: American. Walker became one of the chief agitators to try to 
enlist the merchants in the American rebellion. For these activities, he was 
captured and imprisoned by Carleton before Montreal surrendered to the 
rebels. Released, he continued his pro-American activities until the failed 
invasion in 1776. He returned to Boston. After the war he tried to recoup 
some of the money that he had loaned and to be compensated far the 
property he lost on behalf of the Americans. In 1785 he is known to have 
visited PIERRE DU CALVET in London. He is believed to have died in 
Boston in 1788. His widow was granted 2,000 acres in Ohio in a tract of 
land appropriated for refugees by Congress in 1801.
100. WELLES, JOHN
___________. Quebec. Merchant. There is some confusion in the records
between John Welles in Quebec and possibly another John Wells in Montreal. 
They do not appear to be the same person.
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Commercial Activities: In 1766 Welles formed a partnership with GEORGE 
ALLSOPP and SAMUEL JACOBS, JACOBS, WELLES & Co., to exploit 
the potash works in Lower Town, Quebec, at the former king’s forges, which 
they leased from the Crown. Welles corresponded with Sir William Johnson 
to seek advice on how to produce potash. Although a simple process, 
according to Johnson whose endeavors were highly successful, Welles was a 
victim of an unscrupulous person, and the enterprise failed in 1772. In 1766 
Welles signed an agreement with other Quebec merchants to self-reguiate the 
price of light gold coin that flooded the province.
Political Activities: Wells signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for 
repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
Invasion: American. Welles fled with the Americans who were vacating 
Quebec. Carleton says in his list of twenty-nine traitors that Welles was a 
"sort of secy, to Wooster." Stanley confirms the fact that Welles left Quebec, 
but he spells the name with an "e."
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MERCHANTS FOR WHOM THERE IS INSUFFICIENT DATA
1. AITKIN, JOHN
Aitkin applied for a license to sell spirits. His references were JOHN ROSS, 
SIMON FRASER, Jr., and JAMES SINCLAIR. He was a reference for 
GEORGE MUNRO, who applied for a license to "retail spirits out of doors." He 
signed petitions for an assembly in 1770 and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 
1774. He was also one of thirty-eight merchants that Joseph Cawthome spoke 
for in his letter to the London merchants, published in the Quebec Gazette, 
July 28, 1776, in which Cawthome defends those who rebelled against the Stamp 
Act.
2. APTHORP, ROBERT
The only mention of him is that he took out a bond for leaving the province on 
February 10, 1765, secured by Hugh Finlay.
3. BARRON, THOMAS
Barron signed the protest of Montreal merchants against a closed meeting of 
seigneurs representing only the "noblesse" called by Governor Murray and the 
council, March 1766.
4. BAYARD, N.
Quebec. Merchant. Bayard joined other merchants to self-regulate the price of 
light gold coin that was imported into the province, June 12, 1772. He signed 
petitions for an assembly in 1770, 1773 and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
5. BLACKWOOD, JOHN
Merchant, seigneur. Little is known about him. He married Charles Grant’s 
widow in 1793, thus getting hold of Grant’s assets. He made remonstrances to 
Carleton about the administration of justice and complained about improper 
preferences given to Alexander Grant to trade on Lake Ontario and Erie.
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6. BLAKE, JAMES
He was a subscriber for THOMAS PETERS, Montreal, to sell liquor, March 3,
1773. He petitioned for an assembly, 1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act in
1774.
7. BOONE, HENRY
Merchant. The only reference to Henry Boone, other than his signing petitions 
for an assembly in November and December 1773, is that he recommended 
DESCHARAHT and MARCHAND for a liquor license.
8. BORREL, JOSEPH
Merchant. Montreal. He recommended JEAN ETIENNE WADDEN for a liquor 
license, March 21, 1772. He signed the petition for repeal of the Quebec Act, 
December 1774.
9. BOSTWICK, WILLIAM
England. Montreal. Formerly a hatter, turned merchant. On Murray’s list of 
Protestants, 1765.
10. BRAYSHAW, THOMAS
England. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
11. BROWN, NICHOLAS
Montreal. Merchant. Brown petitioned for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774.
12. BURCH, THOMAS
England. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
13. CAMPBELL, ALEXANDER
Scotland. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
14. CHINN, JOHN
England. Montreal. Merchant. JOHN HOWARD formed a trading partnership 
with John or Edward Chinn, or both. Formed partnership with ALEXANDER 
HENRY at Sault Ste. Marie in 1778.
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15. CLUINIE, DAVID
Scotland. Montreal. Merchant. He was on the list of Protestants in Montreal, 
1765. Little is known about him. He applied for an exit bond, which was 
secured by JOHN MELVIN and ZACHARY MACAULAY.
16. COMTE, BENJAMIN
Merchant. Partner with PIERRE CARDINAL. In 1763 gave JEAN ORILLAT 
60,000 livres to invest in fur trade at LaBaye (Green Bay, Wisconsin). He signed 
the petition of Quebec traders to the King calling for Murray’s recall, April 1765. 
Little else is known about him.
17. CROSIER, JOHN
Ireland. Merchant. He was on the list of Protestants in Montreal, 1765.
18. DANSER, JOHN
Justice of the peace who signed the Grand Jury presentment in 1764. He signed 
petitions calling for an assembly and Murray’s recall in 1765. In July 1766 he 
was one of 38 merchants who were represented by Joseph Cawthome in 
responding to a letter by London merchants. The merchants had chastised the 
rebellious acts of the merchants against the Stamp Act. Cawthome defended such 
actions.
19. DAVIDSON, ARTHUR
He signed a petition calling for an assembly in December 1773.
20. DAVISON, ALEXANDER
Prosperous farmer. He is the father of George and Alexander, Jr.
21. DAVISON, ALEXANDER, JR.
He signed petitions calling for an assembly, November and December 1773.
22. DESAULLES, JONAS
Switzerland. Merchant. Chambly. He was on the list of Murray’s Protestants 
in Montreal, 1765. He protested the closed meeting in Montreal of seigneurs of 
the "noblesse" called by Murray and the council in March 1766.
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23. DESOULAVY, DANIEL
Switzerland. Merchant. Chambly. He was on the list of Murray’s Protestants,
1765.
24. DOIG, JAMES
Montreal. He petitioned for an assembly, and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 
1774.
25. DUNCAN, SAMUEL
Little h  known about him, but he was a member of the Grand Jury in 1764 and 
signed the presentment against Murray for various acts not in accordance with the 
Proclamation of 1763. He also signed the protest against Murray’s calling a 
closed meeting of seigneurs representing the "noblesse" in Montreal in March
1766. He is listed as giving security (£1,000) for JOHN BELLAR, 
November 11, 1765.
26. DUNN, HENRY
Innkeeper. Quebec. He petitioned to sell liquor, Quebec, 1774. He was the 
partner of JOHN McCORD and signed the petition calling for repeal of the 
Quebec Act, 1774. Otherwise, little is known about him.
27. ENGELKE, JOHN H.
Germany. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
28. FORSYTHE, JOHN
Partner with ELLICE, also with JAMES JOHNSON and GREGORY 
McGREGOR, 1774.
29. FRASER, ALEXANDER
He petitioned for an assembly in 1770 and 1773.
30. FRASER, HUGH
Alehouse, April 7, 1772. Sponsors: JAMES SINCLAIR, JAMES MUNRO, 
JOHN FRASER, DUNCAN MUNRO, and CHARLES HAY.
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31. FRASER, SIMON, JR.
He signed petitions for a general assembly in 1770 and 1773.
32. FULTON, GEORGE
Justice of the peace. He signed presentment of the Grand Jury in 1764 and the 
petition for Murray’s recall in April 1765.
33. GEDDES, DAVID
Agent for JAMES JOHNSTON in West Indies 1772. He signed the petition for 
repeal of the Quebec Act, 1774.
34. GORDON, JAMES
Mentioned in reference to JAMES GLENIE in a joint proposal with Glenie for 
land. He signed petition calling for an assembly in 1773.
35. GRANT, ALEXANDER.
Scotland. He is the brother of Robert and William.
36. GRANT, JOHN
Scotland. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
37. GRANT, JOHN
Scotland. Merchant. Sorrel. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765. In 
1763 it is believed that he had a store at St. Ours and competed for the grain 
market with Samuel Jacobs and others.
38. GRANT, ROBERT
Scotland. Merchant. He was the brother of William and Alexander.
39. GRAY, JOHN
Grey was an agent for the London firm of Alexander, Robert and William Grant, 
suppliers for the Navy at Quebec. In 1762, with partners THOMAS DUNN and 
others, he obtained a trading lease from Governor Murray to the king’s post.
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40. GRAY, ROBERT ISAAC DAY
He signed a petition calling for an assembly in 1773.
41. GREGORY, GEORGE
Gave exit bond for Mary Hutchinson.
42. HACY, JOHN
New England. Merchant. St. Lewis.
43. HART, MOSES
He is the brother of Aaron. ISAAC LEVY and HIRAM MEYERS sponsored his 
exit bond of £200 on October 13, 1768.
44. HAY, ALEXANDER
Montreal. On March 27, 1773, he recommended PETER ARNOLDI for a liquor 
license in Montreal. He signed petitions for assembly, 1773, and repeal of the 
Quebec Act in 1774.
45. HAYS, JOHN
He formed a distillery company with BENJAMIN PRICE and SAMUEL 
JACOBS.
46. HOLMES, SAMUEL
Ireland. Merchant. Montreal. He was on the list of Protestants, 1765. Holmes 
was one of the protesters against a closed meeting held on March 3, 1766 at the 
Court House in Montreal. The meeting was called by the governor and council, 
and included only seigneurs of the "noblesse." He signed a petition for repeal of 
the Quebec Act in 1774.
47. HUNTLEY, RICHARD
Montreal. He signed petitions for an assembly, 1773.
48. ISCENHENT, TOBIAS
Germany. Sutler. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 
1765.
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49. JENKINS, GEORGE
He petitioned for an assembly, 1773 and repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
50. KENNEDY, JOHN
Ireland. Merchant. Vaudrieul. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
51. KING, GEORGE
Merchant. Montreal. He purchased share in Montreal Distillery Company. 
JOHN BONDFIELD recommended him for a liquor license in 1773. He 
petitioned for an assembly in 1770 and 1773 and for repeal of the Quebec Act in
1774.
52. KING, GEORGE
Merchant. Quebec. He and GEORGE CHAPIN rented a house from JAMES 
HANNA.
53. KNAGGS, GEORGE
England. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
54. KNIPE, FRANCIS NOBLE
England. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765. 
He was a member of Grand Jury in 1764.
55. LAING, WILLIAM
He petitioned for an assembly, 1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
56. LE QUEEN, JOHN
Guernsey. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants in 
Montreal, 1765.
57. LESSEY, MATTHEW
Lessey was one of the protesters against a closed meeting called for March 3, 
1766, in Montreal by the governor and council of seigneurs representing only the 
"noblesse."
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58. LEVY, ISAAC
He gave security of £200 for an exit bond for Moses Hart on October 13, 1768.
59. LILLY, JOHN
Scotland. Clerk. Montreal. He was on list of Protestants, 1765. He petitioned 
for an assembly, 1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
60. LYMBURNER, ADAM
1778 - With WILLIAM LINDSAY was Quebec agent for London Underwriters. 
He petitioned for an assembly, 1773.
61. LYMBURNER, JOHN
Member of Grand Jury, 1764, who signed presentment October 1764.
62. LYND, DAVID
Attorney for the firm of Brooks Watson and Company. One of nine partners 
including Gray, who obtained letter patent for a toll bridge over the St. Charles 
River. He signed a petition for assembly, 1773.
63. MACKENZIE, ALEXANDER 
Quebec merchant. Fur trader.
64. MARTIN, ALEXANDER
He petitioned for assembly in 1770 and 1773.
65. MATHER, SAMUEL
New England. Commissary. Merchant. Sorrel. He was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants in 1765.
66. MCCARTY, WILLIAM
New England. Clerk. Montreal. He was on the list of Protestants, 1765. He 
petitioned for an assembly, 1773.
67. McCRACKEN, WILLIAM
Ireland. Merchant. Montreal. He was on the list of Protestants, 1765.
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68. McFARLING, PETER
Scotland. Taylor. Montreal. Freeholder. He was on the list of Protestants, 
1765. He recommended Thomas Peter for a liquor license on March 11, 1773. 
He petitioned for an assembly, 1773 and repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
69. McGREGOR, GREGORY
Fur merchant. McLeod established himself as a trader at Detroit in partnership 
with McGregor.
70. McKAY, SAMUEL
In a deal with MOSES HAZEN, he cut trees on Benjamin Price and Daniel 
Robertson’s properties. Two-hundred logs seized by Price and Robertson.
71. McKILLIP, DANIEL
Ireland. Innholder. La Prairie. Freeholder. He was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants, 1765. He petitioned for an assembly, 1773.
72. McLEAN, NEIL
Scotland. Merchant. Point Claire. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 
1765. One of original "habitants." He did not sign petitions.
73. McNEALL, RICHARD 
Merchant. Montreal.
Partner, ISAAC TODD, terminated in . Recommended ALEXANDER
HENRY for a liquor license, June 16, 1774.
74. McRANDALL, GILBERT
_________________ . Quebec. Merchant. Member of 1764 Grand Jury.
He applied for a license to sell "spirits" and was recommended by JAMES 
SINCLAIR, JAMES HANNA, and JOHN ROSS.
McRandall was one of the members of the Grand Jury that signed the presentment 
calling for greater powers for the Jury.
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75. MEASAM, GEORGE
Montreal. Merchant. He signed the petition for Murray’s recall in 1765, for an 
assembly in 1773, and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774. He also joined with 
other merchants to self-regulate the price of light gold coin that had flooded the 
province in June 1772.
76. MELVIN, J.
He petitioned for an assembly, 1773 and repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
77. MEREDITH, RANDLE
He petitioned for an assembly, 1773 and repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
78. MEYERS, HYAM
Merchant who lived in Montreal from 1760 to 1774. In 1778 when in London 
in behalf of the Montreal congregate, he hired Jacob Cohen to serve as minister.
79. MOORE, STEPHEN
Moore was established as a merchant in the retail business in Quebec soon after 
the conquest. In 1763 Hugh Finlay became a partner. They sold a wide range 
of goods, but by 1765, deeply in debt and unable to collect from those who owed 
them money, they had to turn the business over to their creditors.
80. MORRISON, EDWARD
Ireland. Merchant. Vaudrieul. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
81. MORRISON, JAMES
Ireland. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765. 
Bond secured by Edward Harrison in his behalf, April 6, 1769. Recommended 
Samuel Holmes and John Gorbrand Beck for liquor license, April 12, 1773. He 
signed a petition for assembly, 1773 and for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
82. MUNRO, DUNCAN
Merchant. He is listed as a partner of RALPH GRAY. Little else is known 
about him except that he recommended ARMAND PRIMONT for a liquor 
license, August 27, 1773. He signed petitions for assembly, 1773.
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83. MURRAY, WILLIAM
Ireland. Sergeant, innholder. On list of Protestants, 1765. He signed petitions 
for assembly, 1773 and repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774,
84. NEAGLE, JOHN
Petitioned for a liquor license, Montreal, June 6, 1774. He petitioned for an 
assembly, 1773 for repeal of the Quebec Act in 1774.
85. NIELSON, THOMAS
England. Merchant. Chambly. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
86. PATERSON, WILLIAM
Ireland. Sutler. Merchant. Montreal.
87. RITCHIE, HUGH
Mentioned along with his tailoring partner, Ferguson as o w in g  Ralph Gray.
88. ROBERTSON, JAMES
Scotland. Merchant. St. John. Freeholder. He was on Murray’s list of 
Protestants, 1765.
89. STENHOUSE, JOHN
Scotland. Merchant. Freeholder. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants in 
1765. Listed as one of the protesters in March 1766 against a closed meeting 
called by the governor and council of only seigneurs of the "noblesse."
90. STEWART, JAMES
Partners: He was in the potash business with SAMUEL JACOBS and GEORGE 
ALLSOPP.
91. TAYLOR, HENRY
Nephew of James Johnston. He signed the petition for an assembly in 1770.
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92. THOMPSON, JOHN
He was a witness to a notarized protest against a closed meeting held in Montreal 
on March 3, 1766. The meeting was called by Murray and the council, and was 
restricted to only seigneurs of the "noblesse."
93. VANDER HAYDEN, JACOB
New York. Montreal. Merchant. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants living 
in Montreal in 1765. He signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal 
of the Quebec Act in 1774. He probably was related to Richard Vander Heyden, 
an Albany trader who bought trade goods in London for Montreal merchants. He 
recommended JOHN GORBRAND BECK in his application on May 21, 1772, 
to sell spirits as an honest man of sober life and good behavior.
94. WADE, MATHER
Ireland. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765. 
Wade was one of the protesters against a closed meeting held at the Court House 
in Montreal on March 3, 1766. The meeting was called by Murray and the 
council and was restricted only to seigneurs representing the "noblesse."
95. WALKER, THOMAS, JR.
England. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765.
96. WHITE, JAMES DYER
He was a competitor to WILLIAM DAVIDSON, along with WILLIAM HAZEN, 
in the timber industry.
He was reputed to be one of the monopolists of the St. John’s fur trade prior to 
the American Revolution and accused of viewing the "appearance of Jadis as an 
act of effrontery." Presumably was in the Fort Howard area when Tomach, the 
Malachite chief, stopped the threatened assault on the British deputy Indian agent.
97. WILLIAMS, JENKINS
He was a testifying witness in defense of Captain Blais and his son as being the 
"only persons in the parish who were plundered by both Bostonians and rebel 
Canadians," thereby allowing father and son to retain positions in militia. He 
was a member of a commission appointed by governor, along with Gabriel-Elzear 
Tashereau and Francois Baby, to investigate the extent and nature of American 
collaboration in the Quebec region.
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98. WILLOCKS, ROBERT
Mentioned in connection with Joseph Willcocks (Wilcox) as being the second son 
of Robert. Joseph was bom in Ireland in 1773, didn’t leave until 1799—doubtful 
that Robert was relevant.
99. WIOR, WILLIAM
England. Commissary. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 
1765.
100. WOOLSEY, ROBERT
Woolsey signed petitions for an assembly in 1773 and for repeal of the Quebec 
Act in 1774.
101. YOUNG, GEORGE EDMA
Scotland. Merchant. Montreal. He was on Murray’s list of Protestants, 1765. 
Young was one of the protesters of a closed meeting held at the Court House in 
Montreal on March 3, 1766. The meeting was called by the governor and 
council and was only for seigneurs of the "noblesse."
In partnership with CLAUDE JEAN-BAPTISTE CHARBOILLEZ, but probably 
not until 1781.
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